A Winnable War - COMMENTARY - (Foreign Policy)
A Winnable War
COMMENTARY - (Foreign Policy)
by?Raphael S. Cohen?and?Gian Gentile
July 21, 2023
More than a century ago, Europe was convulsed by?World War I, pitting the Allies—led by Britain, France, Russia, and eventually the United States—against the Central Powers, led by imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the west, fighting occurred along a?440-mile front?that stretched from the English Channel to the Franco-Swiss border. Much of this front was characterized by an operational stalemate lasting years on end. Repeatedly, over the course of the war, hundreds of thousands of soldiers surged out of their trenches and went to their deaths for a few miles of land.
Today,?many?commentators?have likened the current Russia-Ukraine war to the Western Front of World War I.?Satellite images?show extensive Russian trenches all along the 700-mile front, with miles upon miles of land mines and fortifications—all of which seem to hark back to a different era. As do the?gray-scape?images?of gnarled trees and mud craters inflicted by artillery barrages, as well as pictures of soldiers, drenched and shivering in the cold, standing guard in those dreary trenches that echo scenes from more than a century ago. Latching on to this historical analogy, observers conclude that the current Ukrainian counteroffensive is doomed to failure and that the war is inching toward an?inevitable stalemate.
Historical analogies can be imperfect but informative. Some, however, are outright?misleading, and the World War I analogy is one of them. Instead, a better historical precedent to understand the current fighting in Ukraine can be found in the U.S. Army's experience in the summer of 1944, when it was fighting against Nazi forces in the hedgerows of Normandy in France. For starters, the overall?offense-defense?balance of the war in Ukraine bears far more similarity to World War II than World War I. Much of the fighting on the Western Front during World War I was characterized by technological deadlock, with neither side being able to overcome the powerful defensive advantages that machine guns, trenches, and barbed wire provided. Even the most innovative technologies of the era—such as the airplane, the tank, and poison gas—could not break the impasse.
By contrast, World War II was a more fluid conflict, with periods of relative stasis followed by breakthrough. After the Allies landed on Normandy's beaches, they hit a period of tactical stalemate. It took the U.S. Army about six full weeks of tough fighting with?slow, grinding attacks (PDF)?through the Normandy hedgerows to push the German defenders just 19 miles beyond the beachhead toward the French city of Saint-L?. Only when the Americans finally managed to break through Nazi lines did the Germans go into full retreat.
To date, the Russia-Ukraine war resembles the battles in the Normandy hedgerows far more than it does those in the trenches of World War I. While there have been?slowdowns?in the pace of territorial gains—most notably before the battle of Kharkiv last summer—for the most part, the Russia-Ukraine war has been marked by remarkable fluidity, as impasses have been?followed?by rapid territorial gains, as demonstrated in last year's battles of Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson.
The terrain in which the Ukrainians are currently conducting their counteroffensive is also similar, in some ways, to the terrain the U.S. Army had to contend with in the Normandy hedgerows. In the?Bakhmut area, the land is hilly, with many streams, tree lines, roads, and rivers running through it. The features of this landscape produce a compartmentalization effect: An attacking Ukrainian unit may be able to see what is in front and above, but it cannot see much beyond its flanks, due to all the hills, slopes, and streams.
As it did for the allies in Normandy, the compartmental nature of the terrain in Bakhmut presents both challenges and opportunities for Ukraine's counteroffensive. And the same is true, of course, for Russia's defenses. Russian forces also cannot see beyond their flanks. As a result, they may inadvertently leave parts of the line inadequately defended—a gap or weak point Ukraine can exploit if it can find it. Moreover, while Ukraine's overall progress may be slow, it is making some progress in the places where it matters, such as seizing the high ground surrounding Bakhmut. Should the Ukrainians be able to take additional terrain, they may be able to set the conditions for more-rapid operations, much as the U.S. Army did in Saint-L?.
