What If Things Went Wrong: Pathways under Updated DOJ Corporate Enforcement Policy

We alerted US Department of Justice (DOJ)’s “all-tool approach” under the revamped corporate enforcement policy released in January to deter and prosecute culpable individuals, redeem troubled corporations, safeguard voluntary, fulsome disclosure and effective cooperation and remediation (“Revised CEP”).[1] [2]?Through diagrams below, this note illustrates the possible pathways to facilitate decision-makers and their counsels and officers to navigate the regulatory complexity in risk assessment and risk/return determination.?

我们在此前简要汇报了美国司法部（DOJ）在今年1月所推出的修订后的公司执法政策，旨在威慑并追究不法个人、挽救受影响的企业并促进与监管当局合作及补救，并保障自愿完整披露历史违规行为的落实。本备忘录对复杂的监管要求下的可能的路径予以探讨，以期对相关管理者及其法律顾问和合规官在风险评估和风险/回报斟酌有所帮助。

Overall, voluntary self-disclosure (along with full cooperation and remediation) presents the “clearest path” to avoid a guilty plea or an indictment against historical misconducts unaddressed, from the enforcement perspective.

整体而言，从（美国）执法部门角度，自愿自我披露（以及充分合作和补救）是避免对既往未决的不当行为进行认罪或起诉的“最明确的途径”。

What are the primary possibilities and consequences under the revised CEP? We illustrate as follows:

下图进一步展示了修订后《公司执法政策》视野下，主要可能性及其后果。

Below are further details of the pathways and consequences:

就各不同情形与后果阐述如下：

1.????Path 1: Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) w/ Full Cooperation and Effective Remediation (“Path 1”)

路径一：企业自愿自我披露、充分合作并采取有效补救（“路径一”）

This pathway will likely qualify the company in question for a presumptive declination under the revised Policy, if such company surrenders all disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or undertakes restitution resulting from the misconduct at issue. ?DOJ will coordinate with “other authority (who) collects disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution,” pursuant to the Department’s Policy on Coordination of Corporate Resolution Penalties in Parallel and/or Joint Investigations and Proceedings Arising from the Same Misconduct, Justice Manual 1-12.100.

如果企业缴纳所有罚金、上缴非法所得和/或采取针对不当行为“恢复原状”（restitution）的措施，那么该路径的结果是企业有望获得根据修订后的公司执法政策获得（酌定）不起诉的资格。美国司法部将根据该部《关于在平行和/或联合执法调查和诉讼中对同一不当行为引起的企业解决处罚的协调政策》，即《司法手册》1-12.100，与 “其他监管部门（即其他追缴、罚没和/或要求恢复原状的执法机构”进行协调。

The exception to this pathway is the existence of “aggravating circumstances involving the seriousness of the offense or the nature of the offender.”?Pursuant to the Monaco Memo, aggravating factors include “grave threat to national security” or “deeply pervasive” misconducts; factual factors impacting determination of the pervasiveness include ignorance by senior management or corporate culture that does not encourage open discussion & reporting).

允许该路径的例外情形是企业存在“涉及犯罪的严重性或罪犯的性质的加重情节”。根据摩纳哥备忘录要求，加重情形包括“对国家安全的严重威胁”或不当行为在组织中“非常普遍”（司法部明确，影响“普遍性”定性的事实因素包括高管对长期存在的不当行为的忽视，或者不鼓励公开讨论和报告合规风险的企业文化）。

2.????Path 2: Aggravating Circumstances arising from Historical Issues Identified under Path 1 While Extraordinary Cooperation Exists (“Path 2”)

路径二：路径一中发现历史问题存在加重情形，但企业采取了卓越合作

Although aggravating circumstances disqualify a company from the presumption of a declination, DOJ “may nonetheless determine that a declination is an appropriate outcome” if the company demonstrates to the Criminal Division that its actions constitute “extraordinary cooperation.”?The following factors must all be satisfied to prove such “extraordinary cooperation:”

尽管加重情形将使该等企业丧失被推定为酌定不起诉的资格，但美国司法部授权检察官如下裁量权，即企业若能向刑事司证明其行动构成“卓越合作”，他们“仍可确定拒绝起诉是一个适当的结果”。 企业要证明其符合“特别合作”的条件，必须满足如下所有要素：

