“The Internet Way of Networking”: Safeguarding the Utility of an Open, Decentralized Internet

Rising tides of Centralization continue to threaten the strength, stability, and future of the Internet; through actions that have been either state-driven or market-driven. Whereas state-driven centralization, which has sometimes been referred to as Digital Sovereignty, could portend benefits for flexibility and innovation on the Internet when control is centralized for citizens.

This article describes the “Internet Way of Networking” by highlighting the Invariants that laid the foundations for the architectural design principles of the Internet, and their role in sustaining the development and utility of the Internet. It goes on to discuss centralization and digital sovereignty; presenting their implications for the “Internet Way of Networking”.

Towards engendering progressive discussions around illustrative policy questions pertaining to Trust and Inclusion at the 15th Annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF 2020), this article then elucidates five Theses that might be useful for kick-starting or advancing deliberations for sustained progress in safeguarding the utility of an open, decentralized Internet.

Background & Introduction

As part of the focus of her 2020 Action Plan Projects for “Strengthening the Internet” [i], the Internet Society (ISOC) proposes to consider the “Internet Way of Networking”. This thematic focus aims at spotlighting the ways in which centralization, be it market-driven or state-imposed (also known as digital sovereignty), threatens the visions for an open global Internet. It also seeks to explore multi-stakeholder collaborations and approaches to demonstrate the benefits of an open global Internet that is free from imbalanced forms control empowered by vested business or sovereign political interests[ii].

Indeed, there is no better time to pursue an Action Plan with this Agenda. Especially as the period of the CoViD-19 Pandemic has unmasked the authoritarian inclinations of several national governments seeking to exert control over Internet operations; as well as the desire by big technology (tech) Companies to dominate the Internet market, through practices that suggest monopolistic intentions.

On the one hand, we saw many governments leverage the unfortunate realities of the Pandemic to advance sovereign political interests through authoritarian approaches to Internet regulation and governance, even in the guise of public safety. While on the other hand, we saw big tech Companies move to consolidate assets and data in a way that amplifies their dominance and ability to control sectors of the Internet market; stifling competition through mergers and buying-out smaller companies.

Notable amongst these recent occurrences are:

1. The recent Turkish Social Media Law that amends Turkey’s Internet law requiring social media companies to store user’s data centrally within the territory of Turkey. Giving government a stronger control over dissenting content posted on platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. Even amidst reports of growing reprehension against free speech and an independent press by the Turkish Government[iii].
2. A proposed merger between technology giant – Google, and the health fitness technology company – FitBit. A merger that has been fiercely resisted by many digital rights organizations, including Privacy International[iv]; amidst concerns of privacy and Google’s growing technology dominance[v].
3. The recent Clean Network Program of the United States (US) that excludes and bans from US networks all telecom transmissions and interactions involving China and countries that do not qualify as ‘Clean Countries’, as well as Chinese-owned technology and telecom companies. The Program also prevents personal data of US users from being stored in Chinese cloud platforms such as Alibaba[vi]. It is important to state that this action comes on the heels of a long-ongoing political imbroglio between the US and China.
4. Ongoing plans by US tech giant, Microsoft, to acquire the US operations of the Chinese mobile application, TikTok[vii]. Whereas TikTok is currently the only application that closely rivals the dominance of American tech giant, Facebook’s WhatsApp, Instagram, and Messenger, in terms of number of users and downloads in the mobile applications market[viii]. This acquisitions not only consolidates the operations of TikTok within the sovereign territory of the US; it also enables Facebook retain an upper-hand in the consumer-applications market, where Microsoft (having been primarily focused on providing enterprise tech solutions) has very little experience.

Indeed, a common strain that is evident in all of these recent occurrences is the ongoing dynamics of power involving large tech corporations and sovereign governments, independently seeking to centralize or consolidate their control over Internet operations and activities. These actions particularly target the Invariants that have nurtured the Internet’s growth and development since the early days.

Invariants: The Internet Way of Networking

The Internet was originally conceived as a small-scale utility network that was intended to foster research collaborations, and the sharing of resources amongst academic institutions within a relatively small geographical area. However, has grown in leaps and bounds to become a vast global interconnection of hundreds of millions of individual networks. These networks bring together billions of people of diverse cultural specifications, social dispositions, racial distributions, age grades, gender identities, sexual inclinations, religious dispensations, caste preferences, and national jurisdictions. Its pervading influence on modern human life is now well understood.