Next, there is the question of troop density—how many troops defend each mile of terrain. During World War I, the density of troops per mile along the Western Front was quite high. For example, on the eve of the British-led Somme Offensive in July 1916, the average ratio of troops per mile on each side of the line was almost?10,000 (PDF). By contrast, in the Normandy hedgerows, the troop density of the German defenders was much closer to the troop density of the Russian defensive lines currently in Ukraine. In the summer of 1944, the average troop density of German defenders that the U.S. Army faced was around?1,000 (PDF)?troops per mile. Today in Ukraine, at the most heavily defended part of the Russian defensive lines centered on Bakhmut,?Russian troop density?is about 700 troops per mile.
Why does troop density matter? Well, because the more sparsely the line is defended, the more likely the line is to have gaps. This is especially true in rough terrain, as the land makes it difficult to patch holes in the line when they occur. Unlike the continuous line of troops on the Western Front in World War I, the German defenders in 1944 did not have sufficient troop density, which meant they had to choose specific points in the hedgerow terrain where they assumed attacking Americans would be most vulnerable. This meant that even though fighting through the hedgerows was tough going, once the U.S. Army?broke through, the Germans took to their heels.
Numbers alone only matter if armies have the right tactics to make full use of both mass and movement, which requires the ability to innovate when troops inevitably encounter obstacles. World War I was characterized by strategic atrophy. Facing tactical gridlock and running out of ideas, the generals took to?throwing?manpower and materiel at what was an operational problem. Not until late in the war did the sides slowly develop the tactics necessary to shake up the lines. By contrast, the Saint-L? breakout was achieved in part by technological innovation—equipping tanks with steel ploughs to?cut through?the hedgerows—and also by more mass, as the Allies brought in more forces. It was also aided by improved tactics, specifically melding together ground and air power.
Indeed, Ukraine is not mindlessly throwing combat power into the Russian defenses, in the style of World War I. Instead, it is deliberately?withholding?some of its best forces. Ukraine still needs a way of clearing minefields, breaching Russian trenches, and blunting Russian air power. Some of this may come from getting the right weapons in sufficient numbers. In this respect, the U.S. decision to provide cluster munitions—which are designed to attack?infantry troops and vehicles—should help. But gains will also require continued tactical innovation. The Ukrainian military has?repeatedly demonstrated?that it has such abilities.
Finally, there is the all-important question of morale. German defenses in the battle of the hedgerows proved determined but ultimately bitter. On July 26 and 27, 1944, U.S. Army Maj. Gen.?Joe “Lightning” Collins?sensed that German defenses were reaching their breaking point. After two days of heavy bombing by the U.S. Army Air Forces against a small area of German defenses northwest of Saint-L?, Collins ordered his corps to attack, and it quickly became apparent that German defenses were crumbling.
Predicting when forces will break is not easy. Still, the?collapse?of Russian forces around Kharkiv last fall suggests that the Russian military is not immune to such sudden implosions. And from a Russian standpoint, the circumstances have only grown increasingly grim since then. Moreover, the recent mutiny against the Russian defense leadership by Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and his mercenaries—followed by what is increasingly looking like a purge of senior officers—has made?manifest?a degree of brittleness at the upper echelons of the Russian military, even if this brittleness hasn't yet trickled down to the tactical level in any obvious way.
None of this guarantees that Ukraine will achieve its own Normandy breakout in the coming weeks. But the World War II analogy is an argument for patience and persistence. Nearly eight decades ago, the United States faced some of the same challenges that Ukraine faces today. But the U.S. Army?persisted (PDF), and its slow, daily advances wore down the German defenders. The cumulative attritional effect proved decisive in the end. Today, the Ukrainian military is making progress, albeit slowly. Whether this halting progress ultimately grinds the Russian military down—or grinds to halt—will only be revealed in time.
The time factor is perhaps the most important reason why it's misleading to compare Ukraine today to World War I. Back then, after four years of fighting and millions of casualties, Britain and France arguably didn't have time on their side, even as the Americans finally entered the fray in the last six months of the war. The British and French watched as an entire generation of young men was decimated and the prewar global order they led was upended. Not so with Ukraine and the West today. The United States and its allies have only invested treasure—not blood—in Ukraine. The West has?time?on its side, and it can afford to be patient. Bad analogies that ignore this fundamental truth only serve to undermine one of the West's biggest strategic advantages.