?????The VSD was made immediately upon the company becoming aware of the allegation of misconduct;

自愿自我披露是在企业知悉不当行为的指控后立即做出的；

?????At the time of the misconduct and disclosure, the company had an effective compliance program and system of internal accounting controls, which enabled the identification of the misconduct and led to the company’s voluntary self-disclosure; and

不仅在企业披露而且在行为发生时，该企业拥有有效的合规体系和内审体系，从而能够识别不当行为并导致该公司自愿自我披露；以及

?????The company provided extraordinary cooperation with the Department’s investigation and undertook extraordinary remediation that exceeds the respective factors listed under the revised CEP.

企业对美国司法部的调查予以卓越（extraordinary）的合作，并采取了卓越的补救措施，其水准高于修订后的《公司执法政策》所列的各个因素。

3.????Path 3: Aggravating Circumstances arising from Path 1, Yet Efforts Not Deemed as Extraordinary Cooperation (“Path 3”)

路径三：路径一中发现历史问题存在加重情形，但企业未能证明卓越合作

The extraordinary cooperation requirement is significant, exceptional incentive available to only companies that demonstrate to the satisfaction of the enforcement authorities.?Under Path 3, failure to prove extraordinary cooperation still permits reduced penalty in the event a criminal resolution is warranted. Such reduced penalty will be “at least 50% and up to a 75% reduction off of the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) fine range.” (As an exception, in the case of a criminal recidivist; and, such reduction will be “generally not be from the low end of the U.S.S.G. fine range,” and prosecutors will have case-specific discretion to determine (“Recidivist Leniency Exception”).)

卓越合作是一项显著但属于例外的激励措施，只有那些令执法机关满意的企业方能获得。在路径三情形下，相关司法程序将根据《量刑指南》规定的罚金范围基础上给与门槛至少50%，75%封顶的处罚减免措施。（作为例外，若存在累犯情形，则减免措施的门槛不应从《量刑指南》规定的罚金范围的最小值开始计算，并且美国检察机关须就具体个案做出裁量（“累犯仍从轻例外”）。）

The outcome will “generally not require a corporate guilty plea—including for criminal recidivists—absent the presence of particularly egregious or multiple aggravating circumstances” under the revised CEP.

根据修订后的《公司执法政策》，若不存在特别恶劣或多重加重的情况，路径三情形“一般不要求公司认罪——即便对于惯犯情形”。

Monitor may be imposed in such situation, however, in the criminal resolution, unless the company “has, at the time of resolution, demonstrated that it has implemented and tested an effective compliance program and remediated the root cause of the misconduct.”

该情形仍有可能在刑事和解决议中要求设立监察员，除非该企业“在决议时已经证明它已经实施有效的合规体系、予以检验，并针对不当行为的根本原因采取了补救措施”。

In the same spirit, the Monaco Memo underlying the revised CEP also tightens intra-DOJ scrutiny and oversight to grant a NPA/DPA commonly pursued, by stressing that:

本着同样的精神，修订后的《公司执法政策》所依据的《摩纳哥备忘录》也加强了司法部内部对在此情形往往趋之若鹜的“不起诉协议”资格的监察，并强调：

“Multiple non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements (NPA/DPA) are generally disfavored, especially where the matters at issue involve similar types of misconduct; the same personnel, officers, or executives; or the same entities. Before making a corporate resolution offer that would result in multiple non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements for a corporation (including its affiliated entities), Department prosecutors must secure the written approval of the responsible U.S. Attorney or Assistant Attorney General and provide notice to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) in the manner set forth in JM § 1-14.000. Notice provided to ODAG pursuant to JM § 1-14.000 must be made at least 10 business days prior to the issuance of an offer to the corporation, except in extraordinary circumstances.”

