A wide but cozy net - IoT security standards in the Cyber Security Bill
The Cyber Security Bill 2024 and its related legislation have received significant attention over the past few months; and more eminent minds have written high-level summaries of what can be expected by stakeholders and security practitioners.
However, as a person who has become increasingly curious about legislative phrases requiring “compliance” with a standard (more on that in another post, or a paper, at a later date), I became curious about the “Security standards for smart devices” in Part 2 of the Bill (Standards Part). I was surprised by what I found. I’ve sought to summarise my thoughts, and what I've been able to discern about how the bill will operate, below.
In my opinion, the effect of the Bill should be considered by any entity that involved in manufacture, rental, importation or other dealings involving electronic devices of any variety (not just manufacturers of “classic” or “commonly recognised” IoT devices).
A consultation period in relation to the Rules will be opened for a minimum of 28 days at some stage soon, and manufacturers should begin preparation to engage to ensure that their interests are not jeopardised. Commencement of the Bill is set at a 1 year maximum from assent, so we can expect consultation on the Rules to occur soon (so that they can be drafted before the automatic commencement).
Key takeaways
There’s more detail below for those who seek it.
Scope – relevant connectable product
The Standards Part of the Bill applies to any “relevant connectable product”, which, in simplified terms, captures two types of products.
First, it captures ‘internet-connectable products’ which are any products you can connect directly to the internet (think anything from a home internet router to an internet connected mailbox).
Second, it captures ‘network-connectable products’. The definition is complex, but it can be roughly simplified to include:
There is also a provision which interacts with the last definition, designed to capture devices which indirectly link to a computer (which probably covers things like wireless USB receivers, USB hubs, and so-on).
As I’ve alluded to, I’m of the view the definition is bordering on overbroad – but the Rules should, for practical purposes, greatly reduce the number of products which give rise to obligations.
The Rules
Section 87 of the Bill gives the Minister the power to make rules. Section 14(1) provides that the Rules may “make provision for, or in relation to, security standards for specified classes of relevant connectable products that will be acquired in Australia in specified circumstances.” Notably, sections 87(3)–(4) provide for a minimum 28 day notice period during which submissions can be made, and any submissions received in that period have to be considered before making rules.?
I am of the view the consultation phase will be very important for manufacturers and suppliers of relevant connected products for the following reasons.
As to consultation on coverage, given the enthusiasm (I use that word with no ill meaning) to secure IoT products, it is possible that manufacturers will basically have one narrow shot at ensuring their products are carved out of the class of “specified products” under the Bill. I would expect to see significant discourse on:
As to the content of the security standards, there are remarks in the Explanatory Memorandum which suggest an intention to broadly align with the Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure Act 2022 (UK) (UK Act). On that basis, one might initially expect that the Standards will be minimal and require:
(See Product Security and Telecommunications Infrastructure (Security Requirements for Relevant Connectable Products) Regulations 2023 (UK), Sch 1)
However, the power to make “security standards” is broadened by section 14(3) which basically allows for a reference to an external document. ?And sections 15(2) and (4) provide that “The entity must comply with any other requirements of the security standard that apply […]” Conceivably, the Minister could go further than the UK, and bind manufacturers or suppliers to an entire ISO/IEC Standard (such as ISO/IEC 30141 – Internet of things – Reference architecture), which might have operational impacts. I can see the power being used in that way where an IoT product has a near-permanent link to its manufacturer.
Ultimately, the position remains unclear until consultation gets underway.
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Obligations
There are, broadly speaking, two obligations. One relates to the supply/manufacture of products, and the other relates to certificates of compliance.
It should be noted that the definition of "supplier" and "manufacturer" are the same as under the Australian Consumer Law. This may broaden the scope of application beyond the ordinary meaning of those words. Organisations involved in things like equipment hire, importation of goods from overseas, and white-labelling of generic products should get advice about whether they are a manufacturer or supplier.
Supply and Manufacture
Under s 15(1) relevant connectable products must be manufactured in compliance with security standards if they are aware, or could reasonably be expected to be aware, that the product will be acquired in Australia in the specified circumstances.
Under s 15(3), suppliers must not supply a relevant connectable product which does not comply with security standards in the specified circumstances if they are aware, or could reasonably be expected to be aware, that the product will be acquired in Australia in those circumstances.
As noted above, sections 15(2) and (4) have the effect of allowing the Minister to bind the manufacturer and supplier to other security standards which don’t directly concern the product in question.
As a side note, I’ve seen some discrepancies in how the obligation in 15(3) has been described. Some firms have described it as a simple obligation for manufacturers. I think that’s related to the fact that there’s a sub-heading which reads “manufacturers must comply” above the whole of section 15. In my view, section 15(3) also captures suppliers who have nothing to do with the manufacture of the product. I think there should have been a sub-heading which read “suppliers must comply” between sections 15(2) and 15(3). That’s supported by:
There is also an exception to this obligation, covered below.
Certificates of compliance
Under section 16, manufacturers have to provide a statement of compliance with any applicable security standard (sub-s (1)), and retain a copy of that statement for a period specified in the rules (sub-s (2)).
Similarly, a supplier must supply the product with a statement of compliance (sub-s (3)), and retain a copy of that statement for a period specified in the rules (sub-s(4)).
The Rules will contain specifications for the content of the statement of compliance, and the retention period manufacturers and suppliers must abide by.
Exception for certain suppliers and manufacturers
Presumably for constitutional reasons, the Bill has a partial exception which appears to be which I am sure will become an important area for legal advice given to foreign and multi-national companies.
The thrust of the exception is as follows:
Two points of morbid curiosity arise:
Powers and enforcement
The Secretary is granted a 4-phase process for risk reduction, and not much more. It works as follows, at a high level:
Somewhat surprisingly, a contravention of the obligations in the Standards Part of the Bill does not give rise any of the usual provisions for regulatory issues such as fines, civil penalties, injunctions or otherwise. However, monitoring under Part 2 of the Regulatory Powers Act is available.
Cyber Security Manager / Senior Penetration Tester at KPMG Australia
3 个月Nice one Zane. I skimmed over it and will need to read over it later but I got the vibe that for each device class it would have been good for the have to have a reference build and update approach for some of more popular platforms used in IOT and comms. Anyway that was a great write up and I look forward to more!!!