Raphael S. Cohen is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at RAND Project AIR FORCE. Gian Gentile is deputy director of the RAND Army Research Division.
This commentary originally appeared on?Foreign Policy?on July 18, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.
++++++++++
LOGISTIK
Container-Umschlag im Hamburger Hafen bricht ein
Grund für den Einbruch sind der schw?chelnde Handel mit China und die deutsche Konjunktur. Die Prognosen für 2023 bleiben weiterhin unsicher.
Hamburg?Der schw?chelnde Handel mit China und die maue?Konjunktur?in?Deutschland?haben den Container-Umschlag im Hamburger Hafen stark schrumpfen lassen. Im ersten Halbjahr wurden mit 3,8 Millionen Standardcontainern (TEU) 11,7 Prozent weniger Stahlboxen über die Kaimauern der Hansestadt gehievt als im Vorjahr, wie der Verein Hafen?Hamburg?Marketing am Mittwoch mitteilte.
Damit ging der Containerumschlag in Deutschlands gr??tem Hafen st?rker zurück als in den führenden Nordseeh?fen Rotterdam und Antwerpen. Die H?fen in Bremen und Bremerhaven schlugen sogar gut 15 Prozent weniger Container um.
Am st?rksten war der Rückgang im Verkehr mit China, dem gr??ten Handelspartner der Hamburger. Hier schrumpfte die Containerzahl um fast ein Fünftel auf 1,1 Millionen TEU. Auf Platz zwei folgten unver?ndert die USA mit einer Zunahme des Containerumschlags um 7,4 Prozent auf 313.000 Einheiten. Der Handel mit Indien legte in der ersten Jahresh?lfte um 9,3 Prozent zu, war mit 99.000 Einheiten aber noch vergleichsweise gering. Auch der Handel mit Japan und Thailand stieg.
Insgesamt sank der Seegüterumschlag in Hamburg im ersten Halbjahr gegenüber dem Vorjahreszeitraum um 5,8 Prozent auf 58,2 Millionen Tonnen. Eine Prognose für 2023 traut sich der Verein Hafen Hamburg Marketing weiterhin nicht zu. Die herausfordernden wirtschaftlichen und geopolitischen Rahmenbedingungen lie?en konkrete Voraussagen nicht zu. ?Wir gehen davon aus, dass zumindest der leicht positive Trend des zweiten Quartals weiter anh?lt“, erkl?rte Vorstand Axel Mattern.
+++++++++++++
German Business Suffered Steep Fall in Activity in August, PMIs Suggest
German business activity recorded its steepest decline in more than three years in August, as the country's key manufacturing sector continues to struggle, data from a purchasing managers' survey showed Wednesday.
The HCOB Flash Germany Composite PMI Output Index--which gauges activity in the manufacturing and services sectors--fell to 44.7 in August, from 48.5 in July, the lowest level since May 2020.
The reading means activity sank deeper into contraction, since it came below the 50 no-change level.
The survey's index for manufacturing output dropped further in August compared with July, though there is hope that the downturn in industry is nearing its bottom, according to Cyrus de la Rubia, chief economist at Hamburg Commercial Bank.
But services sector also hit a nine-month low in the survey, indicating that any hope the sector might rescue the German economy has evaporated, De la Rubia said.
Businesses also remained pessimistic about the economic outlook as rising interest rates, customer uncertainty and high inflation continued to weigh on demand for goods and services, HCOB said.
The euro fell to a two-month low against the dollar following the data, according to FactSet.
++++++++++++
Iran hopes Saudi Arabia is serious about new era in ties?- analysis
Iran seeks outreach to the Gulf, China, and countries in Asia at the same time.
By?SETH J. FRANTZMAN?Published:?AUGUST 23, 2023?
In the wake of the visit by?Iran’s foreign minister to Saudi Arabia, the Iranians are hoping the Saudis are serious about a new era in ties. Iran’s pro-government media highlighted a recent cabinet meeting in Saudi Arabia, saying that Riyadh is indicating a new phase in relations.
