Why was the party system realigned in Greece and not in Portugal after the 2008 financial crisis?

Note: This Dissertation was written and submitted as a final project for my MSc in Comparative Politics (2017–18) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

Abstract

This paper will explore the reasons as to why the party system was realigned in Greece and not in Portugal after the 2008 economic crisis. The paper tests two hypotheses, one that focuses on the effects of populism on the party system, and another focusing on the effects of the electoral systems, more specifically open-lists and closed-lists.

The paper finds plausible reasons to believe that Greece’s political culture triggered the party realignment, while the absence of such political culture in Portugal led to the perpetuation of the status quo. Although the hypothesis is not fully confirmed because of the lack of relevant literature regarding populism, especially its empirical effects on party systems, and its theoretical conceptualization as a political culture. As for the second hypothesis, the same results become apparent, there is plausible cause to believe that open-lists in Greece were more conductive to party system realignment, especially when coupled with the aforementioned populist political culture, while Portugal’s closed-list system was more efficient in upholding the party system.

Abbreviations

ANEL The Independent Greeks

BE Left Bloc

CDS-PP Democratic and Social Centre-Popular Party

CDU Coalition Democratic Unitary Coalition

PCP Portuguese Communist Party

CPT Comparative Process Tracing

DIMAR Democratic Left

Enosi Kentroon Union of Centrists

EU European Union

EUROZONE Monetary Union of the EU

GDP Gross Domestic Product

KKE Communist Party of Greece; KKE

LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally or People’s Orthodox Alarm

MoD Method of Difference

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

ND New Democracy

PAN People Animals Nature

PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement

PEV Ecologist Party “The Greens”

POTAMI The River

PPP Purchasing Power Parity

PS Socialist Party

PSD Social Democratic Party

SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left

Troika European Central Bank, the European Commission and International Monetary Fund

Table of Contents

Abstract 

Abbreviations 

Chapters

1. Introduction 

1.1 Portugal and Greece: Why They Are Comparable 

1.2 Hypotheses I & II: The Differences Being Analysed 

2. Context and Literature Review 

2.1 Context: Political Parties and Pivotal Events 

2.1.1 Portuguese Political Parties 

2.1.2 Greek Political Parties 

2.1.3 Pivotal Events 

2.2 Literature Review: Populism and Electoral Systems 

2.2.1 Populism 

2.2.2 Populism in Greece and Portugal 

2.2.3 Electoral Systems: Open-Lists Versus Closed-Lists 

2.2.4 Electoral Systems: Portugal and Greece 

3. Methodology 

3.1 Methods: Small-n, Mill’s MoD and CPT 

3.2 Strengths and Limitations 

4. Findings 

5. Discussion 

5.1 Hypothesis I 

5.2 Hypothesis II 

6. Conclusion 

Bibliography 

1. Introduction

The financial crisis of 2008 paved the way for the emergence of populist leaders throughout the world, or so we thought. The conceptualisation for this paper began with a simple question ‘why did populism emerge in Greece and not in Portugal after the 2008 economic crisis?’. Upon engaging in further research, it became evident that populism did not arise in Greece as a result of the economic crisis and was in fact Greece’s regular modus operandi of doing politics almost as far back as its democratic establishment in 1974. The focus on the paper then shifted towards the fact that, in the wake of the economic crisis, Greece suffered a party system realignment which did not occur in Portugal.

In order to analyse both hypotheses proposed below, the dissertation will be divided into relevant chapters. Chapter 2, lays out the context by looking at the political parties in both Greece and Portugal, followed by the theoretical framework on populism, alongside with its manifestation (or lack of) in Greece and Portugal, the chapter concludes with a brief outline of pivotal events that give further context to the argument. This section is followed by chapter 3, the methodology section, which presents small-n studies, Comparative Process Tracing and Mill’s Method of Difference as the methods employed to test the hypotheses, with a brief overview of their shortcomings and merits. Chapter 4 presents the findings and is comprised of a summary of the election results during period under investigation. Chapter 5 brings together the relevant literature set out in chapter 2 and findings in chapter 4 in order to examine the links of populism, and test the hypotheses set out in the first chapter. The paper ends with a last section focusing on a conclusion which evaluates the merits and shortcomings of the work alongside its further implications for the field.

1.1 Portugal and Greece: Why They Are Comparable

The first similarity lies in the fact that both countries “experienced authoritarian interludes” (Liphart et al. 1998:18), who were toppled, coincidentally, in 1974. Moreover, ever since the establishment of free, democratic elections, both countries’ parliaments were dominated by two centre-right and -left mainstream parties, PS and PSD in Portugal, and ND and PASOK in Greece (Hellenic Parliament 2018; CNE 2007; Elei?oes Legislativas 2015). A pattern that was broken in Greece during the period observed in this paper, while it remained unaltered in Portugal.

Furthermore, both countries are members of the EU and the Eurozone. Also, within the EU, both Portugal and Greece are considered peripheral countries, geographically and economically, and have similar populations — making up 2,04% and 2,14% of the EU’s total population, respectively (EU 2008). Furthermore, in 2017 both countries had a GDP below that of the EU average — which stands at 106.0 PPPs — with Portugal having a GDP of 77.0 PPPs, and Greece 67.0 PPPs (Eurostat 2018).

Moreover, both countries are considered ‘flawed democracies’, according to The Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. On a scale of 1 (‘authoritarian regime’) to 10 (‘full democracy’) over the span of nine years (2008–2017), Portugal and Greece averaged around the same values at 7.86, and 7.60 respectively (The Economist’s Intelligence Unit 2018). Lastly, and perhaps more importantly, both “Greece and Portugal are among EU countries most severely affected by the Eurozone crisis and by subsequent harsh austerity policies” (Freire et al. 2014:415). As consequence of the impact of the crisis, both countries had to request bailouts from the Troika. The aim of the Troika was to conditionally provide monetary rescue packages in exchange for austerity measures, which meant that “the economic policies” of the countries were determined by the terms of the loans (Katsanidou et al. 2015:5). Greece signed the MoU (bailout agreement) with the Troika in 2010 and 2012, while Portugal did so in 2011.

