Ukraine’s cautious strategy towards Belarus

Up to 2020 Ukraine-Belarus relations were experiencing a positive trend made of a growing political and economic cooperation. Belarusian protests have changed the situation. The two countries have experienced several tensions. Yet, trade between Ukraine and Belarus seems to continue as in the past. Furthermore, Ukraine has only partially joined EU sanctions against Belarus. It thus appears that Ukraine is pursuing its own strategy towards Belarus, shaped by its own economic and security interests. In the region, Ukraine symbolises the opposite of what Belarus is, and Lukashenko is depicting it as its main enemy, yet Kyiv seems to pursue a policy that is voted to maximum caution and is, at times, benevolent towards Lukashenko. Ukraine has done the bare minimum to align itself to the EU and its trade with Belarus seems to continue undisturbed.

5 years of positive relations ruined in 4 months? 

Belarus and Ukraine are of great strategic, economic and symbolic importance for each other. They share 1,239 km of common border. The border is loosely guarded, and for Ukraine, especially after 2014, it became crucial to keep it secured, through good neighbourly relations. An excessive Belarusian alignment to Russia (or its potential annexation or integration) would mean an unsustainable position for Ukraine. For Belarus, it has been convenient having a safe southern border and good relations with Ukraine to counterbalance the Russian influence. After 2014, such shared strategic objective has brought the countries closer together, with Belarus demonstrating an increasing anti-Russian and pro-sovereignty rhetorics and foreign policy which culminated in July’s border tensions with Russia.

Ukraine is (if not counting the EU as a single entity) Belarus’ second trade partner, being the destination of around 13% of Minsk’s exports and the 4th country of origin of Belarusian imports (4,26%). From a Ukrainian perspective, Belarus is the 4th country origin of domestic imports (6% of their total), but only its 11th export destination country (3,11%). Despite suffering a drawback after 2014, especially due Russian recession effects on Belarusian economy, the trade relationship between the two countries have been quite successful. After 2015 the trade volume between the two countries has steadily grown, with a yearly 13,5% growth average. The two countries worked together towards this result. For example, Belarusian enterprises participated in Ukrainian regional economic fora concluding numerous contracts. In addition, since 2018 the two countries established a yearly Forum of Regions of Belarus and Ukraine to enhance economic and political cooperation between their local authorities.

Finally, they have a great symbolic meaning for each other. Traditionally for the Belarusian government, as well as many Belarusians, Ukraine has been long a symbol of “dangers” of democratisation and/or liberalization. Over the past years, references to Ukraine’s disorders, corruption or poverty have been (and are) a commonplace for Lukashenko. On the contrary, traditionally Belarus has not been negatively perceived negatively; it has been long perceived among Ukrainians as an outpost of the economic growth, security and wellbeing that a “strong government” can guarantee. Only last year Lukashenko beat Merkel as the most popular foreign politician among Ukrainians. Despite this today, Ukraine stands as an example of vibrant liberal democracy, it became an example of a potentially different path, while Belarus is perceived as stuck in an authoritarian conundrum. These symbolic differences were already in place, but they did not put a strain in their relations also thanks to the common Russian threat. 

With the 2020 Belarusian protests, these symbolic differences exploded and the Belarusian foreign policy pivot towards Moscow made impossible any compromise. Today, indeed, Lukashenko continues to reference the Ukrainian “Maidan” as a negative event, while the Belarusian State Agency publishes on weekly basis stories on protests and instability in Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine has been accused of aiding the protesters, ordering the “suffocation of Belarus” and being the origin of a weapons smuggling aimed at arming a domestic terrorist group. On its part, already in August Ukraine refused to recognize the results of the Belarusian elections and has joined the EU sanctions against Belarus.

A diplomatic standoff  

Lukashenko’s complete control of the country and its anti-Russian stance were the main factors allowing for Ukrainian-Belarusian good relations. However, now Belarus is shaken by large protests that demonstrated a widespread disenchantment towards Lukashenko’s leadership and his need for external support in an environment characterized by the Western solidarity towards the protesters, brought him back to a way more pro-Russian rhetorics and policy.

Kyiv, to continue receiving the EU support, needs to demonstrate its commitment to its values and geopolitical posture. This created a strong incentive to take an open anti-Lukashenko stance following the example of its new allies.  

