Women & Security: US Withdrawal from Afghanistan

Vanessa Biklo, Samantha Quadros & Emma Rogers, Abdullah Durrani, Zoe Grossman, Angela Vastis

In response to the September 11th attacks (9/11), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) labelled the terrorist attacks as “threats to international peace and security,” and affirmed the United States (US) rights to individual and collective self-defence. Following this decision, the US requested the assistance of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners, invoking the “collective defence provision,” Article V of the Washington Treaty, for the first time in history.[241] This provision stated that “an armed attack against [one member] shall be considered an attack against them all”.[242] Thus, from October 9th, 2001 until May 16th, 2002, Operation Eagle Assist was put into place with the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) executing aerial surveillance of the continental United States.[243] Until 9/11, the extent of female oppression and the multiple human rights violations taking place in Afghanistan did not attract the attention of Western society. It was only after the 9/11 attacks that the US Government started to focus on “protecting” Afghan women from “oppression” as a tool to harness national and international support for the “war on terror” campaign.[244]

For nearly twenty years, NATO troops were stationed in Afghanistan to ensure international security. During this time, Afghanistan saw a rapid growth of international actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multilateral agencies, which facilitated the delivery of services like healthcare and education to women in the region. The “new” Afghan society was “expected to act as a vehicle for development; a buffer against predatory governance, and a means to fight a growing insurgency.”[245] As such, the presence of NATO troops was able to provide relative stability in the region and a secure environment for women to pursue their personal endeavours. Notably, women could safely engage in political, educational, and economic institutions, which were privileges that they did not have access to directly before the US occupation.

On February 29th, 2020, the Trump administration signed a bilateral agreement with the Taliban which outlined the withdrawal of NATO and US troops from Afghanistan. The agreement outlined two “interconnected” guarantees: (1) the withdrawal of all US and international forces by May 2021, and (2) the Taliban’s commitment to preventing other terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, from using Afghan soil “to recruit, train, or fundraise towards activities that threaten the United States and/or its Allies.”[246] The Afghan government was not present during these negotiations, and several key issues, including women’s security, were left out of the core discussion. Leading observers concluded that while the US seemingly endeavoured to protect women in the region, their priority was preventing the Taliban from supporting international terrorist attacks during US withdrawal negotiations. The US began withdrawing forces before the February 2020 agreement was reached. Over the following months, despite assertions that Taliban violence and other actions were inconsistent with the agreement reached, the US and NATO members continued to withdraw their troops. Consequently, on August 15th, 2021, the Taliban took control of the presidential palace in Kabul, becoming the de facto leaders of Afghanistan. The state of affairs in Afghanistan immediately returned to its pre-2002 state in which violence and oppression pervaded. Despite the sizable aid contributions over the past decade from multilateral agencies to “transform” Afghan society and promote women’s rights, women once again found themselves under imminent threat amid the Taliban takeover.

The oppression of women in Afghanistan has persisted throughout history. Afghan women have been subjected to discrimination, marginalization and restrictions that have impaired their access to necessities and full participation in society. However, women’s rights in Afghanistan only became a priority on NATO’s agenda in the post-9/11 era and peaked during its more recent negotiations with the Taliban. Given the adverse turn of events in Afghanistan following the recent withdrawal of US troops, the question must be raised: What policy decisions could NATO have made to maintain the protection of women’s security in the region? Furthermore, can such a policy be enforced in the context of Afghanistan’s current state of affairs? For strategic recommendations to emerge, NATO must evaluate the roots of the threat to women’s security in Afghanistan. The authors of this report contend that the history of women’s interactions with the dynamics of Afghan culture and religion is central to unpacking where this insecurity is rooted. As such, this report will examine Afghanistan’s history through the lens of its long-term struggle to achieve greater women’s rights in the region. It will dissect the overt politicization of women, women’s rights and women’s role in Afghan society, investigating how their fate has been intertwined with and determined by various political, social, cultural and religious structures. In doing so, it will reveal that women hold a crucial role within the religion of Islam and the various tribal cultures within Afghanistan, both of which are central elements influencing the dynamics of Afghan society. This leads to a key diagnosis: the status of female citizens in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the region’s historically rooted cultural and religious practices. Central to this report is the idea that women’s security can only be achieved if the policy is reimagined within the very same indigenous framework that has previously left women in vulnerable positions. It will demonstrate in its recommendations the possibility to create policies that maintain Afghan cultural traditions and values, customized to make a long-term and meaningful impact on women’s lives in the ever-changing political climate of Afghanistan.

I. Methodology

The report is structured around a dual analytical approach in its research towards developing an effective strategic initiative that NATO should have used in Afghanistan to ensure women’s long-term security. Although the current situation in Afghanistan is precarious, the authors hope that the strategic recommendation put forward in this report can someday be implemented in Afghanistan with the help of NATO as a facilitating body. The first analytical approach consists of a historical methodology that outlines the historically-rooted dynamics of women’s issues in Afghanistan which have been a fundamental part of the national agenda since the 1880s. To comprehend the status that women hold in the nation today, it is crucial to analyze how they have been persistently used as symbols in political and ideological conflicts within the larger historical context of the country. The second approach consists of a cultural analysis that interprets Afghanistan’s historically-rooted cultural and religious practices that drive the dynamics of its contemporary society. In doing so, it will illustrate how women’s status and insecurity are inextricably linked to the cultural and religious forces that govern Afghan society. The efficacy of any policy recommendations will require a nuanced understanding of the lessons learnt from previous interactions with the religious and cultural landscape of the country.

