Corona Virus : Hic sunt Dracones

Pascal Daudin, April 2020

Introduction

For the first time since four generations, a huge crisis is striking in our backyard if not in the middle of our homes. The current calamity and its fulgurant development are generating huge disruptions in our societies and is shaking our certitudes about the collective capacity to protect our population. It is also opening the door to serious questions about our current and future ability to outwit such massive phenomena. It may be time to reflect on the true nature of crises and their particular features and why we seem to be taken aback by their occurrence. To paraphrase the French catastrophist Patrick Lagadec[1], we have entered “the continent of the unexpected”.

If you’re not seeing the world properly, you have no hope of any sort of breakthrough. Many of our problems today aren’t the result of too little information. Instead, they come from the challenge of sorting through a huge (and growing) amount of confusing data and perspectives, all constantly changing, and much of it irrelevant, incomplete, misleading or simply wrong. Crisis management relies deeply on our capacity to see the problems from the right angle, with the appropriate level of understanding and it must be rapidly available. In other words: it depends on our capacity to produce real-time actionable intelligence.

A crisis, not an emergency

A crisis is a specific, unexpected (or unpredictable), and non-routine event or series of events that create high level of uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high-priority goals. A crisis is a unique phenomenon that cannot be neither rehearsed nor completely anticipated. It’s not another emergency. An emergency takes place in an environment that is known and can be managed within the existing framework and understanding. A crisis is characterized by discontinuity, uncertainty and complexity. Put more simply: it’s a jump into the unknown. Hic sunt dracones[2] as medieval cartographers would label unchartered waters.

 Joshua Cooper Ramo[3] has put forward the idea that mapping crises in linear systems is far easier than anticipating consequences in a networked society. Increasing mobility of people, goods, capital and information has considerably increased a) the complexity of crises b) the scale and diversity of their impact. In a complex environment (a network of components which give rise to complex collective behaviour), a true crisis is a succession or combination of crises which interact with each other and generate/initiate a vast array of predictable as well as unpredictable effects and new cascading phenomena that are difficult or impossible to anticipate[4]. Several components of the network will overlap to one degree or other and when one starts to fail or has a break somewhere it affects the others in unexpected places and ways, causing a cascade of failures throughout the other networks.

COVID-19 – a networked crisis

Covid-19 is typically a networked crisis. The virus that led to the disease Covid-9 was only the beginning that set off the chain of events and phenomena. The viral infection became a medical crisis, then a public health crisis, rapidly leading to an economical and financial crisis, political and leadership confusion, and is now accompanied by growing social stresses and worries about the provision of basic necessities. And these interact in surprising ways.

 In addition, such a mega crisis may also generate unpredictable collective human behaviour that creates new political challenges. A peak in criminal behaviour and violence would challenge the resilience of state institutions and their functioning. The habitual socio-political framework is severely tested. Trust in the system and its representatives was proved critical for maintaining the social fabric during the Great Influenza of 1918[5].

 Such mega crises may not only challenge existing societal bulwarks but could be also a game changer both on the national and international scene. For example, we already witness the prominent role played by China which profiles itself as a global soft power by assisting other, Western countries to face the current health crisis.

So far, States and their institutions hold quite well, international order is not crumbling. However, we should not underestimate possible transformative effects initiates by the Covid 19 episode and we may expect some profound changes in the prevailing economic paradigm, social behaviour (consumerism, travel), political organisation or security issues.

The Great Plague of 1346 -1353 brought considerable changes in Western societies such the role of religion and structure of political institutions. As Jacques Attali[6] clearly indicates, such catastrophes tend to question the system of belief and the nature of control/authority regime.

Security spill over – recent experiences

We have seen that the development of Ebola crisis (2014) in West Africa was clearly linked with the robustness of States structure. In Liberia, largely a failed state at that time, the initial health issue became quickly a security problem imposing a security intervention from international forces. On the contrary, Sierra Leone which enjoyed a better functioning structure did not turn into a situation of violent unrest. (Unexpectedly, the Ebola outbreak also created a heavy blow to malaria control[7].) During the aftermath of hurricane Katrina, there were reports of looting, violence, shooting at rescuers, murder and rape. Some of these reports were grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, 6,500 National Guard troops had to be deployed in New Orleans, and the governor requested a total of 40,000 for assistance in evacuation and security efforts in Louisiana. In addition, the Louisiana State Guard and state defense forces from several US states were activated to aid the National Guard in sheltering the large number of refugees leaving Louisiana and assist in other disaster recovery operations.

In Sicily, some observers have already reported signs of unrest and police had to descend on a supermarket as people stole food to feed themselves, as patience turns to desperation[8].

Crisis Response

Some people are complaining about the absence of a full-fledged plan. Where is the comprehensive and definitive strategy? Fortunately, there is no such comprehensive plan. Precooked solutions would not work in that case. Rigid, fixed and untargeted procedures may even worsen the problems if not abandoned timely. The problem here is that even the response is part of the crisis dynamic and may not lead to the resolution of crisis.

 Unfortunately, planning (meaning creating the capacity to respond to several related problems) is also absent. It is rather obvious that a complex scenario as we see today was never fully considered. The question is not to think out-of-the-box, simply because there is no box anymore. But better planning and reserve capacity (stocks, autonomy, information gathering, training etc.) would have brought some additional options for decision makers.

 Appropriate responses are particularly difficult to design because the phenomenon is iterative, fluid, and rather unpredictable. The right course of action should be led by rapid, versatile reactions on the ground where events take place and not by directives from the top. Classic bureaucracies are unfortunately not well equipped for this; the pyramid of hierarchies implies that decisions are taken at the top, not the bottom. What the top can and must do is frame and support efforts.

