Why playing the long game against Putin is risky too: some reflections on the debate about a no fly zone

The current indications are that Putin’s Russia is “going all in” to secure its original objectives in Ukraine. The Russian war machine has so far not been deterred or deflected by the unprecedented international sanctions, only by Ukrainian resistance on the ground and its own flawed planning, logistics and poor morale among conscript soldiers. If we take Putin by his word, he has launched this war because he will not tolerate an “Anti-Russian Ukraine”. He says that the current democratically elected government and all its supporters are neonazis, drug addicts or brainwashed by Western propaganda. He does not consider Ukraine as nation with its own distinct identity and right to sovereignty. Russia will probably seek to annex and then control large parts of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. This would leave at best an unstable rump-state without secure borders, subject to interference from Moscow and dependent on EU support for decades.

Seasoned experts such as Lawrence Freedman think Putin’s war aims are unachievable because the invasion has reinforced Ukraine’s sense of national identity even further. It has turned the population against Russia for good and would feed a costly partisan fight-back and civil obedience even if Russia manages to comprehensively defeat the armed forces in the short term.

Yet, Putin may disagree and bet he can still achieve his original war aims by embracing utterly brutal methods – as previously used in Chechnya and Syria and perhaps even going beyond the weapons and tactics used there. He may think he can govern the new territories by killing the current elites and replacing them with pro-Russian puppets, driving millions of citizens outside the country and terrorising those who stay into submission. He probably believes that governing through fear is both effective and necessary. The shelling of civilian urban centres has already started and the plans to kill Ukraine’s urban elites were put into action in Kyiv by Russian special forces and Chechen assassins according to media reports, but fortunately failed so far.

Therefore, we are seeing not just the unprovoked violation of a country’s sovereignty (triggering the right to self-defence and assistance for it under Article 51 of the UN charter), but also substantial evidence of two if not three of the four so-called mass atrocity crimes being planned, if not already executed: ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity prohibited under the UN’s “Responsibility to Protect” – and requiring other states to take preventive action. Putin’s doubling down on his original war aims could lead to many more millions of Ukrainians displaced to neighbouring European countries, perhaps for many years. While Ukrainian resistance and fight-back is heroic and benefits from belated military assistance from Europe, it may not be enough to change the situation on the ground or the Kremlin's calculations. Most military experts assess that Putin is likely to achieve his military objectives, albeit at a huge costs to the future of the Russian people and indeed Russian soldiers’ lives and military hardware.

It is hard to know whether this invasion could have been avoided given President Putin’s views of Ukraine and his evident dissatisfaction with the status-quo. However, it stands to reason that the weakness of Western deterrence and misunderstandings of Putin’s worldviews and tactics lowered the expected risks for the Kremlin. Sanctions were imposed after Russia’s aggression of 2014, but stricter measures or indeed more substantial military support for Ukraine was not provided because of the domestic economic costs, the fear of “provoking Russia” and undermining the Minsk accord.

When announcing the invasion, Russia already threatened “consequences they have never seen” for those countries that “interfere”. Nevertheless, the US/EU and many other countries have evidently judged that such risks were worth taking given the magnitude of what Russia has done and its wider and longer term implications for European security. They took unprecedented actions like the freezing of Russian Central Bank assets or the provision of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Would they reverse these decisions and halt military support if Russia issued an explicit nuclear ultimatum? ?I doubt it. These questions are important because they help to crystallise the underlying dilemmas and issues involved in creating, for instance, a no-fly zone. It has been repeatedly called for by Ukrainian officials and indeed MPs such as the Chair of the Defence Select Committee Tobias Ellwood. There are pieces that look at the substantial practical challenges and risks involved.

It is true that there is a qualitative and legal difference to providing help indirectly and using economic tools to harm the Russian economy. Any plan that brings European soldiers potentially in direct combat with Russian soldiers creates new kinds of risks and costs. Many warn that a non-fly-zone would be a reckless action that threatens not only the lives of European pilots being sent potentially into battle, but also substantially increases the probability of such action quickly escalating into an all-out war between NATO and Russia that could even go nuclear. It would be politically hugely contentious and may fracture international unity. Military experts say a no fly zone might have limited tactical impact because it does not stop the shelling of Ukrainian cities or stop the movement of Russian tanks. Such concerns need to be taken very seriously and one should respect everyone who feels the risks are simply too great.