II. Historical Review: Framing the Issue

a) The Afghan Empire: 1880 - 1973

The birth of modern Afghanistan is credited to Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901), the ruler who, following the second Anglo-Afghan war, consolidated different tribes and established the boundaries of what now comprises the Afghan state. He was also known as the “Iron Amir” due to the violent methods he employed to suppress rebellions and conquer regional powers to centralize the government under his authority. During his reign of 21 years, Abdur Rahman Khan also made significant reforms concerning women’s rights, gradually changing laws that were deleterious to women’s status. For instance, he raised the legal age of marriage for girls to prevent child and forced marriage, granted women rights to divorce in cases of cruelty and non-support, abolished the tribal custom of widows marrying a deceased husband’s next of kin, and allowed women to, in accordance with Muslim law, inherit and own property.[247] Such actions are believed to be a consequence of his wife’s influence, Bobo Jan, the first queen to appear in public wearing Western attire without a veil. According to American-Afghan historian Nancy Hatch Dupree, Bobo Jan “[rode] horses and trained her maidservants in military exercises,” she also participated in political decisions, representing her husband in delicate missions as well as in reconciliation disputes.[248]

After Abdur Rahman Khan’s death, the path towards increased female participation in society was paved by his son and subsequent ruler of the nation, Amir Habibullah Khan. Amir Habibullah maintained previous legislation and progressive reforms in place, and also set a limit on marriage expenses, which often led Afghan families to poverty.[249] Nevertheless, his most substantial contribution was permitting the return of Afghans who were exiled during his father’s reign.[250] Due to this decision, Mahmud Beg Tarzi, a crucial actor in women’s rights reforms, returned to the country. Educated in Syria and Turkey, “Tarzi was strongly influenced by modern interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence and by the liberties afforded to women in these countries.”[251] He defended that in order to develop the nation, it was necessary to educate girls, as “an asset to future generations.”[252] He also argued that Islam did not deny women equal rights and that, consequently, Afghan women deserved full citizenship and participation in society. Based on his belief that educating women was an “essential step for social reform,” the first schools for girls were opened in Afghanistan under Amir Habibullah Khan’s rule.[253] However, the opening of the school did not please tribal leaders. The gesture, combined with an English curriculum and the state’s interference in marriage institutions gave rise to an intense opposition movement which, eventually, led to Amir Habibullah Khan’s assassination in 1919.[254] The motive for such resistance was that Mullahs (nobles and lords) and tribal authorities saw the aforementioned actions as a direct assault on tradition and as a threat to tribal “patrilineal and patrilocal kinship agreements.”[255]

In 1919, Amanullah Khan, Amir Habibullah Khan’s son, ascended the throne. As a vehement follower of Tarzi, Amanullah Khan continued the mission of rapidly developing Afghanistan through social reforms, and his agenda included the “liberation of women from tribal cultural norms.”[256] Under his reign, women were granted the right to vote in 1919, and a Family Code was instituted that banned child marriage in 1921.[257] He also encouraged girls both in the city and in the countryside, to pursue an education, and advocated against polygamy and the use of the veil. In a public function, he stated that the Quran, the central religious text of Islam, “did not require women to cover their bodies”[258] and that the veil was “a tribal custom rather than a requirement of Islam.”[259] During his reign, Queen Soraya, his wife, was instrumental in enforcing the changes pushed by his campaigns and promoting women’s participation in nation-building.[260] For example, after his speech concerning the veil, the Queen tore off her veil in public, causing the wives of other officials present to follow the example.[261] She also founded the first magazine for women, Ershad-e-Niswan (Guidance for Women) and, due to her influence, the Afghan government sent fifteen girls to Turkey for higher education in 1928.[262] In addition to Soraya, other women of Amanullah’s family were essential in giving “a public face to [the] modernizing spirit.”[263] Amanullah’s sisters, for instance, were vital agents of change: one opened a hospital for women and the other, named Kobra, formed the Anjuman-I-Himayat-I-Niswan (Organization for Women’s Protection), which encouraged females to report injustices and oppressive institutions.[264]

In 1927 and 1928, Amanullah and Queen Soraya visited Europe. Pictures of Soraya without a veil, dining with foreign men, and having her hand kissed by the leader of France reached tribal regions and sparked outrage. Queen Soraya’s behaviour was seen as a betrayal of Afghan culture and religion as well as an offence to the honour of women.[265] The rapid reforms implemented by Amanullah were then perceived by conservatives as “too Western” and distant from tribal values as they “challenged men’s familial and tribal authority.”[266] As a response to the ruler’s agenda, revolts spread across the country, leading to Amanullah being driven out of office and, along with Queen Soraya, exiled from Afghanistan. Following their expatriation, a “series of rulers introduced conflicting laws regarding the status of women.”[267] A noteworthy mention is Nadir Shah, ruler from 1929 to 1933. He also attempted to implement gender-based reforms, such as opening more schools for girls while avoiding friction with mullahs and tribal leaders.[268] However, despite his non-confronting approach, he was assassinated in 1933. Following his death, Zahir Shah came to power and ruled Afghanistan for the next 40 years.