1.2 Hypotheses I & II: The Differences Being Analysed

There are two major disparities between Greece and Portugal scrutinised in this paper: populism, and electoral systems. Firstly, the phenomenon of populism appears to have a long tradition in Greek politics while it has yet to be felt in a relevant form in Portugal. In Stavrakakis et al.’s words “Greece is no stranger to populism” (Stavrakakis et al. 2014:124), and there is a relatively stable academic consensus on that subject (see, for example, Vasilopoulou et al. 2014; Papathanassopoulos et al. 2017; Mavrogordatos 1993; Kalyvas 1997). On the other hand, Portuguese populism at a systemic level seems to be predominantly non-existent in parliamentary halls. In Portugal, not only populism failed to gain any relevant traction “it is also viewed as dangerous” (Salgado et al. 2017).

Such difference leads us to Hypothesis I: In Greece, the populist political culture led to the polarisation of the electorate, which in turn resulted in the realignment of the party system. In Portugal, the absence of a populist political culture sheltered the electorate from a systemic polarisation, and therefore the status quo was maintained.

Secondly, as explained in more detail in the forthcoming sections, both countries have disparate electoral systems. Greece’s electoral system utilises (for the majority of seats) an open-list system, where voters can choose between parties and specific candidates in party’s lists. In contrast, Portuguese voters elect their MPs on a closed-list basis, meaning that the electorate can only vote for parties (and their subsequent arranged lists of candidates), rather than candidates themselves.

This difference is examined in Hypothesis II: The open-list system in Greece created a more fertile ground for the realignment of the party system; In Portugal, closed-list systems favoured the maintenance of the party system.

2. Context and Literature Review

2.1 Context: Political Parties and Pivotal Events

In order to better understand the electoral results shown in the findings, it is important to offer an overview of the players being observed in the discussion (Portuguese and Greek political parties). Although not all parties will be mentioned in the discussion, it is important to grasp the notion that some parties in Greece went from being either of the fringes, or on the outside, of the system into having significant presence in parliament. In Portugal, however, the party system remained relatively consistent throughout. The parties below will be described from right to left on the political spectrum.

2.1.1 Portuguese Political Parties

To begin, Portugal does not have a far-right presence in parliament as other European countries. The furthermost conservative “catch-all party” (Moury et al. 2011:29) is the Democratic and Social Centre-Popular Party (CDS-PP). To the left of CDS-PP is one of Portugal’s two dominant, mainstream political parties, the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The PSD is politically positioned as Portugal’s most to the centre, right-wing party, and can be understood as simply a “centre-right liberal party” (Freire et al. 2013:5). On the other side of the spectrum, one finds the Socialist Party (PS). The PS is the other dominant mainstream party in Portugal and is considered a centre-left party “with a catch-all appeal that attempts to reconcile the practices of market liberalism with democratic socialist principles” (Moury et al. 2011:28). Next there is the People Animal Nature party (PAN), elected in 2015, it is the newest player in the Portuguese parliament, although its relevance is symbolic at best.

Next on the political spectrum is the Left Bloc (BE), which is considered one of the two main radical left-wing parties in Portugal. Left to the BE is the Democratic Unitary Coalition (CDU), which is comprised of two parties: the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), and the Ecologist Party “The Greens” (PEV). The Communist Party is a household presence in Portuguese politics and “[d]espite a fairly old-school traditional ideological discourse, the PCP is a very well-organised party and has a stable electorate” (Giorgi 2016:6). On the other hand, PEV’s focus lies on “expanding the ecologist conscience in Portugal” (Partido Ecologista “Os Verdes” 2017).

2.1.2 Greek Political Parties

Firstly, we have Golden Dawn, an extreme far-right party, associated with violence and motivated by “a worldview founded on a firm belief in racial inequality and party legislators have referred to foreigners as ‘subhuman’” (Ellinas 2013:560). Next, there is the Popular Orthodox Rally or People’s Orthodox Alarm (LAOS). The party “is no exception to the general pattern among extreme right-wing parties” (Gemenis et al. 2010:188). Furthermore, The Independent Greeks (ANEL), whose motto “fatherland, religion and family” (Halikiopoulou et al. 2015), encapsulates its extreme right-wing political stance.

On the centre there is New Democracy (ND), which is considered a centre-right party (Thomson 2011:90), and it was (until the period observed in this paper) one of the two dominant, mainstream parties in Greek politics. Moreover, the Union of Centrists (Enosi Kentroon), claims to be a truly centrist party, as its “ideological principles derive from the traditional aspect of the Centre” (ΕΝΩΣΗ ΚΕΝΤΡΩΩΝ 2015), focusing on equality and justice for all before the law and institutions (ibid.).

Further left of the Greek political spectrum is the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). PASOK was the other dominant, mainstream party in Greece. In spite of fact that PASOK “did not start out as a typical, run-of-the-mill European Socialist party” (Kalyvas 2015:130), it came to occupy the centre-left space of the Greek political spectrum. Another centre-left party is The River (To Potami), which has set its agenda not around the pursuit of “power but [the] modernis[ation of] the (…) Greek state” (Smith 2015). To its left is the Democratic Left (DIMAR), which is a “moderate left party” (Chatzistavrou 2014:2) aligned with “the values of European social democracy” (Clogg 2013:259).

Moving towards the radical-left of the Greek political spectrum, we find the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA). Originally a political aggregate of radical-left parties acting in cooperation, SYRIZA eventually materialised into a fully-fledged party. Finally, the last political party being considered is the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The KKE is considered one of the most ‘classical’ communist parties in Europe.

2.1.3 Pivotal Events

The timeframe observed in this essay spans between 2008–2018, which is far too lengthy to describe exhaustively within the bounds of this paper’s word limit. As a consequence, three key events that occurred during this period will be analysed as being representative. First, in Greece, when the economic crisis began to erupt in 2008, ND was in power with the main opposition from PASOK. As a consequence, ND attempted to persuade its major opponent to follow a path of political consensus and economic reform. Instead, PASOK responded by “following the standard script of Greek politics that called for polarisation and outbidding” (Kalyvas 2015:156), resulting in ND calling for early elections in 2009.

In Portugal, the PS was the ruling party in 2008, with the main opposition from PSD. Much like in Greece, the incumbent government acknowledged the need for economic contingencies and political stability. As a result, the Socialists proposed to parliament a set of Stability and Growth Programmes (SGPs) — essentially, austerity packages –, and, in spite of contestation from all parties, the PSD indirectly supported the measures by abstaining from voting and thus letting the measures pass in parliament (Giorgi et al. 2013:313). Over the course of three years three versions of SGPs were approved as a consequence of PSD’s political inertia; And only in 2011, when the PS proposed its fourth SGP, did the Social Democrats eventually, in unison with its minor opposition counterparts, voted against the measures effectively. This event, led to the triggering of anticipated elections, as the Socialist PM had previously announced that in case the fourth SGP was not approved, he would effectively resign (Lochery 2017:265).

