When Silence Isn't Golden: The Hidden Cost of Bullying on Risk Reporting
In any organisation, the ability to identify and address risks to safety, security, and quality depends on one foundational principle: employees must feel empowered to speak up. At Vestas, I’ve seen how simplicity, collaboration, accountability, and passion foster an environment where employees are encouraged to raise concerns and take ownership of solutions. These values help create a culture where psychological safety thrives—a vital component for ensuring risks are identified and mitigated effectively.
When these principles are absent, however, the consequences can be devastating. History has repeatedly shown us the high cost of cultures that tolerate bullying, intimidation, or a lack of psychological safety.
Consider three landmark disasters that reshaped their industries: the BP Texas City Refinery Explosion (2005), the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (2010), and the Boeing 737 MAX crashes (2018–2019).
These disasters' human, financial, reputational, and environmental toll remains staggering. Moreover, each case shares a common thread: a culture of fear, suppression, and intimidation that silenced concerns and ultimately undermined critical protocols for quality, safety, and risk management.
These examples highlight the devastating consequences of toxic workplace cultures. By analysing their impact, we can uncover valuable lessons about the cost of silence and, more importantly, explore how to build cultures rooted in openness, collaboration, and accountability to prevent such failures in the future.
The Toxic Cycle versus a Proactive Risk-Reporting Cycle
To address the challenges of risk management in the workplace, we must examine how different environments shape risk reporting. Two distinct cycles emerge, one driven by toxic dynamics and the other by a culture that fosters open collaboration and accountability. Understanding these cycles is vital to breaking the toxic feedback loop and enabling proactive risk management.
?
?
While Breaking the Cycle provides a roadmap, this is only an aspirational intent with further analysis. To turn intent into action, we must explore how bullying affects the quantification of risks and the systems designed to manage them. ?
?
The similarities in Quantifying Risk for Safety, Cyber Security, and Quality
As George E. P. Box famously remarked,?"All models are wrong, but some are useful."?This analysis does not aim to perfectly capture the complexities of workplace dynamics but instead serves as a straightforward modelling exercise to highlight the potential impact of workplace bullying on critical risk reporting across safety, cybersecurity, and quality domains.
The process of quantifying risk is well-established and applies almost identically across these fields. It generally follows four key steps:?
Stochastic methods are used in source and consequence modelling. These involve selecting various factors, understanding their interdependencies, and calculating probabilities based on how one factor influences another.
Across industries, stochastic models abound, tailored to specific projects and contexts. Each sector has its preferred approach. In cybersecurity, for instance, the?Factor Analysis for Information Risk (FAIR)?methodology often takes centre stage, frequently used with frameworks like?MITRE ATT&CK??and?D3FEND?. Yet, there are times when no existing model suffices, and a bespoke stochastic model becomes necessary.
This past week, I indulged in the creative process of building such a model, enjoying the challenges and company of an AI friend. With a mug of hot chocolate in hand, we rolled out a simple stochastic model designed to explore the interplay between workplace culture and risk quantification.
?
Laying Out the Assumptions
Step 1 of the risk quantification process assumes a perfect environment where the free flow of information is unencumbered, enabling seamless risk identification. While this is an ideal scenario—and a significant assumption—we will revisit it later. For now, the focus shifts to Step 2: Source Modelling.
To model the impact of workplace culture on risk reporting, we rely on the following assumptions:??
By structuring the assumptions, we can explore how workplace dynamics—toxic or enabling—affect the likelihood of reporting critical risks. This approach allows us to quantify the intangible and model the impact of interventions in a clear and actionable manner.
First Round of Analysis
Initial observations from the model's analysis highlight several important dynamics: ?
?
Next Steps: Refining the Model
While these insights provide a solid foundation, they remain general. To deepen our understanding, further iterations are necessary to: ?
By delving deeper, we can uncover more actionable insights, paving the way for organisations to break the toxic cycle and sustain a proactive risk management culture.
Second Round: Stepwise Evolution of Reporting Probability
The initial analysis examined a single team's dynamics in isolation. However, real-world organisations rarely operate in silos. Risk reporting and resolution often require interactions across multiple teams, departments, or hierarchical levels. Adding this organisational complexity reveals further insights into the dynamics of risk reporting. ?
领英推荐
Key Observations:
?
