Why Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Is Progressing Just as It Should: The Devil is in the Details

As an observer, I find myself drawn into the intricate dance of war that is unfolding in Ukraine. I have extensively read about military technique, tactics, and strategy, as they influence political strategy, which has been my primary interest pre-Ukraine’s war.

Before I delve into the argument, I invite you to a brief understanding of what’s happening on the frontlines in terms of offense and defense, as defined by modern warfare theorists:

The Russians’ defense style. It’s a blend of static defense (think WWII’s Maginot Line style fortifications) and in-depth defense, the latter referring to a multi-layered, disparate defense, akin to the Surovikin Line. The Ukrainians’ attack style. It’s a mix of methodical attack and breakthrough attack (the collective mental picture of Blitzkrieg, if you will).Bear in mind that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) do not possess air superiority or supremacy. Hence, the Western attack doctrine, which heavily relies on air supremacy, can’t be implemented in the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Similarly, when you consider the notion “the counteroffensive is moving slowly”, you might unwittingly compare it with the Harkiv counteroffensive in September 2022.

I suggest you do so unwittingly because in communication sciences, this is known as “shadow framing” – it’s what’s left in residual memory and used as a point of comparison whenever we evaluate the unfolding of an event, someone’s actions, or the same person’s actions in seemingly similar situations separated by a specific timeframe. So let’s scrutinize these details to understand the seemingly slow progress of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

My analysis of the situation on the ground must recognize that the nature of warfare is constantly changing. We must also acknowledge that comparisons between the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive and the Harkiv operation last September can be misleading, due to differing strategic, logistical, and operational factors.

When observing the Armed Forces of Ukraine’s (AFU) operations, it’s crucial to remember that they are functioning without the benefit of air superiority or supremacy. This fundamentally alters the dynamics of their offensive approach. Unable to rely on a key component of Western attack doctrine – air supremacy – they must resort to a blend of methodical and breakthrough attacks.

On the Russian side, their combination of static and in-depth defense techniques has created a fortified and resilient structure, reminiscent of the WWII Maginot Line and the multi-layered Surovikin Line. This complex defensive arrangement is designed to withstand, slow down, and frustrate enemy advances. The Ukrainian counteroffensive isn’t moving slowly; it’s progressing as it should given the current military reality. The devil, indeed, is in the details – understanding these nuances provides the key to accurate analysis and forecasting.

The Ukrainian counteroffensive is a chess game, not a sprint. Each move is calculated with a long-term strategy in mind. And it’s in these intricate details, hidden beneath the immediacy of daily news coverage, where we can find the real narrative. Hence, subconscious ‘shadow framing’ might lead you to believe that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are not advancing quickly. The concept of ‘quick’ is relative – it needs a benchmark for comparison, and for many following this war since its onset, that benchmark is precisely the Harkiv Counteroffensive. But here’s where our minds can play tricks on us: they often fail to consider the shifting variables between then and now:

Back then, the Russian army didn’t have any fortified defense line. Now, the Surovikin Line consists of up to six successive layers of in-depth defense, with parts of it being fortified. Hence, there’s a significant difference between Russian defense then and now.Given this timeline, the Russians, while constructing the Surovikin Line, have put the Ukrainians in a challenging position. This has necessitated the Ukrainians to adapt their attack tactics. What we saw in September 2022 as daily breakthrough attacks (Blitzkrieg), has now morphed into a positional attack, complemented with limited breakthroughs. Why this change in tactics? It is to limit losses and maintain momentum.

So, while it might seem that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is slow, it is merely adapting to the changing battlefield. This isn’t a failure, but a testament to their ability to modify strategy as circumstances demand – a key to long-term success in the fluid arena of war.

Back in September 2022, by cunningly feigning an attack on Herson, the Ukrainians forced the Russians to displace a significant number of troops to protect the symbolically and strategically important city. The Ukrainians did this to thin out Russian defenses in Harkiv, and they succeeded.

Today, the scenario has changed. The Russians clearly know that the attack will be on the southern front. By detonating the Khakovka dam, they’ve managed to slow down the Ukrainians and cut off the possibility of a two-flank attack.

