Yasavī Sufi Shrine Influence on Geopolitics

“He appealed to the ruler of the age to hand over the governance of the people [él-ning yasag?n]. The ruler said reproachfully, “You seek the people as your disciples; endeavor to be good, and murīds will not be few. Let me be the first murīd.[1]

           Throughout the history of Sufism there have been intermittent periods when sūfī shaykhs had more authority over the people than the ruling elites. In the aforementioned quote it is possible to see a Yasavī Sūfī (‘Umar Ata) threaten to usurp the ruler. ‘Umar Ata had such an influence on the local population he was confident enough, that in this potential case of treason the populace would have supported him over the Khan. The Khan realizing the power the shaykh wielded made a compromise.  To satisfy the shaykh and still control the region, the ruler offered to be the first follower which allowed both the keep their respective powers, as well as, strengthen each other through legitimizing one another’s rightful positions.

“The preeminent of the saints was that King of Turkistan. The one whose light spreads over the face of the earth was the moon of Turkistan. ‘O young people, I will tell you this secret (of mine), listen well. The proper place (for me) to become an emperor was the place called Turkistan.”[2]

Generations after the death of Ahmad Yasavī his Sūfī order had a great influence on the founder of the Shaybanid dynasty. The influence of Yasaviyya on Mongolian prince Muhammad Shaybānī Khān lead to the Khan legitimizing Sūfī orders by mentioning the great influence of Ahmad Yasavī and his ideological and political foundations. By identifying relationship like Muhammad Shaybānī Khān’s with the Yasaviyya, I intend to look at the influence, mainly, of Yasavī Sūfī shrines and how pilgrimage would alter the balance of power between shaykh and khan in the Khorezm and Mawarannahr regions.

The Rise of Shrine and Ritual Importance

City and Ethnic Interaction:

The Central Asian region has hundreds of shrines, these shrines according to A?irbek Muminov’s one hundred most popular and revered sites in the mid-Syr Darya are; an overwhelming majority of tomb sites of prominent Muslims.[3] The tomb shrines can also be divided into six groups: Biblical and Quranic characters, Muhammad’s companions (a shāb), the “Bābids,” the “Yasavī’s,” eponyms of clans and tribes inhabiting the area (local shrines), and the “new generation.”[4] Since many shrines dedicated to a clans’ or tribes’ eponym, or the so called, “new generation” are not major influences on Central Asian geopolitics, so they will be ignored in this paper. Mostly, the “Bābids,” Yasavī, Naqshbandiyya, and Biblical and Quranic characters contributed the most to Syr Darya geopolitics. Although, all of these shrines usually have their sacred tradition and written sources on site and are commonly perceived by locals as “true” Islam.[5]  

           The rise of cities like Khiva, Turkestan, Samarkand, and Bukhara through their histories have cultivated a plethora of different rulers thus, building up the khanates individual identity and developing different cultures. These differences often created political tension between these competing cities which eventually brought military conflicts between khanates. Ultimately, with the increasing amount of religious travelers and settlers the cities began to gain religious attributes. As the cities accepted more religion through the centuries, tales of popular and influential religious figures would arise. The shrine of Ahmad Yasavī in Turkestan is a prime example of the rise of shrines dedicated to the spiritually powerful Sufi saints. After these shrines were built, they began to gain pilgrims and followers, to include religious leaders who would gain prestige among laymen through shrine visitation. As the layman began to respect and trust a shrines’ religious leader, the khans would ultimately become threatened.

           Several of the popular shrines located throughout different parts of the Syr Darya region would encourage all ethnic groups to make a pilgrimage; again, Ahmad Yasavī’s tomb shrine would draw all ethnic groups of Central Asia. With the increase in ethnic group interaction there would lead to a rise in ethnic culture clashes. Ildik? Bellér-Hann mentions this when she travels with a group of Uyghur women to the shrine of Ahmad Yasavī.

