'Who's afraid of America?' Fear begets deterrence, deterrence begets security.

In a recent interview, Bob Gates, former United States Secretary of Defence, posed the one-million-dollar question - is anyone still afraid of America? Quite a question, if we remind ourselves that once the Cold War came to an abrupt end in the 90s, what monopolized international politics discourse was the concept of ‘the end of history’, which propagated the victory of capitalism and liberalism over communism and authoritarian rule. In the historical duel between the US and the USSR, the last one standing was undisputedly America. For a long time, Washington equated this victory to hegemony by invitation, the epitome of soft power, being convinced that the rest of the world would eventually seek to become the spitting image of America.

Thirty years down the road, American prowess is still a fact. The global predominance of America politically, economically and militarily is a given. The US is undisputedly the greatest nuclear power in the world. It has the greatest army. Big tech and social media worldwide are American-led. So is the world economy and possibly the world’s intellect. Why is, then, Bob Gates worried? And even if he’s right and no one is really afraid of America anymore, why should we worry and how does that affect our everyday lives??

Optics matter

Enter 2012. US President, Barack Obama, issues a stern warning to Syrian leader Bashar Al-Assad regarding the use of chemical weapons against civilians. This is a red line that should not be crossed Assad is told. A year later, Assad does cross that line, using sarin gas to exterminate 1400 civilians in a Damascus suburb taken over by anti-government militia. Washington’s silence speaks for itself. The Syrian opposition waits in vain. Washington Post’s David Ignatius aptly describes this as the moment that Obama blinked. Succeeding administrations follow through with American blinking and swindling becoming more commonplace than not. Something that regularly lets the Syrian-based Kurds exposed to Assad’s and Erdogan’s whims. Taking score on who won Syria that would be Tehran and the Kremlin, both gaining a foothold in the Mediterranean, being put to good use against Americans and their allies as we speak. Adding insult to injury the symbolism of that victory was the fact that Iran and Syria stood by their allies through thick and thin, even when the rest of humanity was against them. Three American presidents down, Assad continues to rule Syria to this day.

Enter the end of the Cold War. As geopolitical entry points would allow, Moscow was more or less left to its own devices to create a cordon sanitaire, a buffer zone, in a geographical area which she herself defined as ‘the Near Abroad’- that is countries which had previously belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence and should rightfully remain there, intact from any sort of external influence by others. Thus, a number of legally invalid secessionist entities came to life via means of intrastate conflict (in which Moscow was unashamedly involved)-clashes which nowadays fall under the ‘frozen conflict’ category. That is Transnistria in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh till recently hanging loose between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It should come as no surprise that the invasion and occupation of Crimea and the creation of two additional secessionist states in Eastern Ukraine in 2014 were allowed to unfold as before. That is with minimum cost to Moscow, the underlying principle being to create just enough cost to make a point that the West did not really approve of such actions, but not enough to show it really cared. It should also come as no surprise that under such circumstances Belarus turned into Putin’s vassal. Such matters were deemed at first as Moscow’s family affairs taking place in its own backyard.

Therefore, Moscow’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should not have been a thunderbolt in a clear sky. Admittedly, taking into account renewed Western interest in Kiev’s orientation in the decade that followed the 2014 invasion, an additional Russian military operation at grand scale did not seem Putin’s optimum choice and his reasons as to why he chose to embroil himself in such a majestic mess have been mostly left unanswered to this day. However, it does seem that the Kremlin had serious doubts, despite verbal proclamations to the contrary, whether a united Western front was ever possible to form on the issue of Ukraine. Europe had so far conspicuously sat on the fence of unanimity on a range of even lesser issues; America had still many wounds to leak since the Capitol riot. Cleavages rather than linkages were key in defining the undercurrent mood of Western societies. Moscow had hitherto successfully stirred them up whenever possible.

In addition to this, one of the most grandiose debacles of American foreign policy had taken place just before the invasion, only a few months back, in summer 2021. In politics, optics matter: the Americans made a spectacle of themselves in Afghanistan, on live transmission, for the whole wide world to see. Putin had carefully watched as their badly-timed, badly-designed and badly-executed withdrawal plan from Afghanistan unfolded, as Kabul easily fell prey to the Taliban, without much resistance. It was another deja-vu of Americans leaving long-standing associates behind to bear the brunt of the Taliban heat, having first wasted billions of dollars down the Afghan drain, without managing to force anyone to choose to be free in the name of liberal democracy.

