Financial and Economic Instability in Zimbabwe: Reforming a Broken Country (2019)

To regain the support of the international financial community Zimbabwe must undertake a series of reforms that are made complicated by a history of corruption and mistrust that perpetuates the country’s economic instability, a cycle that was set in motion over two decades ago. Zimbabwe’s current struggles with currency, liquidity, and political crises are symptomatic of several underlying causes of financial and economic instability. Such causes include ineffective currency reform, a failure to settle historic, contentious land reform issues, deeply mistrusted judicial and electoral systems, and a corrupt body of government leaders who have been unable and unwilling to tackle much needed fiscal and monetary reforms. Without resolving the root of these issues, it will remain an insuperable challenge for Zimbabwe to fulfil the great potential with which it was once associated, as the breadbasket of Africa. However, with strengthened accountability of government leaders, the leadership of domestic businesses, and the support of international organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Paris Club, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the World Bank (WB), there is a path to reform, stability, and growth.

Beyond adding to sorely underdeveloped literature on Zimbabwean economic policy, this paper seeks to update a stance I embraced in 2016 in a paper on Zimbabwe’s liquidity crisis. While working in Zimbabwe as a photojournalist for an agricultural company I undertook research to better understand the causes and potential solutions to the liquidity and political crises that had unfolded, including: chronic cash shortages, lengthy periods of “stay-away” protesting, and mounting pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ). Over three years on from long-ruling dictator Robert Mugabe’s death, I am keen to reevaluate Zimbabwe’s ongoing crises to understand what reform is needed to regain the support of the international financial community. I posit that if Zimbabwe’s politicians, civil servants, and business leaders can begin to make progress on the key reforms outlined by the IMF, they may be able to move towards financial and economic stability and a political system that can be sufficiently trusted so that foreign investors are inclined to reenter the market and international financial institutions (IFIs) willing to reestablish access to external debt relief and new funding. For a landlocked country, this is a key obstacle to overcome to return to a growth trajectory and critically, to improve standards of living for their population of nearly seventeen million and usher in stability to a core sub-Saharan African nation.

Some historical context helps to frame the state of affairs in Zimbabwe today. During the late 1970s and 1980s, as many African nations achieved independence, a new wave of opportunity swept across the continent. The fall of European colonial empires left behind kleptocracies and extractive institutions that still commanded significant political control and economic perquisite. However, for many post-colonial African nations, there was no smooth transition from extractive to inclusive institutions nor from legacy to democratic systems.[1] Via new de-facto dictatorships, constitutional reform subscribed Zimbabweans and others to oppressive policies and unfair elections while building political monopolies by eliminating opposition. Inevitably, the social outcomes have been severe with inequality, unemployment, and deterioration of standards of living and public services becoming rife. Several of Zimbabwe’s neighbours were able to avoid such a fate with Namibia, Botswana, and South Africa among others prospering. According to the WB, today Botswana’s GDP per capita is nearly four times that of Zimbabwe ($8,258.6 versus $2,147.0) versus their nearly identical levels in 1982 ($1,054 versus $1,073).[2]

The April 18th, 1980 signing of the Lancaster House Treaty formalised Rhodesia’s independence from Britain, introduced the GoZ, and brought its first prime minister in Robert Mugabe. From early on, Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party embraced active market intervention, expanded the power of supporters and elites, and continued to support extractive institutions. However, the greatest post-independence contribution from Britain was the design and backing of a Land Reform policy to reallocate land away from white Rhodesians with European heritage to native black subsistence farmers - an attempt to unwind the legacy of the eponymous Cecil Rhodes. Britain contributed on a willing seller-willing buyer basis and the GoZ were able to transact on 40% of Land Reform targets between its inception in 1980 up until 1996 when they withdrew all involvement.[3] Following their withdrawal, and a series of controversial elections, the GoZ put forward a referendum to allow for the compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land. Despite losing the referendum, pro-Mugabe war veterans helped expropriate land from 1,471 white-owned farms through the new Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLR).[4] The unskilled landowners sitting on once productive agricultural property drove Zimbabwe’s agricultural output, and therefore the broader economy, to collapse.[5] This was the struggling economy that would eventually dive into hyperinflation of 89.7 sextillion per cent year-on-year, or 98% per day, by mid-November 2009.[6] Over the succeeding eight years, as with the preceding twenty, Mugabe and the ZANU-PF’s autocratic grip on control continued to tighten, leading Zimbabwe’s economic, financial, and social systems to crumble.

