What is "nuclear security" in Russia?

Russian Nuclear Security Primer #1: Nuclear security in Russia is the sum of its parts—physical protection, and nuclear materials control and accounting—not more.

With this post, I want to start introducing readers to elements of nuclear security in Russia – let’s call it Russian Nuclear Security Primer. Russian nuclear security is not that much different from nuclear security per international best practices. Experienced readers will not find any substantial revelations. My goal is to highlight Russian specifics of implementing common nuclear security elements and lessons from the Russian experience that can be applied elsewhere. The first post from this series will introduce nuclear security as a dedicated activity in Russia

The IAEA Nuclear Safety and Security Glossary defines nuclear security as “the prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities.” For the more practical purpose of defining nuclear security as an area of activity the IAEA definition of “nuclear security measures” might be more useful. Nuclear security measures are defined as “measures intended to prevent a nuclear security threat from completing criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities or to detect or respond to nuclear security events.”

Two distinct sets of nuclear security measures are applied to nuclear materials under regulatory control or out of regulatory control. The IAEA defines regulatory control as “Any form of institutional control applied to nuclear material or other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities by any competent authority as required by the legislative and regulatory provisions related to safety, security, and safeguards. Explanation: The phrase ‘out of regulatory control’ is used to describe a situation where nuclear or other radioactive material is present without an appropriate authorization, either because controls have failed for some reason [to put it simply, nuclear material is lost or stolen – DK], or they never existed [to put it simply, nuclear material is illegally produced – DK].”

In this post, I will introduce nuclear security for nuclear facilities and nuclear materials under regulatory control in Russia.

Nuclear security as a comprehensive concept is not widely accepted in Russia. The terms “nuclear safety” and “nuclear security” have the same translation into Russian – “yadernaya bezopasnost” (“ядерная безопасность”). Since nuclear security became the subject of any discussion in Russia only in the early 90s[1] after the collapse of the Soviet Union, any notion of “yadernaya bezopasnost” typically invokes a concept of nuclear safety, not nuclear security. The dedicated term – “fizicheskaya yadernaya bezopasnost,” which can be literally translated as “physical nuclear security,” was introduced to facilitate the translation of many IAEA nuclear security recommendations. Still, this term is rarely used in expert discussions only and is not captured in legislation and regulations governing nuclear security activities in Russia.

Nuclear security in Russia is represented by its main components—physical protection (PP) and nuclear materials control and accounting (MC&A). On September 15, 1994, the Russian President issued decree #1923, “On Priority Measures to Improve the System of Accounting and Safekeeping of Nuclear Materials.” This decree ordered relevant government agencies to review the status of nuclear materials' physical protection, control, and accounting in Russia and take actions necessary to improve them.

The Federal Law “On Atomic Energy Use,” enacted in November 1995, was the first Russian legal act establishing the legal basis for any civilian nuclear activity. This Law defined PP and MC&A as two dedicated areas of activity in nuclear energy use. The Law established PP and MC&A as mandatory conditions for any civilian[2] activity involving nuclear materials and facilities.

Two Government Decrees that elaborate on provisions of the Federal Law establish general requirements for MC&A and PP activities and define the goals of MC&A and PP. One of MC&A’s goals is “ensuring nuclear material safekeeping and preventing the loss, unauthorized use, and theft of nuclear material or detecting them in a timely manner.” The goals of PP are preventing unauthorized actions, detecting unauthorized actions in a timely manner, delaying an adversary, responding to unauthorized actions, and neutralizing adversaries. Taken together these goals correspond to goals of nuclear security as defined by the IAEA recommendations.

Although PP practice in Russia has developed substantially since the collapse of the Soviet Union, accepting many international best practices and new technologies, it remains a successor to the Soviet practice of protecting nuclear sites, which was established simultaneously with the establishment of the Soviet nuclear program. To a large extent, it uses organizational infrastructure that was established in the Soviet Union.

MC&A, as we know it now, did not exist in the Soviet Union. Expert discussions started in the late 1970s as part of the Soviet Union's support for implementing the IAEA safeguards. Limited application at some nuclear facilities in Russia started within the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreement between the Soviet Union and the IAEA in the mid-1980s. Only in Russia did this become a regular practice applied to all nuclear materials and facilities.

Unfortunately, the whole of nuclear security in Russia is just a sum of its PP and MC&A parts. PP and MC&A systems do not represent well-integrated sub-systems leveraging synergy to achieve nuclear security goals. Rather, they are two loosely related systems working towards their own goals, although these goals supplement each other. PP regulations require some interactions and information exchange with the MC&A system and vice-versa, but this only leads to taking the work of the supplementary system into account rather than joint planning and operations toward the achievement of the same nuclear security goals.

This separation manifests itself in the separation of organization responsibilities for PP and MC&A. In Rosatom, departments responsible for PP and MC&A report to two different Deputy Directors. At the level of individual nuclear sites, the security service in charge of physical protection typically reports to the Deputy Director for security. The site organization in charge of MC&A typically reports to the Chief Engineer of the site—the Deputy Director, whose responsibilities include many other issues related to handling nuclear materials, thus creating potential conflicts of interest. The requirement to establish a dedicated MC&A organization was introduced only in 2012. Until then MC&A function had typically been implemented by the site organization in charge of nuclear and radiation safety.

Rostechnadzor, Russian nuclear security and safety regulatory body, has a dedicated department that regulates and inspects both PP and MC&A at all civilian nuclear facilities in Russia. Still, documents issued by Rostechnadzor to establish mandatory requirements for nuclear sites and to guide Rostechndzor’s inspectors’ work cover issues of PP and MC&A separately.

The separation of responsibilities for PP and MC&A—two key components of nuclear security—has a long history in Russia. By the time MC&A was introduced in Russia in the mid-1980s, physical protection, although under a different name, had existed for forty years. PP was provided by the paramilitary troops reporting to the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, while MC&A practice was driven by scientists with experience working with nuclear materials.

Countries with a strong military or law enforcement culture that only started developing their nuclear energy programs may face similar challenges. This does not guarantee failure. Still, planning and integration of the MC&A component into the nuclear security system at an early stage is important.

Notes:

[1] For an overview of nuclear security in the Soviet Union before its collapse see: Dmitry Kovchegin. “The Evolution of Nuclear Security in Russia”, in Christopher Hobbs (ed.), Sarah Tzinieris (ed.), Sukesh K. Aghara (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Nuclear Security, 2023. https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/46401.

[2] The security of nuclear materials in defense applications is regulated by different legislation that is not as well established as legislation governing nuclear security for civilian applications.