Implications for Organisational Dynamics:
The intersection of hierarchy and culture is critical. A toxic culture inhibits reporting within teams and compounds the challenges of escalating risks across organisational boundaries. On the other hand, positive and enabling environments provide a buffer, ensuring that even complex reporting paths can deliver actionable insights. ?
Future modelling should explore the following:
By accounting for these variables, we can refine strategies to transform rigid and suppressive systems into adaptive and transparent organisations.
?
Some Comments on Legislation Versus Corporate Policies on Bullying
Workplace bullying often persists due to a combination of legislative gaps and immature or ineffective corporate policies. These shortcomings create environments where bullying can thrive, silencing employees and undermining organisational risk management. ?
Persistent Complications:
?
Existing Legislative and Policy Guidance:
Strong anti-bullying laws and whistleblower protection measures are essential for creating safe, transparent workplaces. Examples of legislation and directives that can inform the development of effective corporate policies include:?
?
Call to Action for Policy Makers & Legislators:
To address these issues comprehensively, organisations and legislators must:?
By bridging the gap between legislation and corporate governance, organisations can create safer, more equitable workplaces encouraging reporting risks and misconduct. This will ultimately support broader safety, cybersecurity, and quality goals.
??
Conclusion
What we’ve explored here is not traditional risk quantification but a deeper look at the risks inherent in achieving risk quantification. If risks remain unreported due to fear or cultural barriers, no model can account for them, and you will never be able to calculate the price of risks until you have to pay them. To succeed in any risk-informed practice, the probability of known risks being reported must approach 1.0.
The takeaway is simple yet profound: If you permit bullying in your organisation, the probability of risks being reported approaches zero. In such an environment, risk management practices will fail to surface the critical issues that could lead to existential crises, much like the catastrophic incidents mentioned earlier in this article. ?
??
General Call to Action
We’ve all heard the joke: “How many psychologists does it take to change a light bulb?” The answer is, of course, “just one—but the light bulb has to want to change.” The same applies to organisational cultures: leaders must want to change and foster environments where admitting and learning from mistakes is a celebrated part of good business.
Acknowledging errors isn’t a weakness but a strength in a risk-informed culture. Be the leader who celebrates learning from mistakes, creating opportunities for meaningful insights and improved decision-making in psychologically safe settings.
To illustrate the interplay between bullying and psychological safety, consider this organic analogy:?
A workplace free of bullying lays the foundation for psychological safety, but achieving proper psychological safety requires proactive effort to nurture and maintain trust and collaboration.
To you leaders tackling workplace bullying and building psychological safety, here’s my advice:
Tend and dress your garden. Take good care of it, and you’ll enjoy the harvest—quality, security, and safety will grow naturally from the risk-agile culture you’ve cultivated.?
?
Other Thought Leaders to Follow on This Topic
Of course, I’m not the first to explore these ideas, nor will I be the last. Actual change requires effort and humility—recognising when we’ve been wrong and striving to grow. Here are a few thought leaders I follow who inspire me in shaping risk-aware, collaborative organisational cultures:
Please let me know what your thoughts are.
I'd love to hear your perspectives.
As always, your diverse insights and experiences enrich the conversation. Feel free to share your thoughts, ideas, or questions for others to consider. Let’s keep learning and growing together.
#Leadership #PsychologicalSafety #WorkplaceCulture #RiskManagement #CyberSecurity #QualityManagement #WorkplaceBullying #AntiBullying #OrganisationalDevelopment #FutureOfWork #ThoughtLeadership #Collaboration #Accountability #QuantitativeRiskManagement #Cyber #CyberRiskManagement #CyberRisk #CyberSecurityRisk #Leadership #ChangeManagement #OrganisationalChangeManagement #DigitalTransformation #EmotionalIntelligence #ValueDiversity #RiskInformed #RiskAware #RiskAgile #ProblemSolving
?
CEO @ CYBERCRYPT | Cyber Executive | Cryptographer | R&D and Innovation Strategist | Advisor
3 个月A nice analysis. Normalization of risk reporting is crucial, indeed. A related psychological phenomenon we have experienced first-hand more than a handful of times all over the world is the barrier towards meaningfully involving security experts - internal or external - to identify a security risk or address an already identified one. That is, people and organizations very often prefer either not to know about a risk or remain silent (=not act) on the risk over getting help. How would that fit into the model?