After nearly thirty years of autocratic rule, Mugabe conceded power in November 2017 to Emmerson Mnangagwa. It was not without difficulty that Mnangagwa took power, however, as former First Lady Grace Mugabe and former ZANU-PF Vice President Phelekezela Mphoko were accused of attempting to poison Mnangagwa at a rally.[7] Nor is the now sitting President’s reputation without blemishes, as Mnangagwa was held responsible for the deaths of an estimated 20,000 during the 1980s civil conflict when he served as national security minister.[8] Further, Mnangagwa entered office facing the enormous task of turning around an economy whose GDP per capita and life expectancy have fallen 27% and 7% respectively since 1982.[9]

During the IMF’s September 2019 visit and review of Zimbabwe’s Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) leaders highlighted many long-term issues, potential policies to implement reform, and provided an update on the current state of the economy. There are many significant drags (including some exogenous shocks) on growth that contribute to the IMF World Economic Outlook’s steep -7.1%[10] projected growth rate for 2019, including the impact of ongoing droughts on agriculture and energy production, the cyclone Idai, and fiscal consolidation to account for their double-digit budget deficit.[11] More worrying are the food shortages caused by agricultural shocks, which will leave half of the population food insecure and a third of the rural population dangerously food insecure.[12] Although the United Nations (UN) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are assisting many, there is still a chronic shortage of food and an inability for citizens to pay for it, as inflation once again takes hold.[13]

This year brings a strong sense of déjà vu, as a renewed currency crisis beckons. With rock-bottom confidence and increasingly expansionary monetary policy, there is significant pressure on the exchange rate. Zimbabwe adopted the U.S. dollar in 2009 following the collapse of its hyperinflation-hit currency. As the supply of dollars shrunk as it was moved into foreign accounts, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and governor John Mangudya introduced local alternatives. First, there were Zollars - electronic Zimbabwean dollars back by U.S. dollar credits at a rate of one to one. Then there were bond notes - theoretically backed by an African Export and Import Bank loan that could be exchanged at par with dollars - with bond coins to follow.[14] However, the lack of trust and transparency around whether the credits existed in the proportions claimed by the RBZ put pressure on the dollar peg. On February 20th, 2019 the bond note to U.S. dollar peg was dropped to make way for floating electronic Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) dollars. Since then the exchange rate has depreciated from USD 1:1 ZWL (RTGS) to USD 1:16.5 ZWL (RTGS), as of September 23rd. An alternative way to measure how investors and the international financial community view the exchange is by considering a company listed in both Harare (Zimbabwe’s capital) and London. The difference in the value of the listings of Old Mutual Limited, a large asset manager and insurer, acts as a proxy to show the implied exchange rate (OMIR). Figure 1 shows the exchange rate for the past eighteen months and at the time of writing the OMIR sits at 26.8x that of the USD.[15] Although the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency has decided not to report year-on-year inflation figures until February 2020, the IMF has estimated inflation to be as high as 300% year-on-year while other estimates place it as between 230% and 570%.[16]

Figure 1 - Old Mutual Implied Rate (OMIR), https://omir.today/

This complex web of issues is symptomatic of a series of underlying causes of economic, financial, and political instability and a lack of fundamental reform. These causes help explain why Zimbabwe has failed to obtain the support of the IMF and IFIs. At a high level, the causes include misguided currency reform, a failure to settle historic, contentious land reform issues, a severely mistrusted electoral system, and a corrupt body of government leaders who have been unable to effectively tackle much needed fiscal and monetary reforms.

