How to avoid nuclear "Bucha" at the nuclear power plants of Ukraine?

Today I watched the panel session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on energy Issues and questioned: such attention to Rivne NPP and hasty steps of the leaders of the nuclear industry are connected precisely with the fact that they prepare RNPP for surrender to the Russian invaders?

?No one will be nursing there; the Russians will use the military Belarusians to the fullest, and will use a new tactic with dropping troops directly on the town of Varash, thus making the RNPP under control, because they have confidence that the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not knock them out of there. https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/07/8/7357125/

?Disconnection of the nuclear power plant from the energy system means a loss of power supply to the western region, to Kyiv, by the way, and other consequences. It is also possible to lose control of air defense, logistical directions for the supply of military aids from the West. Everything as planned by those who, “have not even started seriously to fight yet”...

?By dismissing the Director General Mr Pavlyshyn, by illegally suspending the license, they demoralize the NPP personnel and the residents of the satellite town, dropping the message that this is exactly what is intended at the highest level, that no one is going to fight for RNPP.

?The plant employees, licensed personnel and common residents of the town do not understand why none of the country’s leaders sees such obvious things.

??Two weeks ago, there was a draft order already with the act date as of June 7, 2022 but without the reference number, as a result of which they wanted to dismiss the Director General of Rivne NPP. It seems they are upset and worried, and decided to “reinforce” the ARS (AtomRemontService) and Slavutich. It feels as super-normal and super-effort in favor of the enemy in the war conditions to “strengthen” the flank, because it significantly weakens precisely the frontal part, which is a springboard for the enemy to inflict on the impact. Their fingerprints have been already left on the project and on the order itself, but there is no limit to impudence. Strengthening the ARS with reference to Slavutych is an opportunity to achieve few goals:

?1. Weaken the resistance and administration ability of RNPP, where everything does not suit the enemy, which they write about themselves. https://web.archive.org/web/20220615143243/https://vk.com/wall-165019851_245526

2. Get rid of important witnesses, there are random subversives everywhere.

3. Maybe the orcs will take someone captive by accident.

4. If the previous steps fail, then maybe all these problems with restoration of the turbine generator low-pressure cylinders of KhNPP-2, rotors of RNPP, and problems with the centralized spent fuel storage facility (CSFSF) will get to responsibility those who were sent to “strengthen” the ARS. And if they cope, God forbid, then the big management is top gun.

5. And lastly, the fuss with the State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management (DAZV) on the vitrified radioactive waste. This is also a game to still take this project “in hands” of Energoatom as a guarantor not refuse to return the radioactive waste from the Russian Federation (the corresponding draft justification was in place in April already). They probably think that this is a gingerbread that will suit everyone as the price for the Russian Federation not to give up on the grid.

?And as I can understand, when someone, not being in the subject matter or in business, will re-read this, they will again start rattling about far-fetched conspiracy on the “honest managers”, or will claim that all is lost in order to devalue everything. This happens a lot, and precisely in the place where it harms them much, where they were foolishly spotted because of big money or because of insidious interests. And here, the interests of the Russian Federation are dominated by the desire of this flock to earn big money, to which they deliberately agree to somehow compensate for the risks of cooperation in the interests of the Russian Federation, especially at the stage when the threats on the northern borders have escalated to the maximum and will be decisive, like a threat to military land lease logistics, which is the last chance of Russia and attempt to prevent strengthening of our military, on which almost everything depends now.

?The most interesting thing is that with regard to the CSFSF there was an insane pressure on the specialists and state inspectors of the Regulator, who were tasked to issue the operation permit (license) without conducting an inspection for the nuclear facility that was not ready at this stage of the life cycle. Even under such conditions, they managed to protect both Ukraine and the manager from violation of the nuclear and radiation legislation of Ukraine. The permit provided for all additional conditions, only the fulfillment of which guarantees the compliance of the CSFSF with fundamental safety principles.

Therefore, this circus somersault of Energoatom in an attempt to report on getting the CSFSF operation license for a period of 3 years is nothing more than protection by time and distance from being responsible for the missed deadlines for CSFSF commissioning, for covering violations during construction and excess costs, as well as opportunity to use the war umbrella and to blame the previous chairman of the regulatory authority, who really showed fidelity to principles and devotion to safety culture.

The issued license makes it impossible to operate the CSFSF with violations of the nuclear and radiation legislation of Ukraine. Then what did they really try to achieve when reported on the license obtained for the CSFSF?