“An elderly Kazak beggar, dressed in dirty white clothes, approached a group of Uzbek female pilgrims sitting at the nearby table. The women refused to give him alms and chased him away. Our group invited him to join for a cup of tea.”[6]

  This interaction shows how one ethnic group of turned away a poor beggar. But, because of the nearby shrine of Ahmad Yasavī the other group felt compelled to help, although they are different ethnically and economically it was there religious duty to help another person in need. The ability of shrines to affect how people interact with each other was one of the major reasons why rulers would try to become murīds of popular Sufi leaders and get the blessings of the shrines’ Xwā?a. Sūfī Saint shrine sites enable transcendence ethnic and economic boundaries, allowing rulers to gain prestige among nomadic and sedentary groups traveling in and out of khanates. This idea would eventually become important to Central Asian nations after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Rituals:           

The legends of shrine sites invoke the strength the dead saints. The spiritual strength promoted at these shrines eventually caused the development of a set of rituals pilgrims would perform. The rituals would be relatively the same throughout Khorezm and Mawarannahr and included: listening to the recital of Quranic verses, presenting ceremonial fried cakes, bowing in front of the shrine, circling the saintly tomb, and finally praying to the saint and drinking the miraculous water from a nearby well.[7] Rituals performed at the shrines would have helped in establishing the relationship between the saints’ descendants and pilgrims. Another form of rituals, according to Azim Malikov are: pilgrims walking around the sanctuary specifying appeals to the saint, touching the grave, threshold, flags, lamps, and trees; then they would pass a hand over their face and eyes, place a rag on flags (tug- a high wooden pole, the upper part is crowned with a knob shaped as an open palm or medallion representing a semi-blossomed bud[8]; this would be placed nearby shrine sites to let pilgrims and passerby’s know that nearby had a sacred site), trees, or bushes, and lastly sacrifice a lamb or kid.[9] These rituals would be passed on from generation to generation and according to Devin Deweese, Yasavī Sūfī’s would express their political and social role through intimate bonds with local communities.[10] Through shrine pilgrimage the Sūfī shaykhs would develop these bonds, especially with pious rulers who would also make shrine pilgrimages. With rulers attending Sufis shrines like that of Sayyid Ata’s, were able to exert their political[11] influence through this association. This also brought widespread recognition of shrines regionally and locally thus, transforming the socio-religious identity of Central Asia.

           Shrine rituals would also influence geopolitics because the increase in trade at markets selling to pilgrims. Nearby shrine markets would attract people from all regions which would again concern rulers because the population changes. Shaykhs would also have the opportunity to gain more influence among laymen. The markets would provide many of the ritual necessities to pilgrims such as tugs, sacrificial sheep and goats, and religious medallions to protect against the evil eye and jinn’s. As the shrines grew and the sedentary population increased interactions with nomadic groups increased which introduced the Sūfī shrines’ importance. Because these markets relied on the charisma of shaykhs, Sufism began to provide the focal point for communities to build their local identities; and if ignored long enough the community began to question the Khans’ rule. When this occurred there was a possibility the Khan would become the Shaykhs’ first murīd or expel the shaykh from the khanate.

Shaykh/Khan Competition:   

As the competition between the Khan and Shaykhs increased, the Khans would feel the pressure from the Shaykhs and their murīds. Devin Deweese mentions, a time in Yasavī history when tensions between Yasavī shaykh Kojah Bahā’ al-Dīn aroused the suspicions of a ruler[12] because of his ability to attract murīds. At this time the ruler had fears of losing nomads (his source of military power) to the charismatic Sufi shaykh.  In the case mentioned the Khan ultimately expelled the shaykh from the region. By expelling shaykhs the Khans were inadvertently spreading their regional religous culture. Although, the religious culture spread was most likely negative (for the Khan) because expelled shyakhs would attract followers from their previous centers of worship thus, decreasing the Khans population. These expulsions allowed for a new shaykh to attain power from the Khan, and allow the Khan the opportunity to show the community he was a murīd of the new shaykh. 

           Another case when the Shaykhs political power overwhelmed the ruler was during the Ashtarkānid Dynasty (1599-1747).[13]  This involved Bahā al-Dīn who used his political standing to help a Khorezm Khan seize Bukhara. With the shaykhs local power base and apparent disagreement with the Bukharan Khan ‘Abd al-‘Azīz he thought it was in his best interest to aide in overthrowing this khan because of the local rulers’ cruelty. In the helping the Khorezm Khan Bahā al-Dīn choose the wrong side and was ultimately uncovered by Khan ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s men and was executed. This example Shaykh can be seen as responsible for purifying politics by following Islamic law and controlling the moral purity of the Khan.