Currency reform has long been an issue and the instability of the foreign exchange (FX) market has caused significant economic distortions and disrupted trade and investment. Zimbabwe has seen hyperinflation only eclipsed by Hungary’s pengo 1946 crisis, dollarisation, and more recently a wave of unconventional credit-based electronic currencies. Zimbabwe has not had a stable currency for decades and the RBZ is perpetually stuck persuading its citizens, foreign investors, and IFIs that this time is different. The 2019 vintage of currency reform thus far does not seem to be all that different from past efforts with the RTGS dollar experiencing an estimated 300% inflation. The key difference is that today’s inflation is affecting an economy that is almost entirely monetarily digitised, as the mobile payment platform, EcoCash (similar to Kenya’s M-Pesa), now counts 90% of Zimbabwean adults as customers.[17]

While the repercussions of digital hyperinflation are unclear, the tightening pressure on the money supply remains. In 2016, Zimbabwe began experiencing a chronic shortage of dollars and other foreign currencies, which exasperated the system’s instability. Today, EcoCash is leading to further demonetisation, as fiat money is transferred from EcoCash users to the Central Bank via tenders in the banking system. Given the history of expropriation and corruption, this does not inspire the faith of onlookers from the financial community. The government has also played its part, as it too encouraged demonetisation by paying public sector salaries digitally and ultimately banning foreign currencies alongside the introduction of the RTGS dollar. This aggressive step threatened the denomination of domestic bank accounts hence encouraging the flight of privately-held foreign currency. As the demand for foreign currency continues to rise, EcoCash facilitates “the buying and selling of cash at high rates above approved charges of cash-in and cash-out [transactions].”[18] In the RBZ statement, deputy director of financial markets, Josephat Mutepfa, goes on to blame this illegal commoditisation of cash as the cause of price distortions in the economy. In reality, this distortion is better explained as a modern-day example of Gresham’s Law - that bad money drives out good money. Until the RBZ can sustain a stable currency for an extended period, Zimbabwe remains unlikely to instil confidence in its broader financial system. Worryingly, their most recent currency reform efforts have merely added uncertainty to forecasts for GDP levels, inflation, interest rates, and in turn debt balances. Without clarity around these macroeconomic conditions, Zimbabwe will remain cut off from accessing external financing.

One of the most substantial causes of instability is Zimbabwe’s unsustainable public and external debt. While the country paid off its long-standing external debt arrears with the IMF in October 2016, it has yet to clear its debt with the AfDB and WB.[19] This is arguably the most significant obstacle to regaining access to the international financial community, as clearing its arrears with the AfDB and WB is a requirement for receiving relief from sanctions and access to financing from MDBs. Its external arrears up to the end of 2017 amounted to $5.7 billion USD, or 40% of GDP and its debt arrears to IFIs (AfDB, WB, and EIB) amounted to $2.6 billion USD at the end of 2018.[20] Additionally, the country has run significant fiscal deficits since 2016 financed by quasi-currencies nominally pegged to the U.S. dollar. Once the exchange controls over these overvalued currencies broke down, the delicate macroeconomic balance fell out of equilibrium. The fiscal deficit went from less than 3% of GDP between 2008 and 2015 to 9.9% of GDP in 2017 further stimulating public debt issuances.[21] By the end of 2017, the country’s domestic debt amounted to $7.13 billion USD or 32% of GDP (with external debt contributing a further 40%).[22] Seeking debt relief and new sources of financing from IFIs is an uphill battle when the debt outlook is as unpromising as Zimbabwe’s.

Another cause of uncertainty is the government’s failure to settle the historic and contentious land reform issues. This has broad ramifications from inaccurate government budgets, a lack of collateral for the banking sector, and weak property rights discouraging investment into land-intensive sectors. Firstly, the country’s official debt balance of 72% of GDP does not account for liabilities pertaining to compensation for land seized during the FTLR programme. Estimates for such contingent liabilities add at least $2.4 to 10 billion USD to current debt figures.[23] This amounts to between 11 and 45% of GDP implying that the inclusion of a midpoint estimate of compensation ($6.2 billion USD) would raise debt to 100% of GDP - a troubling figure for any economy, let alone one with as many other sources of uncertainty. Secondly, the banking sector insolvency has become a concern as sourcing title deeds for expropriated farmland proves to be an ongoing challenge. Much of the banking sector’s loans and mortgages are collateralised with farmland that is missing a title deed.[24] In the event of a crisis, these banks are unable to find willing buyers of their asset base, as they cannot provide the title deeds that guarantee property rights. A related consequence is a reciprocal effect on farm owners who, without title deeds, have no security with which to access loans that would facilitate their growth. The lack of settlement of land reform issues restricts access for the largest farms in Zimbabwe. Once the smallest-scale farms are considered collateral liquidity is far from the greatest consideration for lenders. The IMF has made it clear they will not interfere with the settlement of land reform, although they have helped in estimating the size of the compensation. Until Zimbabwe provides a resolution on this issue they will remain without investor confidence, established property rights, and access to external financing.