In 2012, the Internet Society published a set of principles that embody the basic unchanging qualities and non-negotiable developmental processes that keep the Internet open, operational, and accessible for innovation, participation, economic growth, and social empowerment. These principles became known as the Internet Invariants.

There are eight of them, and they have helped to insure and preserve the foundations for the evolution of the Internet, as well as its utility throughout its stages of development. These invariants are: Global Reach – Integrity, General Purpose, Supporting Innovation, Accessible, Interoperability, Collaboration, Reusable Building Blocks, and No Permanent Favourites[ix]. The scope of these invariants were later expanded in a 2015 publication by Leslie Daigle[x].

In summary, however, these invariants specify that:

• Information is able to flow across the Internet, in a manner that is unhindered and preserves the intent of the sender from an endpoint, across to the receiver at another endpoint; both of which are connected to the Internet. This is the Global Reach (Integrity) of the Internet.
• The Internet be able to support all users with a wide range of demands; and remain a general-purpose technology that provides the foundation for other tools that may be optimized for specific uses / communication methods. This is the Internet’s General Purpose.
• The Internet creates an environment where new ideas, content, services, and utilities can be freely setup and provisioned by any individual and organization, so long as it aligns with existing standards and best practices. Making it an open and equal-opportunity environment for innovation, that requires no special permissions. This is how the Internet Supports Innovation.
• Anyone (including disabled / challenged individuals) be able to freely get on the Internet, add new parts / components (nodes, servers, or networks) to it, enjoy existing content provided, and include new content based on services and protocols in operation. This is how the Internet remains Accessible.
• Open, and voluntary standards define the context for interoperation of various Internet technologies; and also characterize the mutual agreements that are brokered in this regard between the operators that control autonomous pieces of the Internet. This is how the Internet has remained Interoperable.
• Solutions to new challenges emerge from willing collaborations between stakeholders that might otherwise be in competition. Through common grounds that enable progressive and productive discussions even amidst competing objectives that are often all profit-oriented; in order to emerge with outcomes that are beneficial to the Internet. This is how Collaboration has been preserved throughout the Internet’s evolution.
• Internet technologies be developed and deployed as reusable building blocks that, although built and deployed to serve a particular purpose on the Internet, can end up being applied to meet some other important function eventually.
• Even though some technologies, companies and regions have flourished better than others; their continued success should solely depend upon efforts towards continued relevance and utility, and not on any form of favoured status. Good ideas should always be overtaken by better ideas; and not holding on to any one technology in a way that excludes competition from other players. Also ensuring that new businesses have the opportunity to challenge older businesses in a fair, and open market. This is how Fair Competition has helped preserve the virtuous cycle of innovation on the Internet.

These Invariants laid the foundation for the architectural design principles of Openness, Access, and End-to-End communication that have helped catalyse the growth and development of the modern Internet. They are the principles of structural and operational decentralization that define “the Internet Way of Networking”[xi]. Thus, they remain crucial for safeguarding the future of the Internet, while preserving the utilities and opportunities that it continues to provide.

The Internet of the Future: Implications of Centralization

In a general sense, Centralization refers to actions and processes that tend to concentrate mainstream Internet operations in a way that shifts power and influence into the hands of a few strong players. Centralization could be either market-driven (by business activities that reflect growing corporate dominance in one or more sectors), or state-driven (through regulations that seek to consolidate control for sovereign governments and/or their citizens).

“Digital Sovereignty” is a term that has sometimes been used to refer to state-driven centralization. It generally describes the idea of consolidating control over digital data, assets, and/or operations for Internet players within a sovereign jurisdiction[xii]; usually through the force of regulation / legislation. Digital sovereignty could present both positive and negative implications for the future of the Internet, depending on which Internet player is handed control – government or citizens.

