Why It’s in Iran’s Interest to Tame Hezbollah

This article focuses solely on the Lebanese aspect of U.S. efforts to halt hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and to achieve a ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel. Optimism regarding the Israeli position has faded, particularly as U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein’s arrival in Israel coincided with the International Criminal Court issuing arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and ex-Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. This development prompted Netanyahu to take a hardline stance, especially on the sticking points of the draft agreement.

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Yet the question remains: Have U.S. efforts with Israel failed entirely, or will President-elect Donald Trump make it clear to Netanyahu that blocking a ceasefire agreement is unacceptable? Trump may also warn Netanyahu not to assume that his administration is ready to enter into a military partnership with Israel that could lead to war with Iran. As of this writing, it is unclear whether Israel is stalling as part of its negotiation tactics or has entirely derailed the agreement.

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Regardless, it is necessary to examine what has transpired in the Lebanese phase of the ceasefire efforts, both on the Lebanese side and in its Iranian context. The implications are significant and merit closer analysis.

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Does Iran have a compelling reason to agree to the taming of Hezbollah, transforming it into a political party that relinquishes its weapons to the Lebanese army and genuinely allows the Lebanese state to exercise authority over all its territory? Indeed this would entail Iran abandoning its most critical regional tool of influence and reforming the core doctrine of the Islamic Republic.

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The answer may be yes. Firstly, Iran now faces a stark choice: preserving its nuclear program or maintaining its regional proxies. If it insists on retaining its proxies, it risks exposing its nuclear facilities to military retaliation, whether through Israeli operations or coordinated U.S., Israeli, and European actions that could destroy Iran’s nuclear ambitions—an absolute priority for the regime in Tehran.

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If Iran accepts the new reality—that the U.S., Europe, Israel, and Arab states insist on revising its ideological foundations, particularly its doctrine of creating militias in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria—it could revive negotiations over its nuclear program. These negotiations could safeguard its nuclear facilities and preserve its ambition to maintain its “right” to nuclear development (though not necessarily to develop nuclear weapons).

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In other words, Iran may need to abandon its regional proxies to protect its nuclear aspirations. This does not mean Iran will be granted permission to pursue nuclear weapons, but it would allow Tehran to preserve its current capabilities rather than risk their destruction in a conflict justified in part by events like those sparked by events on October 7, 2023, and their aftermath.

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Iran has realized its vulnerability to Israel and recalibrated its priorities accordingly, returning to the policy drawing board. It has distanced itself from Hamas’s missteps and Hezbollah’s adventures, prioritizing its national interests over the broader “Axis of Resistance.” Forced to choose, Iran has placed its national interest and nuclear ambitions above its proxies, even at the expense of its reputation within the axis.

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Secondly, Israel, with firm U.S. support, has presented Tehran with a blunt ultimatum: either rein in Hezbollah or risk its military elimination at the hands of Israel. Tehran has had little room for manoeuvre. It cannot provide direct military support to Hezbollah, nor can it protect the group from Israeli attacks on the ground or in its tunnel networks.

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In light of this, Iran has sought to present itself as a diplomatic and political facilitator, contributing to the implementation of U.N. Resolution 1701 and achieving a ceasefire. While Iran’s initial steps faltered, it ultimately realized that its interests required acknowledging the value of its influence in this pivotal moment. Today, Iran’s role in Lebanon is markedly different from its past strategies, prompting a revaluation of its calculations.

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Thirdly, both President Joe Biden and President-elect Donald Trump have agreed on two fundamental points regarding Iran: first, that reviving nuclear negotiations depends on Tehran demonstrating goodwill through regional behaviour, and second, that Lebanon is the immediate test of Iran’s intentions.

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Tehran initially expected Trump to adopt an aggressive stance after his election but was surprised when he signaled a willingness to negotiate rather than destroy Iran. Trump conveyed that genuine cooperation would yield significant rewards, while deception would result in severe sanctions and economic collapse. He emphasized that Lebanon would be the first test, where Iran could demonstrate its seriousness by reining in its most powerful proxy Hezbollah. Otherwise, efforts to eliminate Hezbollah would continue with U.S. support for Israel to complete the task.