The second pivotal event happened in 2009, when elections in Greece led to PASOK becoming the governing party (with ND back in opposition). It was this new government that signed the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Troika “in return for unprecedented austerity measures” (Karyotis et al. 2015:3). The move divided Greek parties, with ND (Kalyvas 2015:186), alongside parties such as SYRIZA, KKE, DIMAR, ANEL, and Golden Dawn (Vasilopoulou et al. 2013:527), openly opposing the Memorandum — although ND eventually reversed its stance from anti- to pro-bailout (Dinas et al. 2013:276). Consequently, the signing of the MoU split the Greek parliament into two camps: pro- and anti-Troika. In addition, the political divisions did not end with the MoU, and eventually began to morph into a proxy debate about Greece’s membership of the EU/Eurozone. Grexit, as the issue of Greece’s exit from the EU and the Eurozone became popularly known, started to be “advocated by many pundits on both right and left of the political spectrum, who argued that the Greek people could not possibly” (Kalyvas 2015:183) endure the austerity measures proposed. Greece eventually signed another bailout from the Troika in March 2012.

In Portugal, the request for a bailout was made in 2011 by the Socialist Prime Minister who was enacting his political responsibilities as the head of a caretaker government until the new elections were disputed (Lochery 2017:267). The negotiation process was conducted by the PS caretaker government, but the MoU was signed “by the lenders [Troika] (…) and the three mainstream parties PS, PSD and CDS” (Giorgi et al. 2013:313). In the following elections that same year the PSD defeated the PS, which became the main opposition party. Although the three main political parties signed the MoU, there was still an opposing voice in parliament from both far-left parties (CDU and BE) who rejected “the austerity policies explicitly or implicitly adopted in the EU/IMF Memorandum, [and called for] the renegotiation of the debt” (Magalh?es 2012:315) consistently. Moreover, Portugal’s questioning of its EU/Eurozone membership was “mostly reserved for the ‘non-mainstream’ parties” (Lobo 2011:99), and, consequently, the country’s place within the EU/Eurozone was not questioned by parties with governmental experience (the PS, PSD, and CDS).

The third pivotal event, in Greece, occurred in 2015. After the realignment of the party system had been achieved, the new incumbent SYRIZA “called for a referendum on the ‘bailout’ terms proposed to Greece” (Stavrakakis et al 2017:10) after reaching an impasse with its lenders. The referendum asked Greek citizens if they wanted to accept or reject the deal offered by the Troika, which the SYRIZA was openly against. The rejectionist camp won the referendum, which gave the incumbent government newfound confidence to demand a better deal, as a result of holding a mandate from the Greek population to reject the present conditions. Such stance was short-lived and “[t]he government soon thereafter accepted a harsher memorandum (…) which was backed by the vast majority of the Greek parliament including most government (and until then anti-austerity) MPs” (Katsanidou et al. 2015:19). In the case of Portugal, direct forms of political engagement, like Greece’s referendum, were not materialised with regards to the MoU, and the country remained relatively stable in its attitude towards the Troika.

2.2 Literature Review: Populism and Electoral System

2.2.1 Populism

Populism has received renewed attention in contemporary political landscapes. With political figures such as Donald Trump in the US, Nigel Farage in the UK, Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in Netherlands, or Nicolas Maduro in Argentina dominating political headlines (see, for example, Cillizza 2018; BBC 2018; SPH Digital News 2018; Al Jazeera 2018; Reuters 2018), populism seems to be expanding. Academically, it is commonplace to state that populism is an inherently contentious subject, lacking a consensual definition (Müller 2016:2; Moffit et al. 2014:381; Akkerman et al. 2014:1326; Jagers et al. 2007:321; Canovan 1999:3; Panizza 2005:1; Abts et al. 2007:407). Such lack of conceptual consensus has even led authors like Manuel P. Marques to claim that instead of a populism what “exists are populisms [emphasis added]” (Marques 2018:12). That said, there are two main approaches that can be identified in populist literature: the ideological, and the stylistic or communicative. After defined, these approaches will be followed by the main features of populism and their consequences, to enable a better understanding of populist culture in the discussion below.

-Populism as Ideology Versus Populism as Style

Populism as an ideology, interprets populist actors as vessels sustaining their political existence based on set of ideas. This approach, mainly championed by Cas Mudde, sees populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde 2004:543). Mudde further argues that politics within populism focuses on the volonté générale (general will) of the masses (ibid). Moreover, populism is further conceptualised as a thin-centred ideology, meaning that it occurs across the right-left spectrum of politics (Akkerman 2003:158; Roodduijin 2014:728; Akkerman et al. 2014:1326; Osterguy 2009:28 Stanyer et al. 2017:356). Such approach claims that “populism is a general, abstract concept about politics and society” (Reinemann et al. 2017:13) which can be consolidated with other well-established ideologies (e.g. Socialism, Fascism, among others) according to their specific context.

On the other hand, populism as a political style, discourse, or mode of communication is seen as a tactical tool for the accumulation of votes. From this perspective populism “becomes an anti-elite-discourse in the name of the sovereign people” (Aslanidis 2016: 96), which is deployed in order to attain power. Such a discourse can go beyond mere rhetoric and be complemented with a degree of performativity and mediatisation. As Moffit (2005:209) hypothesised, populist actors engage in a form of spectacularised politics, with recourse to the performance of a crisis in order assure their “political survival”. In spite of the debate revolving around the conceptualization of populism, there are some common features which are undisputed by those exploring the topic. In other words, although the verdict is still out on what populism is, there is a relatively stable consensus on its basic features.

-Three Main Features of Populism

Firstly, as stated above, both approaches agree that populism always attempts to pit ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ — or any other equivalent of the two — (Akkerman et al. 2014:1327; Jagers et al. 2007:324; Rooduijn 2014:727; Müller 2014:485; Spruyt et al. 2016:337). When doing so, populists place themselves as part of ‘the people’ whom are good, and against a corrupt ‘elite’ whom wishes to harm ‘the people’.