The report at Fars News is part of a wider pattern of Iran’s interest in rapidly expanding its ties with Saudi Arabia.?
China also is watching this development closely. China’s foreign minister spoke with his Iranian counterpart after the Iranian diplomat traveled to Riyadh. As such?China is clearly using Iran?as one of its conduits to the Gulf. China is also doing its own outreach. Iran sees this as a unique opportunity.
The opportunity matters more today because of the?BRICS summit taking place in South Africa?this week. Saudi Arabia and Iran are both interested in joining BRICS. BRICS combines Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, making up a large percentage of the world’s leading non-Western economies.?
?Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan went to South Africa on Tuesday to attend the 15th BRICS Summit, Saudi Arabia state media reported.
“The minister will head the Saudi delegation on behalf of the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. On the sidelines of the summit, which takes place from Aug. 22-24 in Johannesburg, Prince Faisal will meet several delegates and dignitaries from different countries,” according to Arab News and Saudi Arabia’s SPA.?
SCMP News reported also that “the Chinese and Iranian foreign ministers have spoken ahead of Tuesday’s BRICS summit in Johannesburg, where Tehran is seeking to become the sixth member of the bloc.”
That report goes on to note that “Iran attaches great importance to the development of Iran and China’s comprehensive strategic partnership, and looks forward to maintaining high-level exchanges with China, deepening cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Amir-Abdollahian said, according to the Chinese foreign ministry.?
On the surface at BRICS, the Saudi-Iran reconciliation is not a central issue; but there is a tie-in because of the wider sense that China is playing a growing role in the Gulf, and Iran is keen to see Saudi ties improve.
Iran looking to expand its circle of relations
As such, many balls are in motion at the same time and the meeting in South Africa brings together key players. Iran is also seeking to do more outreach to ASEAN countries, according to a separate report on Iran’s Fars News.
ASEAN, founded in 1967 as a group of countries, now has ten member states. These include Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and others.
Iran’s media says Tehran is doing more outreach to Malaysia as well as other countries in ASEAN that have Muslim populations.?
Iran hopes Saudi Arabia is serious about new era in ties?- analysis - The Jerusalem Post (jpost.com)
+++++++++++++++
By?Atlantic Council experts
It was easier to approach Moscow in June than to leave it in August. Wagner Group mercenary leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin, who staged a short-lived mutiny against the Russian military two months ago, was reportedly?killed?in a plane crash along with nine other passengers on Wednesday while traveling from Moscow to St. Petersburg, according to Russian authorities and Wagner-affiliated Telegram groups. Some?reports have indicated?that the plane was downed by Russian air defenses. Just hours earlier, General Sergei Surovikin, who allegedly had advance knowledge of the Wagner mutiny and had not been seen in public since it occurred, was?removed from his post?as head of Russia’s air force.
What do the timing and circumstances of Prigozhin’s apparent death indicate about the state of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime? What will this mean for the future of the Wagner Group, including its extensive operations in Africa? And what impact will this power struggle have on the war in Ukraine? Below, Atlantic Council experts weigh in.
Click to jump to an expert analysis:
领英推荐
Like ‘something out of the Godfather series’
?
After June’s mutiny led by Wagner warlord Prigozhin, many observers were astonished by the gap between Putin’s denunciation of the mutiny on the day it occurred and the diffidence with which the Kremlin seemed to treat Prigozhin immediately after the fact. That mystery seems resolved. In what seems like an act of slightly delayed revenge, something out of the?Godfather?series, Prigozhin’s plane was shot down and all on board, Prigozhin included, were reportedly killed.
While the circumstances are not yet clear, it seems best to assume that this was not an accident, but a targeted hit. The only unusual feature is that Prigozhin was not pushed out of a window or shot on the street or in an apartment stairwell, like other Kremlin opponents, but apparently shot down from a plane in lurid fashion.
What does it mean? (What follows is speculation that will be tested and likely revised as additional information unfolds.)
First, Putin has exacted a price against those who move against him. Prigozhin appears to be dead and?Surovikin, former commander of Russian troops in Ukraine and by many accounts a competent one, and who was seen as close to Prigozhin, has been dismissed, arrested, and may face charges (or worse). The strange spectacle of Prigozhin’s initial lenient treatment is over; the delay in going after him may have meant only that Putin needed to gauge the degree of Prigozhin’s support before acting.