In 1953, Zahir Shah appointed his cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, as the country’s prime minister. During his reign, there was significant progress concerning women’s rights. For instance, in 1964, the third Afghan constitution was instituted, allowing women to enter elected politics and participate in political decision-making.[269] As a result of legal and economic reforms encouraging female involvement, the nation had numerous women in cabinet, in the police force, working as doctors, pursuing an education and taking part in the country’s political and legislative institutions. The reason why Zahir Shah was able to make such substantial progress concerning female empowerment was that, unlike his predecessors, “[his] steps were slow and careful, avoiding challenges to traditional attitudes that had been so provocative in the 1920s.”[270] To illustrate this point, one example is how he declared veiling a voluntary option rather than actively campaigning against it as Amanullah and Queen Soraya did.

b) The Afghan Republic - Daoud’s Presidency: 1973 - 1978

After World War II, the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) utilized economic assistance to compete for global influence. Hence, after the US established military ties with Pakistan in 1954, the Soviets strategically began to give Afghanistan their support.[271] As a result, Daoud implemented a pro-USSR policy, and, in 1965, a USSR-backed organization called the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed.[272] In 1967, the PDPA split into two factions: the Parcham, which received support mainly from urban, educated Pashtuns, and the Khalq, which received support from educated, rural Afghans, also predominantly Pashtun.[273] In 1973, with help from the Parcham faction, Daoud led a coup that overthrew Zahir Shah. Upon taking control of the Afghan state, he declared Afghanistan a republic, making himself the first Afghan president.

After assuming the presidency, Daoud began to marginalize the Parchamis and diminish his government’s relationship with the Soviet Union. After he “ordered the arrest of PDPA leaders for reasons of subversion,” the two factions of the party reunited (1977), killing Daoud and his family and, thus, seizing power (1978).[274] This coup, termed “The Saur Revolution,” led to a USSR-backed government under the leadership of Nur Mohammed Taraki, head of the Khalq faction of the PDPA, and Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham division.[275] During their rule, the government started a radical and rapid reform that introduced mass literacy programs for men and women. However, the use of force and mass repression (such as the arrest and execution of dissenters), especially in the countryside, to implement such initiatives was highly problematic. A particular case was when, in the Kunar province, hundreds of Afghans were slaughtered in one night after they resisted the implementation of the government’s agenda.[276] This violence combined with “[t]he PDPA’s [...] brutal disregard for societal and religious sensitivities, resulted in massive backlash from the rural population,”[277] also leading to the mobilization of Mujahideen factions in resistance to “the communist political expansion.”[278] The term Mujahideen means “those engaged in jihad,” with Jihad meaning “a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam.” Hence, Mujahideen forces considered themselves Muslims who fought against the PDPA on behalf of the faith of the Muslim community.[279]

c) The USSR Invasion: 1979-1989

The PDPA’s inability to control the opposition resulted in a direct invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR. On 24 December 1979, the first USSR planes arrived assuming complete military and political control of Kabul and causing intense indignation in the non-communist world. Their justification was that the PDPA insistently requested “immediate aid and support […] against external aggression.”[280] The US saw this gesture as a “clear defiance against the West” and as an explicit disregard towards the relaxation of strained relations between Soviets and Americans.[281] The US became concerned that the USSR was using the lack of American presence in the region following The Islamic Revolution in Iran as an opportunity to control the oil-rich Persian Gulf and, consequently, dominate the Asian subcontinent.[282] Because of this fear, the US began to support Mujahideen insurgent forces, approving a plan instructing the CIA to provide military supplies and humanitarian assistance to the group. In order to gain support from other nations, the American government “highlighted the human rights aspect concerning the invasion,” stressing how important it was to “investigate Soviet human rights abuses.”[283]

By January 1981, the Carter Administration had spent roughly $60 million per year in funding and training the Mujahideen as well as providing military aid, such as the supply of lethal equipment, through Pakistan.[284] Other nations besides the United States, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, China and Saudi Arabia, played a role in supplying Mujahideen forces. For Saudi Arabia, specifically, assisting the insurgency movement meant gaining influence in the region and having the opportunity to “export its brand of ultra-conservative Islam termed Wahhabism.”[285] As a consequence of Saudi Arabia becoming one of the US’s most important Middle Eastern sponsors, Wahhabism started to spread throughout the refugee camps that were being funded.[286]

During the period of warfare, drought and lack of access to food aggravated the situation, leading to exacerbated poverty levels in the nation. Due to the lack of financial security, several Afghan families were selling or forcing their daughters into marriages as a means to survive. Amid this crisis, the Mujahideen used the vulnerability of Afghan women to gain political support, stating that “they would ensure the safety of Afghans and their women” if they rose to power; as a result, many civilians aligned themselves with the resistance side.[287] Once again, women were used as a political tool to sell a specific agenda.

