The world today … the world tomorrow

The world today … the world tomorrow

Brian Hillman’s Bugle

Sayonara Fukuyama: the long goodbye …

The world’s increased disorder

What’s going on? Where will we be in 10 years time? Starting from now, looking at Russian aggression, China’s political assertiveness, the regional ambitions of each of Iran and Turkey and others, unbridled resurgence of terrorist groups, environmental catastrophes, mass migrations, the rise of authoritarian regimes and retreat of democracy, growth of inequalities between and within states, financial instability, and denial of human rights, the world appears in a vortex of increasing disorder, spiralling into chaos.

Return to the “rules-based order” in international relations

The “rules-based order” to which the US and its allies are calling for return features those rules adopted and established by the US after victory in World War 2 in 1945. In this the Americans drew on the European experiences of the sovereignty of states recognised by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the universality of human rights postulated in the French Revolution. These were then capped off with the economic and military primacy of the USA. ?The most fundamental of these rules is respect for the territorial integrity of states. From this unassailable position the US was able to lift allies and former enemies from their parlous post war situation by enormous aid, such as the Marshall Plan for Europe, so as to have fellow travellers profiting from economic growth, eager to subscribe to this “rules-based order” that allowed for establishment of Pax Americana, restraining the Soviet Union, increasing allies, curbing neutrals, promoting trade and technology, and advocating democratic values.

Economic take off

The “rules-based order” was accompanied by an unprecedented surge of global trade and commerce. Those who couldn’t or didn’t join in, such as Cold War adversaries in the Soviet Communist camp and most of the third world nations, were left behind. Latecomers, such as China and many third worlders, happy to play a role as manufacturers in the globalisation that followed were welcomed. For those that joined in, their entry ticket was the cheap and sometimes skilled labour they could provide – offshoring.

Growth in inequalities between states

For those states who joined in, the inequalities between them and those that didn’t became increasingly apparent. Many third world countries left behind see no way out of their grinding poverty and inability to feed their burgeoning populations. For those who joined in and profit from their manufacturing advantages, subsequently risk “middle income trap” – their success in supplying the first world increases their income and so that of their population. This increase diminishes their low skilled manufacturing cost advantage, and so this manufacturing benefit moves on to cheaper still countries. To escape the “middle income trap” offshoring countries need to upskill their manufacturing bases. This has been successfully done by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. It is now facing many others, commencing with China and Vietnam.

Growth in inequalities within states

Within western economies the introduction of cheap offshore production, linked to automation and technology growth, deprived many workers in first world countries of their jobs and the security of participation in their nations’ economies. To cap it off, the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, that turned into the Great Recession of 2008-2009, was taken as a manifestation of the increased inequalities of those already behind the 8-ball due to the impact of globalisation and technological progress. Western governments appeared prepared to tolerate the growth in inequalities and to do little to ease the pain. Contrarily banks and other businesses considered “too big to fail”, not only received support of governments but were permitted to bounce back with bonuses the seemed to sneer at the suffering of those who felt increasingly left behind.

Populism – “All I know is that …”

Populations who had considered themselves included in the post-World War 2 growing prosperity through their work found themselves excluded and left behind through no evident fault of their own. This was all without any apparent explanation from and preparation by their governments. Feeling disenchanted and disenfranchised economically, people sought to allocate blame for something that was to them clearly not their fault and exclude those who could be blamed. Targets could be democratic but ineffectual governments, elites, and migrants. Populists who could offer facile, mendacious, and divisive solutions prospered in most developed countries.?

Pax Americana

Pax Americana, incorporating the “rules-based order” was demonstrated by the Gulf War of 1990 against Iraq and with virtually universal support, even including the Soviet Union and China. This American led multinational repulse of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was heralded as confirmation of the fundamental rule of international law of territorial integrity. Pax Americana went on to reach its apogee with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, the end of the Cold War, and the growing inclusion of the People’s Republic of China in trade and the world’s globalising economy. It was presumed that the inclusion of China would lead to increasing liberalisation of the regime in Beijing. The USA saw the end of the Cold War as the end of a bipolar world and a move to a unipolar one. It was hoped and anticipated that this unchallengeable Pax Americana would bring about peaceful resolution of previously intractable disputes, above all those of the Middle East.

Thirty squandered years

From this apogee of the 1990s the US acted with naiveté, bluster, overreach and underreach, failing to build on its strengths and failing to address consequences of unbridled capitalism that were unleashed through globalisation. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 opened a Pandora’s box of terrorism and regional competition. The overreach of the Iraq War in 2003 and then underreach in the Syrian conflict in 2013 diminished American credibility. The USA fought the Iraq War but Iran, as a non-combatant won it, extending its influence over the region, putting the Arab countries and Israel on a tinderbox alert. The Obama administration’s drawing of redlines in Syria and then backing down, allowed the Russians a successful entry into the civil war and consequent victory for the Assad regime. The weakness of the US encouraged Turkey to exert its own influence as a regional power. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the perceived exploitation by the USA and the West on Russia’s humiliation and economic chaos, led to resurgent Russian nationalism under Putin and enmity. The failure to interpret China’s exponential economic growth as stimulating its hunger for recognition of concomitant political power has led to confronting competition, in seeking influence, military might, technology, and economic power.?