 Yet, decision makers have to improvise solutions in a very complex environment where they don’t have the control over a large number of parameters (such as the international environment, cross border phenomena or scientific uncertainties). Responders must therefore use opportunistic and tinkering methods instead of building large systems, and make sure that these measures do not produce perverse effects.

Bounded rationality

Economy Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon, a couple of years ago developed the idea of bounded rationality. He suggested that economic agents use heuristics to make decisions rather than a strict, relatively rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation and inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. Deliberation costs might be high and there are often other competing economic factors also requiring decisions. This also characterizes the ambivalence of the so-called crisis responders who tend to transfer their own uncertainty to science which in turn does not have all the responses. To quote Brecht: the aim of science is not to open the door to infinite wisdom, but to set a limit to infinite error[9]. The ultimate responsibility rests with politicians and rulers who have to balance diverging interests.

Crisis situations inevitably create the feeling that State response is not based on pre-established routine, proper deliberation and cartesian logic. This is partly true but such situations by nature also call for dead reckoning, guess work and conjecture.

 Nevertheless, insights gained from crisis events such as Ebola (2014-2016), Luxleaks (2014), Hydro-Quebec (1998), Fukushima (2011) have demonstrated the relevance and success of the following practices:

 ·      Necessary interventions shall orient the overall strategy and not the opposite. You need to listen to front-line people;

·      Rapid detection of gaps and blind spots allow the responder to fix emerging problems and stop focusing only on the visible and current ones;

·      Current knowledge has to be systematically questioned and adjusted accordingly

·      Supporting emerging and relevant initiatives improve response quality once it is established that they are not aggravating the problem;

·      Refrain from narrow focusing on key issues (“body count”, number of people in intensive care) and try to encompass the whole ramification of the progressing crisis.

Limited scope of response options in liberal democracies

Decision makers have therefore to improvise solutions in a very complex environment where they don’t have the control over a large number of parameters (such as the international environment, cross border phenomena or scientific uncertainties).

 From an ethical point of view, we are once again at the heart of Weberian tension between the ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and the ethic of responsibility (Verantwortungs-ethik). Democratic states do not have an unlimited choice of means to enforce measures and to get results. Governments are facing an important dilemma: on the one hand, the necessity to protect the population (containing the pandemic as quickly as possible) and on the other, the obligation to safeguard economy and civil liberties (freedom of speech, data protection etc..). Times when political regimes could take drastic measures and demand huge sacrifices of their population are over unless constraints imposed are perceived as fully legitimate and for a short period of time only. 1n 1347, during the Great Plague, Visconti, the Tyran of Milano succeeded to stop the contagion in the city by walling up three houses with its inhabitants inside[10]. In absolute terms, our legal frameworks limit considerably the scale and effectiveness. of our crisis response. This might amount to part of the final cost and we have to accept this as nations attached to preserve human rights.

And Switzerland?

They are a lot of debates about Switzerland’s state capacity (or lack thereof) to take executive decisions and to align the various actors/institutions concerned. Federalism is certainly less equipped to impose uniform response policies based on swift decisions as a Jacobine France or more assertive regimes would do. At the same time, our decentralized country may have some competitive edge over pyramidal states. Once the larger response framework is defined centrally, implementation and problem treatment are left to the judgment of proximity institutions and other entities who are very familiar with the field reality. Local governments enjoy a higher level of trust among the population.

Switzerland has this extraordinary privilege to have 26 mini states fully equipped with elected governments that are extremely close to their constituencies. The federal government shall support the lower echelons, may allocate missing resources and ensure coherence without directing operations from the top.

If the State has to coordinate its action through its regalia power, the overall response has to be a whole community endeavour which goes far beyond the purview of the (federal) state. A country cannot be solely measured against its chain of command but also against the density of its response network and its resilience capability. Of course, such a configuration superficially creates dissonances and the feeling that things are not completely under control but the overall structure is far more agile than a centralized and assumed omniscient management and leadership. Differentiated response policies does not mean balkanization of State action. It is of paramount importance to preserve some space and autonomy for community and private initiatives. Without political pragmatism and operational multifaceted response, the risk is to fight yesterday’s battles.

[1] Lagadec, Patrick, le continent des imprévus, Manitoba, Belles Lettres, 2016.

[2] Declaration of Senator Harry Reid, on September 18, 2009 in the midst of the economic debacle: ? No one knows what to do. We are in a new territory here. This is a new game. ?

[3] Ramo, Joshua Cooper (2009), The age of the unthinkable: why the new world disorder constantly surprises us and what to do about it. Little, Brown, 2009.

[4] Nobody could predict that banking information could not be exchanged across borders and therefore preventing French employees having their jobs in Switzerland to work from home.

[5] Barry, John M. (2005), The great influenza: the epic story of the deadliest plague in history (New York: Penguin Books) 546 p.

[6] Jacques Attali blog post : Que na?tra-t-il ? 19.3.2020

[7] See The Lancet, 16 March 2020

[8] Discomfort and malaise are growing and we are recording worrying reports of protest and anger that is being exploited by criminals who want to destabilise the system," declaration from the Mayor of Palermo, Sky News, 28.3.2010

[9] Brecht, Berthold, Life of Galileo, Bloomsbury, 1986.

[10] S. Qarnam, Histoire médicale générale et particulière des maladies épidémiques, contagieuses et épizootiques, Lyon 1835.