What Will Tehran’s Rulers Choose: To Reform the Fundamentals of the Regime or to Modify and Camouflage its Conduct?

Some of the most important questions regarding the implementation of the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, sponsored by China, include the following: First, how much is the regime in Tehran willing to either reform or modify its regime and ideology, in order to deliver on its pledges contained in the trilateral document affirming respect for states’ sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs and to activate a security agreement between Tehran and Riyadh, affirming the three countries’ keenness to enhance regional and international stability and security? Second, what will be the fate of the China-Russia-Iran Troika in the light of this crucial development at the level of Saudi-Iran relations, as a result of the Chinese diplomatic initiative as well as given the Iranian involvement in the Ukraine war with Russia? Third, why does the United States seem to not mind much for China to take on a completely new role in the Middle East and the Gulf? Does this relieve the United States or is it thinking of watching for now then retaliating in the future? Fourth, how could the Iranian interior be affected by the Saudi-Iranian agreement in terms of divisions within the ruling class and within the popular uprising? And fifth, what will happen to Iran’s regional proxies, a cornerstone of the Iranian regime?

Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Moscow next week. Most likely, the specific date will not be announced, at Beijing’s wishes. This is a sensitive visit that will be carefully watched in Washington and the European capitals, to understand its implications amid the fierce battles taking place in Ukraine. For the West, Ukraine remains the priority, not China’s Middle Eastern initiative, except perhaps insofar as it concerns the fate of the China-Russia-Iran Troika.

According to the information available, China and Russia’s discussions ahead of the visit will tackle the issue of the strategic troika, “which is alive and well” according to a former Russian official familiar with the trilateral relations. That is, the Chinese leadership could reassure Iran from the Russian capital that the strategic pact between them will not be affected by China’s pivot to the Arab Gulf states. Beijing could also reaffirm the importance of strategic relations with Moscow against the West, in a subtle way that does not directly antagonize the United States.

Russian President Vladimir Putin will urge his Chinese counterpart to help offset Russia’s losses from Western sanctions, especially after NATO successfully pressured Turkey to restrict exports to Russia. The two leaders will likely discuss projects for new pipelines between their countries and the scenarios of the Ukraine war, address the strategic and military alliance between Moscow and Tehran extending from Ukraine to Syria, and discuss enhancing long-term strategic agreements between the three countries.

There are two scenarios: The first involves a major shift having taken place in the Chinese position, where the pivot to the Arab Gulf states represents a warning to Tehran that China’s interests require a reconfiguration and that Iran’s leaders must accommodate this and reconsider the core of their regional ideology. Those who believe in this scenario are optimistic that China’s leverage over Iran could induce a shift in its behavior vis-à-vis its neighbors and the region, and its proxies in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The other scenario follows from the premise that the China-Iran-Russia Troika is a lasting strategic alliance against the West led by the United States. Those who believe in this scenario doubt there has been any fraying of Chinese-Iranian relations, and believe the Iranian leadership is reassured by its alliance with both China and Russia, regardless of what happens to their relations with the Arab Gulf states.

Let’s begin with the second scenario before tackling the first, to try and identify the thinking of the Iranian leadership that follows as they remain on alert to defend the survival of the regime.

There is a fundamental difference between for the regime to reform or modify its behavior, especially in the region. Those familiar with the thinking of the heads of the Iranian regime are adamant that the rulers of Iran will never agree to real reform because reform would entail abolishing the regime’s raison d’etre and dismantling its rulers’ political and personal gains, including the huge wealth some of them have amassed. These men will never abandon their partnership with their proxies given the extraordinary personal benefits and financial gains they reap from them, including revenues from trafficking contraband; and the ideological, security, and political gains from using these militias to intimidate and subjugate states and peoples in countries crucial for the regime’s project, namely Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.

The rulers of the regime in Tehran will thus not agree to reorganize it in line with the commitment to respect states’ sovereignty and to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs. The regime will not shed its skin and alter the mechanisms of the state built after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, including mechanisms for exporting the revolution to Gulf States and exporting the IRGC model to Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon.

In this scenario, what the men of the regime in Iran could do is create a new status quo with a gentler fa?ade and less provocation and open confrontation. They would not alter the essence of the regime and would only soften its conduct. They would adopt enough flexibility to press ahead with their projects covertly rather than overtly. They would create new obscure proxies to sustain the regime’s plans from Yemen to Lebanon, without being openly linked to them and without flexing muscles.

The men of the regime in Tehran would update their ‘game of puppeteering’, as a source friendly to those men described it, so that Iran’s foreign policy becomes more sophisticated, “not carrying the axe with their hands, but with pockets full of bombs”. The IRGC would not suffer. Hezbollah in Lebanon would not worry. It is the tactic that would change but not the strategy or essence of the Iranian regime and its projects.