Fear, deterrence, security

Zooming back to today, the situation can be aptly summarised thus: over in Gaza, Netanyahu behaves more like the prodigal rather than the obedient son to Biden’s calls for restraint; the Houthis have the Red Sea under seize jeopardising world trade, while there are concerns for the security of deep-sea communication cables close to their grip; Iran-sponsored terrorist organisations make it their regular business to attack Western interests on a global scale; a new ‘Great Game’ is unfolding in the Pacific, where the balance between American and Chinese influence can at best be described as delicate. Should America fail Ukraine and let it prey to Putin’s whims, undoubtedly Taiwan, Japan and Australia will worry about their own chances of survival vis-à-vis further Chinese encroachment.

Enter Europe. At present, it behaves like an economic giant with security and foreign policy feet made out of clay. As the international system is descending into chaos, as international institutions are as discredited as they are dysfunctional, despite significant steps towards solidarity, Brussels still remains at a loss as to how it should and above all, could respond to global challenges. EU economic muscle is not accompanied by the same amount of political clout. At this point in time, Europe is no contender for the hegemon’s seat. China, Iran, Russia, even Turkey, think they are.

Does that spell trouble? Yes, it does.

The Americans have for some time now attempted to ‘lead from behind’. That is bad news as far as deterrence and security are concerned. Fear begets deterrence, deterrence begets security. ?Thucydides would be at a loss. Pericles is calling from the sidelines: ‘Your empire?is now?like?a?tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go.’ Paraphrasing the same words he used to convince Athenian citizens against introversion, against letting go of hegemony, one could warn Washington that it, too, should be concerned with the dangers of possibly wanting to let go, having been a reluctant hegemon for far too long. ?Refusing to acknowledge the responsibility of supremacy does not mitigate danger: the burden of primogeniture still stands even if you decide to ignore it.

Allowing power vacuums to prevail, although natural law dictates that they will not remain empty for long, creates risk. Risk wreaks unexpected havoc till a new equilibrium is established, till a renewed balance of power equation is reached, till a peaceful interlude to regional and intrastate conflict is agreed. Most analysts in the know have classified 2024 as a very possible annus horribilis for humankind- an extremely bumpy ride for us all.

One cannot be optimistic as to how Washington will react in the months to come, ahead of a possibly course-changing presidential election in November 2024. Social cohesion in the United States is falling. As a result, endogenous resilience (a security multiplier) to internal and external threats is also falling. Washington seems in no position to lead itself, let alone lead others.

The view from Cyprus

The government of Cyprus has been attempting for some time now to kickstart a renewed round of negotiations, under the existing UN mandate. Negotiations are to involve the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, but, above all, the aim is to bring Turkey back to the table. Cyprus being an EU-state, the EU acquis Communautaire is to provide an additional framework within which manoeuvres must be made.

Nonetheless, however useful, it is important to place all of the above in the current geopolitical context. In a recent article for Foreign Affairs, CIA Director, Bill Burns, made it quite clear how the American administration sees developments in the Middle East: no problem can be resolved unless the Americans muscle in, even if they do not really wish to do so. The same can be said for the Cyprus Problem, which remains a conundrum yet to be solved.

Strategic, military, economic cooperation between Washington and Nicosia has now reached unprecedented levels. The Republic of Cyprus is a rare pillar of stability and democracy in a shaky region. Bar a festering wound-its northern part, occupied by the Turkish army since 1974. A land where lawlessness remains rife, providing fertile ground for all kind of illegal activities such as money laundering, people- and goods-smuggling, drug trafficking, as well as suspicious, unchecked terrorism-linked activities. As tensions keep running high in the region, neither Cyprus nor the region can be secure. This uneasiness cannot be ironed out unless the Americans step in. Unless the Cyprus problem becomes an American foreign policy priority, with the kind of arm-twisting that this implies. it is unlikely that cages are rattled, it is unlikely that a solution is reached.