WW2 Arguments in favour of appeasement and their relevance to Ukraine today

In a Wall Street Journal article published today called “Trump’s Churchillian Option for Peace in Ukraine”, Margus Tsahkna, Estonia’s foreign minister, writes:

“If President-elect Donald Trump repeats the errors of 1938 he’ll leave America weakened and poorer and its enemies emboldened... Chamberlain made concessions to Adolf Hitler for the sake of peace, but as Churchill argued at the time, forcing Czechoslovakia to concede territories inhabited by Sudeten Germans to Germany only emboldened Hitler. To a dictator spurred by imperialist ideas, such acquiescence only demonstrated weakness and encouraged him to demand even more. It is the same with Vladimir Putin... A clear victory for Ukraine would prove that the U.S. and its allies are strong enough to counter the growing military and diplomatic challenges worldwide...”

Many WSJ readers who commented on the article vehemently objected to the implicit suggestion a clear victory for Ukraine remains possible without an enormously unpopular increase in America’s involvement and even a potential Nuclear War, but let us leave those obvious objections aside and focus on the appeasement point.

In search of analysis, I asked ChatGPT to discuss with me the question:

Are there any critics of Churchill’s appeasement argument against Chamberlain?

Here is what we agreed in précis:

Yes, many critics say Churchill oversimplified and appeasement was not the unequivocal failure he suggested.

*Churchill ignored arguments to Readiness:

Critics point out that Britain was not militarily, economically or politically prepared to confront Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s. Appeasement, they argue, bought valuable time for rearmament, which proved critical in the eventual Allied victory in World War II. Again, the Great Depression had strained Britain’s economy, making immediate military action against Germany financially unviable. Again, Chamberlain had to contend with widespread pacifist sentiment following the devastation of World War I and critics suggest he would not have won support for a military response at that time.

*Churchill misrepresented or ignored Chamberlain’s Political Calculations:

1.????? Not a Red Line: Some historians argue Chamberlain was fully aware of Hitler’s likely long term ambitions but believed that delaying war through diplomatic measures was vital to later winning it. Others argue Chamberlain still hoped he might be able to avoid war completely. They suggest Chamberlain considered the Sudetenland issue to be more grey than black and white, consequently he did not think Hitler’s demand for its return absolute proof of Hitler’s wickedness, thus it was still possible to hold out some hope Hitler could be reasoned with and war could be avoided. They suggest Chamberlain also speculated if, on the other hand, Hitler were really as wicked and dangerous as Churchill imagined, then showing toughness on the Sudetenland issue, even if Hitler acquiesced, would not stop a new world war war because such a dangerous opponent could be only temporarily frustrated not neutralised by such an action. The upshot of this line of reasoning is that the sensible solution was arguably to give way in the Sudetenland and wait for clearer proof of Hitler’s wickedness whilst preparing for war.

2.????? Diplomacy: Some argue Chamberlain may have seen appeasement as a way to isolate Germany diplomatically and avoid alienating potential allies like the Soviet Union. This was because in the Soviet Union, there was a sense Germany might deserve the return of Sudetenland but it was in the economic interests of the Allies not to let Germany have it, also the conflict had its roots in the much criticised Versailles treaty the Allies had created, so they might be resisting return for the sake of refusing to admit their guilt due to political self-indulgence. Hence by returning the Sudetenland, Chamberlain would seem to them morally upstanding, thus they would be more likely to take his side in future disputes.

3.????? Nationalism: Some argue Chamberlain may have seen appeasement as a way to de-energise German Nationalism. This was because in Germany, the opinion Germany deserved the return of Sudetenland and the Allies were treating them unjustly was widespread, and that was driving support for nationalists like Hitler, so by returning it, Chamberlain may have hoped to calm German politics.

*Churchill failed to understand Chamberlain’s Moral Analysis:

1.??????Non-interference: Chamberlain, along with many others, considered WW1 to have its roots in a violation of the moral idea of non-interference. For example, Chamberlain himself talked about avoiding war over a “quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”. Some argued to start a war over the Sudetenland issue would be to repeat the mistakes of WW1. They said the Sudetenland issue was a matter for German-speaking people and the Czechoslovak state to resolve, and Great Britain should leave it to them to argue and fight over between themselves. In more detail, British politicians in the 1930s talked about the principle of Non-Interference taking in questions of intellectual authority, closeness and overreach. How can we in Britain presume the wisdom to judge their dispute? How closely are we connected to the counterparties? Will getting involved in their conflict end up profiting us or squandering our resources?

2.?????Self-Determination of German people: The Sudetenland was home to a majority German-speaking population—around 3 million ethnic Germans—who had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before its dissolution after World War I and many resented their transfer to Czechoslovakia under the Versailles Settlement. Many said they felt like second-class citizens and complained of economic marginalisation and cultural discrimination under Czech-majority rule. Chamberlain, unlike Churchill, was a proponent of self-determination who felt morally committed to gradually liberating the British Empire’s colonial possessions. In the same sort of way, Chamberlain was probably a supporter of Sudetenland self-determination arguments.

3.?????Stabilisation of Czechoslovakia: Some say Czechoslovakia’s position as a multinational state was inherently unstable. They argue that the removal of the Sudetenland, while weakening Czechoslovakia economically, can be seen as a step toward resolving ethnic tensions in the region and making Czechoslovakia a more viable state.

*Churchill’s Self-Serving Narrative:

Historian Piers Brendon and others suggest that Churchill’s critique deliberately oversimplified the complex arguments in order to cast Chamberlain as a convenient cowardly foil for Churchill’s heroism.