When digital sovereignty centralizes control for citizens, it grants Internet users within a sovereign territory control over their digital involvements. One positive example of state-driven centralization is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[xiii] which was passed in the European Union (EU) in 2018; and centralized control for EU citizens over their digital data. This includes the right to privacy and protection of digital data by platforms that collect and use these data; while also expanding users’ control over their data, to include rights like ‘the right to know’, ‘the right to opt out and be forgotten’, and ‘the right to access personal data collected’, to mention a few. This positive example of digital sovereignty helped to break and prevent monopolies around user data. It also provided an effective safeguard against unethical uses of data that breach trust and privacy; while adding the flexibility and portability that is needed to boost data-driven innovation.

However, when digital sovereignty (or state-driven centralization) begins to involve fragmenting the digital space to centralize sovereign control for governments at the expense of other Internet players, it portends critical risks for the “Internet Way of Networking”. These risks are insidiously similar to the long-term implications of business operations that consolidate data and assets in ways that centralize market dominance for strong Internet players, apparently suffocating competition (also known as market-driven centralization). This is because a particular Internet player becomes an imposing force or dominating gatekeeper for mainstream digital / Internet-related operations, communications, and activities in particular sectors and jurisdictions.

Such centralization enables a kind of unilateral dominance or superimposed control over digital spaces, which must be bypassed or overcome by new and unauthorized entities seeking inroads. Thus posing added difficulty for those entities with interests that are perceived to be potentially competing or conflicting with the status quo. This particularly endangers the Internet Invariants of Global Reach (Integrity), Innovation, Interoperability, and No Permanent Favourites.

Indeed, recent efforts at state-driven centralization are likely to force “vast amounts of internet traffic to route into third countries, extending the distances data must traverse, increasing the potential for surveillance and manipulation of internet traffic, increasing the risk of internet outages [due to high-impact points of failure], and in general increasing costs to everyone on the internet,” the Internet Society has recently in reference to the US Clean Network Program. Further adding that, “Having a government dictate how networks interconnect according to political considerations rather than technical considerations, runs contrary to the very idea of the Internet. Such interventions will significantly impact the agility, resiliency and flexibility of the Internet.”[xiv]

Also, to perpetuate a situation wherein mega platforms that are consolidated around few large tech corporations continue to impose an oversized influence over mainstream online content and services is no less risky. This ultimately creates an ecosystem where few big players are able to influence public opinion and control mainstream market dynamics in a way that could threaten free speech, democracy, and fair competition. The fact that these big tech companies are concentrated within a handful of ‘powerful’ states also means that at the coercion or behest of authoritarian governments through sovereign regulatory forces, censorship would have a more far-reaching effect. Even as it would also become more difficult to challenge unintentional or interest-driven biases in the behaviours of algorithms used in curating online content by these platforms. One example is the criticisms that have long trailed the operations of Google’s PageRank? Algorithm[xv].

Furthermore, these mega platforms could soon begin to pose as permanent favourites (even though inadvertently), since competition is effectively suffocated. Also, because these platforms usually do not interoperate across different proprietors, switching between options means that users across many jurisdictions (outside the EU) have to deal with the reality of leaving their data, connections, and social interactions behind. A consideration that is likely to keep existing users strapped to a particular platform, even though a more preferred alternative might exist that provides better service. This is able to endanger innovation on the Internet.

In the long run, as state- and market-driven centralization advances on a broad-scale, it is able to create a complicated situation wherein, a vulnerable, insecure, and unreliable Internet costs so much to access. Even though major services and utilities revolve around a few outsized market players whose platforms do not interoperate; and whose interests are almost entirely profit-driven. This unappealing reality could characterize the Internet of the Future, should current activities of centralization continue unhindered.

Safeguarding the Utility of an Open, Decentralized Internet

It is important that the decentralized nature of the Internet be preserved if it is to retain its utility as a free, open and general-purpose technology for fostering social interactions, and catalysing innovation and economic growth in a manner that is broad-based, sustainable, and inclusive. But then, how can this be pursued in the face of current global occurrences? You may ask.

Here are five Theses to help kick-start, or advance stakeholder deliberations for progress in this regard.

Thesis One: Internet Policy should be separated from the complexities and complications of Sovereign Politics.

It is risky to subject Internet Policy to the complicated sentiments and complex biases that are known to characterize decisions in national politics. Unfortunately, however, this has been the case, and all too often. Indeed, the Internet was built and developed based on firm technical principles that serve to safeguard its social, and economic utilities. Even though it continues to play a remarkable role in global politics, particularly with respect to democratic transformations and civil rights; yet it remains a technical resource. As such, it is important that technical considerations remain primary and superior in guiding all policies and decisions regarding Internet operations, in order for its utility not to be diminished on any front.