Shrine Sites:

Shrine sites of popular Sufi saints were usually associated with “sacred trees, bushes, a rock of strange shape, and sometimes sacred ponds or wells.”[14]  A couple of examples are the mountain near Sayram named after Mansur Ata, which one time possibly held his shrine and Tashkent which is associated with the saint Ahmad Yasavī.[15] These sites usually gained popularity through word of mouth by respected locals. Bellér-Hann mentions that a local healer (qumilaq?i) was able to pass the word of Sūfī shrines to her pious clients.[16] The healer’s position as a respected community leader also encouraged her to lead a group to shrine sites in the Syr Darya valley.

Using names and episodes that were widely familiar and already accepted in a similar context would heighten the credibility… names and narratives linked to local shrines.[17]

These well-known sacred shrine sites would attract many people from all reaches of Central Asia; most would come with urgent questions on life. At, these shrines Xwā?a would watch the pilgrims perform the rituals and scold them for improper behavior while in the shrine complex. Many pilgrims would go to increase their religious prestige, promote health, and wealth.  But, to go to distant shrines with increased cost could be excessive to many people; causing this category of people to travel in groups to lower the overall cost of travel and ritual necessities (which included donations to the shrine, sacrificial meals, and buying rags). This would allow many pilgrims to make multiple trips to tombs such as Ahmad Yasavī’s in Tashkent; which Muminov mentions, that at least two trips would equal one Haj to Mecca,[18] though this is debatable as the Encyclopedia of Islam mentions, that the tomb site of Bakhauddin Naqshband is considered the “little pilgrimage” to Mecca. Once at these shrines many pilgrims would encounter the ?irak?i (the watchman, usually a hereditary descendant of the saint) who could also be the Xwā?a (a hereditary ancestor of the shrine).  The Xwā?a would also ensure that clans and tribes voluntary donations would benefit the shrine.[19]  As tribes gave alms voluntarily to shrine sites there was reason for Khans to approach shaykhs at certain sites with extreme caution.  

Sufi Order Might:

Sufi orders have traditionally held supreme authority among the population because people have been hesitant to turn to formal, state supervised clerics for religious guidance.[20]  

This statement has held true through the centuries of sūfī history. This is particularly vivid during Russian and Soviet administrations trying to control the local population through official religious leaders.  During the early part of Russian rule you can see Khans using sufi’s for political and religious legitimization (except when the Khan was a sūfī enthroned by followers) to influence and organize protests against Russian rule. Several uprisings and rebellions revolved around local religious leaders, such as, Duchi Ishan and the beginning of the Basmachi Movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Ultimately, the Russian/Soviet rule over Central Asia was one of the periods in Sūfī history in which Sufi orders were denounced by the ruling government; although many local traditions and practices were continued underground.

Popular pilgrimage to shrine sites of saints, learned scholars, local rulers, and pre-Islamic figures has often given power to various cities in Central Asia. Ahmad Yasavī’s shrine in Tashkent, Bahauddin Naqshband’s shrine in Bukhara, and the Djakardiza graveyard in Samarqand wherein lies theologians Abu Mansur al-Moturidi and Burkhan ad-din al-Marghinani are buried, drew many pilgrims thus developing these cities into religious and political centers. These shrines provided the cities increased competition with each other; because Bukhara, Samarqand, and Khiva were in constant political and cultural turmoil with each other, pilgrims going to each city would influence geopolitics. Although, depending on the grandeur of the shrine and prestige of the saint in the mausoleum, the shaykhs and khans would be able to attract pilgrims and possibly influence the pilgrims to stay or move to the city. To increase the glamour of the shrines Khans that considered themselves first murīds or shayks would often have tombs located at or near shrines. As Eugene Schuyler notes in his travelogue of Turkestan while at Ahmad Yasavī’s shrine: “right and left are rooms filled with tombs of various Kirgzhiz Sultans of the Middle and Lesser Hordes, among them the celebrated Ablai Khans… at the back of the building are the tombs of Ahmad Yasavī and his family.”[21]

With the development and rise of Yasavī Sufi communities in Central Asian, Islam was able to gain a toehold and grow into the identity of local cultures. As the cultures gained strength and the great Khans and religiously powerful shaykhs passed away shrines grew throughout Khorezm and Mawarannahr. As Shrine sites attracted pilgrims from all over and the popularity of Sufi order’s gained more followers, the Khans would at points become threatened. Many times there was a compromise with powerful shaykhs and Khans which eventually lead to the development of Khans and Shaykhs legitimizing each other’s right to power. The legitimizing appears to have the Khan becoming a murīd of the Shaykh and the Khan allowing the Shaykh to live or stay in his current role.

