X-Raying the Greek Election

The election due to be held this Sunday, May 21st, in Greece is very hard to predict due to several particularities. Firstly, it is the first election in three decades whereby two prime ministers (current and former) are contesting with the people getting to have a say on whose term yielded the most beneficiary results for them and the country. Secondly, the election will be held with a proportional system of seat allocation without any bonus seats awarded to the first party, as is the case in most Greek elections and has consecutively been so since 2009. Given that partisan feeling is high among political bigwigs, it is all but certain that the country will go to the polls again, probably in July, with a reformed electoral law, which will give the ability to the winning party to form a parliamentary majority with a plurality of electoral votes. With a second vote looming, turnout might be lower than usual as many voters will assume that a second election is on its way and that participating in this first ballot is unworthy of their time and energy.

Thirdly and most importantly, it is the first time in the political era called Metapolítefsi (and which started with the fall of a military junta, in 1974), when a recognisable political party is explicitly banned from contesting the election by law. Greeks-National Party, the political successor of the neo-nazi criminal group Golden Dawn, and whose leader, Ilias Kasidiaris, is behind bars serving a lengthy prison sentence, was consistently polling at around 3%, the threshold for entering Parliament, when it was banned from running on May 3, just under three weeks before the election. The supporters of this party are mainly protest voters that will now be forced to chose another political outlet to express their wrath against what they perceive as a "rotten" and "unpatriotic" system; it is too precarious to say for whom their vote will be now cast.

On top of this small portion of the electorate that has now been deprived of its partisan affiliation, there is another sixth of the general population of the country that remains undecided on which party to vote. Despite the fact that the amount of undecided voters is obviously shrinking, it might be the case that one in ten Greeks decide what to vote at the polling station or the day before the election. These people, disillusioned by Syriza, the main left-wing challenger of ruling right-of-center New Democracy party, are weary of handing the government an easy re-election, especially after the horrific railway accident which occurred at the outskirts of Larissa, a town in central Greece, costing the lives of more than 50 people, mostly university students, and sparked large protests and still haunt the generation of university student parents: it is characteristic that the main demographic shift that pollsters noted right after the accident was a 10-point fall of the liberal-conservative government's popularity in the age group of 55-60 year-olds. Nonetheless the so-called "Tempi tragedy" (named after the exact location of the crash), is not enough to shift the early gen-X voters to the left: political polarisation is evident in Greece, with voters disillusioned from New Democracy and Syriza opting for smaller, right-wing or left-wing outlets respectively. Insofar as the young are concerned, anti-systemic vote is on the rise, with former Economy Minister Yanis Varoufakis and his party, DiEM25, polling at a percentage more than triple of that he got in the last election, in 2019, and with an astonishing share of the gen-Z vote on the verge of supporting jailed Kasidiaris or its affiliate EAN party, despite Mr. Kasidiaris' conviction for criminal gang coordination.

In this awkward political landscape, this article will dare to come to some conclusions insofar as the election result anticipated is concerned, mainly based on regional polls, released in late April by Kathimeriní, a large news outlet, as well as recent trends, historical trajectories, the political gravitas of candidates and the continuous feed from the news cycle, which, before an election, is always very dense in Greece.

The North

Starting off north, at the Greco-Turkish border province of Evros, New Democracy has a historical tendency of punching upwards of its Panhellenic weight, with the 2019 election giving the party a twenty point lead over rival Syriza, at 45%. Polls have shown that both big parties have suffered significant losses at this important region, which includes the port city of Alexandroupolis, strategically important for NATO in its efforts to support embattled Ukraine. Due to its being a border province, the nationalist stripe of the right-wing dominates the political landscape, a fact that translated to what was to be Mr. Kasidiaris' largest vote share in the country at around 8%. With this prospect now scrapped, and with a border wall with Turkey, which will prevent migrant flows and hybrid warfare under construction, it is highly likely that these voters will return to New Democracy, especially in view of the fact that Syriza has consistently had an ambivalent stance on the border wall and has boycotted it gaining European support and funding, at EU Parliament debates and public discourse. The Prime Minister, Kyriacos Mitsotakis will also be on the ballot to bolster government support. Syriza therefore will greatly underperform in the region, benefitting the erstwhile powerful PASOK, a socialist party that had ruled the country for twenty years before seeing its vote share plummet in 2012, which in supporting the wall projects itself as a more sensible and patriotic left-wing alternative than Syriza.