Also, it is important that Internet Policy is spared from being used as a weapon in the hands of feuding sovereign governments to advance political interests through sanctions that compromise the visions for an inclusive, global, secure, stable, and reliable Internet. To go contrary portends tremendous negative implications for broad-based sustainable development (and not just for the Internet as a technology), even beyond national levels. The full scale of such negative impact is often only comprehensible in retrospect.

Thesis Two: Scrutinize and restructure ownership in mergers involving strong Internet players; especially those with market dominance that already exceeds a particular percentage necessary for preserving fair competition.

How can fair competition be safeguarded on the Internet? At face value, this might sound like a rather simple question. However, attempting to unpack or answer it quickly reveals further questions that first need to be answered. For example: What (indices) characterizes fair competition on the Internet? Are there business practices that could threaten fair competition on the Internet? Or, to put it differently, can fair competition be threatened by dominance in a particular Internet sector or market? If so, then at what level of a player’s dominance in a particular Internet sector or market can we say that fair competition is being threatened? The answers to these questions are crucial to advancing debates regarding an open Internet market that enables fair competition.

In moving forward, it is necessary that regulatory efforts aim to scrutinize or restructure ownership when mergers are proposed involving Internet players that already hold an outsized proportion of market value/impact. This would help maintain a balanced playing field, to ensure that the long-term operations of Internet businesses do not become inimical to consumer or public interest. But then again, the characteristics and indices that define an unfair market proportion should be decided through an inclusive multi-stakeholder process; and the onus is on international trade organizations such as the WTO (World Trade Organization) to lead multi-stakeholder deliberations for progress in this regard.

Also, public-private investment partnerships in mainstream Internet sectors/markets also present a resilient approach to waging formidable competition against dominating market forces to break monopolies and shift ownership away from strong Internet players.

Thesis Three: Blockchain technologies present appealing prospects for re-decentralizing the Internet and balancing the power landscape.

This Thesis echoes the viewpoint of a 2017 joint research conducted by the MIT Digital Currency Initiative and the Centre for Civic Media at the MIT Media Lab[xvi]. A blockchain is essentially a decentralized peer-to-peer ledger system that operates and stores records (known as blocks) using an interlinked hashed encryption scheme (known as the chain). This creates an efficient system for managing records in a deeply decentralized and highly secure manner; such that subsequent records cannot be altered without a retroactive alteration of all preceding records in the chain. Whereas all alterations are powered by a distributed majority consensus of peers on the network; thereby making records resilient to any attempts at modification.

By implication therefore, there is no single point of control or failure in a blockchain; since its infrastructure is based on an untrusted network of peers that coordinate to create a resilient decentralized system for managing content in a secure and trustworthy manner. Also, the operations of a blockchain are almost impossible to regulate, as the entire infrastructure is often far-distributed and downright untraceable. In principle, it becomes increasingly impossible to reconstruct a blockchain infrastructure as the chain grows and new peers are added.

Although, blockchain implementations currently present certain cons that could delay manifestations of its use on the mainstream Internet. Asides the fact that blockchain platforms require much technical expertise to implement and innovate around, ease-of-use is often also traded for enhanced security. Whereas robust security is necessary to preserving trust and utility within blockchain structures, due to the depth of decentralization and anonymity that they feature. Nonetheless, the blockchain idea presents appealing theoretical prospects for re-decentralizing the Internet in a way that returns control over online content to the hands of users and away from large corporations; creating a level entry field by removing any gatekeepers.

Thesis Four: More regulations empowering user-controlled data rights would create the flexibility that users need to port their data across preferred platforms.

Through an unprecedented body of legislation, the EU GDPR of 2018 gave users a measure of digital sovereignty over their data and digital interactions.

However, very few countries and regions have data regulations that could compare to the GDPR in terms of scope and provisions; and worse still, many have no data governance regimes at all. But then, a robust data governance regime is important for creating the flexibility that would help users to conveniently port or even replicate their data across platforms that offer preferred services. Such regimes could model the measure of digital sovereignty (in terms of control and rights) that the GDPR gives to Internet users within the jurisdiction of the EU.

