Why the Italian Campaign in World War 2 was Justified

The war in Italy was one of the most controversial campaigns of World War 2. Winston Churchill considered Italy “the soft underbelly of the Axis” and hoped attacking it could bypass a costly invasion of occupied France. Unfortunately, the war in Italy cost the Allies similar casualties as the Germans, for what many scholars believe were mediocre results. But the Italian Campaign was the best the Western Allies could’ve done against Germany in 1943, and produced more benefits than is usually recognized.

It’s hard to think what the Western Allies could’ve done in the summer of 1943 that would’ve hurt the German war effort more than invading Italy. A common view is they should’ve invaded France in 1943 to take pressure off the Russians (fighting the majority of German forces) and end the war sooner. Supporters of this point out Germany had fewer divisions in France in the summer of 1943 than 1944, but this overlooks more important factors.

Why an Invasion of France in 1943 Wasn’t Feasible

Firstly, the Allies only gained the advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic just before the summer of 1943. This was necessary to keep Britain in the war and allow America to build up forces there, obvious preconditions to eventually invade France. In fact the Allies suffered some of their worse shipping losses in the Atlantic during early 1943, and the turning point in May was as unexpected to them as the Germans.

Secondly, the Allies also only won the war in North Africa in May with the surrender of the German Africa Korps and Italian forces in Tunisia. There wasn’t sufficient time for the Allies to transport major forces from the Mediterranean to Britain, retrain and refit them, and launch an invasion of France in the summer of 1943. Not least because the Allies were recovering from massive shipping losses in the Atlantic from the previous five months (close to 2 million tons).

Thirdly, the Allies didn’t have air supremacy over France in 1943. This was needed to dominate the airspace during the invasion and interdict forces trying to reinforce the German army in Normandy. While the Allies had more planes (air superiority) in 1943, they didn’t dominate the air with little risk of serious enemy interference (air supremacy). For example, Germany had relative air superiority over the R.A.F. during much of the Battle of Britain, but it never achieved air supremacy to let it bomb airfields with impunity or invade Britain.

It’s plausible the Allies had enough planes to support an initial invasion of France in 1943, but they would’ve faced a still relatively strong German airforce. It would’ve been hard for allied airpower to cover the invasion, escort bombers, support air to ground operations, and interdict German reinforcements, all at once. When the Allies had air supremacy in 1944 these things were far easier to do.

In 1943 America’s daylight bombing offensive against Germany was constrained by the strong presence of German fighters in Western Europe. How would the Allies have decimated German communications like railroads, marshalling yards, tunnels and bridges, to isolate the German army in Normandy in 1943, without air supremacy? Only the introduction of the P-51 Mustang fighter, and external drop tanks to give it enough fuel to escort bombers to Germany and back, allowed America to gain air supremacy over the Luftwaffe in early 1944.

***

There are other reasons the Western Allies couldn’t have realistically invaded France in 1943.

They just didn’t have enough available divisions to mount a serious invasion at the time. Even by August 1943 America had less than a dozen divisions in Britain and North Africa. The British had more but not enough to face the 45 German divisions in France. The Allies also had a shortage of specialized landing craft, and lacked sophisticated armored vehicles that were used on D-Day, nicknamed “Hobart’s Funnies,” that hadn’t been invented yet.

The Allies also hadn’t mastered amphibious warfare (the hardest form of war) by the summer of 1943. Given the near disasters at Salerno and Tarawa later in 1943, and Anzio in early 1944, the odds the Allies would’ve succeeded on a bigger scale in France in 1943 weren’t encouraging. While they landed more troops on Sicily the first day of the invasion compared to Normandy, there weren’t major defenses on the Sicilian coast, and the landings were mostly unopposed. Sicily was also guarded by only a few German divisions and mostly ineffective Italian forces.

It should also be stressed Britain and America argued so much about whether and when to invade France, that the final decision didn’t occur until the Tehran conference in late 1943, where Stalin pressured Churchill to commit to it. Only afterwards did serious planning for the invasion begin, as well as the allocation of necessary resources for it to succeed.

While the issues above had been addressed by June 1944, the invasion of Normandy could’ve still failed, or been far bloodier, if Germany hadn’t been deceived by the Allies’ disinformation efforts. Had the Germans concentrated most of their forces (especially tanks) in Normandy, instead of the Calais region closest to Britain, history would’ve turned out much differently.

Once an invasion of France in 1943 was ruled out there wasn’t much left to choose from. An invasion of Norway would’ve been logistically difficult and offered little strategic value. An invasion of Greece would’ve been the same, unless it enticed Turkey to enter the war, but this wasn’t likely and Turkish intervention wouldn’t have given the Allies a strategic edge. Finally, invading Southern France in 1943 was also impractical. Logistical issues, the lack of advanced naval and air bases, limited port facilities in the Western Mediterranean, and the fact Sardinia and Corsica weren’t liberated until later in the year, ruled it out.