Second, this latest affirmation of Putin’s style—keep cool in a crisis and kill your opponents on your terms and timing—probably strengthens his position in the short term. The inconsistency and apparent wavering on the day of and shortly after the mutiny, which generated speculation that Putin was vulnerable, has been superseded.
Third, a tyrant maintaining power through murder and fear can work in the short run. But such rule exacts a price on the country. Putin has made bad decisions, like starting a war with Ukraine that Russia cannot seem to win. He may pay no immediate price for that decision (or other bad ones) unless he fails, on the battlefield or otherwise. At that point, he could be vulnerable. A tyrant such as Putin, history shows, has agents and servants but no real allies or friends.
?—Daniel Fried?is the Weiser Family distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council and a former US ambassador to Poland.
Putin sent a message to anyone who contemplates challenging him
Prigozhin looks to have died as he lived: violently. The Kremlin chef’s apparent fiery end, which some Russian sources say was brought by a missile fired by the Russian military, indicates that crossing his boss, Putin, is a deadly serious business. Reportedly, Dmitry Utkin, the Wagner founder and its military commander, also perished on board the Embraer jet.?
Putin sent a message to anyone who contemplates challenging him, while earlier jailing his opponents from both the liberal and ultra-nationalist camps: Alexei Navalny and Vladimir Kara-Murza are jailed for nineteen and twenty-five years respectively, and Igor Girkin is under arrest and facing trial, to mention just a few.??
The question now arises: What will happen with the Wagner Group assets in Russia, Belarus, African countries, and Syria? Integration into the Russian military will be bumpy, as many fighters are personally loyal to Prigozhin, and the state armed forces’ affiliation would even further dilute the already-tenuous plausible deniability the Russian state-supported mercenaries have enjoyed.?
Clearly, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov won this round of the power struggle, but the jostling for power in Moscow never ends. Today what Winston Churchill called “the fight of bulldogs under the carpet” produced the dramatic pictures of the crashing business jet: Wagner’s?G?tterd?mmerung.?
In the future, there will be fights between the military and the Federal Security Service; the competent “system liberals” in the Central Bank of Russia against the economic nincompoops in the Duma; between the presidential administration and the security services; and among the different factions of the Kremlin-connected oligarchs. This struggle will escalate as the jockeying for Putin’s legacy proceeds to its inevitable end.?
—Ariel Cohen?is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
To preserve the regime, Putin needs to preserve fear
At the risk of stating the obvious, it is highly unlikely that the airline crash that appears to have killed Prigozhin was an accident. If Prigozhin were not forced to pay a heavy price for his rebellion in June, Putin’s regime would have been severely weakened. This is because the Putin regime essentially operates according to the logic of a crime syndicate. Putin is the godfather. Prigozhin was a capo who apparently didn’t know his place. And in the immortal words of Omar Little of?The Wire, “You come at the king, you best not miss.” Putin is famously vindictive and from the moment Prigozhin aborted his march on Moscow, he was a dead man walking.
Historically, political change comes to Russia when three factors are present: a divided elite (check), a dissatisfied public (check), and an absence of fear. If Prigozhin had been left unpunished, fear would have been removed from the equation and the regime would have been in peril.?
A couple of other details are also worth noting. On the same day Prigozhin apparently died, his close ally Surovikin was relieved of his duties as chief of the Russian Air Force. And as news of the plane crash spread, Putin was busy presenting the Hero of Russia award to soldiers live on television. Russian journalists were quick to note that in June 2022, Putin gave the same award to Prigozhin. So the optics of Prigozhin’s elimination appear to have also been carefully choreographed.?
—Brian Whitmore?is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, assistant professor of practice at the University of Texas-Arlington, and founder and host of The Power Vertical Podcast.
With or without Prigozhin,?for Russia in Africa, it is business as usual
After his rebellion, the question was: What will be Wagner’s future in Africa, its main ground, now that Prigozhin is exiled in Belarus? Three options were possible: its dissolution, its nationalization by the Russian state, or the appointment of a new leader.