Same old - to avoid responsibility for the untimely fulfillment of the obligations undertaken and to shift all this onto other shoulders, particularly:

1. The SNRIU chairman’s signature is in place, so now it’s his responsibility for whatever shortcomings will be found by Energoatom’s guys, whose managers reported on the CSFSF being not damaged, or looted and ready for getting the operation license.

2. Deflect the hit from AtomProjectEngineering (APE) managers and themselves by shifting responsibility to ARS, who was supposed by its functions to accept and start operation of the nuclear facility that was ready in every sense. The fact that it was so is confirmed by strengthening the ARS by the API with those who were responsible at the lower level for construction and obtaining the operational license.

3. Appoint Mr. Pavlyshyn, the RNPP’s Director General, to head the ARS, in order to either create unbearable conditions, or precisely because of his attempts to restore order, explain the nullity of the license, and thus demand new financial investments from NNEGC Energoatom.

Now it is clear why they are “strengthening” the ARS. The operation of the facility has not started yet but the ARS manager and employees are responsible for everything that has not been accomplished by the APE before the facility commissioning, by violating the fundamental safety principles and physical protection of critical infrastructure in the very complex area with possible military influence by the Russian Federation, as such they try to write off all their managerial superpowers.

And now the question: what should we really do as immediate steps to confront Russian plans to destabilize Ukraine's nuclear power plant? We see in their analysis how they speak of unsuccessful actions, what further conclusions they draw regarding the attack on the Ukrainian nuclear power plants, using?precisely their turncoats, who consciously or not are acting against Ukraine. We see in their analysis how they speak of unsuccessful actions, what further conclusions they draw regarding the attack on the Ukrainian nuclear power plants, using?precisely their turncoats, who consciously or not are acting against Ukraine (!!! See a copy of this text with the link to Russian publication in the attachment to this article)?

Our primary steps must be immediate and unconditional, and they are:

1. Completely change into patriotic one the leadership of the power block of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), National Guard, physical protection services of the nuclear power plants and satellite towns. The replacement should certainly spread on all the first leaders and their deputies. Recommend the combat officers for the senior positions who were involved and trusted in combat operations against the Russian Federation.

2. Prohibit for the war period to remove general directors from their positions at the NPPs. Withdraw the decision to terminate the license of DG of Rivne NPP.

3. Terminate the positions of assistants, advisers to the general directors and chief engineers of NPPs, representing the SBU, prosecution service or the Ministry of Internal Affairs or who previously worked in these structures.

4. To assign the NPPs’ general directors for the period of martial law with the authority to maintain direct communication only with the authorized counterintelligence departments of the SBU and the National Security and Defense Council in Kyiv.

5. Develop a step-by-step plan for the safe return of ZNPP to Ukraine, minimizing technological and humanitarian risks without violating fundamental security principles, coordinate it with the military-political command of Ukraine

6. Check all heads of departments of the NPP physical protection system, Security Service of Ukraine, National Guard with modern methods of verification in order to protect against possible attempts by the Russian Federation to recruit agents of influence. To carry out a thorough due diligence of the heads removed from their positions in the power block of NPPs and satellite towns

7. Review the appointment procedure and qualitative composition of the NPP emergency preparedness departments. Replace workers who did not have experience in the licensed operational activities at the nuclear power plants. Introduce only specialists with licensed experience into the UVAGR, document this with the relevant plant provisions.

8. For each NPP site and satellite towns, develop appropriate provisions for protecting NPPs from external influence on the NPPs ability to counter threats from the Russian Federation through their agents of influence, who are employees of Ukrainian NPPs.

9. Review the system of obtaining the work permit at nuclear power plants. Dismiss all NPP employees who have Russian citizenship and were employees of the Russian special services

10. In the systems of physical protection and nuclear material control, terminate any system of physical, instrumental and video control with any trace (human or industrial) of origin from the Russian Federation, Belarus, China or companies of the European countries that originated from the Russian Federation.

11. Establish the main crisis management center for the critical infrastructure of Ukraine.

12. Develop the urgent list of technical, organizational and military measures for the development of physical and cyber protection of Ukrainian NPP sites, Crisis Centers and secure communication channels, space Internet communications and process data transmission channels for NPP emergency response and control of the state of nuclear materials controlled by the IAEA

The list is not complete. It does not address the technical issues of nuclear and radiation safety to be further discussed, as well as humanitarian issues, issues regarding protection of the operational, maintenance and licensed personnel and their families, who are in the temporary occupied territories now.?