By 1988, the conflict in Afghanistan was a bleeding financial wound for the USSR, leading to the Geneva Accords, an agreement signed with the Americans guaranteeing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the nation by February 1989.[288] After the settlement, the US completely abandoned the country, leaving Afghanistan in shambles after a decade of destructive and ruthless war.[289] Many Afghans felt betrayed when American troops turned their backs on the Afghan situation after the aftermath of the conflict. Meanwhile, by 1992, Mujahideen factions took over central power in Kabul and “the status of women went from bad to worse.”[290]

d) The Fall of the Mujahideen and the Rise of the Taliban: 1992-2001

During the beginning of Mujahideen rule, the various Mujahideen factions agreed to a power-sharing system with a rotating presidency. One of the first decrees made by this government was making the hijab, a head covering for women, mandatory and prohibiting female reporters from being visually represented on television. Although they were allowed to work at first, the screen only showcased the picture of a rose as a woman read the daily news.[291] Later on, female reporters were banned altogether, and, in the series of international conferences that followed, such as the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development and the 1995 Beijing International Conference on Women, there was no Afghan government representation.[292]

As the seven different Mujahideen factions began to demand a more significant share of the government, leaders were involved in incessant disagreements. Without success in bridging their political differences, a civil war started as Mujahideen commanders established themselves as local warlords and factions divided themselves into fiefdoms “who fought in an array of alliances, betrayals and bloodshed.”[293] During this period, it was common for groups to use rape and sexual assault against women as a strategy to demonstrate power and as a weapon to weaken the community of opposing divisions.[294] Civilians experienced unprecedented brutality by Mujahideen forces and stories of killings, amputations and other forms of violence were told daily. It was under these circumstances when citizens had lost all faith in the country’s leadership, that the Taliban originated.

The term “Taliban” is notorious nowadays for its association with terrorism. Nevertheless, the true meaning of the word stems from Talib, which means “student.” Hence, Taliban is the plural term for Talib, standing for “students.” The denomination of the group as “students,” comes from the large exodus of Afghan refugees during the period of conflict between communist and Mujahideen troops.[295] With no formal education available in refugee areas, boys were sent to religious schools called Madrassas where they learnt the extreme brand of Wahhabism, which, as mentioned before in this section, was spreading through camps at the time (as a consequence of the monetary aid flowing from Saudi Arabia).[296] Thus, the Taliban emerged from a “select group of Mujahideen” who became refugees in Pakistan.

Disillusioned with the chaos that followed the Mujahideen victory, former Mujahideens followed Mullah Mohammad Omar and started a mission of ending the civil war and restoring stability through the enforcement of (their interpretation) of the Sharia (“Islamic Law”). Initially seen as “Robin Hood” figures, the movement grew due to their actions of insurrection against the corrupt regime in Kabul, and due to their constructed image of “guarantor[s] of security and moral purity,”[297] values the population longed to see after a long period of violence and chaos.[298] In order to save people who, in the Taliban’s point of view, had “lost their way,” in 1996, the Taliban took control of Kabul and in 1997, they renamed the country as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” with Mullah Omar assuming the title of amir-ul momineen (“commander of the faithful”).[299]

As soon as the Taliban assumed control of the state, one of their first mandates was to outlaw female education by closing schools for women and girls. Subsequently, women were obligated to wear burkas and prohibited from leaving their homes without the presence of a male relative as a chaperone. Amid such actions, the Afghan population at first perceived such losses as temporary and as “a small price to pay for the restoration of stability.”[300] Nevertheless, as limitations continued to expand, the “restriction on women in public, and the lack of provision of public services started to outweigh the dividends of what may be termed as ‘peace in the graveyard.’”[301] In addition to the previously mentioned constraints, women and girls were forbidden from being examined by male physicians. At the same time, due to laws banning females from the workforce, it was illegal for female doctors and nurses to operate. Hence, numerous women and girls died from curable diseases due to regulations halting their access to existent treatment. After such decisions, the Taliban agenda led many Afghans to realize that they had “simply exchanged one set of repressive leaders for the other.”[302]

e) The post 9/11 period: 2001-2015

Until the 9/11 attack, the extent of female oppression and the multiple human rights violations taking place in Afghanistan did not attract the attention of Western society. It was only after the terrorist aggression on September 11th, 2001, that the US Government heavily focused on “the oppression of Afghan women” as a tool to harness national and international support for the “war on terror” campaign.[303] Through photos and news reports revealing dreadful conditions, Americans became more sympathetic to the cause, as the war waged in Afghanistan was depicted not only as a necessary defensive action to protect the American people but also as a vital initiative to “emancipate” Afghan women. The War on Terror was also “a fight for the rights and dignity of [females].”[304] It is important to add that, due to a lack of knowledge about Islam and Afghanistan’s politics, many Westerners erroneously perceived the Taliban’s extremist interpretation of the Muslim religion as the traditional representation of Islam in the area. Hence, as part of the Bush Administration’s strategic use of words and images, the Muslim veil was constructed as the most powerful tool used to oppress women in the Middle East. Nevertheless, despite the Western narrative of the veil as a symbol of the patriarchy, during the 2001 Afghan Women’s Summit for Democracy in Brussels, where Afghan women issued numerous demands concerning the protection of women’s rights, the veil was never mentioned as an instrument to subjugate girls.[305]

After the 9/11 attacks, the UNSC labelled the terrorist actions as “threats to international peace and security,” affirming the US’s rights to individual and collective self-defence. Following this decision, the US requested the assistance of its NATO partners, invoking the “collective defence provision,” Article V of the Washington Treaty, for the first time in history.[306] The provision stated that “an armed attack against [one member] shall be considered an attack against them all.”[307] Thus, from October 9th, 2001 until May 16th, 2002, Operation Eagle Assist was put into place with the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) executing aerial surveillance of the continental United States.[308]