However, one should not necessarily take each and every Russian threats at face value and assume certain consequences are a certainty as some politicians do. Instead, these risks need to be acknowledged, understood and carefully managed. Decision-makers should not dismiss options out of hand, but consider them fully alongside other perhaps better alternatives for protecting the civilian population against war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

One advantage of a no fly zone is that it can be more easily justified with reference to international norms and laws and are more limited in nature than other measures. They would not be directed against Russian territory or the regime itself, but their purpose is to stop Russian aircraft violating fundamental red lines for human rights and international law. Diplomatic work towards creating such a zone would ideally be supported by a substantial majority of UNSC members and international support from non-Western states. Unfortunately, this job has not been made easier by the legacy of the Western intervention in Libya when Western countries strayed beyond their original mandate.

However, it is self-evident that the Libyan and the Ukrainian cases are very different, not least because the action would be taken upon the explicit invitation of the democratically elected government and the goal is not regime change in Russia. ?One would need to ensure that many countries act together rather than jeopardising the extraordinary level of unity seen so far. Perhaps one could keep NATO as an organisation outside the picture and channel any action through the UN and broad coalitions of the willing. It would need to be pre-announced and clearly justified with sufficient lead-time, giving Russia ample time to carefully weigh its next steps and responses – either negotiate a ceasefire, withdraw troops and sign a peace-deal to secure at least some face-saving outcome; or to escalate further militarily in a fight it is likely to lose or to risk its own annihilation by using nuclear weapons in a first strike against a NATO member. Russia would come under intense pressure from China to cave in because China’s own strategic interests would be on the line.

The UK not only survived, but managed to thrive despite the humiliation experienced over its Suez canal intervention. Putin could claim some kind of face-saving victory at the negotiation table as long Ukraine remains free to determine its future course, particularly in relation to the integration into the EU single market and eventually the EU itself. This would be the main price for the country as EU members are beefing up their defences and give substance to the mutual assistance clause in the EU treaties.

There are good reasons to argue that the risks of such a step or indeed other alternative measures that European soldiers in harms way are simply to great. There is a reason why the Ukraine was not given a NATO membership action plan since 2008. However, not acting in this way could also entail substantial risks too as we have seen in the case of not enforcing the red-lines against Syria using chemical weapons in 2013. Just picture the following scenario in 12 months time: when Russia has taken the major cities and special forces have worked through their elite execution lists, when tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, when several millions have fled to European neighbouring countries with little hope of return, when Russia has achieved air superiority and rebuilt its own air-defence in Ukraine, when the Kremlin feels bold enough to retaliate through its own hybrid warfare measures such as assassination and attacks on EU critical infrastructure. President Biden may have become a lame duck president after victory of the Republicans at the mid-term elections. They should also consider the situation in 2-3 years time when China might have helped its new “no limits partner” to adjust to the Western sanction and Russia is threatening Moldova and Georgia and bullying the Baltics and Poland. And when the next US presidential election in 2024 has returned Trump or another anti-EU and possibly NATO populist to the White house.

Thousands of Ukrainians have chosen to fight despite high odds of intense suffering and defeat. Europe faces difficult choices in the coming days and weeks on whether it sticks to the current self-restraint on deploying its own soldiers in the hope that the combination of increased military support, strong economic sanctions and international pressure force Russia to scale back its war aims. The stakes are high and decision-makers need to keep a cool head when they consider steps on the already risky new path they have embarked on since the invasion started. We will know the right decision often only with the benefit of hindsight, but need to carefully weigh the risks and opportunities of different kinds of action, and crucially, not acting. In the past, Western countries have too often said “enough is enough”, when it has been “more than enough” in terms of human suffering and the remaining options to act were extremely limited and costly. I worry that the international community may currently think it has time on its side and that it can play the long game successfully. I fear that governments may deeply regret not having gone further at a moment when Putin’s regime, economy and military machinery was at its weakest, the consequences on the ground not yet irreversible, international support greatest and the US firmly on Europe’s side.?