The World is a Tinderbox and Putin is Playing with Matches

The timing of two recent events scares the hell out of me.

1. During an interview, Putin said that Russia would “invade Poland only if Poland attacks Russia” first.
2. No one knows exactly when Alexei Navalny died, but Putin’s government chose to announce his death during the Munich Security Conference when the world’s most senior national security leaders were together in one room.

The events are unrelated, but the consecutive timing of two very provocative messages is not coincidence. Putin doesn’t do coincidences. He does calculated chaos backed by plausible deniability.

Putin mentioned Poland 36 times in his recent interview with a prominent right-wing blogger and useful idiot. A direct broadcast of Russian propaganda to American citizens, the objective of this interview was to normalize certain ideas, and ideas about Poland were a top priority.

Putin’s reference to Poland were all pejorative and based on fabricated historical references which framed Poland as an instigating, hostile aggressor. This narrative normalizes the reality of a Russo-Polish war. Putin’s promise to engage only in defense probably sounded quite reasonable to Tucker Carslon’s fan base, a minor-majority of Americans not known for geopolitical savvy nor critical thinking abilities.

Putin’s framing and the intentionally ambiguous choice of the word “attack” is significant. There are any number of incidents that could be construed as an “attack.” A cyber event, a training exercise, an assassination, or a domestic uprising could be misattributed to Poland so that Russian kinetic countermeasures would be justified.

Or there could be no incident at all. Putin only has to say there was an attack. Because it’s difficult to prove something didn’t happen, it could take days or weeks to establish a mutually agreed-upon truth. Clarity around conflict genesis is essential for NATO Article 5 to be triggered.

Let's talk about the timing of the announcement of Navalny's death. The only correct response to the news of his death is moral outrage. Within the intimate Munich Security Conference, moral indignation is a contagion and emotionally-charged words among leaders already confined in close proximity are more likely to spark into a decisive action.

This is exactly what Putin wants. He is goading NATO and the west into armed confrontation with the tried and true Russian technique of pushing right up to the line of acceptable behavior (aka Salami Tactics).

The timing of these messages makes it clear that Putin is in go-mode. Nations issue provocative propaganda only during times of crisis or conflict, because there is no need to agitated during times of peace and cooperation. Make no mistake that Putin sees the US as an adversary with whom Russia is already engaged in conflict.

Given the instability in Lebanon, Israel and Iran, the volatility in the Balkans, the Sino-Russian alliance and enduring RSSI coalition, Russia has a lot of friends on their side. One diplomatic slip could easily lead to cascading effects with devastating global repercussion.

The world is on the razor's edge and timing is everything.

How does this relate to cyberconflict strategy? I believe we are not projecting American cyberpower in ways that could disrupt or deny Putin's aggressions. Our focus is not aligned with geopolitical realities.

As long as the DoD stays in reactive, triage mode, as long as allies are not equally armed synchronized, and as long as civilian sector critical infrastructure remains vulnerable, we are too committed to small battles and too distracted to be ready for the big war.