In addition to the exercise of Operation Eagle Assist, the United States also launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with the aims of destroying al Qaeda and its Taliban shield, thus preventing the use of Afghan territory as a “safe haven for terrorist activity.”[309] The OEF officially began on October 7th, 2001 with American and British bombing strikes targeting Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Following the start of airstrikes, First Lady Laura Bush stated in a speech that “the world [was] helping Afghan women return to the lives they once knew” and that the US “[reaffirmed] [its] mission to protect human rights for women in Afghanistan and around the world.”[310] In contrast to her words, however, while Operation Enduring Freedom was taking place, the lives of multiple Afghan citizens were endangered. Firstly, due to the “collateral damage” of airstrikes, leading to several civilian casualties and; secondly, due to the disruption of humanitarian aid routes. During that time, Afghanistan was going through a drought and extreme food shortages, hence, the destruction of aid routes could lead to widespread malnutrition and famine. Hence, despite defending an agenda heavily focused on women’s rights, expressions of support for Afghan women amid US military actions “served to paint ‘a feminist glow on some of the most brutal bombings of the 2001 campaigns.”[311]

In December 2001, after less than three months of fighting, Taliban leaders surrendered the organization’s final territory in Afghanistan. After their surrender, the Bonn Agreement, a series of resolutions intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan, led to Afghan political parties establishing a timetable for the creation of a representative and freely elected government.

Additionally, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), create the conditions whereby the Afghan government could exercise its authority” in Kabul.[312] From August 2002 to December 2014, NATO-led ISAF missions, aiming to help “build the capacity of Afghan national security forces” until the Afghan National Defense and Security assumed full responsibility for security across the nation.[313] In January 2015, NATO launched Resolute Support Mission (RSM) to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces and institutions to fight terrorism and secure their country.[314] On 2 May 2011, U.S Navy SEALS launched a raid on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, killing the Al-Qaeda leader.[315]

III. The Role of Culture and Religion

As shown above, there “is a history over the centuries of women’s subjugation” predating even the Islamic militancy of the Taliban.[316] The historical contexts outlined above shed light on an integral component of Afghan society that has exacerbated the status of women in the region for decades: the contention regarding progressive reforms for women’s rights. Viewing this issue within the context of culture and religion in Afghanistan provides critical insight into the issue of women’s insecurity in the region. This section, therefore, aims to critically examine the structural manifestations of religion and culture that have impacted how women are perceived and treated in Afghanistan. Analyzing how these dynamics interact with women’s status in Afghanistan will provide NATO with an effective framework for sustainable change towards women’s security. In doing so, the authors will find the presence of two contradicting systems that govern Afghan society: Islamic and tribal law. This contention at the core of Afghan society has consistently thwarted efforts towards progressive reforms concerning women’s rights and status. Understanding these dynamics will allow for the formulation of an effective indigenous-led reformative project that can be facilitated by NATO.

a) Contentions Between Islamic and Tribal Law

The religion of Islam was first introduced to the region of Central Asia in the 8th century. Those who practice Islam subscribe to Islamic law, which regulates a Muslim’s behaviour with neighbours, the state, God, and with one’s own consciousness. The introduction of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula vastly expanded the statute of rights for women, greatly improving their position, removing their status as mere property,[317] and adding a heavy emphasis on the moral responsibility of all Muslims to safeguard the rights of women.[318] Although Afghanistan has had a strong Islamic presence for nearly 1500 years, modern Afghan legal thought is not principally determined by the principles of Islamic law. Generally, Islamic states vary in how orthodox their interpretation of Islam is, which is highly dependent on the prevalence of their own cultures, colonial histories, and the school of Islamic thought that they subscribe to.[319] However, while provisions of gender equality and women’s status appear within the legislatures of some Islamic nation-states,[320] they clash with the dominant underlying tribal ideologies that were endemic in these regions before the Islamic conquest.[321] These tribal ideologies, known as the Pashtunwali, frame ideal behaviours and customs in a way similar to Islamic law. This clash between Islamic and tribal ideology is especially apparent in the modern state of Afghanistan. Tribal law also blends into interpretations and the formation of legal provisions in modern Afghanistan, which yields a “complicated array of influences” that are often not coterminous with the Sharia Law.[322]

For example, within the Pashtun tribal code (Pashtunwali), a notable tribe in Afghanistan, honour is a determinant of membership and belonging within one’s society. In contrast, Islam gives “implicit rights” to men and women based on the edict.[323] Arguably, women bear a disproportionate incidence in the maintenance of honour within Pashtun society, as men can accrue honour, “but both men and women can negate it.”[324] The Pashtunwali instructs women to observe a form of chastity (purdah) to remain honourable - any violation of this would result in “punitive measures” as a form of correction, ranging from harm to ex-communication.[325] Pashtunwali blurs the lines between social and legal institutions. Besides being a code for life, based upon the performance of honour, it has in place an informal framework known as the Jirga.[326] The Jirga enforces the Pashtunwali through punitive measures decided by a tribunal of people from involved parties and tribal elders.[327] Many view the Jirga system as a form of restorative justice as it “proposes a community-based model of justice that places special emphasis on the restoration of dignity, peace, and relationships between offenders and victims” by providing offenders opportunities at reintegration.[328] However, it is important to analyze the shortcomings of the Jirga in their practice of justice and control over the lives of their constituents. The majority of Afghan women identify themselves within and derive their rights from, both an Islamic and tribal framework.[329] It is this dissonance between the two supposedly parallel ideologies that lead to the manifestation of patriarchal cultural practices. For example, in the case of inheritance laws, Islamic mandates a share be given to the daughter from her father’s estate. However, the tribal expectation for women is to relinquish their property rights to male kin, as men are seen as providers of the family and carriers of the bloodline.[330]