Moving westwards, Rhodope and Xanthi are two provinces of Thrace with the unique feature of being populated by both christian and muslim indigenous populations. The muslim minority is traditionally leaning to the left, while Christians tend to rally round the flag of more right-wing options. Since strong Muslim candidates are included in both the party-lists of Syriza and of PASOK, the Muslim vote will most probably be split, benefitting New Democracy, without the latter necessarily gaining voters but rather holding on to its 2019 base. Particularly Rhodope will be an interesting race, where Ilhan Ahmet, a secular Muslim hailing from PASOK, appeals to both religious communities and opposes to the influential consulate of Turkey in the region, which is always inclined to interfere in the politics of the minority.

In Drama and Kavala as well as in the far-north provinces of Kilkis and Pellas, in Macedonia, the political landscape seems similar to that of Evros, with traditional left-of-centre voters splitting between Syriza and PASOK, inclined by both the refugee crisis that the country experienced in 2015-16 and by the memory of the Prespa Agreement of 2018, which was regarded by many as a retreat for Greek diplomacy, as it awarded to North Macedonia concessions that are thought by a great part of the electorate as far more generous than what history should permit.

A million votes up for grabs

Then comes Thessaloniki and its penumbral provinces, Serres, Chalkidiki and Imathia. Being the second largest city of the country, and through time neglected by an over-centralised government system based in Athens, the two electoral prefectures of Thessaloniki (A and B) were traditionally regarded as strongholds of New Democracy. The same went with Serres, the birthplace of the party's founder, Constantine Karamanlis, the longest serving Greek prime minister, and with Chalkidiki, to the metropolitan area's south, with a tourism-driven economy. The picture today however is different. Thessaloniki A, the largest prefecture of Central Macedonia, with around a million voters, will be too close to call. Bearing in mind that in 2019 and despite the infamous Prespa Agreement and the austerity measures imposed at the time, Syriza got an astonishingly high 30% of the votes cast with New Democracy at 35% and below its national average, the battle for the capital of Northern Greece will be tight. Mr. Tsipras' showing at his last pre-election speech in the city was fairly strong. It is likely though that the government will continue to have a narrow edge over the opposition, given that the prime minister himself is a candidate in that constituency, a factor that may rally some voters. Thessaloniki B will also see a fall in New Democracy's vote share, with many voters presumably casting their votes for hard-right parties, such as Kyriakos Velopoulos' Greek Solution, a small nationalist party with established roots in Macedonia.

Serres, erstwhile the bastion of New Democracy, will also be a challenging race featuring former prime minster Alexis Tsipras against the fallen-from-grace minister of public transport who oversaw the Tempi tragedy, Kostas Karamanlis, the party founder's nephew. Although it is very unlikely that Syriza will prevail, the constituency will be much more competitive than usual, with the government's lead narrowed significantly compared to previous elections. By contrast, Chalkidiki, a great beneficiary of Greece's tourism sector roaring post-pandemic comeback, and Imathia, will most likely reliably remain strongholds of New Democracy, with no serious indication suggesting otherwise. The same goes for nearby constituencies of Grevena, which yields only a single member of Parliament, and in the small coastline region of Pieria, where things also seem to remain more or less the same as in the last election cycle.

Industrial Mainland

Western Macedonia is a tricky prefecture of the country. Many constituencies have voted for Syriza before and could potentially do so again, if it promises to save jobs that will most likely be cut due to the energy transition away from fossil fuels. Large energy-production facilities in Kozani will eventually close, if Greece is to meet its carbon neutrality targets, having as a result a potentially discouraging result for the governing party, out of fear of income losses. Kastoria and Florina, two other scarcely populated constituencies of the region, have been heavily affected by the Russo-Ukrainian war; the main industry of those provinces was production and export of fur goods to Russia, now in essence eliminated due to European sanctions against the Kremlin aggressors. This suggests that many voters of the ruling party will shift to Mr. Velopoulos' party, which is apparently pro-Russia and advocates for Greek neutrality in the conflict. The flow of voters towards the latter party will be more limited in Kastoria than in Florina, which also has a strong left-wing audience.