The last two options would preserve Wagner’s achievements in Africa, which Moscow considers highly, including?mining concessions and efficient anti-Western propaganda. None of these scenarios included Prigozhin. His apparent death would not change anything in Russians’ plans besides maybe getting rid of a potential future threat. For the Russians, it is very important that Wagner’s work in Mali and the Central African Republic “of course, will continue.” That is what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said after Prigozhin’s rebellion a few weeks ago to his African friends, who were very worried about the situation.?
Prigozhin or not, the Russians wanted to keep their business and security interests in Africa. It is a primary goal. Putin was very clear about that when he said the mutineers “betrayed the country.” He could not trust Prigozhin, who was under investigation for armed rebellion, any more. Even after his exile, Prigozhin was a threat to Russian interests in Africa, maybe a competitor with rival interests. Surprisingly, he showed up in Saint Petersburg at the recent Russia Africa Summit. Clearly, the interests of the Russian government and the Wagner Group were not aligned any more. Africa is key in Putin’s strategy in Ukraine: to prove he is not isolated, to circumvent Western economic?sanctions?and rebuild his forces via Wagner. Prigozhin’s uprising required a clarification on the nature of Russia’s partnership with African countries. It’s done.
?—Rama Yade?is senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center and senior fellow for the Europe Center.
Expect Xi and Putin to move closer once again
The apparent killing of Prigozhin and the?ousting?of Surovikin, who was rumored to have supported Prigozhin during June’s mutiny, is a show of force meant to deter other would-be domestic challengers and signal to outsiders that Putin remains in charge of the power vertical. The near-simultaneity of these major actions—which took place exactly two months after the June mutiny started—is not a coincidence.
Beijing will likely be pleased with Putin’s cold and lethal decisiveness, as well as its implications. Putin likely would not have liquidated Prigozhin unless he judged that the domestic political fallout would be minimal and that Russian forces can withstand any Ukrainian attempt to exploit an opening. Accordingly, Beijing may believe with greater confidence that Putin will survive domestic and foreign policy challenges.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initially sought to institutionalize China-Russia relations in the wake of the mutiny but may be re-emphasizing personalistic ties.
Beijing appeared genuinely shocked by the intensity and duration of the Prigozhin mutiny and was slow to issue expressions of support for Putin. Moreover, on July 10, a little over two weeks after the failed mutiny, Beijing invited Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko to a meeting in China, where CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping?framed?Sino-Russian relations as a “strategic choice made by the two countries based on the fundamental interests of their respective countries and peoples.” This new rhetoric apparently sought to downplay the Xi-Putin personal relationship and formalize political ties.
With Prigozhin out of the way, however, Beijing may be willing to reemphasize leader-to-leader ties. On July 25, exactly a month after the mutiny concluded, the Russian side?announced?that Xi and Putin would meet in China in October. While the Prigozhin mutiny and Xi’s slow support for Putin in the crisis exposed the limits of the personal relationship between these two “best and bosom friends,” the two figures may be moving closer, once again.
—Joseph Webster?is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and editor of the China-Russia Report.?
The plane crash shows Lukashenka that Putin is still the boss
Two months ago, Belarusian leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka extended security assurances to Prigozhin. Throughout the uprising and its aftermath, Lukashenka adeptly assumed the role of a peacemaker, positioning himself as an essential player in resolving the tensions within Russia. His propaganda went as far as claiming that he had rescued the Russian people.
Wednesday’s plane crash in Russia’s Tver region has significantly compromised Lukashenka’s standing. Primarily, his image as a skillful mediator has taken a hit. This incident exposes a lack of autonomy on his part, confirming a subordinate connection to Putin. Both he and Belarus were used as instruments to facilitate the “agreement.”
If the plane crash was not a mere accident but a deliberate targeted action, it should serve as a stark reminder to Lukashenka and his associates of the Kremlin’s readiness to test the limits in its treatment of its allies—particularly those allies who have shown any form of opposition or resistance. Such actions will be interpreted as acts of betrayal. A response will follow.