Contemporary shrine influence

 During the decline of imperial Russia and the Soviet period the Russian administration did all it could to disrupt Islam’s influence in Central Asia. As noted earlier this caused the rise of Dachi Ishan’s Andijan Uprising and the development of the early Basmachi Movement. These movements rose because the deterioration of Islam through the nationalization of waqf properties and closing of khanaqas; this caused the movements leaders to feel that the Russian administration was promoting brigands, immoral behavior, and causing shaykhs to lose their social status among the population. Though the Russians realized through these movements they could not close the most scared pilgrimages for fear of increased regional uprising. 

Central Asian republics in the post-Soviet period…have sought to curb Islamist trends by promoting a vision of Islam, intimately connected to Sufism.[22]

In the post-Soviet Russia and with the rise of radical Islam (Wahabbism) newly independent Central Asian nations returned to Sufism to help give their nation and people a national identity. During this period modern Central Asian nations began to look at their history to restore a national identity and one of the figures they looked at was Ahmad Yasavī because he was one of the first to open Islam; bringing Central Asian Turks into one cultural sphere with higher progressive values in all segments of life, moral, cultural, social, and economical.[23] During this period politics and religion began to transform tribal differences because sūfī shayks were bringing people together and after centuries shrine sites would unite more tribes. Currently, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Tajikistan are trying to use shrines to encourage patriotism while still promoting Islam.

With Khoja communities around shrine sites being able to transcend neighborhoods, territorial borders, sovereign nations, and interactional boundaries current leaders realized, that through the loose of identity during Russian rule this would be a good way to build a new identity. As in ancient times Yasavī Sufism connected rulers to the people and city dwellers to nomads, contemporary leaders hoped to use Sufism again to connect religious layman with the government by establishing religious schools and to connect metropolis’ with smaller towns. One of the ways the governments encouraged this was to rebuild old decrepit shrine sites.

Although the use of Sufism as a political tool comes with a price, Martha Brill Olcott says, the expense of the emphasis on morality and spirituality that defined early Sufism. These changes weakened the organizational structure of the Sufi orders and promoted their merger with the state.[24] Specifically this can be seen in Tajikistan where the government and religious leaders choose to use veneration of local saints and shrine pilgrimage to fight against “extremism.”[25] Through giving up some moral and spiritual decisions to the state religious leaders are legitimizing the government while at the same time losing prestige and respect among layman. From a political point of view this takes the power out of a single religious leader thus stabilizing the region and preventing the rises of Shaykh Khans like Duchi Ishan.

As Central Asian governments set restrictions on religious leaders they realized that Sufi shrine worship and Islam were becoming synonymous. As shrine sites attracted followers the governments began to rebuild these sites to also attract Sufi followers from other nearby countries such as China and Turkey. Kazakhstan had particularly taken this step when building the shrine of R?yim Batir as part of their effort to construct a national history[26] and the rebuilding of the Ahmad Yasavī’s shrine in Turkistan. Because of the importance of Ahmad Yasavī’s shrine, Kazakhstan received financial support from a Turkish nongovernmental organization, as well as, a construction crew. Rebuilding and building of shrine sites affected the geopolitics of Central Asia because nations would reach out to the international community for help. The rebuilding also encouraged the Kazakh government to approach Turkey for help financially, to rebuilding Ahmad Yasavī’s daughter’s (Jawhar anam) shrine.

Central Asian nations approaching the international community for shrine support brought a new level of influence from the shrine sites. The international attention the shrine sites gained not only brought attention but influenced nations to give financial support for rebuilding and interest from scholars who are helping build Central Asian national histories. According to O’Dell, western scholars and politicians suggested Sufism should be encouraged in Central Asia to combat extreme ideologies.[27] The current “War on Terror” has even provided discussion between nations on how to promote Sufi shrine pilgrimage as a cure to Wahabbi and Salafi Islam. As policy makers work together to fight extremist in Central Asia and worldwide they are trying to promote Sufism through literature, education, and renovating Sufi shrines, while at the same time trying not to overtly control Sufism to prevent violent backlashes against shrines and governments.

