Why New START is NOT Verifiable -- How Russia has Deployed New Strategic Weapons Without Bothering to Violate It

An Essential Read for Anyone Interested in Arms Control as New START Expires

In a new article published by the National Institute for Public Policy, Bryan Smith has definitively pulled back the curtain on the disinformation campaign waged by arms control zealots, including the primary US negotiator , on New START verification. He explains what made the INF and original START Treaties effectively verifiable. Finally, he advises the Trump administration on the need for a verification regime far more effective than new START as it considers whether to extend New START and how to replace it with an effectively verifiable treaty that includes China, and all strategic, theater and tactical nuclear systems. https://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IS-463.pdf

Between now and February 2021, when the New START Treaty expires, the national debate will certainly include the matter of arms control and its verification. Bryan Smith's excellent article is absolutely an essential read for those blessedly untrained and inexperienced of the arcane details of verification and compliance. Even arms control advocates might learn from the robust reality check it provides.

Bryan Smith served as a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), during the Senate's consideration of New START. He was tasked to analyze the effectiveness of the New START Treaty’s verification, and draft a classified report for Members’ consideration. This assignment was based in part on his previous experience working for President Reagan’s top verification expert, Dr. Manfred Eimer, on INF, START, and Soviet arms control compliance determinations. 

The New START Treaty expires in February 2021. The document permits extension by agreement of the US and Russia for periods from 1 to 5 years. Arms control advocates argue, and will continue to argue in increasingly shrill tones, that New START must be extended. Their arguments will include:

• In the absence of a strategic arms control agreement with Russia, a nuclear arms race is sure to begin, and Russia is better positioned than the US to build up its forces. The problem with that argument is that Russia and China HAVE been racing, and only the US has not. Russia and China's massive and rapid deployment of new and advanced nuclear weapons have been growing unconstrained by New START.
• New START is a good arms control agreement. Mr. Smith's article thoroughly explains why that is not the case. It is an agreement that barely passed the Senate and that permits the potential of massive Russian breakout from it central limits.
• Russia has been certified by the US Department of State as being in compliance with the New START Treaty. Bryan Smith provides the following reality check:

The good news is that despite the New START Treaty’s verification inadequacies—or perhaps because of them—the Russians appear to have complied with the treaty. (I say “appear” because we can’t really know, given the Treaty’s serious verification deficiencies, and after all, we’ve never found anything successfully hidden.) Further, since Russia can gain major advantage through legal and/or partially legal breakout options, they may be content with this benefit. (It would be unimaginable that Russia’s General Staff has not drawn up serious contingency plans for warhead uploading during a crisis.) One might even wonder whether Russia’s strongly expressed desire to extend the New START Treaty is motivated, in part, by a desire to also extend the Treaty’s breakout options. Therefore, the good news on Russian compliance warrants skepticism, especially in light of its history of arms control violations.  (NIPP IS-463, page 4)

Skepticism is indeed warranted. As they say in economics, cavaet emptor, or let the buyer beware.