The motivations for Wagner mercenaries to remain in Belarus are diminishing rapidly. The future course of action for them remains uncertain. Their presence in Belarus initially stemmed from Lukashenka’s effort to demonstrate his loyalty to Putin. It was then manifested through the intimidation of neighboring Western countries and Ukraine, a stance that found favor with Putin. Now, following Prigozhin’s death, there is a possibility that the mercenaries could face pressure to leave Belarus.?
Their departure is likely to bring a sense of relief to the Belarusian people. But once again, it’s evident that Lukashenka’s control is restricted. The Kremlin will dictate the schedule for their presence. This dynamic also extends to forthcoming developments concerning Belarus, where Lukashenka might be overlooked or regarded as a secondary figure.?
—Hanna Liubakova?is a nonresident fellow with the Eurasia Center and a Belarusian journalist.
Putin may have frozen further threats to his regime
In the Greek myth of Icarus, a man ignores warnings against?flying too close to the sun and eventually falls straight from the sky, perishing on impact. Recent reports of Prigozhin’s death after allegedly being shot down in his private jet roughly three hundred kilometers from Moscow may be a new grisly parable for today’s Russia. Just two months earlier, Prigozhin led a mutiny against Russian military leadership and marched toward Moscow, only to halt on the M4 highway and reverse course after striking a deal with Putin, brokered by his Belarusian counterpart Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Armed with security guarantees and assurances that he would maintain some control over his Wagner Group paramilitaries, it looked like Prigozhin had gotten away with the whole thing. He popped up regularly over the next few weeks, claiming to be variously in Belarus, Saint Petersburg, and even with Wagner forces in Africa.?
In the end, Prigozhin’s antics may have proved intolerable for the Kremlin. If Prigozhin really is dead, and if his plane was shot down, as has been alleged, then this is a major win for Putin. Despicable though Prigozhin is/was—leading thousands of Wagner troops against Ukraine, sponsoring violence in Africa, and sowing discord in the West—it is also true that he represented the most dynamic domestic threat to Putin’s power and to his more than two decades-long rule. The Kremlin has gone to extreme lengths to silence any sort of dissent at home, especially against Russia’s war on Ukraine. But Prigozhin not only chirped at the Russian military for months and questioned the war effort, he actively led a rebellion to change Russia’s military leadership. Putin’s authoritarian kleptocracy is largely based on the quiet assent of the masses and proved brittle when faced with armed resistance from Prigozhin and Wagner.
If Prigozhin really is off the chessboard, along with his Wagner number two Dmitriy Utkin, then the best-organized armed threat to Putin’s power may have been disarmed, at least for now. As more details come out, Prigozhin’s reported death will also likely have a chilling effect on any other pretenders to the Kremlin thinking of striking against Putin, few though they may be. The Russian dictator may not maintain complete control, but the apparent death of his most significant rival may very well freeze further domestic threats to his regime.
—Andrew D’Anieri?is assistant director at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
Wagner mutiny’s last chapter has yet to be written
Prigozhin’s apparent death represents a continuation of the storm that brewed in Russia two months ago during the Wagner Group’s mutiny. What comes next? A few important questions to ask:
?Does evidence emerge clearly showing this was a deliberate act to down Prigozhin’s plane??Supporters of Prigozhin may not need definitive evidence to prompt their next move, but it would certainly further exacerbate tensions between Putin’s regime and Wagner forces/sympathizers if proof emerged showing this was a decapitation strike.
Can—and if yes, do—Wagner forces organize a formidable challenge to Putin and their opponents at the highest levels of Russia’s Ministry of Defense??Wagner forces were approaching Moscow two months ago; now, many of them are in Belarus and their leader appears to be dead. Their desire and capacity to organize a new challenge to Putin’s regime remains to be seen.
What happens in Ukraine??Should violence return in the near term, Russian morale on the front lines could deteriorate, while command-and-control weakens. If Prigozhin’s supporters bide their time, they could wait for continued, hard-fought Ukrainian successes to leave Putin in a more politically precarious state before launching a new challenge to the regime.