Climate change, war, terrorism, and migration

The upsurge in economic growth post World War 2 has allowed first world countries to draw on more and more of the world’s resources. With globalisation developing countries have followed that lead so that we now end up with human induced climate change. No serious efforts to inhibit or arrest this have been achieved. The North and South Poles, and Greenland continue to lose ice, seas continue to rise, threatening to submerge low lying islands, rising sea temperatures bring about extraordinary rain and cyclone patterns, and deserts, above all the Sahara, advance. Diminishing means of support are exacerbated, particularly in Africa, by population growth – the median age in countries of the Sahel is 17, in Australia median age is over 38, in France over 42, and in Italy over 47. Besides destruction of environments that can sustain life, countries are afflicted with kleptocratic and corrupt governments, ongoing outbreaks of war, revolutions, and terrorist raids. Migration, often hazardous and illegal, grows because leaving and risking death is a better alternative than staying to an inevitable death.

Authoritarian regime growth and democratic decline

Reversing the trend from the halcyon “end of history” of the 1990s propagated by American academic, Francis Fukuyama, authoritarian and illiberal governments are on the rise and boast of their success. These range from world powers of China and Russia to regional aspirants of Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, to smaller players such as Hungary and the current Polish regime. Boasting their nationalist credentials, lingering on nostalgia, pushing nationalist myths, and denigrating democracies as declining and ineffectual, it is claimed that authoritarianism is the future. The nationalism espoused justifies suppression of human rights, xenophobia, and social division. Populist admirers preach and emulate their policies in almost all western democracies, commencing with Trump and followers in the USA. Hopefully the US midterm elections signal a brake on the spread of the willingness to disdain and jettison democracy.

Multipolar world, nationalist myths, historical nostalgia, “manifest destiny”, and resurgence of imperialism?

The squander of the last 30 years of American hegemony has led to a new multipolar world where shared interest in American goals and values has ceased. China’s growth over the last 30 years to rival the USA in economy, technology, trade, and consequent influence is seen by the Chinese as not only a reversal of more than a century of exploitation and humiliation by the West and Japan but also a restoration of the superpower that China has been for the last 2,500 years. This is the assertion of the empire that China was and deserves to be. In this China has to deal with serious problems such diminishing population growth, significant youth unemployment, slowdown in productivity due to Covid shutdowns, increased state directed and controlled businesses reducing profitable private enterprises, and redirection of technology development away from trade-oriented businesses. Russia is in serious decline and maintains its status only through its weapons and provision of raw materials. To counter this Russia plays its self-perceived historical role of victim/hero to its home base. In this it asserts its territorial ambitions both as a way of turning away attention from its decline and pursuing its glorious imperial role that culminates from national suffering and bravery dating back over 1,000 years. Sharing imperial nostalgia are Turkey and Iran. Turkey has moved away from the nation state and secular limits of Atatürk’s post World War 1 restructuring and Westernisation. Turkey is offended by what its leaders view as a rebuke by Europe. Turkey has re-oriented its attention to the Central Asian Turkic Stans stepping out of the Soviet Union, the Arab states to its South, and North Africa - all the while looking back to the glory days of the influence of the Ottoman empire. Iran similarly looks to the Middle East as the home of Persian influence dating back millennia. As well as the dangers of imperial lust, leaders of these countries will always be tempted to push antagonistic nationalist agendas as a way to deflect the attention of their populations from discontent with the direction of society and the economy. India, while not authoritarian and pushing a nationalist myth, seems destined to be number 3 world power within 10 years, with a “manifest destiny” to fulfil. On the plus side interesting developments are evolving. The new and much unheralded 12U2 group held its first meeting in July 2022. This is a grouping of India, Israel, UAE and USA to cooperate on joint investments and new initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health and food security. It looks to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It may not be far-fetched to see 12U2 developing as a counterbalance to Iranian influence in the Middle East.

Rules-based order

The one thing that these multipolar players share is a rejection of the “rules-based order” based on values and traditions that they may not respect now and in the future. With no hegemonic control by the USA, new rules will need to be cultivated in the new multipolar world to minimise potential conflicts. Failing such development, the future portends increased disorder and chaos.

“Always look on the bright side of life” – Monty Python: “the Life of Brian”

While it is clear that the certainty, comfort and security of Pax Americana are ending, there are hopeful signs. The midterm elections in the USA seem to presage a roll back in antidemocratic and isolationist populism. The election results may give at least 2 years for the Biden administration to achieve goals. These can include sustained support for Ukraine to put lead in Europe’s pencil to hold in its support. India and China have made clear their view that Russia needs to rein in its Ukrainian invasion. All of the G20 participants, other than Russia, have indicated the world cannot tolerate shortages and disturbances that the protracted Ukraine conflict has caused and poses for the future. This combined clear and implicit support may give Ukraine sufficient success in the field and Russia sufficient reality check to negotiate an end to war.?The offside meeting of Xi Jinping and Biden at the G20 summit indicated Chinese willingness to exert control over both Russia and North Korea on resort to nuclear weapons. Discussions between the Chinese and American leaders also indicate a willingness to work together to address climate change challenges. Xi seems to be reassured by his third term appointment to reconsider strict Covid lockdowns, not saving the real estate market, and giving more slack to private market investment by Chinese business. Biden talks more of cooperative competition rather than containment for China and holds back on the use of the “T” word (Taiwan). Xi talks to an Australian Prime Minister for the first time since 2016. While a return to the “rules-based order” drawn up under American primacy may not be on the cards, formulation of a more acceptable order in a multipolar framework may evolve. Maybe the Thucydides trap can be avoided for the next 10 years at least.