All there is to it is that we would see Iran less publicly belligerent. An Iran that would continue its nuclear program without threats or bombast. An Iran that understands that its arrogant rhetoric is not useful, and that it is better for its positioning to be subtle, a more sophisticated Iran.

The question here is: Would China agree to such circumvention and subterfuge, or would it truly commit to respect for the sovereignty of states, which would require Iran to roll back the deployment of paramilitary forces loyal to it in sovereign countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen?

Is China really serious about guaranteeing Iran’s pledges to de-escalate and stop encroaching on other states through proxies and militias? Is Beijing willing to pressure the rulers in Tehran until they prove they have stopped interfering in Yemen and using the Houthis to strike at Saudi national security? Would China push for respect of Lebanon’s sovereignty, for example, and endorse the call for Hezbollah to shift from being a military arm of Iran undermining Lebanon’s sovereignty into a political force with full rights but only as a Lebanese entity?

There is no clear answer yet to these important questions that will now be put to the test. For this reason, it is premature to talk of giving a Nobel peace prize for China for sponsoring a Saudi-Iranian agreement, despite its importance. Instead, expectations for a quantum leap that changes the features of the region should be tempered and should not be overhyped, just because a statement was issued after years of negotiations between Riyadh and Tehran in Iraq, Oman, and finally Beijing.

The Saudi official position has avoided hyperbole albeit was cautiously optimistic. The Saudi council of ministers made a brief comment, welcoming the pledges made in accordance with the conditions set by the joint statement of China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Pledges that Iran will not pursue any ambitions that impact security relations between the two countries and will stop its expansionism at the expanse of the sovereignty of states in the region.

Going back to the optimistic scenario hoping for a major shift as a result of the Chinese initiative: Among the leading reasons for the belief China would guarantee the implementation of pledges made is its strategic Belt and Road initiative, and its keenness to maintain strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, the GCC states, and the countries of the Levant.

China’s grand strategy is to replace the US strategic influence in the region, but not displace it as the leading security partner of the region’s states. But China’s economic priorities are not limited to securing energy at good prices from Saudi Arabia and Iran, rather it is building ports from the Arabian Sea to the northern Gulf and from Djibouti in the Red Sea, to access European shores. China will benefit greatly, strategically and economically, by building up its reputation as a guarantor of pledges and conflict resolution. Yet all this depends on Iran’s commitment to its pledges without deception.

?The optimistic camp sees the change in Iran’s positions as resulting from necessity following its international isolation, with dwindling European support and protection for Iran following its involvement in the Ukraine war alongside Russia. In addition, Iran’s efforts at the Vienna nuclear negotiations have failed to secure its nuclear ‘rights’, meaning developing its capabilities without building nuclear weapons while securing sanctions relief. Moreover, domestic unrest continues to haunt the regime.

?Today, the regime could have to the belief that survival requires modifying its logic and putting to one side the principles of the Islamic Revolution. This is how the optimistic camp perceives the shift in the positions of the Iranian regime, as having been forced to bend to pragmatic calculations to protect itself even at the cost of discarding its ideology. The view of this camp is that this is a fundamental shift that will also impact Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon, and curtail Iran’s ability to impose its will in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.

?Why would the men of the regime in Iran agree to all that? The optimistic camp believes that they have been compelled to change tack not just because of their economic dire straits, but also because Iran faced the prospect of a war with the United States and Europe through Israel because of its nuclear program. The Chinese initiative thus could have come to reassure these powers that Beijing is committed to upholding UN resolutions and principles which preclude nuclear arms proliferation to Iran, through peaceful rather than military means.

?Possibly for this reason, the US administration has welcomed China’s diplomatic demarche. Indeed, it could spare the United States having to use military power against Iran and to put further pressure on Tehran to stop it from moving closer to a military nuclear program. Washington would also be spared from Israeli pressuresto become involved in a war with Iran, if China guarantees Iran will stop enriching uranium at weapons grade levels.

?Some in Washington may not be happy that the Saudi-Iranian agreement has dispelled the myth that an Arab Gulf-Israeli military axis could be created against Iran, although the idea was already fundamentally in doubt in many corners. Moreover, the United States does not see China as an adversary to Israel, and thus does not believe China’s move encourages a Saudi-Iranian partnership against Israel.

?Finally, we will not know yet how the Iranian interior will be affected by the agreement, because this also depends on how the Iranian leadership plans to implement it. If the men of the regime really overturn the principles and ideology of their revolution that has set back Iran and its great people by half a century, this would be a great achievement for the Iranian people and their prospects. But if the men of the regime plan to resist serious reforms and avoid change by temporary softening of their conduct as a form of diversion, then the Iranian people will pay part of the heavy price paid by the peoples of the region.?