These are just a few of the questions worth asking in the days and weeks ahead. One thing is certain: The last chapter of June’s mutiny has yet to be written.
—Jeffrey Cimmino?is deputy director of operations and a fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
If you come for the king, do not miss
When it became obvious that the Wagner mutiny had failed, it also became totally clear that there would be ramifications for Prigozhin and the top Wagner aides that had engaged in the insurrection against the Russian state. Putin—as everyone knows—is infamously unforgiving of betrayal. Many of us asked one another what it was exactly that Prigozhin possessed that was so useful to the regime that he could possibly assume he was safe. The most logical supposition, outside of kompromat, was that Wagner was far too powerful and important within Russia’s African operations and that he could not very easily be replaced as CEO of the corporation and its many subsidiaries without incurring transaction costs and losses to the Kremlin.?
That answer has now proven itself to be incorrect. Putin and the regime that he oversees were wounded enough that a very public example needed to be made. Coupled with Surovikin being removed from his command for allegedly knowing what was about to transpire, the apparent killing of the maverick mercenary leader will send an unmistakable message to the Russian army and general population: If you come for the king, do not miss (and even if you make a deal do not expect to survive the next six months). In the long term, the apparent killing will likely make morale among the leftover Wagner men even worse and will likely mean that the mercenary organization has no future outside of the direct command of the Russian Defense Ministry. None of this makes the cohesion of the Russian state look particularly great, however.
—Vladislav Davidzon?is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Since 2018, he has served as a co-producer for a television series on the effects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
With Prigozhin’s apparent death and Surovikin’s dismissal, Putin is cleaning house
This was a big day for Ukraine. Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian S-400 air-defense system in Crimea, brought in a Russian defector and captured his helicopter, and shot down a Russian warplane over the Black Sea. But the best news of all was the downing of a plane reportedly carrying Prigozhin, who was responsible for the butchering of countless Ukrainians. Ultimate responsibility may rest with a vengeful Putin seeking to eliminate the man who openly challenged him two months ago, but there will be few tears shed for the warlord’s demise.
One reason Prigozhin may have lived as long as he did after his attempted rebellion is that Putin might still have needed him for Russian operations in Africa and to ensure that he wasn’t turned into a martyr by his Wagner fighters. Two months later, that no longer appears to be the case. Prigozhin’s apparent death is likely to be a signal to the rest of the Russian elite that challenging Putin’s rule is a death sentence.
Just the day before his plane was downed, Prigozhin posted a video claiming to be in Africa where he vowed to make “Russia even greater on every continent.” Especially with Prigozhin apparently dead, Russia’s operations in Africa should remain under close scrutiny.
Prigozhin’s apparent death also comes as Surovikin, who disappeared during the Wagner uprising and was reported to be under house arrest, was formally removed from his post as head of the air force under suspicion of aiding Prigozhin. In all likelihood, Putin is finally cleaning house.
—Doug Klain?is a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center.
Putin will seek plausible deniability by blaming Ukraine
Assuming Prigozhin and his deputy Dmitry Utkin were killed aboard his jet, this was “no accident, comrade,” as Lenin observed. Most likely, it was purposeful sabotage engineered by one of Russia’s intelligence services, ordered by Putin. A missile strike would be detected, as with the 2014 attack on a?Malaysia Airlines passenger jet, and would have been an act of supreme incompetence and stupidity, as it would have placed blame squarely on the Kremlin.
For Putin, this is a “hat trick” from hell. First, Russians will understand who was responsible and that this is a case of “shock and awe,” letting all know who is in charge. Second, Ukraine will be accused as the perpetrator, giving Putin plausible deniability that many Russians will accept. Last, whether or not this was revenge, Putin plays for keeps. Past and current US presidents failed to understand this.
The United States and NATO need to ask basic questions about how safe air travel is over Russia, and why and how this happened. Second, they need to send a consistent but low-key message that NATO maintains an overwhelming conventional military superiority over a desiccated Russian army. Teddy Roosevelt was right—speak softly and carry a big stick. But will we?
—Harlan Ullman?is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the author of?The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.
The End++++++++++++++