The final important source of economic and financial instability and crisis focuses on poor governance, severe corruption and cronyism, and public sentiment of mistrust. There is a lack of faith in the government and central bank’s ability to stick to reforms as well as a distrust of the judicial and electoral systems. While attributing cronyism as a cause of economic instability is often a pretence for a misunderstanding of systemic economic issues (or at least a simplification), in Zimbabwe it remains a significant obstacle to progress. One might hope that the prospects of debt relief, international financial support, and recovery of social conditions ought to be worthy enough motivation for implementing reform, yet Zimbabwe’s leaders persist in their unwillingness to concede power to a fault. Power and corruption remain prevalent issues that perpetuate the mistrust of citizens in their leaders’ promises and the governance systems they exploit. Further, corruption is preventing the provision of a lifeline of support to Zimbabwe’s failing economy. When their politicians are reportedly still buying votes, forcing attendance at election rallies, and threatening those that threaten their power it is hard to label elections as fair and free.[25] If public money continues to be siphoned off and new money printed - both physically and electronically - then IFIs will continue to impose sanctions.

To resolve the prevalent issues outlined thus far there are a series of policy reforms that must be implemented. The effectiveness of the implementation will depend on whether the underlying causes are dealt with proficiently. Zimbabwe’s leadership must implement effective monetary to stabilise and rebuild confidence in domestic currency, settle land reform liabilities, contain the fiscal budget with non-inflationary measures, and espouse fair, transparent electoral and judicial systems with accountable leaders. If this can be achieved then the foundations for stable growth, relief of debt arrears, and future external financing from the international financial community become viable.

First and foremost, the GoZ and RBZ must contain the fiscal deficit while also stabilising the currency and exchange rate. This poses an immediate challenge, as financing sources for fiscal spending such as domestic debt or monetary accommodation will create further inflationary pressure and destabilise the exchange rate. It is therefore critical that the RBZ reduces its quasi-fiscal activities by halting its financing of the fiscal deficit. To the credit of the GoZ, the overall fiscal deficit fell from 9.7% of GDP in 2017 to 7.1% in 2018.[26] Further, and likely in anticipation of the IMF’s SMP, the GoZ demonstrated their commitment to fiscal consolidation via the repayment of maturing government bonds in early 2019 as well as making token payments towards arrears held with IFIs. However, monetary policy and currency reform are also required to stabilise the exchange rate and restore confidence in their domestic currency. The introduction of the RTGS in February 2019 provided much-needed inflation stability, eliminated the economic distortion of the bond note system, narrowed the premium in parallel FX markets, and provided FX transparency.[27] However, the domestic money supply has since grown sharply causing high and growing inflation and volumes of trades in FX markets have fallen, meaning the RBZ is likely to be low on FX reserves within the short term. Consequently, the RBZ must seek to increase reserves to facilitate smooth FX consumption while maintaining exchange controls to limit domestic demand. If the GoZ and RBZ can maintain such stability then, when Zimbabwe recovers from recent, exogenous shocks, there will be a platform for stable, job-creating growth and more aggressive policy frameworks.

The ramifications of Mugabe-era land reform are still felt, although the FTLR programme, or Indigenisation policy, has been relaxed. However, fully accounting for the disruption and conflict caused by farmland expropriation and white farmer ejection is key to restoring investor confidence to aid the transition towards a private sector-led Zimbabwe. By factoring in a proportion of the estimated $2.4-10 billion USD of related compensation into the annual budgets, the government can move to promote foreign investment by establishing stronger property rights. Thus far, the government has committed to partially compensating farmers with the 2019 budget including a payment of $60 million RTGS (or $2.7 million USD at the time of writing).[28] However, it is important that the farmers who are compensated for costs incurred from the land seizure respond by handing over the title deeds to their land. With the purchase of these deeds, the government can generate revenue by selling such deeds to new and expanding private firms. Without obtaining the deeds, the compensation to expulsed farmers is merely a gesture of goodwill and benevolence with their current economic conditions is not a top priority. Settling land reform issues require a framework for coordination and prioritisation to ensure compensation is distributed responsibly and over a realistic time frame. However, once the title deeds to Zimbabwe’s 33.3 million hectares (of a possible 39 million hectares) of farmland are obtained, then the doors are open to the recovery of its all-important sector.