This way, users would not have to worry about leaving behind their data, connections, and social interactions when they need to switch across platforms. Thereby creating an environment where innovation could easily take place around users’ data, upon consent; regardless of whatever platforms currently host these data. This Thesis echoes a recommendation of the 2017 joint research conducted by the MIT Digital Currency Initiative and the Centre for Civic Media at the MIT Media Lab[xvii].

Thesis Five: The multi-stakeholder approach to Internet Policymaking remains a viable path to achieving sustained, long-term progress when confronted with difficult issues.

What used to be a coordinated, integrated, and inclusive multi-stakeholder approach to Internet Policymaking has gradually deteriorated into a situation wherein certain stakeholders (usually governments) now move to enact policies by defying widely-accepted norms for achieving broad-based consensus. Then other stakeholders are left to react to such policies that are usually already operational (often to no avail). This situation has continued to perpetuate tides of growing tensions between governments, tech corporations, civil society groups, human rights organizations, and technical standards bodies.

It has resulted in a heated, polarized atmosphere for Internet Governance, wherein progressive deliberations have become more difficult to achieve; and consensus is often stalled by lingering standoffs between stakeholders. However, several organizations, such as ISOC, adopt and advocate a formidable and inclusive multi-stakeholder approach to Internet diplomacy; one that continues to yield progressive results through sustained engagement. There is no doubting that the multi-stakeholder approach remains a viable means to achieving effective, and sustained long-term progress when dealing with difficult issues of Internet Governance and Policymaking.

Thus, there is the need to return to this path, and the onus is on international organizations such as the Group of Twenty (G20), the African Union (AU), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to provide necessary leadership for sustained progress in this direction.

Conclusion

It is impossible to exaggerate the threats that Centralization poses to the strength, stability, and utility of the Internet. Particularly when such centralization is politically-motivated to give government oversized control over Internet operations, at the expense of other stakeholders; or when it is catalysed by business operations that tend to consolidate data and assets for strong Internet players, in ways that reflect an outsized level of dominance within / across particular sectors of the Internet market. However, when digital sovereignty (or state-driven centralization) is geared towards giving control to citizens and Internet users, it offers advantages for innovation and flexibility, in ways that benefit Internet growth and development as well as broad-based economic development.

Moreover, the threat of centralization endangers not just “the Internet Way of Networking”, but also the security that is provided through “Encryption” (being another focal area of the ISOC 2020 Action Plan[xviii]), as information travels from end to end across the Internet. This is evident in a recent move by the Chinese Government attempting to block all web connections that are secured using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) version 1.3 technology, having a setting known as encrypted server name indication (ESNI).

As the 15th Annual Internet Governance Forum (IGF) of the United Nations approaches, Trust[xix] and Inclusion[xx] form part of the focal thematic tracks for stakeholder deliberations[xxi]. These Themes are premised upon discussions held at the 14th Annual IGF in 2019. A number of illustrative policy questions have been enlisted on the Agenda for the 2020 IGF to guide deliberations under these thematic tracks. These include:

• What is digital sovereignty? How can stakeholders better understand its positive and negative impacts, e.g. political, economic, geographical, cultural impacts?
• How are national and international laws applied in cyberspace in the context of digital sovereignty? Can those frameworks be implemented and enforced in cyberspace in ways that avoid fragmentation? What could be the role of international organizations, such as the G20, WTO, and OECD?
• Within the evolving Digital Economy, how can we get the most contribution from the different actors of the Internet Ecosystem, particularly strong players, in order to tackle Internet Affordability without closing opportunity for different business models and preserving Internet openness?
• How do we ensure that Internet governance processes are truly inclusive?

Indeed, these questions are pertinent and crucial for deliberation at this time. Especially because the period of the CoViD-19 Pandemic has revealed how much humanity depends on a stable, secure, and global Internet for every-day interactions and activities pertaining to information dissemination, work, business, relationships, and education.

It is hoped that the content of this article, and the five Theses which have been elucidated herein, provide useful insights to the discourse on Centralization and Digital Sovereignty with regards to the strength, stability, reliability, and utility of the Internet. So that they prove helpful towards developing the Internet Way of Network (IWN) Framework that ISOC is currently working on; while also being useful for initializing and engendering progressive multi-stakeholder deliberations towards robust answers to illustrative policy questions at the 2020 Internet Governance Forum.