In September 2022, the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) was still new to the Russians and they didn’t have an answer to it. The destruction caused by HIMARS on the logistics centers at the Harkiv front, from Velyki Burluk, Kupyansk, and Izium, were decisive in causing the total collapse of the front.

Now, the situation is markedly different. True, the Storm Shadow missile is a game-changer, but the Russians have adapted. There are fewer large troop concentrations, the storage facilities are smaller and dispersed (to make the use of Storm Shadow economically inefficient), and logistics centers are also smaller and spread across multiple locations.

These are not setbacks for the Ukrainians but part of the evolving chessboard of warfare. Every move has a counter-move, and it’s a constant dance of adaption and innovation. The Ukrainian forces are not slowing down; they are cautiously advancing, acclimatizing to this ever-evolving military landscape.

Therefore, what we see today is in no way comparable to the Harkiv counteroffensive, to which the majority (including Western Generals) refer when they claim “the counteroffensive is moving slowly.”

Taking all these factors into account, what is Ukraine doing now, and why do I believe that this counteroffensive is moving at an absolutely admirable pace, even exceeding expectations in certain front areas?

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are employing a hybrid model of flexible attack: a blend of breakthrough and positional attacks (using artillery to strike deep and diminish Russian forces). They first attack a point, essentially using raid-type attacks (rapid, with a high density of forces and a pre-established time and space limit) to force the Russians to respond with artillery – thus revealing their positions and sending infantry and mechanized infantry – in what would typically be termed “offensive defense.”

When the Russians resort to these tactics, leaving their positions, the Ukrainians pull back and bring in their artillery, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and tanks. The former are used to destroy Russian artillery batteries, where they still hold numerical superiority, and the latter to eliminate the forces displaced for trench defense.

This strategic approach slowly erodes the Surovikin Line defense day by day, which is why we see daily increasing breaches of the Russian defense, and in ever greater depth.

Consider the Battle for Bakhmut. Why is it important? From what I know from my sources in Ukraine, corroborated by official Ukrainian or western sources, the Russians continue to amass between 50,000 and 70,000 troops in that direction. Why? Because Bakhmut is Putin’s only victory, and he cannot afford to lose a locality that today has (as it did before) no strategic value. Moreover, today, Bakhmut is just a destroyed city, of no value whatsoever to the Russian Federation.

These tens of thousands of troops are thus pinned down by the Ukrainians, who in the meantime have taken the initiative, have entered (as I wrote a few days ago and today confirmed even by Russian sources) Bakhmut and gained ground both to the north and south of it, forcing the Russians to remain fixed there.

Despite their inferior artillery numbers, less ammunition, the natural handicap of the offensive, and the fact that Ukraine’s air force is almost non-existent compared to Russia, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have made progress today on all four southern axes (Herson, Vasylivka, Orihiv-Tokmak, Velyka Novosiikla-Berdiansk), but especially in the Bakhmut area. They have crossed the Siversky Donets canal, are close to encircling Klischiivka, already attacking Kumydivka and Andriivka to the south, and have territorial gains in the north.

Zelensky’s statement about the future success of this counteroffensive by the time of the NATO Summit in Vilnius on July 11 is political in nature. His succinct wording doesn’t allow for the elaboration that I am able to provide here. It is an optimistic forward-looking statement designed to inspire confidence and morale both in Ukraine and among its allies. It’s also likely a way to exert pressure on NATO and its member countries to offer more concrete assistance or take stronger action in the face of this conflict.

General Mark Milley, on the other hand, has expressed a slightly more cautious perspective, stating that the counteroffensive is proceeding well but at a slower pace than expected. With all due respect to General Milley, who previously predicted that Kyiv would fall within 72 hours in the event of an invasion (a prediction made on February 5), allow me to disagree with him this time. Real-world military operations, especially of this scale and complexity, rarely go according to anyone’s exact predictions.

In conclusion, we’re not dealing with a Hollywood movie here. This is a real war with real casualties and real victories, however incremental they may be. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are advancing, and perhaps most importantly, they are doing so without having yet engaged in battle with what I refer to as the “The Nine” Brigades – those specially prepared for this counteroffensive.

On the Southern Front of the counteroffensive, we see activity on two significant axes: Vasylivka and Orihiv-Tokmak.