I will give only 13 statements to the endless questions to the higher Crisis Management of the NPP of Ukraine in the conditions of war. These statements and considerations are not to or about the managers of the NPP sites of Ukraine. These questions are for those who simply disappeared somewhere in the most critical days before the ZNPP capture.

§1???The President of Ukraine did not leave Kyiv, and the heads of Energoatom have been somewhere for almost a month.

§2???The sites of Ukrainian NPP appeared to be in an autonomous survival mode.

§3???The Crisis Management was not involved either at the beginning of the war or after the occupation of ZNPP

§4???There was no interaction with the military-political leadership of Ukraine to oppose the occupation of the NPP.

§5???Russia tried to synchronize the capture of ZNPP and SUNPP through negotiations by 03.03. 2022.

§6???Simulation of countermeasures and seizure of ZNPP before the start of negotiations on 03.03. 2022

§7???Russia's occupation of ZNPP is a planned sabotage and a separate agreement with Rosatom.

§8???The IAEA was not given permission and invitation to carry out direct supervision and inspection at the ZNPP site for the storage and non-proliferation of nuclear materials

§9???Energoatom was well aware that the electricity of half of Ukraine's nuclear power plants would not be needed in the spring of 2022. Half of the capacities of Ukraine's NPP were planned to be shut down for refueling.

§10?The detention of O. Boyaryntsev by counterintelligence in wartime and the suspension of H. Yakob from operational activities, and their triumphant return to their official duties.

§11?The damage to the turbine of KhNPP power unit 2 and simultaneous shutdown of KhNPP power unit 1 for the unplanned repairs is a step towards destabilizing the power system and logistics communications in the northern and western regions of Ukraine.

§12?Suspension of the license and dismissal of the RNPP general director from his position is a reduction in the ability of the northern and western regions of Ukraine to ensure the protection of airspace and logistical communications with Lend-Lease military assistance from the United States.

§13?The conditions of the ZNPP license for safe operation under the occupation - in the presence of unauthorized military weapons, mines on the site and around the NPP, and complete loss of control over its physical protection system - have not been changed. The ZNPP has not been transferred to a safe state of cold shutdown for the release of the ZNPP personnel and evacuation of their families. Energoatom and the Regulator allow putting ZNPP power unit 6 into operation for the power system in addition to the two already operating power units 4 and 5.

Are there not enough data on the state of Energoatom and the safety of Ukraine's nuclear power plants?

Why these conditions are not the best ones for resisting the enemy and for the security of Ukraine?

Is there and whose desire is this to understand the conscientious performance of the direct duties of Energoatom managers?

Specialists are forced to ask questions to those who issue and receive management licenses in the nuclear industry of Ukraine:

1.????????At what time in the calendar schedule was it planned to operate the Ukraine’s energy system in the isolated operation mode?

2.????????How to explain the incredible and ideal coincidence in the time of testing the isolated mode of power system operation with the time of blitzkrieg of the Russian Federation in Ukraine from February 24 to 28, 2022?

3.???????Why was it so important to keep all nuclear power units in operation in January and February 2022, right at the time of maximum threat of war?

4.????????Did have an action plan after beginning of the war and since when was it put into action and to what extent did this help reduce risks and prevent potential risks at NPP sites?

5.???????Why was the Crisis Management Center of Energoatom not involved in the period from February 24 to March 4?

6.????????What were first instructions to the ZNPP management after the capture of the satellite town of Energodar by the Russian military on February 3, 2022, how can confirm this?

7.???????What were first instructions to the ZNPP management when the satellite town of Energodar was captured by the Russian military on February 3, 2022, and how can confirm this?

8.????????What was done by the head of the operating organization to ensure constant?monitoring and external control by IAEA inspectors at the NPP sites to ensure the integrity and storage of nuclear materials both for fresh and spent nuclear fuel?

9.????????What kind of address and actions were performed to ensure the presence of IAEA inspectors exactly at those NPP sites where Westinghouse nuclear fuel is located?

10.??????Why do you prevent IAEA inspectors from their direct supervision and inspection of the storage and non-proliferation of nuclear materials at the ZNPP?site?

11.?????What is the basis of your confidence that Russia did not appropriate the documents, codes and nuclear materials produced by Westinghouse that we had at ZNPP?