References

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[ii] Internet Society (2020). Internet Way of Networking. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.internetsociety.org/issues/internet-way-of-networking/

[iii] Human Rights Watch (2020, July 27). Turkey: Social Media Law Will Increase Censorship. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/27/turkey-social-media-law-will-increase-censorship

[iv] Privacy International (2020, June 17). Press release: Privacy International calls for the Google/Fitbit merger to be blocked. Retrieved (July 04, 2020) from https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/3750/press-release-privacy-international-calls-googlefitbit-merger-be-blocked

[v] Vincent, J. (2020, July 03). Google’s $2.1 billion Fitbit acquisition is getting closer scrutiny from EU regulators. The Verge. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.theverge.com/2020/7/3/21312383/google-fibit-acquisition-antitrust-data-regulatory-eu-scrutiny

[vi] TelecomPaper (2020, August 11). Internet Society warns of 'splinternet' after US steps up Clean Network programme. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.telecompaper.com/news/internet-society-warns-of-splinternet-after-us-steps-up-clean-network-programme--1349896

[vii] Warren, T. (2020, August 03). Why Microsoft Wants TikTok. The Verge. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/3/21352309/microsoft-tiktok-acquisition-deal-why-us-countries-data

[viii] Emem, M. (2020, August 03). Mark Zuckerberg Desperately Needs Microsoft to Acquire TikTok. CCN. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.ccn.com/mark-zuckerberg-needs-microsoft-acquire-tiktok/

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[x] Daigle, L. (2015). On the Nature of the Internet. Global Commission on Internet Governance. Centre for International Governance Innovation and Chatham House. Accessed August 12, 2019: https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no7.pdf

[xi] Internet Society (2020, June 18). Fact Sheet: Internet Way of Networking. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/2020/fact-sheet-internet-way-of-networking/

[xii] Techopedia (n.d.). Digital Sovereignty. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.techopedia.com/definition/33887/digital-sovereignty

[xiii] Intersoft Consulting (n.d.). General Data Protection Regulation: GDPR. Retrieved (May 17, 2020) from https://gdpr-info.eu/

[xiv] Internet Society (2020, August 07). Internet Society Statement on U.S. Clean Network Program. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.internetsociety.org/news/statements/2020/internet-society-statement-on-u-s-clean-network-program/

[xv] Cardon, D. (2013). Inside the Mind of PageRank: A study of Google’s algorithm [translated to English by Libbrecht, E.]. Réseaux, 177(1), 63–95. https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_RES_177_0063--inside-the-mind-of-pagerank.htm#

[xvi] Barabas, C., Narula, N., & Zuckerman, E. (2017, August). Defending Internet Freedom through Decentralization: Back to the Future? MIT Media Lab. MIT Digital Currency Initiative and the Centre for Civic Media. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://dci.mit.edu/decentralizedweb (c.f. https://dci.mit.edu/s/decentralized_web.pdf)

[xvii] Barabas, C., Narula, N., & Zuckerman, E. (2017, August). Defending Internet Freedom through Decentralization: Back to the Future? MIT Media Lab. MIT Digital Currency Initiative and the Centre for Civic Media. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://dci.mit.edu/decentralizedweb (c.f. https://dci.mit.edu/s/decentralized_web.pdf)

[xviii] Internet Society (2020, August 14). Internet Society: Blocking TLS 1.3 in China Makes the Internet Less Secure. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.internetsociety.org/news/statements/2020/internet-society-blocking-tls-1-3-in-china-makes-the-internet-less-secure/

[xix] Internet Governance Forum (IGF) (n.d.). Trust Thematic Track Comprehensive List of Illustrative Policy Questions. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/illustrative-policy-questions-trust

[xx] Internet Governance Forum (IGF) (n.d.). Inclusion Thematic Track Comprehensive List of Illustrative Policy Questions. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/illustrative-policy-questions-inclusion

[xxi] Internet Governance Forum (IGF) (n.d.). IGF 2020 Thematic Tracks. Accessed August 18, 2020: https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/content/igf-2020-thematic-tracks