Secondly, populists advocate for direct forms of democracy (in opposition to more institutionalised, bureaucratic procedures) in order to enforce the volonté générale of ‘the people’ (Arditi 2005:91; Akkerman 2003:156; Abts et al. 2007:408; Reinemann et al. 2017:18). Margaret Canovan reinforces this feature, by stating that populists bypass traditional democratic institutions by calling for unmediated forms of political actions in order to reassert their position as representatives of ‘the people’. In other words, by “rejecting ossified institutional structures, including bureaucratic layers of organisation, populists celebrate both spontaneous action at the grassroots and a close personal tie between leader and followers” (Canovan 1999:6) — an example of how populists tend to enforce this is by the call to referendums (Tsatsanis 2011:14; Moffit 2015:195; Canovan 1999:2; Inglehart et al. 2016:7; Crick 2005:626), in order to legitimise their authority.

The third and final feature of populism is the personalisation of politics, often in the form of a charismatic leader. A leader who serves as the embodiment of the aforementioned features and is the vehicle for the transmission of their ideological content. Moffitt et al. (2014:392) explains that populist leader’s appeal is due to the fact that they disregard certain norms around concepts such as ‘political correctness’, curated language or fashion choices (i.e. hairstyles and formal clothing) (Müller 2016:33; Akkerman et al. 2014:1327; Inglehart et al. 2016:7; Arditi 2005:95; Weyland 2013:20).

-Consequences of the Three Main Features

The consequences of these features are twofold: anti-pluralism, and institutional weakening. With regards to anti-pluralism, by dividing society into ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, populism consequently suppresses the legitimacy of diverse groups in society (Müller 2016:3; Reinemann et al. 2017:19; Hawkins et al. 2012:3; Akkerman et al. 2014:1327) and leads to the exclusion of certain sections of the population in favour of others (Aalberg et al. 2017:10; Reinemann et al. 2017:14; Jagers et al. 2007:324; Panizza 2005:28; Abts et al 2007:419). For example, right-wing populists tend to focus on the exclusion of culturally or nationally different persons (e.g. immigrants) (Reinemann et al. 2017:18; Stanyer et al. 2017: 360; Inglehart et al. 2016:7; Canovan 1999:5; Guiso et al. 2017:12; Marques 2018:12). While, on the other hand, left-wing populism identifies ‘the people’ in a classist or economic manner, as being those who do not belong to ‘the elite’ (e.g. intellectuals, the wealthy, or politicians) — in other words, those who are considered to be a part of ‘the (corrupt or conspiring) elite’ are automatically excluded form ‘the (good, common) people’ (Guiso et al. 2017:11; Canovan 1999:5; Rooduijn 2014:727; Jagers et al. 2007:323; Akkerman et al. 2014:1327; Reinemann et al. 2017:17; Marques 2018:12). Regardless of the populist’s political leaning, what is true is that populism (if effective) polarises the voting base (if not society at large) by othering and even scapegoating some sections of the population over others.

Another consequence of the features is institutional weakening. By advocating the bypass of institutional norms or protocol in favour of more straightforward means of political engagement and representation, populism (when successfully established) contributes towards the erosion of credibility in established state institutions (e.g. constitutionalism, judicial system, political parties) (Moffit et al. 2014:392; Aslanidis 2016:94; Ostiguy 2009:26; Akkerman et al. 2014:1327; Jagers et al. 2007:338; Moffit 2015:207; Arditi 2005:76; Weyland 2013:20; Abts et al. 2007:407). In summary, populism is an ideologically versatile political phenomenon, which displays at least three main characteristics: pitting ‘the people’ against ‘the elites’, calls for direct forms of ‘rule’, and charismatic leadership.

2.2.2 Populism in Greece and Portugal

Greece has developed what can be called a populist political culture. Such lies in the fact that populist attitudes have been present in the country as far back as the 1980s, pushed initially by PASOK and later by ND, Greece’s dominant parties up until the 2008 economic crisis (Kalivas 2015:141–2; Stavrakakis et al. 2014:124; Vasilopoulou et al. 2014:391; Papathanassapoulos et al. 2017:196; Mavrogordatos 1993; Kalyvas 1997:86; Doxiadis et al. 2013:45; Stavrakakis et al. 2017:4). This populist political culture “became the only ‘legitimate’ means of competition — that is, the only way a party could gain and maintain political power” (Vasilopoulou et al. 2014:391).

An anecdotal example of how engrained populism is in Greece, can be found in Stavrakakis’s (2005) study of the Church of Greece’s clash with the government in 2000, because the latter wanted to exclude religion from identity cards. In this case, even a non-political agent (the clergy) engaged in populist tactics to combat governmental reforms. The author saw such a transcendence of political practices onto other realms of public life (religion) as being “the populist legacy of Greek politics” (Stavrakakis 2005:248). On a more contemporary level, both established and relatively new parties are still seen as carrying forward the legacy of their predecessors. Parties such as the KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL, and LAOS continue to engage in populist politics well into the present (Papathanassapoulos et al. 2017:201; Stavrakakis 2015:277; Stavrakakis et al. 2017:7).

In Portugal, however, populism as a dominant political culture has yet to establish itself (Salgado et al. 2018:3; Silva 2018:3; Salgado 2017:236; Marques 2018:147; Neto et al. 2016:231; Salgado et al. 2017:8). Such claim should not be mistaken for the absence of populist actors in the country (for an example of an unsuccessful populist party in Portugal see Costa, 2001), but rather that they have not been successful enough to enter parliament, and even less to shape the political atmosphere as in Greece. Overall, what is relevant to highlight is that Portugal lacks a clear populist political culture, which contrasts with Greece’s form of engaging in politics.

2.2.3 Electoral Systems: Open-Lists Versus Closed-Lists

Electoral systems shape the way in which citizens exercise their say in the political governance of the country. What type of system is chosen by a given country can have consequences not only on how voters cast their ballots, but also how candidates navigate the competitive world of elections. Both Greece and Portugal adhere to a Proportional Representation (PR) system, although they differ on the different types of party list modalities used to elect representatives: open-lists, and closed-lists.

Open-lists are lists of prospective MPs put forward by political parties “in which […] voters can express preferences for particular candidates within the list” (Norris 1997:303). The candidates will then be assigned seats in parliament according to how many personal votes they received (Jones et al. 1999:344). Consequently, voters have a double choice to make when voting under open-list systems: what party, and what candidate in the party. There are some more complex consequences associated with open-lists.

The first consequence of open-list systems is that it creates an environment that encourages the cultivation of personalistic politics among candidates (Blumenau et al. 2016:17; Carey et al. 1995:418; Górecki et al. 2014:67; Chang 2005:718; Chang et al. 2007:118), as triggered by intraparty competition. Secondly, the fact that open-list systems foment both interparty and intraparty conflict, they will be more conductive towards the weakening of political parties. The aforementioned competitiveness amongst candidates from the same party, can reflect or produce an internally embattled, incoherent or unorganised party (Kunicova et al. 2002:11; Carey et al. 1995:423; Blumenau et al. 2016:2).