Afghanistan’s contentious history thus created “the parallel existence of two legal systems [Islamic and tribal law] that have proven to be a source of contradiction and continual contention”.[331] These conflicting dynamics are illustrated throughout the history of women’s ever-changing status in Afghanistan. It is important to note that Islamic law is more pervasive in the urban regions in Afghanistan (i.e. Kabul), while tribal law has a stronger hold in rural societies. This divide between the urban and rural populations has further been a driving factor in the long struggle towards achieving greater rights for women in Afghanistan. As demonstrated by the contentions between tribal and Islamic law, women in urban and rural areas have different values and views of their rights within the patriarchal Afghan society. For example, whereas the urban population has been open to social reforms to improve women’s rights in Afghanistan, the rural populations have met “modernizing elites with stiff resistance” when “pushing for women-friendly reforms.”[332] The different views of women in Afghanistan is exemplified by a study conducted by Naila Kabeer, Professor of Gender and Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Kabeer interviewed various Afghani women in the late 2010s and asked them about their values on the idea of gender equality. In particular, Kabeer sought to determine if women in Afghanistan understood gender equality as it is widely understood throughout Western society. Kabeer found that most women “subscribed to a normative model of relations between men and women within the family based on the idea of a patriarchal contract, often drawing on religion as a sanction, which spelt out their rights and responsibilities.”[333] For example, some women “emphasized the mutuality of rights and responsibilities” between men and women.[334] For other women, “[they] believed that religion legitimated a male monopoly of rights.”[335] As one woman named Pareesha put it: “A man’s rights are clear. In their opinion, they are free, they can have ten wives, they can go anywhere. These are men’s rights. If my husband marries another woman, what can I do? Islam has given these rights.”[336] These quotations show the extent to which NATO needs to consider both Islamic and tribal law when developing policy in Afghanistan.

b) The Precarious Place of Women in Afghan Society

How Afghan women interact with civil structures is unique within this socio-religious framework we have outlined. Women cannot influence the moral philosophies of tribal culture and Islam but are nonetheless constricted by the apparatuses that enforce them. They are too precarious to leave their society and too marginalized to exercise power within it. The social and cultural connections that women form within Afghan society are within the confines of their religion and tribe. They are therefore tied to spaces like their mosques, ritual space, and other social structures. In Afghanistan, women are in precarious situations, where they “cannot leave, or do not want to leave, their [community] due to economic reasons,” or other compounding factors.[337] The lack of mobility of women within their communities’ space reproduces the conditions of their marginalization and makes it harder for them to leave their birth-assigned faith and culture groups, or exercise pluralism in religious thought. We can therefore observe that women’s entry into civil society is coupled with a “trade-off” between their rights and protections. Women leaving the confines of religion and culture are no longer protected by rite and are therefore subject to persecution on the justification of ‘honour crimes.’[338] Any organized resistance by women against patriarchal laws is innately viewed as “anti-family” and going against the “natural order” that exists where women are underneath men.[339] For instance, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief found numerous instances where laws supposedly drawn from Islamic and cultural practices “were often rooted in patriarchal interpretations of religious doctrine and had a disparate impact on women” where “sanctions are generally imposed on the women rather than the men.”[340] As a result, sexual assault and other instances of gender-based violence often go unreported in Afghanistan, due to the fear of societal consequences of breaking purdah. The criminalization of women pursuing fair and equal rights happens as a result of women being the subject of correction, rather than protection. For example, this can be seen by the imposition of legislation such as “modest dress code” laws that portray women as the wrongful actors in crimes perpetrated against them.[341] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)’s report speaks of a “gender ideology” found within the discourses of patriarchal laws in Afghanistan and subsequent resistance to more progressive ideologies.[342] Women’s rights activists are positioned as “immoral actors” who espouse a harmful gender ideology that deteriorates “children, families, tradition and religion” by those in Afghanistan who hold traditional beliefs.[343]

Practitioners of patriarchal tradition in Afghanistan form their unique gender ideology as opposed to liberal manifestations of female civil society. This uniquely manifests in distinct Afghan cultural practices and structures such as purdah, the honour system, and the Jirga. It places the responsibility of reproduction of religion and culture on women, which allows for their heavy control under this framework. When Afghan women break or disobey these structures, it is seen as an attack on Afghan society itself, and any woman who does not seek to co-opt this traditional gender ideology is seen as aiming to destroy Afghan civil society. Islamic law specialist Ziba Mir-Husseini finds that, in Afghanistan, the era of neo-imperialist resistance following American occupation coincided with “women [becoming] symbols of cultural authenticity and carriers of a religious tradition and way of life.”[344] Women symbolize the continuation of the nation - ideals such as culture and purity are embodied within a woman’s gender as a ‘natural reproducer,’ therefore she is imbued with a ‘natural duty’ to be ‘used as a raw material with which to establish ethnic prominence,’ in essence, reproducing the nation and its people.[345] Hence “any dissent on their part could be construed as a kind of betrayal or could be silenced.”[346]