On the Vasylivka axis, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are advancing from Lubkove towards Luhove. The entire area in front of Luhove is contested territory, and as we can see, despite what Russian propaganda might suggest, the Ukrainians are starting to find gaps in the “Surovikin Line”.On the Orihiv-Tokmak axis, the situation is a bit more straightforward. The AFU has advanced further than the map might suggest and they are at the entrance to Robotyne, having crossed two lines of defense, one of which has elements of fortification. Between Robotyne and a key operational objective – Tokmak, lie some of the heaviest fortifications constructed by the Russians. Anticipate higher casualties for the AFU here, with Leopard 2 tanks and other Western equipment likely to be destroyed. It’s important to set expectations correctly. However, this defensive line is already being tested by the Ukrainians through a type of hybrid elastic attack. Due to their lack of air force, they are compelled to use such combined arms operations, involving reconnaissance, targeting, striking, attacking, and withdrawing. It’s a dynamic, fluid form of warfare that keeps the enemy off balance and prevents them from focusing their defenses too narrowly.

An Operational Objective serves as an intermediary between the highest level, Strategy – which determines military lines according to the political goals of the war – and Tactical objectives, which can be as specific as attacking a hill or a fortification. Operational Objectives often include things like road or rail junctions, essentially terrestrial communication logistics nodes (or GLOCs). Tokmak falls into this category.

Should the Ukrainians succeed in liberating Tokmak using any attack method – whether it’s encircling and destroying ammunition depots, command centers, etc. – it would significantly ease their path towards Melitopol and further to the Azov Sea and Henicesk. Thus, the capture of Tokmak is not just a short-term tactical achievement, but it also serves a crucial operational purpose, setting the stage for the longer-term strategic goals of the Ukrainian forces.

On the Velyka Novosilka-Berdiansk axis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) are attacking Staromaiorske from three directions. What’s essential is the attack from the west of the locality, from Rivnopil, a location that was liberated just two days ago. This positioning provides the Ukrainians with a superior elevation, a significant advantage in military operations.

In total, on the southern front, nearly 10km were liberated just in the last 24 hours. While this might seem small to some, the amount of contested territory no longer entirely under Russian control has vastly increased compared to a week ago. By the way, it’s 85km from Staromaiorske to Mariupol, which might not seem like much but, in a war where Ukraine is inferior in almost all dimensions of military force, it seems like the longest journey in history.

On the Bakhmut-Siversk-Kreminna axis, the battle for Klischiivka has begun. There are unconfirmed reports suggesting that the Ukrainians have retaken the single fortification on the hill east of Klischiivka. If this information turns out to be true, Klischiivka is all but won, which opens a new line of attack for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to advance towards Opytne, Andrivka, and of course, Bakhmut.

To the north of Bakhmut, what once was the pillar supporting the northern pincer, namely the area between Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka, is on the verge of collapsing. Now, it’s only a matter of time until this Russian front falls. North of the AZOM industrial complex, the Ukrainians have observed Russian troops retreating as the Ukrainians are getting close to breaking through from Berkhivka-Yahidne into northern Bakhmut.

I don’t believe that the Ukrainians’ intention is to liberate Bakhmut right now. Their aim seems to be to pin down the Russian forces that could otherwise reinforce the southern front. Bakhmut, in a symbolic sense, is a strategic-level objective. It represents the only “victory” achieved during the Russian winter-spring campaign.

What I can tell you with 100% certainty is that Bakhmut is NOT under Russian control at this moment, even though there aren’t many sources confirming this, and certainly no official sources (for obvious reasons).

The battle for Kreminna. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) have advanced towards Dibrova from three directions. They are likely to bypass this town, surround it, and proceed towards Kreminna.Remember, war is not about speed, but about careful, strategic movement and the achievement of critical objectives. Even small territorial gains, like the ones made by the AFU, can have significant strategic implications. As the conflict continues, these gains will only increase in value, potentially shifting the balance in Ukraine’s favor.

Every day is a test of endurance and a demonstration of commitment for Ukraine, as they hold the line and push back. Their strength and determination have become the embodiment of resistance. As we watch the situation unfold, we can only hope for a swift resolution that brings peace and stability back to the region.