The third consequence of open-list systems is their association with higher levels of corruption, as several individual candidates compete for a single position at an individual level. Therefore, it is argued that the recourse to extra-legal means of vote acquisition is more common in open-list systems (Chang et al. 2007:134; Kunicova et al. 2002:6; Chang 2005:716). Clientelism, a form of corruption that will be mentioned in the discussion, is defined “as the practice of exchanging a targeted, non-policy-based provision of money and state resources (jobs, public services, government contracts, etc.) for political support (such as votes, campaign funding, and campaign support)” (Berenschot 2018:14). Clientelism is also linked to the aforementioned concept of populism, as Müller connected the two concepts by highlighting that “populists tend to engage in mass clientelism” (Müller 2016:46) for widespread political support — discussed further in chapter 5.

In closed-list systems, on the other hand, parties present a list of candidates in a preassigned order, and the electorate can only vote for a specific party, instead of a particular candidate. Consequently, prospective MPs will be elected into parliament in the order they are situated within the party list (Chang et al. 2007:118; Kunicova et al. 2002:2; Jones et al. 1999:343; Ruel 2010:4; Deemen 1993:238). For example, in a hypothetical parliament with 100 seats if a party earns 25 per cent of the vote then 25 seats in parliament will be occupied by the first 25 candidates on the list. As opposed to open-list, closed-list candidates have no motivation to publicly differentiate themselves from their party counterparts. Considering that party leaders choose which candidates enter the list, and in what position they are placed, there is an incentive to adhere to internal party cooperation, rather than internal party competition (Chang et al. 2007:118; Kunicova et al. 2002:7; Carey et al. 1995:422).

Secondly, with regards to the weakening of the political parties, closed-list systems discourage intraparty competition, and reward the construction of a unified front, to portray their party as coherent, stable and organised, in order to reassure the electorate of their political strength (Carey et al. 1995:419; Kunicova et al. 2002:6). Thirdly, with regards to corruption, closed-list systems are less prone to encourage recourse to extra-legal means, since candidates may not be competing for the same exact seat they held previously (their position on the list may change), and because they want to preserve the strength and reputation of the party itself (Chang et al. 2007:134; Chang 2005:719).

Overall, the difference between closed- and open-list systems lies beyond the modality under which the electorate cast their votes. The available literature suggests that open-list systems are more likely to encourage the pursuit of votes based on individual characteristics of candidates, intraparty conflict, and weakening of the party structures and corruption. On the contrary, closed-list systems are argued to develop stronger party stances (and therefore limit competition to an interparty level), intraparty political homogeneity and harmony, and reduce the appeal towards the recourse to illegal activities.

2.2.4 Electoral Systems: Portugal and Greece

Whilst there are several forms of elections (e.g. local, presidential) this paper focuses specifically on legislative elections since they stipulate who has “the control of national executive power” (Freire 2004:54). The system utilised in parliamentary elections affects under which rules votes can be transformed into seats, or, in other words, how and which parties convert the votes they receive into members of parliament.

Although Greece and Portugal are both Proportional Representation (PR) systems, they do differ in how such a system is put into practice. The Portuguese Parliament has 230 seats, and although there is not a formal minimum threshold for reaching such seats, the D’Hondt Method does create some boundaries to the election of MPs (for more on the D’Hondt Method see, for example, Wilson 2014). Voting is open to all registered adults, whom can cast their vote in a PR closed-list system.

The Hellenic Parliament is unicameral and has a total of 300 seats, 50 of which are given as a ‘bonus’ reinforcement to the party acquiring the greatest number of votes. The system is a mixture of open-list and closed-list PR, where 12 MPs are elected on a closed-list modality and the remaining 238 selected through open-lists. Moreover, there is a 3 per cent threshold which parties need to pass in order to enter parliament. Overall, the majority of Greek MPs are elected by registered adults in a PR open-list fashion.

3. Methodology

In order to facilitate a structured analysis of the subject at hand, there is a need to establish a methodological base that defines how case studies are selected, and consequently analysed. This section will explore the methodologies of small-n case comparisons, Mill’s Method of Difference and Comparative Process Tracing, alongside the methodology’s shortcomings and merits.

Apart from the methods discussed in the sections below, this dissertation focused on desk research or, in other words, secondary resources for the majority of the information gathered. I have therefore researched and collated electoral results from secondary governmental resources to help corroborate my findings. Due to the word constraints in this paper, I will focus mainly on the methods utilised and their strengths and limitations.

3.1 Methods: Small-n, Mill’s MoD and CPT Small-n Case Comparisons

-Small-n

Small-n comparisons look at a small amount of countries “in a more detailed manner that allows us to understand the complexity of relations” between them (Newton et al. 2016:385). By nature, small-n studies “cannot operate effectively under probabilistic assumptions” (Lieberson 1991:312), because in order to explore any case based on its probabilities of reproduction (or statistical patters) one would have to resort to a larger number of cases. Consequently, the small-n approach relies on “qualitative evidence and methods” (Newton et al. 2016:385), as opposition to purely quantitative resources.

-Mill’s Method of Difference (MoD)

The selection of the case studies is made by applying Mill’s Method of Difference (MoD). Coined by John Stuart Mill, the method states that “we require to find two instances which tally in every particular except the one which is the subject of inquiry” (Mill 1904:1069). This means that when two countries are being compared they need to have similar characteristics (which make up the basis of their comparability), except for one, which will be the subject of analysis.

-Comparative Process Tracing and Process Tracing

The method applied in this paper for the analysis of the case studies is CPT. The method employs “a theoretically informed comparative approach that takes social and political processes seriously, combining elements of theory, chronology, and comparison to make general inferences possible” (Bengtsson et al. 2017:46). Consequently the central feature of the method is Process Tracing (PT), even though applied comparatively.

PT entails “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011:823). Consequently, as the name suggests, process tracing requires that several pieces of information are analysed in order to produce a convincing explication of the steps that resulted in a specific outcome. According to Tansey, “the goal of process tracing is to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes” (Tansey 2007:765) in order to defend or reject a hypothesis or hypotheses. In sum, PT works by combining possible explanations with evidence that is consistent with such explanations (Bennett 2008:6).