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Trump has given his blessing to Hochstein’s mission with a phone call, signaling support for his efforts. Iran listened, understood, and chose to facilitate Hochstein’s task rather than sabotage it. Indeed strategically, Iran assigns great importance to its relationship with the Trump administration, especially as it recognizes its inability to rescue Hezbollah militarily. Tehran concluded that taming Hezbollah was preferable to witnessing its total annihilation. Taming would allow Hezbollah to survive, whereas total defeat would leave no path to an eventual recovery.

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Accordingly, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, the successor to Hassan Nasrallah—whom Israel decided not to assassinate—adopted positions that facilitated the negotiations led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri with Amos Hochstein. Qassem is the one who will, symbolically, sign the understandings with Israel and is also the one receiving directives from Tehran. Thus, his statements this week after the conclusion of Berri and Hochstein’s negotiations are notable and carry significant implications.

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Qassem stated that Hezbollah wants the election of a president for Lebanon. This is important because Hezbollah had previously obstructed the election of a president, with Hassan Nasrallah acting as the de facto ruler of the country, deciding its entire fate.

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Qassem also said that Hezbollah intends to abide by the constitution, explicitly referencing the Taif Agreement. This marks a significant shift in Hezbollah’s stance, as the Taif Agreement emphasizes the state’s sovereignty and the exclusive possession of arms by the state—similar to U.N. Resolution 1701, for which Hezbollah, through Speaker Berri, agreed to establish a mechanism for implementation. This mechanism includes the full withdrawal of Hezbollah from the Lebanese-Israeli border to the Litani River. However, Hezbollah’s commitment to the Taif Agreement carries broader implications than just withdrawing its weapons from southern Lebanon. Qassem also stated that Hezbollah is prepared to pivot its presence to politics.

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This rhetoric, in itself, does not guarantee Hezbollah’s or Iran’s intentions, particularly in the long term. However, the reality is that Hezbollah has lost 80% of its capabilities and now faces a choice: either complete elimination or acceptance of a role in Lebanon’s political landscape. The reality is that Hezbollah has found itself alone against Israel without protection from Iran. The reality is that Iran, to which Hezbollah pledges allegiance, has effectively advised the group to accept what is being offered instead of pursuing a costly defiance. The reality is that Hezbollah today is not the same Hezbollah it was before September 17. Consequently, it has conceded after years of defiance, making the details of the draft agreement that much more critical.

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The essence of the agreement, if negotiations succeed, is a mechanism for implementing U.N. Resolution 1701, which encompasses Resolution 1559. Together, these resolutions form a roadmap for Lebanon’s recovery and its liberation from the grip of both Israel and Hezbollah.

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The key points are as follows: Once Israel and Lebanon agree, Hochstein will request both parties to commit in writing to the terms of the agreement by a specified date, marking the cessation of hostilities. From that date, a 60-day period will commence, during which the Lebanese army will deploy in the area between the border and the Litani River. A broader implementation monitoring committee—including Lebanon, Israel, UNIFIL, the United States, France, and possibly a fourth state—will oversee the execution process.

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Meanwhile, the trilateral military committee comprising Lebanon, Israel, and UNIFIL will address the 13 disputed points along the border in preparation for formal border demarcation. Eight of these 13 points were resolved last year before the recent conflicts erupted.

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Officially demarcating the border between Lebanon and Israel is of immense importance. The United States is determined to press for this goal for several reasons, foremost among them being that border demarcation would end Israeli occupation and eliminate the justification for maintaining Hezbollah’s weapons under the pretext of resistance. In other words, the resistance narrative will end, along with Hezbollah’s rationale for bearing arms, as the occupation comes to an end.

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According to the understandings, following the ceasefire, Lebanon’s president will be elected within three months. Then, discussions on a national defense strategy will begin. Once the 13 border points are resolved and the borders are officially demarcated, the national defense strategy discussions will lead to a clear conclusion: Hezbollah’s weapons will be handed over to the Lebanese army as the occupation ends. In essence, the end of occupation will also mark the end of the weapons maintained under the pretext of resistance.

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This is the roadmap for saving Lebanon from destruction and for sparing Hezbollah from annihilation by transforming it into a political party. It is also the roadmap for preventing Israel from occupying Lebanese territory under the pretence of targeting Hezbollah’s missiles and tunnels. Additionally, it is the roadmap for dismantling the weapons of Palestinian factions that claim to resist Israel from Lebanese soil.

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This is not a matter of optimism or pessimism. It is political realism, which Iran understands well—hence its submission to the idea of taming Hezbollah.