12.??????What were the orders and documented actions to save from loss the technical documentation, calculation codes, software and servers that are applied in providing support for Westinghouse nuclear fuel at the sites of ZNPP and SUNPP?

13.??????How do explain the reasons for the low physical protection of ZNPP and Energoatom's unpreparedness for terrorist threats at the ZNPP site?

14.??????Why are the following cooperation agreements with the Russian Federation not denounced?

Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on scientific, technical and economic cooperation in the field of nuclear energy

Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation in the field of transportation of nuclear materials

Agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine and Russia's Federal Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety

Agreement between the State Committee for Nuclear Regulation of Ukraine and the Federal Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Russia on the exchange of information and cooperation in the field of safety regulation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

15.??????Has the IAEA Director General been requested to convene a conference to revise the provisions of the?Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963 (Article XXVI of the Convention)?subject to establishing absolute liability for nuclear damage on a Contracting Party that has committed an act of nuclear terrorism in relation to a nuclear object of the other Contracting Party?

16.?????Why have not the terms of the license for the safe operation of ZNPP under the conditions of its occupation by the Russian Federation, and the loss of control over the physical protection system of the ZNPP site, been changed?

17.?????Why have not all power units of ZNPP not transferred to a safe state of cold shutdown; how can you confirm that the operation of NPP power units at power, as well as the state of electric generators filled with hydrogen, is a more dangerous state than the cold shutdown of reactors and turbines of ZNPP?

18.??????What operational state of ZNPP power units is safe in the current conditions of ZNPP occupation, in the conditions of site and territory mining around the plant, detection of unauthorized types of weapons on the territory of ZNPP, in view of possible initial events?

19.????Why were no changes made to the terms of the license given the occurred problems with ensuring the emergency preparedness of ZNPP, as per the requirements of 18 SSR 2/2 IAEA Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation? Why haven't appropriate changes been made to the emergency preparedness plans that take into account the ZNPP occupation and correspond to the current state of emergency risks of military operations?

20.?????Were the engineering, design, analytical, probabilistic safety analyses of the ZNPP current state performed? Can you confirm that the ZNPP current state, the licensed operational personnel, as well as the licensed management comply with the fundamental principles of safety and do not violate the?Law of Ukraine on the use of nuclear energy and radiation safety, namely Articles 4, 5, 15, Articles 22 - parts 3 and 4, Articles 23 - part 2, Articles 24 - parts 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Articles 25 - parts 1, 3, Articles 26 - part 4, 5, 6, Articles 33, 46, 47, 60, 61, 62, 63.??

21.????Is it possible to consider the fact of commissioning ZNPP power units 4, 5, 6 into Ukraine's energy system as an effective plan for the safe return of ZNPP to Ukraine, which minimizes nuclear, radiation and humanitarian risks, without violating the fundamental safety principles stipulated by SF-1 IAEA FUNDAMENTAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES???

What negotiations are being conducted with the leaders? What are the blackmailing and what are the conditions of the adventurers? Maybe it's some kind of delusion...Somewhere in the past of nuclear fans of gasoline filling station, in an attempt to prove that a scam was committed only by Rosatom ...

1. The daughters of Gazprom are confidently holding back the modernization of polar cranes in order to prevent environmental problems of finding nuclear storage facilities on the territory of Ukraine.

2. The Russian Federation sees serious threats to the nuclear security of Ukraine, and therefore guarantees:

2.1 Acceptance of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from all Ukrainian NPP sites to the Russian Federation;

2.2 Introduction of new types of nuclear fuel for all NPPs of Ukraine that are "successfully" applied at Russian NPPs;

2.3 Completion of transition of Ukraine's nuclear reactors to nuclear fuel of the Russian Federation within five years that ensures termination of the nuclear fuel diversification;

2.4 Investments in the costs of storage and reprocessing of all spent nuclear fuel produced by Westinghouse and reclassification of the centralized storage of spent nuclear fuel into the facility for storage of vitrified nuclear highly radioactive waste from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from all nuclear power plants.

3. The Russian Federation ensures the unhindered use by Ukraine of the capacities of the Belarusian and Russian energy systems and provides investments into connecting the energy networks of Ukraine and Europe through DC inserts in the directions - Romania, Poland and Hungary.

4. Ukraine fully restores relations with the WANO Moscow Center and refuses from the services of the WANO Paris Center.

Curtains drop...