The Advantages of Invading Italy:

The invasion of Italy was the only practical operation the Western Allies could mount in 1943 to seriously damage the German war effort. Admittedly, it had little prospect of defeating the German army, or impressing the Russians, who were about to fight the biggest battle of the war against Germany at Kursk. But it still promised the Allies major strategic advantages.

Firstly, it offered the chance of knocking Italy out of the war. It’s true World War 2 literature is uncharitable regarding the performance of Italians arms. But Italy was Germany's closest ally and fielded significant forces to oppose the Allies. Most notably the Italian navy was a major force and Italy’s geographic position cut Britain's main maritime route to the Far East. The British estimated securing the Mediterranean route would decisively shorten their sea lines of communication and save the Allies a million tons of shipping a year. This wasn't a small consideration after the mauling the Allies took in the Battle of the Atlantic in early 1943.

Additionally, there were still many Italian divisions fighting against the Western Allies, or deployed in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and France. While they didn’t always perform well, they freed up many German divisions to fight elsewhere.

If Italy was knocked out of the war Germany would need to replace these divisions. As it was overstretched in Russia and elsewhere, this would drastically limit its offensive capabilities. The number of Italian troops that would have to be replace wasn’t small. It included over 1,000,000 soldiers from Italy to the Aegean.

Consider what did happen when Italy surrendered as the Western Allies began their invasion. Germany initiated Operation Axis to disarm Italian forces and replace their garrisons across Europe. The German high command estimated it completely disarmed 56 Italian divisions and partially disarmed 29. To suggest eliminating 1,000,000 enemy soldiers from the enemy's war effort wouldn’t benefit the Allies would be disingenuous.

***

The Italian Campaign offered other benefits.

While Russia expected a direct attack on France and wasn’t thrilled about the Western Allies attacking Italy, it was the best they could do, and helped stop Stalin pursuing a separate peace with Hitler in 1943. It’s often forgotten Russia fought the lion’s share of German forces and broke the back of the German army. As the British and Americans fought a few German divisions in Sicily in July 1943, Germany and Russia fought the biggest battle of the war at Kursk (involving millions of soldiers and thousands of tanks and aircraft). It was only after the Russian victory at Kursk that the overall initiative in Europe passed to the Allies. While the Italian Campaign didn’t impress the Russians, it at least convinced them the Western Allies were committed to fighting the Germans that year.

The seaborne assaults launched during the Italian Campaign (Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio) also gave the Allies valuable experience in amphibious warfare. This shouldn’t be dismissed as this experience was vital to guarantee a successful invasion of France, and necessary to deploy the Allies’ material advantages against Germany effectively in 1944.

Those who suggest the Allies should’ve invaded France in 1943 must again remember the list of difficulties, failures, and near disasters they suffered during amphibious assaults throughout the war.

Britain’s abortive attack on Dakar, it’s desperate invasion of Madagascar, the disastrous raid on Dieppe, and the heavy losses at Tarawa, were made against mostly second rate forces without serious firepower. Later invasions at Salerno and Anzio against stronger German forces could’ve been thrown back into the sea. On D-Day itself the Americans nearly failed at Omaha Beach, despite the harsh lessons from such experiences, and the massive firepower they enjoyed. Put bluntly the Allies needed all the experience in amphibious assaults they could get and weren’t ready to invade France until mid-1944.

Finally, like the war in North Africa, the Italian Campaign gave the Western Allies valuable, perhaps necessary, experience fighting the German army. Besides fighting a handful of German divisions in North Africa from November 1942 to May 1943, the Americans had no other experience fighting the German army at the time. Britain had considerably more experience against the Germans in France, Norway, Greece, Crete, and North Africa from 1940-1943, but its record wasn’t great. British forces generally didn’t perform any better than American ones in Sicily or Italy and needed as much experience fighting the Germans as anyone else.

The Russians did no better on the Eastern Front. Many who glorify the Russian army tend to exaggerate the Western Allies’ defeats, and ignore the stupendous losses Russia suffered. Russia’s army sustained 4 million casualties in 1941 alone, its losses (in numbers and proportionately) dwarfed western ones, it lost most battles against Germany until Kursk, and total casualties included perhaps 10,000,000 dead soldiers. Russia destroyed the majority of German forces in the war but its learning curve was no less steep than the Western Allies’.