“一般而言，不赞成签订多个不起诉或延期起诉协议，特别是在系争事项涉及类似的不当行为、相同的人员、经理或高管或者相同实体。在提出会导致一家企业（包括其关联实体）签订多项不起诉或延期起诉协议的公司解决方案之前，司法部检察官必须获得主持该案的美国检察官或助理总检察长的书面批准，并按照《司法手册》第1-14.000条规定的方式向副总检察长办公室（ODAG）上报。根据《司法手册》第1-14.000条向ODAG上报必须在向该企业发出要约之前至少10个工作日内完成，极其特殊情况除外。”

4.????Path 4: No VSD, But Full Cooperation and Effective Remediation

路径四：企业没有自愿自我披露，但充分合作并有效补救

DOJ still provides leniency nonetheless in such situation.?Moreover, the reduced penalty is “twice the maximum amount of a reduction available under the prior version of the CEP.”?The Criminal Division will recommend to a sentencing court, up to a 50% reduction off of the low end of the U.S.S.G. fine range. ?Recidivist Leniency Exception also applies.

美国司法部对于该等情形仍然予以从轻发落的可能性。不仅如此，从轻处理的幅度还从此前水准提升了两倍。相关司法程序将根据《量刑指南》规定的罚金范围基础上给与最多50%封顶的处罚减免措施。作为例外，若存在累犯情形。累犯仍从轻的例外仍然适用。

5.????Path 5: No VSD, No or Deficient Cooperation and Remediation

路径五：企业没有自愿自我披露，也没有充分合作并有效补救

The recent enforcement against Glencore exemplifies the consequence for such pathway —a criminal resolution in the form of plea agreement that includes $1.5bn criminal penalties, forfeiture, restitution, and imposition of a monitor.[3]

Glencore案件的处理结果可资参考：该企业以认罪协议的形式接受了刑事裁决，包括15亿美元的刑事处罚、没收违法所得、恢复原状和以及实施监察员措施。?

There, DOJ spoke out that “the company only received a minimal reduction for cooperation and remediation under the CEP because of late and incomplete cooperation and failure to take adequate, timely disciplinary measures with respect to certain personnel involved in, or aware of, the criminal conduct—which was pervasive.”[4]

美国司法部在该案指出：“该公司的合作与补救根据《公司执法政策》只获得了最低限度的从宽待遇，因为其合作起步晚且不完整，而且没有对参与或了解犯罪行为的特定人员采取充分、及时的惩戒措施——该等违规行为普遍存在。”

Outlook / To-dos 展望/跟进

These prioritized elements aim to deter risky behavior and foster a culture of compliance, and “seek to potentially shift the burden of corporate financial penalties away from shareholders—who in many cases do not have a role in misconduct—onto those more directly responsible.”

以上监管部门侧重评估的因素旨在阻止高风险行为、培育合规文化，并“寻求将罚金惩戒实际承担方从无辜股东身上转到更直接的违规责任人身上。”

?

Key to establish full (if not extraordinary) cooperation lies in the “immediacy, consistency, degree, and impact—that apply to cooperation by both individuals.”

企业实现全面（如果不是卓越）合作的关键在于“其具体举措的积极迅速、前后一致、程度及其影响”。

Equally important, compliance with local blocking statutes (e.g., those under China and EU) and ensuring cross-border enforcement cooperation under UN Anti-bribery Convention must be weighted in in such determination.?This note is not substitute to legal advice and experienced counsels must be sought to undertake the right, responsible pathway.

同样重要的是，遵守当地阻断法律（例如中国、欧盟等法律规定）并确保联合国反腐败公约约束下的跨境监管合作，必须在这方面的决定中予以额外重视。?

本备忘录旨在参考，不构成法律意见；您应寻求有经验的代表律师以求负责任并择善从之。

Note: The contents of this newsletter are the author(s)’ individual responsibility, and do not necessarily represent the views of any company / organization or any of its members. Due to the general nature of its contents, this newsletter is not and should not be regarded as legal advice. No specific action is to be taken on the information provided without prior consultation with your trustworthy counsel(s).        

[1] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy” (Jan. 17, 2023) (“revised Corporate Enforcement Policy”), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1562851/download

[2] Yi Wang, Enforcement Policy Stresses Effective Compliance Programs Must Be Follow-through and Prevent Circumvention (Jan. 1, 2023), https://mind-re.org/2023/01/01/surface-or-hide-it-enforcement-policy-stresses-effective-compliance-programs-must-be-follow-throurgh-and-prevent-circumvention/.

[3] Plea Agreement, United States v. Glencore International A.G. (May 24, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1508266/download.

[4] U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. Delivers Remarks on Revisions to the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement Policy” (Jan. 17, 2023), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-kenneth-polite-jr-delivers-remarks-georgetown-university-law.