Georgiy Balakan

P/S/ n the continuation of the publication, I suggest you read the conclusions of the energy expert Olga Kosharna

?Olga Kosharna

29 June, 10:53??·?

The order dated 25.06.22 on transfer of P. Pavlishin, the RNPP Director General, to the position of Director of AtomRemontService has the justification for this transfer.

The purpose in the order is “speedy elimination of the consequences of damage to infrastructure as a result of hostilities and occupation activities of the enemy ... at the site of the CSFSF ..., creation of the most efficient system for managing the production and financial resources of ARS under the conditions of a difficult economic situation due to the war in our state, ensuring the CSFSF operation, transportation, storage of the spent nuclear fuel at the CSFSF site with close proximity to the border with Belarus, conducting an updated analysis of the design hazard and the related implementation of a set of measures to create additional infrastructure for the physical protection of CSFSF and other vulnerable facilities ... "

With regard to the design hazard and creation of additional infrastructure for the physical protection of facilities in the Exclusion Zone.

Undear ones, in the Energoatom’s headquarters there is a separate specialized directorate headed by S. Rossokha - the Directorate for Physical Protection and Special Security, consisting of 27 people, who were supposed to review the design hazard and measures to strengthen the physical protection under the war conditions. The design hazard document has been developed with the participation of law enforcement agencies and is a classified document. Or is S. Rossokha in Energoatom to solve other issues? Or for furniture? By the way, this is a character with an interesting biography for journalists and security officials)))

In May 2022, also by the order of P. Kotin, an employee of AtomProjectEngineering was transferred to ARS with the purpose “speedy elimination of the consequences of hostilities at the site of the Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility”.

It is very strange to read these “justifications” when in April, Energoatom received from his apostate A. Korikov, the Chairman of the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, a separate permission to put into operation the CSFSF without the SNRIU inspection after de-occupation. The national supervision of the sufficient physical protection is also within the SNRIU competence.

Thus, in the substantiation of Pavlyshyn’s transfer to ARS, the NNEGC Energoatom just “set up” Korikov under attack. Like, by the way, P. Kotin set up Korikov with arrangement of the IAEA mission to Zaporizhzhya NPP, since in the interview with the media Kotin said that the SNRIU was against the mission to ZNPP and Energoatom had a letter from the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate on this topic.))) Well done, why? ...

Based on the rationale in the order to transfer the APE employee and P. Pavlishin, we can draw an unambiguous conclusion: the State Nuclear Regulatory Authority issued a permit for commissioning of the CSFSF with violations of the norms, rules and standards for nuclear, radiation and physical safety of the facility.

The Energoatom’s and SNRIU’s activity regarding the CSFSF should be assessed by the law enforcement agencies, in particular, the Security Service of Ukraine, who should deal with the security of nuclear installations and sufficiency of measures for their physical protection.

Application to the Russian link for analysis of failures in the grab of the AES of UkraineOverheard, Army | Military service https://web.archive.org/web/20220615143243/https://vk.com/wall-165019851_245526

Why they didn't capture Kyiv in three days? Who is to blame?

?The result of the war largely depends on the preparatory measures that are carried out long before the start of hostilities. It's not even about the training of the army personnel, weapons and equipment. The courage and skill of the military is of great importance on the battlefield. But no less important is the work of intelligence, special services and agents in the environment of the enemy. And if there are no complaints about the military, then there are many questions about the work of the Russian special services. The failures of the first stage of the ‘special military operation’ are a vivid example of this. One of the most important factors in the failure of the "quick victory" is the failure of the operation to destroy the energy system of Ukraine. Now we can talk about it.

?More than 50% of all electricity in Ukraine is produced by nuclear power plants. There are four operating nuclear power plants there: Khmelnitsky, Rivne, South Ukraine and the largest Zaporozhye. Disabling the power system was the most important task for the special services. Plunge Ukraine into darkness and chaos, block the supply of electricity to cities, thereby stop the work of the railway, paralyze logistics, sow panic. That was the most important task of the operation.

?The thing is that thermal power plants can be disabled as a result of an explosion, an air attack or an artillery strike. As for the nuclear power plant, forceful military methods were not suitable, due to the specifics of the nuclear facility. Here a different approach was needed. For the implementation of which colossal resources and financial means were allocated. In fact, everything that the “chekists” asked for was given, but the task was only partially completed, and the operation as a whole failed. Now our soldiers have to pay with their lives for the mistakes of the special services.