3.2 Strengths and Limitations

The strengths of the methodologies used in this paper will be explored in this section.

In the case of small-n studies, the strength lies in its capacity to observe specific processes within the context of selected countries. The method also benefits from application of a more heuristic approach, considering both quantitative (e.g. statistics) and qualitative (e.g. culture) pieces of information, whilst applying such content in a manner that does not need to be standardisable (Newton et al. 2016:385–6). In other words, small-n studies can observe cases beyond their strictly quantitative features (particularly when researching political culture), consequently, the generated results that may not be generalisable, but still produce relevant findings which may contribute to new theoretical insights.

The strength of Mill’s MoD stems from the fact that the method allows for the identification of similar patters with different outcomes, across different countries, which may lead to new hypothesis with regards to the causes of political phenomenon.

PT rests on the invocation “of a more complex logic, one analogous to detective work” (Gerring 2006:178), which is imperative for the exploration of subjects that cannot be (or have not yet been) developed to a point of being analysed in a quantitative manner. For example, given the academically contested status of populism (discussed further below), it is a concept which cannot quantitatively assessed, and as a consequence its impact can be better assessed via the use of several disparate (but relevant) pieces of evidence. Moreover, in spite of its supposed lack of generalisability, PT can be useful in “identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically describing them” (Collier 2011:824), which in turn may pave the way for further research.

On the other hand, the limitations of this paper’s methodology are the following. Small-n approach’s generalisable results may be hard to reproduce. In other words, “even a perfect understanding of them [the case studies] might not help us reach general conclusions” (Newton et al. 2016:386) about different countries; the result’s external validity may be hard to achieve. Another possible shortcoming may arise from the use of qualitative data, which, according to Lieberson, should be supported by a probabilistic (or quantitative) approach “to evaluate the evidence for a given theoretical perspective” (Lieberson 1991:309).

Alternatively, MoD does not work as neatly in social sciences as it does in the natural sciences, because the former cannot be contained in a controlled environment and is too exposed to unforeseen variables (e.g. weather, geography, cultural customs).

Other limitations in the methods are PT’s inability to produce generalisable or parsimonious results (Checkel 2005:17); as well as being deterministic, rather than probabilistic, in nature (Lieberson 1991:311). By being deterministic the theory produced via a PT method is more exposed to being discredited by a single measurement error, and it disregards the fact that there can be more explaining variables than the ones being theorised (Lieberson 1991:309).

4. Findings

Electoral Results 2008–2018: Portugal and Greece

In order to facilitate a more fluid argument in the latter sections of the paper this section will provide an overview of the mutations that occurred in both Portuguese and Greek parliaments throughout the decade being observed (2008–2018). The tables presented in this section were the outcome of a compilation of electoral results from both Portugal and Greece. The data provided allows for a preliminary observation of the evolution of the party systems in the countries in a quantitative manner and will be analysed in a qualitative form in the discussion chapter.

-Portuguese Electoral Results

2005

2009

2011

2015

-Greek Electoral Results

2007

2009

2012 (May)

2012 (June)

2015 (January)

2015 (September)

5. Discussion

5.1 Hypothesis I

In Greece, the populist political culture led to the polarisation of the electorate, which in turn resulted in the realignment of the party system. In Portugal, the absence of a populist political culture sheltered the electorate from systemic polarisation, and therefore the status quo was maintained.

As described in the ‘Pivotal Events’ subsection, the emergence of the crisis in 2008 led to an immediate response (in Greece) of polarisation and effective non-cooperation. This is consistent with Mudde’s approach (2004) to populism’s first feature of separating society into two antagonistic camps, ‘the people’ versus ‘the elite’. Such feature, when elevated to a whole political culture, like that of Greece, will result in a political environment that “continue[s] to polarize and prepare the people for (…) confrontation” (Müller 2016:42). Therefore, it can be argued that the first step in the realignment of Greece’s party system was the polarising trigger, that emerged in conjunction with the environment of crisis, and a populist political culture. Such tendencies were reinforced and expanded, as seen in the second event mentioned earlier, the signing of the MoUs. The polarised electorate, as a result of the populist modus operandi, can be seen as starting to express their fragmentation at the polls after the second MoU was signed in 2012. If one reverts to the electoral results mentioned earlier, it is on that same year that the overall voting share became significantly scattered across the table, with new parties elected into parliament. This is consistent with an effective polarisation of the electorate, which was divided into smaller hubs of voting intentions.

Moreover, with regards to the last pivotal event observed in chapter 2 (the 2015 Greek referendum on the MoU) its significance was twofold. First, it created an environment of polarisation and simplification of a complex issue to the whole of the population. In the Greek case, putting something as complex as a Memorandum of Agreement in the form of a simple ‘yes versus no popular vote’ is oversimplifying a vital subject that could have disastrous consequences for the country’s economy. Also, no referendum happens without some form of campaign backing from one or the other side, which will lead to further inflammation of socio-political stances amongst the electorate.

Second, as mentioned in the literature review, populist actors’ preference for means of direct engagement on behalf of the population (such as referenda), while bypassing institutions (in this case parliament and the Troika), also contributes to the erosion of credibility and trust in those same institutions. Therefore, a consequential path can be observed as starting with the Greek initial response to the economic volatility triggered by the economic crisis of 2008; Which was one of deep antagonism amongst the party system. The activation of Greece’s populist political culture led the parties to exploit the possible divisiveness of the political environment, which was reflected in the electorate by means of voting out the incumbent government. Such initial response was further aggravated after the MoU was signed, as reflected in the first signs of party realignment in the country’s 2012 elections. The polarising environment was exploited and expanded by the party system into activating new cleavages which went beyond the signing of the Memorandum, and into EU/Eurozone membership. This led to a highly divided voting base, which was motivated into casting their ballots for what used to be fringe, or non-existent, parties in parliament. Finally, the Greek populist political culture, and its polarising effects continued to be felt well into 2015 when the incumbent SYRIZA triggered a referendum on the MoU conditions, a move which continued to divide the electorate and public opinion, while at the same time eroding the trust in both Greek and European institutions, and therefore perpetuating the voting attitudes that led to the realignment of the party system. The full effects of this last step will only become evident in the upcoming 2019 elections, but what is certain is that the Greek party system is inherently different today than it was in 2007.