c) The Pitfalls of American Occupation

The misunderstanding of tribal and Islamic tradition has caused existing NATO policies to fail to protect Afghan women during their twenty-year occupation. As previously mentioned, Afghan reactionary resistance to Western imperialism took the shape of hyper-nationalism in the form of intense tribalism and adherence to Islam.[347] Religion is used as a unifying, anti-occupation force that allowed the Taliban and other powerful actors to increase their hold over the country and consolidate power centred around a doctrine of strict Wahhabi Islam. Secularism and leftism were especially viewed with greatly negative sentiments and punished by Taliban leadership during this era.[348] Membership into both Islamic and ethnic identities hinged on disassociating from anything deemed ‘Western’, such as an agenda of progressive women’s rights.[349] This viewpoint was legitimized by the military presence of the West, causing “women and gender relations [to acquire] a particularly strong symbolic edge” and allowing for a “charged symbolism of Islamic family law.”[350] This meant that commitment to Islamic and customary laws fell under the realm of protecting Afghan national identity. Therefore, religious identity was used as a marker for Afghan patriotism and formed a strict antithesis to modernization. Importantly, Western liberal feminism is more favoured by the Afghan urban population than the rural population, which has consistently impeded progressive efforts throughout history.

The US had the status of Afghan women as a central reason for its occupation. As Professor of Women’s Studies, Huma Ahmed-Ghosh wrote, “the situation of women came to symbolize to Western military powers a justification of war in the name of [their] freedom.”[351] America, as the leader of the global rights-based order, purported to end the oppressive fundamentalist Taliban regime that brought about the repression of Afghan women. This is a common dialectical narrative used to understand America’s presence in the region and justify its actions. Discourses of Western feminism introduced to non-Western areas in early iterations rested upon the “credibility” of Euro-American women over Asian women due to their acceptance of secularism and negation of gender roles.[352] Afghan women are often faced with the choice of “choosing between their Muslim identity [...] and their new gender consciousness,” which led to a rise in women questioning the relations of Islam with the state-sanctioned patriarchy.[353] Western society must have a nuanced understanding of religion and culture in the lives of Afghan women when creating policy. For example, in the post-Taliban era (2001-2020), many urban middle-class women who were able to re-enter the workforce still decided to continue wearing the chadri, the traditional full-body covering that was mandated by the Taliban.[354] This shows how some women find security within their religion and still value it even when it is not mandated. It is important that these values and decisions are recognized when creating policies as we should not be trying to get rid of these values but instead create ways that these values can become more inclusive and ensure that women can live securely in society.

IV. Strategic Recommendations

Women as “natural reproducers” symbolize the continuation of culture and the nation. Hence, for policy recommendations to be efficient, interveners must take into consideration the role of women within the religious and cultural landscape of the country. As the historical section has shown, rulers who defended the “liberation of women” by distancing them from tribal cultural norms failed to implement lasting change in the country. In the 1920s, for instance, Amanullah Khan advocated for rapid reforms that reflected Western ideals while overlooking tribal customs and norms. As a result, his agenda received intense backlash, as it was perceived as a betrayal of Afghan culture and religion and as an offence to the ‘honour’ of women. Contrastingly, during the reign of Zahir Shah in 1953, there was substantial progress regarding female empowerment and the overall status of women in Afghanistan. Females entered elected politics, participated in political decision-making and were able to pursue an education freely. This was possible because “[his] steps were slow and careful, avoiding challenges to traditional attitudes that had been so provocative in the 1920s.”[355]

The aforementioned historical events are important as they show that for initiatives to succeed, they must reflect Afghan contexts and worldviews. Western feminism often fails because it associates itself with secular ideologies and progress towards “Western-type societies.” Although it aims at helping females, since actions come from a place that completely renounces Islam and tribal customs, reforms are unsuccessful as they alienate Muslim women who want social and political change without compromising their Islamic identity. Additionally, since such attempts to enforce women’s rights do not reflect deeply rooted identities between women, religion and tribal society, interventions also alienate large groups of men who retain the power to make a change and support women’s rights.[356] Rather than obtaining their cooperation, reforms are perceived as cultural imperialism, which, in turn, leads to reactionary attitudes. From this understanding, we defend that for positive and sustainable change to occur, reforms must embolden an indigenous movement in which women can engage with cultural and religious practitioners, reforming the system while consolidating its traditional values.

a) An Indigenous Approach

A policy approach that reflects the realities of Afghan society is one that is indigenous-led. Importantly, this will defer from NATO’s unsustainable policy reforms that were implemented during the twenty-year occupation. Hence, rather than grounding reforms within a Western framework, which are often foreign to Afghan ways of thinking, we propose initiatives that tackle peacekeeping and conflict resolution through an indigenous agenda that reflects Afghan social paradigms. Importantly, this framework consists of consulting Afghan peoples, not as mere objects but as participants in the process. For instance, since traditional leaders possess significant influence in deciding the fate of their community members, it is crucial to include them as stakeholders in negotiations, planning processes, and reforms covering women’s rights. The sensitization of tribal elders in regards to women’s issues, rather than their exclusion from decision-making, could allow for positive change to be implemented within cultural parameters. Moreover, Islam presents a vast plurality of legal understanding that can promote a progressive women’s rights agenda while simultaneously appealing to traditional religious Afghans. Thus, a discourse that involves tribal leaders, religious leaders, as well as Afghan scholars is essential towards improving women’s status - and in turn, their security - in the region.