Are these really arguments in favour of appeasement?

Churchill called the Munch Agreement recognising the German annexation of the Sudetenland “appeasement”, but, if you think about it very carefully and philosophically, you will realise:

It is not actually clear how the moral concept of “appeasement” should be defined, or even if the Munch Agreement is an example of “appeasement”, though it is, of course, generally described that way.

For example, if Chamberlain’s motive was simply to give himself more time to prepare for war, would it really be right to call his act “appeasement”? Assuming “appeasement” is a ‘giving way’, it should not then be applied to Chamberlain in this case, for in this case, he is not really giving way, he is simply taking his time in responding so he can respond more effectively. The upshot is that what looks like ‘appeasement’ / ‘giving way’ to those who fail to understand his reasoning is not really ‘appeasement’ / ‘giving way’. This realisation of a gap between ‘what really is’ and ‘what appears to be’, denied, for example, by today’s Logical Positivists, is fundamental to the study of Ancient Philosophy and Virtue Ethics. Furthermore, it is, of course, by exploiting this gap between how things look and how they really are that sophists and orators are able to discredit their opponents and trick their audiences.

Plato gives a famous example of a very similar problem in his Latches dialogue. In that dialogue, Socrates asks Latches to define courage, and Latches replies, “Good heavens, Socrates, there is no difficulty about that: if a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself against the enemy without running away, then you may rest assured that he is a man of courage.” Like a sophist, Socrates then seems to play with his words and derive the corollary, ‘a man who runs away from his post is cowardly’. Once that is agreed, Socrates overturns the argument with the example of the Scythian Calvary who are famous for “knowing how to pursue and fly quickly this way and that”. If you look very carefully, this is not actually a refutation because Socrates has switched from willing to doing, and they are not the same, e.g. just because a man is willing to die for his country, that does not mean he would do so pointlessly. Latches, however, does not notice the trick, and responds the definition at least still holds in the case of the simple infantryman. Socrates then refutes him with another cunning example. Socrates talks about how “The Spartan hoplites at Plataea, when they were up against the Persian soldiers carrying wicker shields, were not willing to stand their ground and fight against them but ran away. Then, when the ranks of their opponents were broken, they turned and fought, just like cavalrymen, and so won that particular battle.” It’s another trick because, in this case, the hoplites were presumably ordered to fight that way by their commander, so Socrates is using “not willing” here in a different way to mean “not willing to disobey their commander”, which is actually akin to “not willing to abandon their post” instead of contrary to it.

Consider again the opening words written by the Estonian Foreign Minister: “Chamberlain made concessions to Adolf Hitler for the sake of peace, but as Churchill argued at the time, forcing Czechoslovakia to concede territories inhabited by Sudeten Germans to Germany only emboldened Hitler.” This idea of making one’s opponent more bold is often quoted in attacks on the concept of appeasement. Yet, as discussed above, assuming Hitler to be a thoroughly evil man, you can argue talking tough to him is pointless because it is not going to make him any better. Indeed, it is perfectly obvious that if Chamberlain had refused to sign the Munich Agreement, it would not prevented World War Two, it would probably only have brought it forward, and as a result of that Hitler would have probably beaten Stalin, and World War Two would have been lost. So the whole argument the Munich Agreement emboldened or empowered Hitler is nonsense. The upshot is that if emboldening an opponent is key to the notion of appeasement, as the Estonian Foreign Minister and many others indeed suggest, then the Munich Agreement should not be taken as an example of appeasement.

In summary then, I rather chose the title of this article for the sake of clicks instead of the sake of truth, for I am not really arguing in favour of what I think is Chamberlain’s appeasement, only arguing against Churchill’s attack on what he called Chamberlain’s appeasement.

For what it is worth, in my view, of all the arguments above, the one that seem to me most closely associated with a possible concept of appeasement is the political one: let us give the German people this thing they want because it will calm them down. Yet I think even this argument is perfectly reasonable and, because potentially unpopular, also potentially courageous. It seems to me if Hitler had not been such a frothing demagogue, he might have settled down after the Sudenteland return to bask in the praise of his people and busy himself rebuilding his country like Mussolini. I also think most people would argue the victors of WW1 should have tried to give Germany much more help much earlier, and if they had done that, Hitler might never have arisen, but men like Churchill got in the way of any generosity and rapprochement. That's my guess anyway, but if you feel strongly I am wrong feel free to disagree in the comments.

What a marvellous ChatGPT+Human analysis! How does it relate to Ukraine?

Most obviously: Compare the complexity of Chamberlain’s arguments above to the modern debate over Ukraine. Even the most basic argument to economic realism today is considered politically incorrect. For example, it was clear cutting off Russian gas would harm the Germans more than it would harm the Russians, yet German politicians waved it through anyway. Again, whereas Chamberlain admitted there were multiple moral arguments in favour of Germany’s annexation, today’s right-on Western politicians utterly dismiss the possibility Putin was unfairly treated by them in the run up to his 2022 ultimatum. Again, whereas Chamberlin worried about interfering in other people’s affairs, Western politicians today constantly campaign across the world for wokish democratic uprisings such as the Arab Spring and the Orange Revolution.

When I was a young child, my father (a now retired Court Of Appeal Judge) used to encourage me to seek both sides of the argument and never fall into the trap of thinking there is a simple answer to complex political disputes beyond dishonesty and ignorance and running away from the debate. For example, in the discussion above, what makes Churchill’s Self-Serving Narrative evil is its oversimplification, be it deliberate or simply low IQ. Why is it evil? Surely most of all because it ruins the?education of the next generation, destining them to failure…

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