Contrarily to Greece, Portuguese parties did not engage in combative politics in the wake of the effects of the 2008 crisis. Instead the party system opted for a more pondered approach, which in itself served to not over-inflate the electorate’s intentions. Moreover, with regards to the signing of the MoU, by showing a united front, Portugal’s three main parties (averaging at about 70 per cent of the voter share) were able to create an environment of political consensus around the MoU. Such stance became even more relevant considering that only the incumbent government’s signature was needed to approve the measures. Consequently, by assuming a collective responsibility towards the MoU, Portugal’s mainstream parties created a political environment in which the austerity measures, in spite of being harsh, were a ‘necessary evil’ which had to be carried forward if the country was to avoid bankruptcy. A side effect of this might have been that there was little room left for the crisis to spread into a debate about the EU or Eurozone memberships, or any other possible type of contagious divisive topics. Furthermore, there were no appeals to direct forms of political engagement in Portugal, as it happened in Greece in the form of the referendum, which further highlights the lack of a populist political culture in the country. This becomes evident upon analysing the electoral results which displayed little fluctuation in the party system status quo.

To summarise the above, on the one hand, the Greek populist political culture contributed to the fragmentation of the electorate and the weakening of the credibility of national and international institutions, which in turn was reflected in the realignment of the party system, as voted for by the electorate. Portugal, on the other hand, did not engage in populist practices and instead displayed a more conciliatory stance among the party system, which in turn did not polarise its electorate nor weakened its institution’s credibility, and therefore motivated the voter base to sustain the party status quo in the ballots.

Overall, this comparative analysis of three key points in the Portugal and Greece’s disparate responses to the economic crisis at different moments reveals two separate paths: the Greek and the Portuguese. Moreover, in spite of voter attitudes not being directly considered, the effects of the disparate political cultures can be seen in the election results, and consequent rearrangement (or lack of) the party system. In Greece, where a populist political culture is present, the combative and divisive attitudes of the political parties were reflected in the way voters casted their ballots. As the crisis deepened, Greek voters supported the entrance of more players into parliament, and the voting share was distributed more thinly across the board. This becomes especially evident when one considers that Greece went from a relatively stable five-party system in 2007 to having as many as eight parties in parliament in 2015. Contrarily, in Portugal, where no such populist political culture is present, voter’s attitudes reflected the political environment under the economic crisis. Although there was still some voter fluctuation, that can be regarded as a part of the natural competitiveness that arises from a politically charged crisis-environment. Also, aside from the one seat earned by the PAN, the two-party dominated system remained relatively unchanged with the PSD, and PS still dominating the parliament, as it happened in the pre-2008 period.

In spite of such factors reasonably suggesting that the presence of a populist culture was a determining factor is the redefinition of the party system in Greece, one cannot fully confirm such hypothesis for a variety of reasons. Firstly, populist literature tends to focus mainly on individual actors or parties. As a consequence, it is hard to reach a final conclusion on the full impact of the phenomenon at a political culture-level, as more research needs to be done in that sense. Secondly, populism, as seen in the literature review, is still a contented concept academically. As a result, it cannot (yet) be quantifiable, or measured in any systematic form, which impedes the emergence of a conclusive finding. This hypothesis, therefore, has the potential to be confirmed, if a more sophisticated method of evaluation and measurement is established.

5.2 Hypothesis II

The open-list system in Greece created a more fertile ground for the realignment in the party system; In Portugal, closed-list systems favoured the maintenance of the party system.

The conditions in which votes are cast, can affect both how candidates dispute their positions and, consequently, how swayed the electorate might be by such campaigning. In the literature review it was established that open-list systems, like Greece, are more prone to corruption than their closed-list counterparts. Such literature seems to be supported by the fact that Greece is ranked at number 59 in the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2017), with a score of 48 in a scale of 0 to 100; 0 being ‘highly corrupt’ and 100 being ‘very clean’. Such a position is consistent with the previously mentioned form of corruption that is clientelism, a well-established practice in Greek politics (Kalyvas 2015:141; Vasilopoulou 2014:389; Mavrogordatos 1997:1; Papathanassopoulos et al. 2017:202). Clientelist practices are compatible with the intraparty conflict mentioned in chapter 2, which leads to the pursuit of votes based on extra-party attributes (features that differ from official party-lines, such as policy or ideology), including the exchange of material or immaterial goods and services for votes.

Portugal, on the other hand, is located 30 places above Greece in the Corruption Perceptions Index, at number 29, with a score of 63 (Transparency International 2018). Moreover, Kopecky et al. (2011) found that clientelist practices in Portugal seemed to be slightly below the European average, results which more than doubled in Greece (Kopecky et al. 2011:907). Such figures are consistent with the previously mentioned literature on close-list systems, which claim that the inability to compete with members of the same party creates an incentive for the party and its members to avoid any internal divisiveness, in order to strengthen its competitive stand against their political counterparts. In other words, when candidates acquire as much votes as possible for its party, they enhance their own chances of being elected. Consequently, engaging in illegal practices seems unappealing, since it may tarnish the party as a whole, rather than the individual candidate.

Moreover, related to the already mentioned Greek populist political culture, “[e]lectoral systems can function as enablers or barriers to the presence and success of populist parties” (Stanyer et al. 2017:358). As mentioned in the literature review, one of the main features of populism is its personalisation of politics — that is, the individual appeal of a single candidate running on a platform of personal traits (e.g. strength, morality, intellect, personal views). Since open-list systems favour interparty and intraparty competition simultaneously, candidates have to present themselves as belonging to the best party while at the same time inflate their own personalities in order to get an advantage over their party colleagues, who also belong to the best party. In other words, their party is the best choice, but their party colleagues — who are supposed to stand for the same ideological and political values as they do — are not.

In Portugal, however, the closed-list system may be a supressing factor in the insurgence of populist forces. Since closed lists systems value party strength over individual competition, prospective MPs do not have an incentive to pursue a personal vote directly over their party colleagues. The consequence of which is the prioritisation of the party structure over the individual vote, which clashes with the populist feature of personalisation of politics, and the weakening of institutional frameworks. In other words, if a candidate chooses to engage in personalistic politics, especially in intraparty conflict, it will portray “the party as incoherent and confused” (Blumenau et al. 2016:6), which may turnoff voters from voting in the party, and consequently ruin the candidate’s chances of being elected. In addition, by becoming a liability, such candidate may eventually be purged from the party itself.