While considering the tensions between tribal customs and Islam, policymakers must keep in mind the different interpretations of Islam. As stated by Iranian-born anthropologist Ziba Mir-Hosseini, “the holy texts and the laws derived from them, are matters of human interpretation.”[357] However, no interpretation is definite. For instance, while kings such as Zahir Shah and Amanullah Khan pursued reform through a more liberal framework of Islam, the Taliban and Mujahideen forces framed their actions through an ultraconservative framework of the religion. Hence, it is crucial to understand that there is no single way to read the Quran. Previous interpretations satisfied particular needs and answered particular questions.[358] In contemporary Afghanistan, new issues have arisen, and therefore new methods for answering them are needed. In this scenario, the authors of this report advocate that interventions take an Islamic-Feminist approach. Since the indigenous framework consists of using appropriate language and values to communicate objectives and results, it is vital to frame women’s rights and women’s issues within the framework of Islamic texts. This means providing women with the tools to analyze and gain knowledge of their rights as outlined in the sacred Islamic texts. Historically, patriarchal interpretations of the Quran have prevailed, and women have been subordinated within society. If awareness can be raised about the different interpretations of the Quran, and women can be educated about these, they will know to defend their rights from a source considered to be divine. In this framework, it becomes much harder to refute reforms and becomes easier to actively challenge patriarchal interpretations that are being used to define women’s status in society, as the changes are being made within the same Islamic framework.

An example of how reforms lose validity if they are not reconciled with religious frameworks can be seen in Goetz and Gupta’s (1994) study on credit provided to women in rural Bangladesh.[359] The study found that a significant proportion of loans borrowed by women are directly invested by male relatives.[360] Women borrowers, however, are the ones who bear the responsibility for repayment even though they do not necessarily benefit from the loan. Hence, although providing women access to credit is vital, the benefits are limited since they lack control over the money.[361] Nevertheless, certain passages of the Quran can be interpreted as giving women complete control over their income and property, while men should be responsible for maintaining their female relatives.[362] If education on such a right was included as a component of credit programmes, preventing misappropriation of women’s property would be more effective as female autonomy over property would be grounded on a source that many Islamic practitioners perceive as indisputable.[363]

In summary, this policy recommendation states that to be efficient, interventions in Afghanistan must consider local belief systems. Making initiatives that are appropriate to the indigenous context of Afghan society is essential to the effectiveness of planning and implementing reforms to improve women’s security. Policy attempts that neglect local realities are direct assaults on Afghan cultural traditions, religious values, and legal norms. Such reform attempts have legitimized ultraconservative Islamist groups, such as the Taliban, which have consistently thwarted efforts to improve women’s status within society. Moreover, the feminist position that rejects Islam also fails to consider the importance of religion for women, making them choose between their Muslim identity and a secularized gender-consciousness. This leads programs to failure as they do not appeal to both rural and urban women, making it challenging to gain regional support. From this perspective, it is crucial that interventions address Islam, avoid strategies that might alienate Afghan communities and have an awareness of existing social structures and norms which might promote more successful implementations. Finally, through the inclusion of tribal leaders and Afghan women as stakeholders, it is possible to frame changes within an integrated multi-dimensional model that represents Afghan cultural traditions, religious values, and legal norms, and at the same time can draw on human rights principles traditionally promoted by NATO countries.

V. Final Considerations

As the Taliban assumed the leadership of Afghanistan in August 2021, they vowed to “honour women’s rights […] within the norms of Islamic Law”.[364] Nevertheless, as mentioned previously in this report, although women’s rights are protected by Islamic law, the ultraconservative interpretation of Islam defended by the Taliban does not afford equal gender rights. For instance, during their previous years in power, the Taliban claimed that there was no gender discrimination, as they were granting women all rights afforded by the frameworks of Muslim tradition. The official Taliban spokesperson, Zabiullah Mujahid, said “our women are Muslim. They will also be happy to be living within our frameworks of Sharia”.[365] Torunn Wimpelmann, a political ethnographer focusing on gender politics and legal reform in Afghanistan, said that it is likely that the Taliban’s frameworks will indirectly revoke women’s participation in the workforce and their access to education. For instance, it is possible that rather than closing universities, women will be banned from going to higher institutions until “[they] can get female lecturers,” resulting in “a kind of de facto exclusion of women from higher education”.[366] Additionally, women may be “allowed to work” but, simultaneously, they will be prohibited from being alone with a non-relative male, hence, indirectly, excluding females from a multitude of positions.[367] In fact, one Taliban fighter told CNN that “female journalists will still be able to practice their profession as long as they adhere to rules such as wearing the niqab and not engaging with men outside of their family”.[368] There are various women’s rights activists trying to get a say and place in the Afghan society; however, they have faced resistance and lack of support from both international donors and the government.[369] This, along with the Taliban’s discriminatory attitude towards women, makes women question whether their freedom will be achieved in the near future. According to Heather Barr, the Taliban leader claimed to build a just society where all Afghans have equal rights and argued that women were enjoying all rights “granted by Islam”.[370] While this report has formulated a robust policy recommendation to protect women’s security in Afghanistan, the question remains: can such a policy be enforced in the context of Afghanistan’s current state of affairs? The authors of this report believe that such a policy can be enforced with careful and deliberate actions on the part of NATO countries, which engage with the literature presented in this report, and put Afghan women at the centre of deliberations.

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