The Costs and Limitations of the Italian Campaign

While the Italian Campaign would give the Allies major benefits there were disadvantages. Invading Italy was correct from a political and strategic point of view, but from an operational and tactical perspective it wasn’t an ideal battlefield. With its narrow length and mountainous terrain Italy was often a defender's paradise. Despite the Western Allies’ significant numerical and firepower advantages, the war in Italy was characterized by attrition, slow advances, and few examples of military excellence.

The campaign was useful to appease Stalin, divert German forces from other fronts, prepare for D-Day, and give the Western Allies necessary experience, but it rarely degraded German military power. This was all that could realistically be expected from it. Despite Churchill and other British strategists' wishes to fight a major war in the Mediterranean, it was unlikely. To do this would’ve required enthusiastic American support. America was always committed to an eventual invasion of France, tolerated the Italian Campaign as a necessary venture in 1943, and given its growing dominance in the alliance with Britain, was bound to get its way by 1944.

If there were sound strategic and political reasons to invade Italy, the execution of the campaign was more questionable. It’s fair to suggest the topography of Italy makes it difficult to conduct quick and decisive military operations. But it would be wrong to say it was impossible. Hannibal Barca accomplished many brilliant feats in Italy despite countless disadvantages. Napoleon won two campaigns in Italy with relative ease. Germany’s crippling victory against Italy at Caporetto in l917 (in a war that uniqued favored the defense), provides a more contemporary example of what was possible.

This isn’t to suggest the Western Allies could’ve easily defeated the Germans in Italy, or accomplished an impressive victory there, but historians generally accept they could’ve conducted the Italian Campaign with more skill.

While the Allies eventually won in Italy the campaign itself, much like in North Africa, showed they had much to learn about fighting the German army. The slow pace in Sicily, the near disaster at Salerno, the “stranded whale” (as Churchill put it) at Anzio, and the slogging matches at Monte Casino, didn’t reflect well on allied operational and tactical skills. Perhaps the one chance of inflicting a decisive defeat on the German army in Italy was wasted when General Mark Clark decided to take Rome, arguably to win glory, instead of surrounding much of the German 10th Army.

Again Italy's unfavorable topography, the tactical superiority of German forces, and not least of all hindsight, help explain the often unimpressive allied conduct in Italy. But it’s obvious the more important political and strategic advantages of the Italian Campaign have often been overshadowed by the Allies’ mixed performance. Yet much like the overly criticized British army during World War 1, the Allies in Italy during World War 2 won, got the big ideas right, and deserve more respect than condemnation.

Conclusion:

The invasion of Italy was the only realistic option for the Western Allies in 1943 and gave them decisive advantages. They didn’t have the resources and combat experience to invade France, or inflict a decisive defeat on the German army, in 1943. The campaign knocked Italy out of the war, forced Germany to send many divisions there (that were needed elsewhere), and replace Italian garrisons across Europe. This took significant pressure off Russian forces, gave the Western Allies necessary combat experience, and improved their amphibious warfare capabilities, which were needed to invade France successfully in 1944.

The Italian Campaign isn’t as glorified as the Normandy invasion, and wasn’t as important as the titanic struggle on the Eastern Front, but it was a necessary, if usually forgotten, part of World War 2.

Bibliography

Barnett, Correlli. The Desert Generals. London: Cassell, 1999.

Bauer, Eddy. Illustrated World War 2 Encyclopedia. New York: H.S. Stuttman INC. Publishers, 1978.

Beevor, Antony. The Second World War. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2012.

Bishop, Chris. German Campaigns of World War 2. London: Grange Books, 2001.

Churchill, Winston. The Second World War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948-1953.

Danchev, Alex and Daniel Todman. War Diaries: 1939-45, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke.?London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001.

Lewis, Jon. The Mammoth Book of Battles. London: Robinson Publishing, 2000.

Macksey, Kenneth. From Triumph to Disaster. London: Greenhill Books, 1996.

Overy, Richard. Why the Allies Won. New York: W.W. Norton, 1996.

Warner, Philip. World War Two. London: Cassell, 2002.

Article from the “Comando Supremo, Italy at War:” The Second World War in Italy: Was it worth it? The folly and brutality of war, from Sicily to the Po Valley by Michael Howard, June 25, 2008. https://www.comandosupremo.com/forums/topic/5783-michael-howard-on-italian-campaign-was-it-worth-it/

Article from the “National War Museum:” The battle for Italy, January 2023. https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/italian-campaign

Article from the “U.S. Naval Institute:” D-Day, A Year Too Late? by Vincent P. O’Hara, June 2019. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2019/june/d-day-year-too-late

Article from “Warfare History Network:” Long-Range Fighter Escort by Gene J. Pfeffer, April 2016. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/long-range-fighter-escort/#:~:text=

Wikipedia. (2024). “Operation Achse,” [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Achse [2024, February].