To help protect against backlashes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was created to prevent extremism in Central Asia and helps to promote national identity, economic support, and promote tourism. Particularly Kazakhstan uses the shrine of Ahmad Yasavī to encourage international tourism through shrine pilgrimage, since pilgrimage in Islamic societies constitutes a form of social action. Bellér-Hann describes this type of international cooperation between China and Kazakhstan. She mentions how a group of Uyghur women prepared for a pilgrimage to the shrine of Ahmad Yasavī in Turkestan by first going to local Sūfī shrines in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. These local shrine visits would train pilgrims in rituals, as well as prepare them for the spiritual experience and ethnic interaction in foreign nations at popular shrine sites. Using the shrine sites as a cure against extreme ideologies works as Bellér-Hann discovered on her pilgrimage into Kazakhstan when she noticed religion appeared to transcend ethnic boundaries and “that in multi-ethnic Kazakhstan what mattered was common, shared Islamic tradition.”[28] This rite of passage was felt once pilgrims would return home and gain attention of their communities. Ultimately, Bellér-Hann believes that the shrines reinforced ethnic boundaries and separation of gender identity especially at shrines since many groups would identify the Sūfī saint as one of their ethnic group (sometimes miraculously the saint would mention their ethnic affiliation).

The combination of the fall of Soviet Russia and the rise of extreme ideologies in Central Asia revived shrine visitation because of the shrines ability to bring different groups together for a common belief. The fifty years of Soviet rule brought a decline in common identity from groups in Khorezm and Mawarannahr. But, after the Soviet Union broke apart newly created Central Asian nation began to rely on Sufi shrine pilgrimage to rebuild national identities. Additionally, the rise of extremist groups in the area aided to governments decisions in using the influential shrine sites (particular shrines used where Ahmad Yasavī’s and Bahauddin Naqshband’s) to build national identity. 

           After the Soviet Union dissolved the khan/shaykh relationship would be revived and would be vital to the establishment of the newly formed Central Asian countries national identity. As Central Asian began to reestablish their national identity they looked at their past. But, unlike the Khans of old the new leaders ensured that the Shaykhs would not be able to gain popularity and threaten their rule; this was controlled through the establishment of religious committees. Also, the fledgling governments began to use shrines from popular Sufi saints. The shrines were used as a gathering point by the government which, ultimately led to the shrines influencing the political powers to reach out to the international community. As Central Asian nations reached out to rebuild old shrines and build new ones world policy makers began to come together to help develop the Sufi shrine sites to combat extremist ideologies in the region. The rise of shrine pilgrimage has even begun to spread to Northern Afghanistan; when the Taliban controlled the country and territory they did not promote Sufism as Islam. Now that Central Asian nations have promoted shrine pilgrimage and defeat of Taliban forces Sūfī practitioners are no longer fearful of shrine pilgrimage for worship. This fear was defeated by the rise of spiritual experiences and shrines’ ability to help people solve life’s questions. It is possible that shrine influence to build national identity in other Central Asian nations has led to the revival of shrine pilgrimage in places were shrine visitation was previously condemned.

Throughout this paper I attempted to display that Yasavī Sūfī saint shrine pilgrimage influenced the geopolitics in Central Asia. Although, the Yasavī order initiated this unintentionally, they were the first to have popular shrine pilgrimage that influenced geopolitics. Looking at the history of Central Asia one can see that as Yasavī Sufism gained popularity among the masses, the Khans at certain periods would feel threatened and react one of two ways (become first murīd or deal the offending shaykh a harsh blow). As shrine sites became more numerous and pilgrims from all of Central Asia traveled between Khanates the possibility of population shifts would threaten the Khans power, this especially holds true among the nomadic populations. Because nomads controlled considerable military and political power Khans would become threatened when regional Shaykhs would begin to gain more power than the Khan. Eventually the rise of the Khan becoming the first murīd developed to place the Khan as the mediator of the people to the Shaykh.  Then during the Russian and Soviet eras shaykhs would play a role in uprising against the government in protest of un-Islamic ethics. Once the Soviet Union dissolved the neophyte nations would again turn to shrine sites as a source to rebuild their lost identities and also to combat regional extremist ideologies (particularly Wahabbi, Salafi[29]) and the Taliban.  Ultimately, the relationship of khan and shaykh would transform into the Shaykh and the Khan legitimizing each other which would later transform into government and religion legitimizing each other while recognizing the importance of shrine visitation.