The Far West

In Epirus lies one of Syriza's strongholds: Arta, wherefrom the party leader's family hails from. The constituency will remain reliably in Syriza hands, unlike nearby provinces of Thesprotia and Preveza, which will most likely be retained by New Democracy, with the asterisk of an augmented PASOK presence sensed by regional polls in the former region. Lastly, in the city of Ioannina, the election will be fought in the shadow of Moses Elisaf's passing, the town's popular first Jew mayor. A respected figure by both New Democracy and PASOK and a political bridge-maker, Elisaf may leave his mark in this election, for both of these parties will claim the fruit of his productive tenure and positive legacy. It is therefore unlikely that Ioannina will flip to the left.

Spotlight at the Centre

Central Greece most probably will not render any surprises: both main parties will retain their positions, albeit weakened by the rise of smaller groupings, of which there are more than twenty, this time round. Larissa and Karditsa, in the heartland of Thessaly's plains will remain solidly blue, as will also do Evrytania, a small mountainous constituency, where the Prime Minister's nephew, currently the Mayor of Athens, has long-dating family roots. Trikala, a pioneering technology hub in the region, which has largely benefitted by Mr. Mitsotakis' pro-business agenda, will also renew its support to the ruling party. Magnesia though will be closer to call, with the mostly urban population of its port-city Volos being more equally split between the two main parties. In Fthiotis and Fokis, the ruling party is likely to retain the lead with socialist PASOK making noticeable gains. Boetia however, the part of Central Greece closer to Attica, is quite close to call; for long a socialist stronghold, the province has significant communist presence thanks to the party's general secretary who was born there, and may flip to Syriza, in the event of an outflow of disillusioned right-wingers towards Greek Solution party or other smaller nationalist outlets. A victorious strike is also likely to be delivered by Syriza in the island province of Evia, which was greatly plagued by the 2021 wildfires and has not quite recovered since. The left will grow its vote share on the island with gains possible also for PASOK and for the Course of Freedom, an extra-parliamentary patriotic left party, led by barrister Zoe Konstantopoulou, who also hails from the region. Mrs. Konstantopoulou is also likely to enjoy some popularity in Boetia and in the Peloponnese, as well as in Crete, where Nazi Germany committed war crimes in the last world war, for which the leftist leader and former Speaker of Parliament has pledged to deliver reparations, a cause she has fought for since 2000.

A Tied Archipelago

In the Ionian sea the vote share of PASOK is reportedly on the rise, whereas also there is a significant presence of the Greek Communist Party, depriving Syriza of important votes. Zante and Lefkada will most likely remain in New Democracy's hands for these reasons, the first due to an inflated communist presence and the second due to a similar punch of PASOK significantly above its weight. Notably, Lefkada was one of the first provinces to flip away from Syriza, after the party signed the country's infamous third bailout package, in Summer 2015. Cephalonia is an island more difficult to call for either big party, with its traditional divide between left-leaning Lixouri and right-leaning Argostoli hamlets. A looser turnout might also benefit smaller parties making the island an electoral tossup. Things are more predictable in Corfu, where New Democracy overtook Syriza by just a percentage point in 2019. It is highly likely that the island, the largest of the archipelago, will this time yield a narrow victory to Syriza. A seemingly unpopular regional Governor, affiliated to New Democracy may also contribute to this direction.

A Divided South

Moving on to the West of Greece and to Peloponnese, we find some die-hard New Democracy strongholds such as Lakonia, where the emblematic towns of Sparta and Mani are found, or Messinia, the constituency of former Prime Minister Antonis Samaras, an MP elected there since 1977. Corinth, Argolis and Arcadia are usually swing provinces. The first has an increasing presence of the far-right that might narrow the lead traditionally enjoyed by New Democracy; the second is more reliably blue whereas the third, formerly a constituency manifold won over by PASOK, may see the socialist party regaining ground, rendering worse results for both New Democracy and Syriza. To the West, the city of Patras, won by Syriza with a twelve point lead in 2019, will most probably remain to the left's hands but modestly so; Patras is the ancestral seat of the Papandreou family, which has given the country three left-of-centre prime ministers since 1944, and among them PASOK's founder and his son, also a former PM, contesting again for a parliamentary seat. If projections that PASOK's nationwide figures will be higher than in 2019, then it is certain that the region will contribute quite a bit to the Socialists' comeback. In the north of Patras, lies the province of Aetoloakarnania and in the south, the province of Ilia. Both of them, were formerly PASOK strongholds, won over by New Democracy in the last election cycle. In both regions, things will be tough for the ruling party; the former's electoral contest will feature another controversial former government minister, Spilios Livanos, who was ousted from the cabinet in 2021, whereas the latter will feature a former EU Commissioner and popular two-term Mayor of Athens, Dimitri Avramopoulos, a political maverick. Given Aetoloakarnania's "swing-state" tendency and its significantly young population, it would be safe to say that if New Democracy manages to win again, it won't be with a lead larger than 3-4 percentage points. Whereas, in Ilia, a region which gave to PASOK one of its largest vote shares in 2019, the gravitas of the former Commissioner may contribute to its remaining on the conservatives' side, albeit with a razor thin margin. Had it not been for his prominent candidacy, the race would be a tossup, since it was only won by New Democracy by one percentage point in the last election.