Further political reforms are required to curb corruption and uphold good governance practices. As discussed previously, cronyism and corruption perpetuate the mistrust of citizens in the systems their leaders govern. Instead of facilitating power-grabbing and cronyism, systems of accountability and supervision are required to support free elections and sustainable, balanced growth. Any loans from the IMF, WB, AfDB, and European Investment Bank (EIB) will necessarily come with requirements of oversight, but Zimbabwe also needs these practices to flow from within for the times when they do not need or are unable to rely on the support of IFIs. When elections are fair, power is achieved based on merit, and leadership requires trust to be earned then maintaining stability in the long term becomes attainable.

To overcome the systemic mistrust of the government, fair elections are of paramount importance. Vote-buying, money printing, intimidation, and violence subjection must end for any confidence to be regained. Yet, as recently as the 2018 elections, repressive legislation, such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), has been used to allow police to take fatal action against protestors.[29] The IMF’s SMP reports claim that political reforms are underway with a series of repressive acts including POSA slated for repeal.[30] Further, legislation to curb the uncontrolled power of the police, to support the freedom of expression, to respect human and property rights, and to fight against corruption is required to improve governance and rule of law.

While Zimbabwe has no one clear path to reengaging with the international financial community, there will inevitably need to be write-downs of large sums of foreign debt arrears, which will require the support of the IMF, IFIs, and other multilateral development banks (MDBs). Zimbabwean authorities have demonstrated their willingness to reenter the international community through some small payments to IFIs. However, since defaulting on their debt in 1999 and as a result of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe in 2000, Zimbabwe has relied on the African Export and Import Bank (Afreximbank) for loans that are backed by future mineral exports. The IMF has noted that although necessary for accounting for humanitarian crises, the mineral-backed loans are likely to further complicate negotiations with creditors from IFIs when attempting to settle debt sustainably. Therefore, Zimbabwe must prioritise settling their debt with the AfDB and WB at all costs to avoid making access to future financing impossible.

Although it is not hard to foresee relatively favourable terms from IFIs for debt arrears write-downs, Zimbabwe will nonetheless require a bailout from the IMF to pay off a meaningful proportion. The counterargument to a potential bailout from the IMF is that it requires Zimbabwe’s authorities to show abiding resolve through reforms that will inevitably worsen their current economic conditions. Such reforms also present a high risk of a complete system collapse or a military coup, which would result in a further lack of financial support. Incongruously, for an IMF bailout to become an option the reforms must be achieved proficiently and the IMF’s SMP must observe greater economic stability and system confidence. This contradiction demonstrates the importance of fair elections and continued oversight over the implementation of reforms.

However, there are a few caveats that may support financial support without as aggressive and prompt reform implementation. Zimbabwe is on the receiving end of several Russian loans that are collateralised by mining receipts and future mineral exports. Following intervention in many other African nations, China has become Zimbabwe’s largest source of aid and investment with $3.17 billion USD of investments approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Authority between 2010 and 2017.[31] Thanks to China’s frequent labelling as an African neo-colonialist, the U.S. government is desperately attempting to stop China’s power grab in Africa.[32] Hence mounting intervention by both China and Russia supports the case for the U.S. to intervene and support Zimbabwe to avoid it falling into Chinese control. With the U.S., such intervention is likely to come via pressing IFIs to lift sanctions and the IMF to support a bailout. Indeed, while Zimbabwe’s external arrears to IFIs amounted to $2.6 billion USD as of the end of December 2019, a bailout of a substantial proportion of this amount is not out of scope. In July 2019, the IMF approved a $449 million USD bailout of the Republic of the Congo, which amounts to 17.5% of the external debt arrears they held with China.[33] Elsewhere, the IMF is completing its $925.9 billion USD bailout of Ghana.[34] The precedent already exists; therefore, it is a question of how effectively Zimbabwe implements reforms that are underway and responds to ongoing advice provided by the IMF and other business leaders. The lifeline they have received from the IMF in the form of an SMP should provide a much-needed basis from which to implement reform. Although it is unclear whether the current wave of attempts at broad reform will succeed, if Zimbabwe’s authorities and leadership continue to show a desire to drive change and do not succumb to the temptations of power and extraction, then reestablishing a relationship with the IMF and WB is possible.