Overall, it was demonstrated that Greece’s open-list system provides a fertile ground for corruptive practices, such as clientelism. The widespread existence of corruption may lead the electorate to rearrange its voting preferences by either punishing the status quo for the existence of such practices (and therefore voting for alternative parties), or by being persuaded through extra-legal terms to vote for new players. The first reasoning seems more probable, since in the context of an economic crisis the electorate may connect the economic situation of the country with the clientelist practices of the ruling government, being therefore more predisposed to look for alternatives to fix the problem. Since Portugal faired relatively low on corruptive practices, the electorate may have not had the same reasoning as their Greek counterparts. Moreover, since under closed-list systems candidates are not encouraged to look for personal votes, the temptation of engaging in practices such as clientelism might have been diluted. As a consequence, the Portuguese electorate might have not perceived the economic crisis as being an internal political one (as in opposition to an international economic one), which might have dissipated the need to find alternatives to the current party system.

Furthermore, when an open-list system is coupled with a populist political culture as in Greece, the pursuit of personalised politics may work in a manner that weakens institutional credibility. By requiring candidates to engage in both interparty and intraparty conflict, Greece’s open-list system halts the capability of parties to prioritise stability and coherence above all else. When candidates standing for the same set of values and political direction fight amongst themselves to secure a seat in parliament, it sends a message to the electorate that the party itself is fractured. Moreover, considering Greece’s specific populist setting, the appeal to harness votes on a personal level, leads to a more combative and polarising form of political competition, embodied in the form of charismatic candidates. This, in turn, may further fragment the electorate into small hubs of politically inflamed voters, voting for specific candidate’s views or personality, rather than on party’s policies and ideologies. Contrarily, in Portugal, the closed-list system contributes to the perpetuation of parties’ institutional standing. By not making prospective MPs of a same party directly compete against one another for a seat, Portugal’s closed-list system encourages internal coherence, which is reflected onto the electorate as a stable set of consistent parties competing for votes.

Overall, the open-list system in Greece might have led to the widespread use of corruption practices. In turn, such practices might have triggered the electorate to blame the dominating parties for the country’s economic situation, and therefore to look for alternative parties. As a consequence, new or smaller parties were voted into parliament, and therefore the former party system was disrupted. Alternatively, in conjunction with a populist political culture, the open-list system fomented the pursuit of personalistic votes through intraparty conflict based on polarising rhetoric. This led to the division of the voting base into smaller hubs of voters, while simultaneously weakening the credibility of parties as institutions. Therefore, voters chose to vote based on personalistic motives, rather than institutional ones, which led to a spread of votes across smaller and less institutionalised parties equipped with populist candidates; This led to the realignment of the party system. In contrast, Portugal’s closed-list system appeared to be less conductive of corruptive practices, which kept the electorate from forming a connection between the parties and the economic crisis itself. As a consequence, the electorate did not feel the need to welcome new parties into parliament, nor to significantly punishing the dominant mainstream parties by displacing their votes significantly. Conversely, the absence a populist political culture, combined with a closed-list system may have led candidates to strengthen their parties’ institutional standings. This, in turn, did not lead to the erosion of credibility in the parties, nor the party system itself, therefore maintaining the parliamentary status quo intact.

In summary, the hypothesis focusing on the difference between open- and closed-list systems and their possible impact on the party systems in Greece and not in Portugal cannot be fully corroborated. This outcome is due to lack of sufficient quantitative research aimed at measuring comprehensively the intentions of both candidates and voters alike. In spite of such lack of resources to undoubtedly prove the hypothesis, there is not enough evidence to dismiss it either. The literature-backed reasoning presented in this section does present that open-list systems, especially when coupled with a populist political culture, have the potential of significantly impacting the electorate, and its consequential voting intentions.

6. Conclusion

This paper attempted to explore the effects that a populist political culture, coupled with a conductive electoral system, can have on a country’s party system by contrasting the case of Greece with that of Portugal. In spite of the fact that both hypotheses explored could not be deemed as conclusive, they cannot be fully dismissed either. With regards to the first hypothesis analysed, there is reason to believe that populism may be a destabilising force for party systems, especially under specific contextual conditions that can trigger the emergence of strong socio-political cleavages, as witnessed in Greece in the post-2008 crisis period. Beyond the fact that the available literature supports this hypothesis, the contrasting Portuguese case did not display the same party system realignment which also supports the argument at hand.

The reason as to why the hypothesis cannot be fully corroborated rests on lack of available resources, in many fronts, dealing with populism. Firstly, the lack of a single, incontestable definition of populism hinders one’s capacity to fully explore it in a rigorous manner. Second, the fact that most literature dealing with populism focuses mainly on individual populist actors (and, occasionally, parties), there is not a solid base to explore the fullest impact of a whole political culture that is populist. Thirdly, and as a result of the former two aspects, there is no conceptual, universally agreed upon, theoretical toolkit for the measurement of the impact of a populist political culture in a methodical and rigorous manner. All of which amount to the incapability of confidently confirming any thesis on the effects of populism in a country’s party system beyond reasonable doubt.

Moreover, with regards to the second hypothesis, the literature-based evidence seems to partially support the fact that open-list electoral systems are prone to facilitate the realignment of party systems in contrast to closed-list systems. The Greek case study, especially when contrasted with Portugal, is consistent with the hypothesis. The argument that open-list systems are more conductive to realignment also becomes stronger when it is coupled with the factors of an economic crisis alongside a populist culture. Although, much like the first hypothesis, there is not a sufficiently detailed theoretical toolkit that allows for a full confirmation of the thesis, nor there is sufficient evidence to dismiss it. Therefore, more research is needed on the effects of closed- and open-lists on party systems, including its impact on both voting behaviour and candidate campaigning.

The implications of this paper are manifold. First, the work contributes to the attempts of studying the long-term effects of populism at a systematic scale, one that focuses on more than just what populist actors say or do. Such contribution has implications to understanding how a populist political culture impacts party systems, voting tendencies, and democracy at large. Considering the difficulties mentioned earlier with regards to fully corroborating or dismissing the first hypothesis, it is then imperative to build a more empirically sustained literature on populism, to which this paper may be a conceptual starting point. Secondly, this essay also introduces into the discussion of populism, the possibility that the political phenomenon can be more impactful under certain electoral circumstances.

The second hypothesis opened the possibility of closed-list electoral systems being more conductive to the propagation of populist actors. This may have implications to both populist literature, and also to how electoral systems impact democracies, voting tendencies, and candidate behaviour or tactics. Finally, this paper identifies the need for a more empirically-driven and consolidated study and definition of populism. More research is also needed in the wider impact of open-list systems in countries’ elections. These should both be explored whether as factors interacting amongst each other, or in their own individual merits.

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