All of this translated in Ukraine not recognizing the official results of Belarusian elections, breaking diplomatic contacts with Minsk and joining the EU sanctions against it. The sanctions that Ukraine joined consist of a travel ban and assets freeze against 40 Belarusian officials from the Interior Ministry, the Central Election Commission (CEC), the Okrestina detention Centre in Minsk and the State Security Committee. On its side, Belarus has abandoned any friendly rhetorics and it has accused Kyiv of having an operative centre dedicated to subverting the Belarusian state, arming a domestic terrorist group under the control of a local millionaire and former dissident and finally ordering to “suffocate the country”.

Sergiy Rudenko suggests that Making Ukraine an enemy is necessary for Lukashenko to keep reinforcing the myth of external involvement and keep compact his supporters. This also allows disqualifying any Ukrainian role to mediate between the Belarusian government and the opposition, thus avoiding that Kyiv manages to obtain any significant regional role at the expense of Russian influence. It is indeed Lavrov, the Russian MFA, that fed Lukashenko with the information of 200 Ukrainian extremists active on the Belarusian soil in order to organise “radical actions” in the country. Lukashenko right away used the information for its domestic political purposes. 

However, a further worsening of the relations could be disastrous for both countries on a security and economic level. Ukraine’s security partially depends on Lukashenko’s promise of a safe (and non-Russian) common border. They are also fundamental economic partners for each other. It seems that a real worsening of their relations is not in the interest of both countries. In other terms, Ukraine is not completely interested in a further destabilization that could bring to a direct (annexation) or indirect (electoral victory of a pro-Russian party) control of its northern neighbour by Russia.

A “controlled conflict” 

Despite Belarus is pursuing a strongly confrontational stance towards Ukraine, it is Minsk’s economy that would be the most hard-hit. The trade between the two countries, which in 2019 totalled 5,8 billion USD, it is characterized by a strong Belarusian surplus, which amounts to 2,5 billion USD. This is a figure of fundamental importance for Belarus, as it traditionally struggles with a structural trade deficit that in 2019 amounted to 6,41 billion USD. For Belarus, Ukraine has been a promising partner as not only it absorbed an important share of its exports (12,54%), but it was also a figure that has steadily grown in the last 4 years (8% average growth).

For Ukraine, Belarus constitutes an important partner, especially for its metal and mining sector, which produces every 8th hryvnia of the Ukrainian GDP. Indeed, despite the vocal attacks, and the border issue with the Hasidic Jews in September, Ukraine did not join the new rounds of EU sanctions towards Belarus, including the ones that target directly Lukashenko. Dmytro Kuleba, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that he “did not see the fundamental need for economic sanctions towards the country”. 

Such a statement underlines a peculiar approach towards Belarus, that differentiates itself from the one pursued by the Western European partners. It is also an approach that directly contradicts what has been asked and suggested by the leader of the Belarusian opposition, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya. She advocated for economic sanctions towards the main Belarusian SOEs. Lukashenko’s resilience can be partially explained by the control of heavy industry SOEs that employ the majority of the country’s population. The Belarusian industrial SOEs, as well its entire economic system, are actively propped up by Russia, but also, indirectly, by “business like usual” relations with trade partners as the UK, Germany, Poland, and Ukraine. Indeed, in December the EU implemented a new round of sanctions targeting also specific companies. Again, Ukraine did not join.

 The Belarusian National Press Agency BelTa does not depict Ukraine exclusively as an enemy as some of the official discourse does, but also as a fundamental economic partner importing products from some of the most important SOEs. Indeed, between November and December, the Burdyansky and the Mokrianski Stone Quarry have received 6 BELAZ-7547. The 10th of December the Belarusian agricultural machinery enterprise Amkdor, sold for the first time in Ukraine its newest model Amkodor 2551. On the 20th of October, the Belarusian MAZ gave 57 buses to Kyiv city transport. This year Ukraine has also been the largest importer of Belarusian potatoes.

Belaz and MAZ have experienced in August some strikes. Yet, now the factories are working to deliver new machinery to their clients and the attempt to involve workers in the protests seems to be both of limited success and one of the main reasons of their failure in toppling Lukashenko. 

Ukraine has imposed in December a 16,08% duty on Belarusian steel rebars, however, this is unconnected with the current political events and part of an older rogue between the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian steel producers that dates back to 2019 first measures against Belarusian dumping practices in the Ukrainian steel market. This will probably have only a limited effect on the Ukrainian rebar imports from Belarus, which have been steadily growing in the last few years.