The work of joint 2019 Economics Nobel Prize winner Professor Michael Kremer offers a compelling summary case for the international financial community to support Zimbabwe when applied to the country’s development path and the macroeconomy. Professor Kremer’s O-ring theory of economic development states it is necessary to complete tasks proficiently and in conjunction for any holistic process to be of value and in turn calls attention to the importance of the weakest link in such processes.[35] Taken in the context of an economy, the theory reveals that the failure of a single component can cause the rest of the system to collapse. In this way, O-ring economies are self-perpetuating, such that when there are several failing systems, fixing one still leaves the others failing. Zimbabwe has long had many broken systems and no means of fixing all of them synchronously thanks to their self-perpetuating state of inertia, inability to find a root for progress, and a lack of leadership to drive such progress. Thus, any financial support should come in full with an implementation plan to balance all of the failing sectors rather than attempt to fix one at a time. Simply pointing out the issues, bailing out an isolated sector, or supplying aid for short-term solutions that is subject to corrupt barriers will not significantly alter the growth prospects of Zimbabwe. The IMF and AfDB alongside current Zimbabwean authorities have conducted important research to identify the roots of the issues and outline the reforms necessary to tackle the assortment of crises they continue to face. If the action can be taken to stabilise their currency and FX markets, to fully account for the legacy of land reform, and to demonstrate accountability up to the highest level of leadership there is great hope for relief of debt arrears, future support from IFIs, and reengagement with the broader international community. Should all of these outcomes be achieved proficiently and in parallel, these reforms have the power to realise the standard of living promised to so many Zimbabweans for so long and to provide the stability required for the effective recovery and growth of the economy.

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Footnotes:

[1] Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail, London: Profile Books, 369-372.

[2] "GDP Per Capita (Current US$) - Botswana, Zimbabwe | Data,” Data.Worldbank.Org, accessed November 26, 2019.

[3] The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, “COHRE Mission Report Land Housing Property Rights Zimbabwe 2001,” Issuu.com, 2017, pp. 16, accessed November 26, 2019.

[4] Peter Greste, "Africa | Why Mugabe is deaf to the West," News.Bbc.Co.Uk, accessed November 26, 2019.

[5] Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, “Zimbabwe at a glance,” Fao.Org, accessed November 19, 2019.

[6] Steve H. Hanke, “New Hyperinflation Index (HHIZ) Puts Zimbabwe Inflation at 89.7 Sextillion Percent,” Cato.Org, accessed November 19, 2019.

[7] British Broadcasting Company, “Zimbabwe's Emmerson Mnangagwa criticised over poison claim,” Bbc.Com, accessed November 19, 2019.

[8] British Broadcasting Company, “Emmerson Mnangagwa: The 'crocodile' who snapped back,” Bbc.Com, accessed November 19, 2019.

[9] International Monetary Fund, "Zimbabwe And The IMF," Imf.Org, accessed November 26, 2019.

[10] "Zimbabwe And The IMF," Imf.Org.

[11] International Monetary Fund, “IMF Staff Concludes Visit for the Article IV Consultation and Discussions on the First Review of the Staff-Monitored Program to Zimbabwe,” Imf.Org, accessed November 26, 2019. 

[12] United Nations News, “Zimbabwe: Droughts leave millions food insecure, UN food agency scales up assistance,” News.UN.Org, accessed November 26, 2019.

[13] World Food Programme, “Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan (2017-2021),” Wft.Org, pp. 1, accessed November 26, 2019.

[14] MacDonald Dzirutwe, “Zimbabwe scraps bond-note dollar peg, paves way for exchange rate slide,” Reuters.Com, accessed November 26, 2019.

[15] Old Mutual Implied Rate, “Zimbabwe Dollar Implied Exchange Rate,” Omir.Today, accessed November 19, 2019.

[16] Ana Monteiro, “Zimbabwe Inflation Slows for Third Straight Month in September,” Bloomberg.Com, accessed November 26, 2019.

[17] Izabella Kaminska, “Mobile money is not helping,” FT.Com, accessed November 19, 2019.

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