An Island Repainted?

In Crete, a bastion of the traditional socialist left, two "royal battles" will set the tone: the first will be in Iraklion, the birthplace of the current leader of PASOK, Nikos Androulakis, where his father too is a prominent party figure. Won by Syriza by its largest margin in the last election, Androulakis' presence will surely weigh in, yielding to the radical left a slimmed-down victory. The other battle will be fought between the prime minister's sister, former Foreign Minister (and Mayor of Athens between 2003 and 2006) Dora Bakoyannis and one of Syriza's most controversial yet polarising figures, former Alternate Minister for Health (and Mayor of Sfakia between 2011 and 2015), Pavlos Polakis. Chania, the ancestral seat of the Venizelos-Mitsotakis family, may this time give New Democracy first place, considering the significant grassroots work of Mrs. Bakoyannis and her iron-lady-posture compared to the weak position of Mr. Polakis whose relations with his party almost reached breaking point in February this year. Nonetheless, the battle will be close, Syriza having won by a slim edge last time round. In Rethymno and Lasithi, it is likely that due to PASOK's overwhelming presence, which also has a historical dimension attached to it, New Democracy will take the lead, if it manages to retain the vote share that it got in 2019. In any case, Crete will also give Mr. Varoufakis a significant percentage, far higher than his nationwide average, at about 7% or more, stemming from the anti-systemic comportment of many Cretans, his own Cretan pedigree and his enduring presence in regional media.

Growing, growing

In the Aegean Sea, New Democracy will most likely run triumphant. Overall growth in the Cyclades and the Dodecanese, which markedly drove up local income, the government's tough stance on illegal migration and on Turkish aggression, especially when things seemed to head down to their darkest hour in Summer 2020, will be quantified at the ballot box. Similarly, Chios, of the Northern Aegean islands, a bastion of the right-wing will continue on worthy of its title. The vote will however be split in Samos and Ikaria where the Communist Party has usually its strongest performance, being formerly a lieu d' exil during the country's civil war (1946-49). With PASOK back on the rise and with Syriza possibly retaining its percentage or suffering losses towards Mr. Varoufakis, on its left, the news for the centre-right might not be jolly. Lastly, in Lesvos, the island that suffered the most from the migrant crisis, scepticism will influence the vote as the region has garnered bad publicity worldwide and thus is not quite capitalising on the growth of tourism, despite of significant infrastructure projects that have been completed in recent years. Lesvos will likely not switch to Syriza but the lead of the ruling party is expected to be slimmer.

The Great Game

Intentionally, Attica, which hosts a third of the country's permanent residents, was left to be considered last and with maybe more carefully. Starting from Athens A constituency, which encompasses the municipality of Athens proper, a slight swing to the left might occur, without particular cost incurred by New Democracy which will most likely retain first place, albeit with some of its voters fleeing to more right-wing fringe parties, for reasons of enduring lack of safety, rising criminality, growing immigrant influx etc. The governing party's local electoral list includes the popular minister for digital transformation, Kyriacos Pierrakakis, who is credited for effectively tackling to a great extent the country's intolerable bureaucracy, as well as former minister for Tourism, Olga Kefaloyannis who enjoys substantial personal popularity. The affluent Northern Suburbs, the population of which was struck hard by the Tempi tragedy, will most likely "forgive" the centre-right and grant it a second chance for fear of a rewind to the previous leftist administration, which was characterised by heavy taxation, especially for the upper middle class. Many government bigwigs will steal the show from the opposition, including development and investment minister, Adonis Georgiades, a party firebrand.

