What Now? A New Arctic Security Future by COL (Ret) O. Kent Strader

What now??That’s the question in my mind as I consider an Arctic Council dominated by NATO members—acknowledging Sweden and Finland are still aspirants.?The Arctic Council has been cast as a model of international cooperation, to the extent it has been nominated by Norwegian Members of Parliament for the 2021 Nobel Peace Prize for its constructivism. ?Said another way, the shared ideals of Arctic Council members are greater than their national interests, which is arguably unprecedented among international organizations.?Nevertheless, the ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia’s branding as a pariah state, and Sweden and Finland’s application to NATO membership could change the constructive nature of the Arctic Council and upend geopolitical cooperation in the High North. ?While the Arctic Council charter precludes it from dealing with matters related to military security, Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership accession would create a bright red line between Russia and the West in the Arctic.?So how is this new future to be managed?

The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that deals with non-security related issues related to its members states and its indigenous permanent member nations.?It has correctly focused on environmental governance and stewardship of the region, in recognition of the fact climate change is altering the Arctic’s principal characteristic, the ice sheet.?Climate change and governance notwithstanding, the problem facing the Arctic Council is all its member states, save for Russia, are now aligned with NATO and in support of Ukraine.?Conversely, Russia, in undeniable violation of international law in Ukraine, has militarized the Arctic, which till now did not disrupt the Council’s constructivist agenda.?Now the previous existing modicum of cooperation must be reassessed.?Russia has little to no incentive to work constructively with the other Arctic Council states; arguably, Russia has incentive to work at cross purposes with the Council. ?The Arctic’s vast resources, considering Russia’s sanctioned economy, will be more reliant on opening the Arctic to commercial enterprise to stabilize the ruble.

The two predominant sea routes, the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are becoming navigable longer each passing year.?Russia’s, Northern Sea Route is the most accessible due to the receding ice along the Eurasian continent.?In expectation of commercial exploitation of this shortened route to northern Europe from Northeast Asia, Russia has built 10 Arctic Rescue Centers, modernized its icebreaker fleet, and positioned the Federal Security Services to oversee and monitor the Northern Sea Route.?Arctic Council Observer States such as China, India, the European Union, and other nations with Arctic interests conduct research and exploration in the region.?Arctic tourism has increased, as does the threat of a vessel being holed by ice or running aground.?But more specifically, Russia has re-militarized and reoccupied its Cold War footprint in the Arctic to posture its conventional and nuclear forces against NATO, especially the United States, it’s nemesis.?

These changes and drivers of insecurity are troubling given the rough handling the Ukrainian’s have given Putin’s military over the past three months. Contemporary drivers include: the destruction of several Battalion Tactic Groups and its drubbing at the Bilohorivka river crossing; the Russian militaries defeat in the battles for Kyiv and Kharkiv; and its maritime force failures controlling Snake Island and the loss of the Moskva.?Russia is arguably running out of conventional options as Putin continues to throw under-resourced and ill-trained units into the fray, leaving him more dependent than ever on existential deterrence.?To reiterate, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have forced the alignment of previously non-aligned Sweden and Finland with NATO, which leaves its alone as the only non-NATO Arctic member state or applicant.?This shift in alignment does not bode well for the Arctic.

So, will the Arctic continue to be seen as a region defined by international cooperation or will it become a competitive space between NATO and Russia??Regrettably, I believe the later.?A revisionist nation fixated on past recrimination; Russia’s self-inflicted wounds will exacerbate its isolation after the war in Ukraine.?Regardless of who sits in the Kremlin post-conflict, a kleptocratic Russia will likely never take the blame for its actions, or be held accountable, nor surrender or reduce its nuclear arsenal, so the table is being set for a new East versus West stand-off.?While one can hope the Arctic will remain a non-competitive space and the Arctic Council continues to be a model of international cooperation, the likelihood is low.?

So, what should be the future of the Arctic Council? Since March of this year Arctic Council nations have agreed to not meet under the leadership of Russia who currently chairs the body.?The Arctic Council’s charter allows states and nations to provide decisions via correspondence with Russia, but given the current human rights excesses carried out by Russia Forces in Ukraine this hardly seems likely.?Meanwhile, Sweden and Finland will come under the umbrella of NATO protection.?Immediately, this places the Baltic and Barents Seas in a whole new light.?The Barents-Euro Arctic Council and the Council of Baltic Sea States will undoubtedly feel the ire of a recalcitrant Russia.?These geopolitical shifts will diminish cooperation and will likely stall the agenda of the Council.

Therefore, while Arctic nations should continue to dialogue and advance their various International Organizations agendas to the extent possible; however, the military security dilemma will likely shape the geopolitical landscape.?As such, NATO, as part of its ambition should look to expand its role in the High North by creating an Arctic security mechanism to deter Russian aggression, while NATO members of the Arctic Council await a return to dialogue and cooperation.?NATO should initiate its expanded role by creating an Arctic Dialogue, much like the Mediterranean Dialogue, that encourages other non-NATO states with polar interests to join the conversation about how to prevent the Arctic from becoming a competitive space.?The Alliance should subsequently balance this through its High North deterrence mission command posture.?Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum would seem the most likely headquarters to assume mission command of High North deterrence operations.?In North America, NORAD should extend the western flank of NATO, while tying in with JFC Brussum at Iceland or Greenland, thus providing a continuous line of defense from Vardo to Nome. ??

This expanded mission command arrangement in the High North should not seek to militarize areas above the Arctic Circle to the extent possible to avoid environment impacts, rather posture below it to deter aggression.?This will likely require a NATO maritime presence in the Baltic and Barents Seas, and patrols across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. On the western flank this will likely require US and Canadian military presence in the Bering Sea, Pacific Ocean, and Sea of Okhotsk.?The purpose of these patrols is to present a viable deterrent and prevent coercion of NATO nations. ?While NATO already provides presence patrols in some of these areas, the coherency of this approach is meant to represent a unified front against Russia provocation.?The messaging of this approach should be clearly stated to prevent misinformation or misunderstanding.?Maritime and air patrols in international waters and air space is nothing new.?The scale of these operations though could be misrepresented.

Despite our best efforts to prevent the Arctic from becoming a competitive space, realpolitik has asserted itself, making defense a logical and practical necessity.?The security environment will likely continue to dominate our future until Russia undergoes a political renaissance.?A recalcitrant Russia will regrettably be a more belligerent one, despite its losses in Ukraine.?Therefore, the Alliance, expanded, we hope, by the accession of Finland and Sweden, should posture itself to both prevent further militarization of the Arctic and defend its member states by presenting a viable deterrent.?Russia has a need to be respected as a great power and posture is one way it feels that respect. Alliance member states should commit themselves to ensuring another half century of peace, despite the threatening clouds of conflict.?A viable deterrent is the only way to assure the peace.

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Colonel (Ret) O. Kent Strader is an Arctic strategist with broad experience working as a policy analyst at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and as a Strategy and Policy thought leader at NORAD-USNORTHCOM.?He is a 2007 graduate of the NATO Defence College Senior Course.????????????