What's the Problem?

Before I begin a second of my disordered rants - I'll state the important and hopefully obvious caveat - I'm not perfect, I'm not an expert, I'm barely competent in the the areas which I'm most familiar with (Refrigeration Design). I can't solve a Rubric's cube, and I hate cryptic crosswords. With that said, I have been Problem Solving since starting in the refrigeration industry (and, before you ask, only some of that time has been spent solving the problems I might have created) and here is some important principles which I find have helped, and some times I have found to have been lacking.

Problems are everywhere. From the problem of not selling goods and services to somebody who you'd like to sell to, to trouble shooting a failing pack controller (Electrickery), to getting a Fox, a Chicken and a sack of Corn across a deep river in a boat of a finite size. Anything is a problem, and in my experience the successful resolution involves much the same things as below.

And then there's us.

Scene from Moneyball (2011)

"You're not even looking at the problem...

...The problem we're trying to solve, is that there are rich teams, and there are poor teams. Then there's fifty feet of crap, and then there's us."

Michael Lewis, author of The Big Short and Liar's Dice, followed the Oakland Athletics on their record setting winning run of 20 games in 2002, with the third lowest payroll in Major League Baseball (it's a very interesting book, and the film is not bad at all either) and an approach to statistics (sabremetrics) and finding value which was unique at the time. The above scene from the film, centres around the Oakland A's management and scouting team discussing how best to replace star player Jason Giambi, who had just joined the New York Yankees for $120 million over 7 years contract. For comparison the Oakland A's payroll for 2002 was about $40 million in total.

Billy Beane, Oakland A's General Manager identifies the problem in the scene. The scouts don't. The problem they have is not to replace Giambi like for like (because they can't). The problem is they have to get into the Playoffs, when all the other teams can outspend them for the talent they need.

It should be said that whilst Billy Beane, Paul Depodesta, and the A's might have solved their problem of ensuring they got into the playoffs, they never solved their playoff problem, which they have not reached the World Series since 1989. Billy Beane (in)famously thinks this isn't/wasn't a problem, as a relatively small series of games luck can play a much bigger part in determining the outcome, than it does over the course of a 160 odd game season. I'll leave it to you to decide whether that's a cop-out or a shrewd assessment.

So what does this mean in general to you and me? Identify the base requirement/problem you're trying to met/solve, and then work forwards or backwards to find the solution to the actual problem. Too many times we're implementing a solution before we've understood what the problem is. I've seen many costly instances of this, such as:

• Installation of Adiabatic Cooling Systems on Transcritical CO2 to alleviate hot weather problems, when there is an excess of compressor capacity to cope with an increase in flash gas fraction.
• Construction of Acoustic Enclosures, when there is a easily rectifiable controls issue which has created excessive fan speeds and noise levels in the first place.
• Replacement of entire packaged plant systems well before their End of Life which are working well elsewhere in the estate, because there is a lack of understanding on how they work, and what is required to make them work.

And in such cases - the problem is not resolved, the consequences often remain (high energy consumption, noise still present) and all the client or the service company has done is impact their bottom line, and in many cases just added more risk and maintenance requirements onto their sites.

Learning from a Toddler

Just like Accidents having more than one cause - there is generally more than one issue creating problems. As I repeat ad nauseam above - We should try to identify the root cause of the problem otherwise we will never actually solve the problem... In Don Norman's Design of Everyday things (a little dry, but I found it very interesting), the example of the crash of a United States Air Force F-22 Raptor, one of the most sophisticated aircraft in the world, which killed the pilot and destroyed the plane in 2010. The F-22 had been involved in accidents before, and pilots had also complained of oxygen deprivation.

The USAF investigation board, released a report into the incident, placing the blame squarely on the pilot "Failure to recognise an initiate a timely dive recovery due to channelised attention, breakdown of visual scan and unrecognised spatial distortion".

The Inspector General's office for the US Department of Defence reviewed the findings, and disagreed with the assessment, as the Investigation Board report didn't consider "Why sudden incapacitation or unconsciousness was not considered a contributory factor".