?Stage one: Agents

?It is not difficult to create agents in a corrupt country. Especially in a corrupt state-owned company, which is the operator of Ukrainian nuclear power plants Energoatom. The special services coped with this task easily and long time ago. The quality of the agents left much to be desired, but they coped with the task at the first stage.

?A year before the start of the ‘special military operation’, the replacement of the heads of special services at the nuclear power plants was provoked. If required, the manager of the plant was changed. This task has been almost completed. Their task was, when the Russian military appeared, to prevent armed resistance and transfer control of the nuclear power plant to the Russian specialists.

?Further, after the start of the military operation itself, it was necessary to disorganize the work of “Energoatom” and prevent coordination of work ensuring protection of the nuclear power plants. And the secret services coped with this task. Already on the first day, the managers of the plants remained on their own, and the company's management disappeared from Kyiv.

?The situation was aggravated by the fact that it was at the beginning of the military operation that the synchronization of the energy system of Ukraine and the EU was about to begin. A big success for our agents was the decision of the Ukrainian authorities to disconnect from the Russian energy system. Thus, on the day the ‘special operation’ began, the Ukrainian energy system operated autonomously and only checked attempts to synchronize with the European energy system. After rocket and air strikes on thermal power plants and their shutdown, the power units of Ukrainian nuclear power plants by themselves would not be able to provide stable electricity supplies to the population, industry and ensure the functioning of logistics facilities. Darkness in houses and on the streets will provoke panic and fear among the population. And most importantly, they will make it impossible to quickly transfer combat-ready units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the western regions of Ukraine to the directions of the main advance of Russian troops. In addition, for example, 70% of Kyiv's electricity needs are covered by the Rivne NPP. Disconnecting the nuclear power plant from the Ukrainian energy system would completely paralyze Kyiv and the Ukrainian authorities.

?Stage 2: Capture of NPPs

?And although the first stage was implemented almost completely, it is precisely this “almost” sets the reasons for the failures in the commission of the subsequent stages that left an imprint on the conduct of the entire ‘special military operation’.

?Of the four Ukrainian nuclear power plants that operate and produce electricity, only one came under control: the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. It is the largest NPP not only in Ukraine, but throughout Europe. Immediately after the arrival of Russian specialists at the plant, following to the plan, all six power units were stopped.

?But there were problems with other nuclear power plants. Although difficulties were expected only with the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant, which, unlike others, is located not at the borders of Ukraine, but in the depths of the territory. Despite this, both power units of the KhNPP were turned off. But this did not save the situation as a whole, since it was not possible to gain control over the South Ukraine and Rivne nuclear power plants.

?The advance of Russian troops on Voznesensk, past Mykolayiv, was stopped. At the same time, there is a leak of information regarding the real goals of the Russian military units in this direction. Despite the active hostilities on the outskirts of Mykolayiv, the Armed Forces of Ukraine transferred several brigades not to defend Mykolayiv, but to protect the road to Voznesensk. And they were able to delay the advance of our troops. Despite the fact that everything was ready for the entry of Russian specialists to South Ukraine NPP.

?Rivne NPP became the second problem. After the liberation of Energodar and getting control of the Russians over Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, they reaction at RNPP was immediate. Our employees were arrested and disarmed, who were sent to nuclear power plants under the guise of escorting equipment that the Ukrainian Energoatom had previously bought from a Russian company. The garrison guarding the plant was reinforced, and the town of power engineers itself was turned into a fortified area. Moreover, the plant director said in a commentary to the Western media that the station's guard garrison would fight despite the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

Here it should be mentioned that Rivno NPP is located in close proximity to the border with Belarus. The operation to gain control over this nuclear power plant was entrusted to the grouping of our troops located in this direction. But the insufficient preparation of the operation by our special services and the failure of the South Ukraine NPP made the operation to liberate the Rivno NPP pointless. Because it would lead to serious losses and consequences that could harm Russia itself.

?In the sequel, the energy system of Ukraine withstood and it was almost successfully synchronized with the European one. Part of the agents simply did not fulfill their task. Part - was detained by the Ukrainian special services and counterintelligence. It is possible that they agreed to cooperate with the special services of the Kyiv regime. This could be one of the reasons for the leakage of information and the disruption of the operation subsequently.

?The question remains open: who is to blame and who will be held responsible? For the money spent, the failure of agents that led to mistakes, for which the soldiers of our army are paying with their lives. And what was supposed to end in three days, due to the negligence of some representatives of the special services, develops into a protracted military confrontation.