For now, between the sanctions, accusations, and aggressive tones characterizing the rhetorics between the two countries, Ukraine has limited its activities to the bare minimum alignment to the EU line towards Belarus. Current contracts (and probably future) contracts will be unaffected by the events.   

This should not come as a surprise. The symbolic difference is big, but as in the past, in front of the Russian threat and other concrete interests, it was put aside to pursue common aims, the same is (partially) done today. 

Indeed, Ukraine has no real interest in impoverishing its neighbour or not favour a “gradual” and “disciplined” transition like the one that Russia is now pushing for. Destabilising the Belarusian economy and eventually escalate even more the conflict is not in the Ukrainian interest, Lukashenko remains (it will be seen for how long) a guarantee for its northern border. Tikhanouskaya is right in pointing out how these SOEs are fundamental in allowing the government to stay in place, but it is also true that the Russian government has shown readiness to support the Belarusian economic system. Losing non-Russian partners will probably only produce an increased dependency from Russia and thus less and fewer margins of action for independent action by Belarusian officials that sooner or later could look for an alternative to Russia. Whatever can limit the increase of Russian influence over its northern neighbour is still in Kyiv’s interest. 

Furthermore, the economic backlash of the pandemic makes it highly undesirable for Ukraine to lose such a trade partner as Belarus. Furthermore, in Belarus the situation is not as straightforward as it can seem, as noted by several observers, Russia is helping Lukashenko aiming at creating the margins for a transition that would produce a (relative) liberalization advantaging Moscow. This means a greater parliamentary role and economic freedom that would advantage pro-Russian forces and Belarus asset-stripping by Russian businesses. On the other side, Lukashenko is trying his transition path, led by himself and his loyal élite, which has its first step in the “All-Belarusian People’s Congress”. When a few days ago Lukashenko’s statement that the convocation of the Congress (11-12 February 2021) does not respond to the pressure of foreign partners, but only to the necessities of the Belarusian People, was directed more to Moscow than the West. Lukashenko is pursuing a new constitutional reform that instead of giving some of the presidential powers to the National Assembly, as originally planned, constitutionalises the All-Belarusian People’s Congress. This means that some of the power will be given not to an institution with Party representatives, but to a social-corporatist body,[1] where mostly labour representatives from SOEs and state Trade Unions could guarantee support for the President. After all, the Congress was called by the President for the first time in 1996, during the conflict with the Parliament, as an alternative to the latter. It allowed Lukashenko to go around the Parliamentary opposition and legitimise itself with a grassroots-corporative Assembly, today the same manoeuvre is attempted. This is not what Russia wants, and it is becoming more and more impatient with this “Lukashenko’s way”.

Values aside, it is understandable that Ukraine could be worried by a Russian-led transition in Belarus or a destabilization that could lead to Moscow’s activism in the country. Moscow’s unsatisfaction with Lukashenko’s transition strategy could lead to further pressure, leaving Ukraine carefully observing. The Ukrainian priority is avoiding Russian divisions across the Northern border. Kyiv is following a wise and cautious policy towards Belarus. Its refusal to follow the EU in directly sanctioning Lukashenko, could demonstrate its will to keep open communication channels, remain a viable interlocutor for both the government and the opposition and a partner for the entire country. If Kyiv is really rooting for a Lukashenko's transition option is hard to say, but it remains clear that looking at the vital interests of the Ukrainian People, it could be not the worst option.

The diplomatic standoff between Ukraine and Belarus covers a reality made of continued trade and contacts, a relation that at the current stage has still important possibilities for future mediation and cooperation. Further Belarusian actions impairing Kyiv’s security or increased pressure from Brussels could change Kyiv’s course. However, Ukrainian ambiguity has been in place since the beginning and it is likely to stay. The hostile tones between the two countries hide more complicated relations, strategies, and interdependencies, that force Ukraine to cautiousness. 

[1] The representation is not based on a “political-territorial” principle like it happens with electoral districts, but on a “production principle”. People are elected in the labour collectives of their enterprises and the institution hosts up to 5000 representatives, who discuss for a few days under the supervision of the President of the Republic. According to Karbalevich, this is part of an authoritarian “framework, in the form of vertically subordinate labor collectives headed by managers who have proved their loyalty to the president, makes society surprisingly consolidated, homogeneous, and easy to control and manage from above”.