Norman parodies the responses to the report as

Air Force: It was pilot error - the pilot failed to take corrective action

Inspector General: That's because the pilot was probably unconscious.

Air Force: So you agree, the pilot failed to correct the problem.

In this particular section of the book, Norman is discussing how bad design gets let off the hook, as soon as human error is found. The fact that bad design can inevitably cause human error is often overlooked - see Three Mile Island - where a valve status light merely indicated a power supply, it did not indicate the valve open or closed status, which is of some importance when trying to stop a nuclear meltdown.

Norman discusses the procedure for identify the root causes that is called the "Fives Whys", originally developed by Sakichi Toyoda and used by Toyota for improving quality. And this is effectively being a toddler who has discovered the question "Why" for the first time. As annoying as it is - a toddler will often be able to, after many whys, highlight (embarrassingly in many cases) areas of ignorance. To bring it back to the F-22, Norman gives an example how such an approach could be used.

• "Q1. Why did the plane crash? Because it was in a uncontrolled dive."
• "Q2. Why didn't the pilot recover from the dive? Because the pilot failed to initiate a timely recovery.
• "Q3. Why was that? Because he might have been unconscious"
• "Q4. Why was that? We don't know, we need to find out"

And so on.

The Air Force Investigation Board stopped at Question 2... Don't stop at question 2. And the questions don't have to be "whys" when we're investigating problems.

And, again, just like accidents having more than one cause- there usually is more than one problem on site. So once one problem has been found, , keep going until you're satisfied that it work as it should...

Did it ever work?

Back in the dim and distant past where I can't recall, I read at least three questions regarding looking at engineering problems on site. There are 3 specific questions which I try ask when facing a problem on a system.

1. Does it work as designed/intended? An obvious starting point.
2. Did it ever work as designed/intended?
3. Could it ever have worked as designed/intended?

It is surprising how many times over the last few years I have seen the answer to Question 3 be "No". An example would be the replacement of R404A with R407A&F on refrigeration systems. Many manufacturers simply placed 24.8 bar PRVs on to new systems selected to run of R407F, despite the British Standard calling for a distinctly different pressure rating. Additionally, they didn't change their design to reflect the required design ambient temperature(from 32 °C to 38 °C for example) that was specified.

Both lapses actively worked to make new refrigeration plant perform worse in warmer weather than an existing R404A system, with the system performance envelope was reduced, due to HP switches tripping at lower condensing temperatures than otherwise. These issues were largely written off as site conditions, poor maintenance and hot weather and hidden by the fact that they would work OK for 99% of the year - but the fact of the matter is that many systems simply could not work as intended. Indeed, they had an excess of compressor capacity that they would never use. So not only would they not work as intended, they likely cost more for the privilege. Oh, and guess what? Some sites would then have adiabatic cooling systems fitted to them as a result...

More information required

More knowledge is always good, especially when it comes from a increased breadth of knowledge. Some of the most valuable experiences I've had is getting on site with category experts from the various arms of the industry. Not just commissioning engineers from Refrigeration, but with Mechanical, Electrical, Controls engineers. From Architects to Fire Engineers. And together we have solved problems which have eluded us when acting in isolation for years. From innovative and optimal design solutions, where the trade offs from building an additional plantroom are saved by a reduction in refrigeration plant installations - or to just finally realising that the induct air filter, has been installed - downstream of the heating coil.

So in summary.

Find the actual Problem, and attack it at source if you can. Tackle the disease, not the symptoms.

Never stop asking "Why?", even if it annoys the people who tolerate you.

Always consider that the system might never have worked properly, and in some cases never could...

Increase your breadth of knowledge, and even (shudder) collaborate actively. as well as your depth. In Refrigeration we work in a sector which interfaces with many other disciplines and dozens of stakeholders. It's all very well being a category expert - but somebody in their Ivory Tower is never as much value as they think they are.