In the West Suburbs however it might be the case that Syriza will achieve its biggest electoral win, with an abundance of party bigwigs running in the constituency: the party's list includes Yannis Dragasakis, a former vice-president of the Syriza cabinet, Effie Achtsioglou, a dynamic former employment minister and Rena Dourou, formerly the Governor of Attica, and heir presumptive to Mr. Tsipras until she fell from grace after the Mati wildfire catastrophe, in 2018. The Southern Suburbs, a rare mix of affluent urbanites and proletarian workforce will be a more challenging arena for all contestants. New Democracy is likely to have the lead but inroads will be made by both PASOK and Syriza. The ruling party's main asset in this electoral constituency is Nikos Dendias, the wildly popular foreign minister, who is expected to garner the most votes probably of all MPs country-wide. In both the West and the South the presence of the Communist party is also notable and might increase.

In the port city of Piraeus (Piraeus A constituency), the right-wing still remains dominant, with Mr. Mitsotakis' party remaining unfettered and bolstered by increasing foreign investment and enduring anti-Syriza sentiment in its predominantly commerce-based middle class. Gains are to be made however by both the Communist party and Greek Solution, to which political anger is likely to be channeled, especially in view of a staggering absence of strong candidates on the part of Syriza. The working-class bastion of Piraeus B might be an electoral surprise: despite the fact that Syriza will retain first place, it is possible that New Democracy enjoys important gains due to the revival of the ship-building industry after a decade of precariousness and high unemployment. The far-left and far-right will also benefit though especially from disillusioned voters that are still lagging under the poverty threshold, with the Communist party enjoying traditionally high popularity.

Lastly, come the suburban regions of Western and Eastern Attica. The West, more industrial and with households of less-than-median income, is likely to be retained by the Left, with far-right outlets also having a good shot at enlarging their vote share. Working class voters from minoritarian background might contribute to this result. The East on the other hand, more affluent and rapidly developing, will be an easy win for the ruling party, which has to present three ministerial candidates with national recognition, including political heavyweight Makis Voridis, the interior minister, while Syriza finds itself in an enfeebled position, disgraced by including in its list a former spokesperson for a New Democracy cabinet (2008-09), Evangelos Antonaros.

Vote!

Overall, adding all the aforementioned up and bearing in mind that the election will be contested by thirty-six parties and alliances (an unprecedented number bar the elections of May 2012), leads to the conclusion that governing New Democracy has a head-start of approximately five percentage points over left-wing Syriza. More specifically, New Democracy will easily win upwards of a 33% share of the vote. Syriza will not see its own support falling at less than 28%; nonetheless, considering that the last days before the elections are decisive, the party's potential to reach 30% might be severely damaged, if the wrong words are spoken or the wrong points are raised. The recent Katrougalos debacle, for example, whereby the former Syriza minister supported reinstating a very unpopular public insurance and pension law, may single-handedly have discarded any chance of Syriza tying the race with New Democracy. PASOK is sensed to hover just above 10%, placed in a better position than in 2019, but without the over-performance thought of when Mr. Androulakis first sat as his president, in late 2021. The Communist Party will secure the vote of its traditional base of 5-6%, whereas the small parliamentary outlets of Mr. Velopoulos and Mr. Varoufakis will likely exceed 4% each, despite voters recently discovering yet smaller parties in the far-right and far-left respectively, such as Niki and EAN on the right, or the party of Ms. Konstantopoulou on the left. Of those parties outside of parliament, the latter's Course of Freedom has the best chance of entering parliament on just over 3%, due to rapidly growing political clout in recent weeks. If a seven-party parliament emerges, she will be its seventh party leader. By contrast, the neo-liberal alliance of Thanos Tzimeros and Failos Kranidiotis, called National Recreation, originally projected at 2% will most probably underperform, with its voters realigning with Mr. Mitsotakis at the last moment. Smaller parties, including Niki (a religious conservative bunch), EAN (affiliated to Mr. Kasidiaris) or Antarsya (an anarchist-communist grouping) will secure no more than one percentage point.

With the election season coming to a close (at least for now), we offer our sincerest wishes to all candidates running and openly call upon everyone to perform their civic duty, participating in the largest democratic exercise in our polity. No vote must be spared, for democracy is never to be taken for granted.