What I Learned Last Week: Less is More?

Mehrnoosh Aryanpour; 27 November, 2020

President Elect Joe Biden and his transition team have been relatively silent regarding Iran, particularly since his last op-ed, in which he promised something to the effect of (in the current parlance), “compliance for compliance contingent upon calm for calm and a reciprocal commitment to more for more”.  

Following today’s as-yet unattributed assassination of top Iranian scientist Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, perhaps the closest analogue there is to General Qasem Soleimani for Iran’s nuclear research, the Biden transition team will, however, be forced into action.

As such, Mr. Biden's promise of a ‘smarter way’ forward with Iran will be put to the test in the face of what Iran will perceive as overt hostility by a staunch U.S. ally, for although it remains unconfirmed who orchestrated and carried out the killing, Israel is suspected, and by extension, regardless of what the scant details available suggest, America’s complicity at some level whether tacit or express will be assumed by the Iranian leadership.

Just months ago in September, Mr. Biden wrote that he favored a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), were Iran to commit to the same (so called “compliance for compliance”) and would agree to talks on a more expansive deal (so called “more for more”) while hinting that some measure of ‘good’ (faith) behavior in the neighborhood is also a requirement for everyone (so called “calm for calm”).

It would, though, be difficult to see today’s killing as fulfilling the necessary condition of mutual de-escalation with the Islamic Republic, even if America had no direct hand in the hit given that Israel has committed killings of Iranian scientists in the past, particularly around sensitive thresholds in Iran’s nuclear advancement. 

Although Tehran initially pursued a policy of “strategic patience” in response to the American withdrawal from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018, it eventually followed with a more comprehensive set of actions which we can think of as “less for less” in response to America’s maximum pressure campaign: less adherence to nuclear limits; less restraint on matters of regional security; and less inclination to consider any occasion for rapprochement, all culminating in a tense standoff that included torched ships in the Persian Gulf, a downed drone, a decimated Saudi oil terminal, and the killing of General Qasem Soleimani.

Now, on the eve of President Elect Biden’s inauguration, with today’s bloodshed on the front page of the weekend papers, how likely is it that the parties can forget the past 30 months of bad blood and return to an agreement which even Josep Borrell this week suggested could use some work? 

On the one hand, the European contingent of the P5+1 were publicly unnerved by the buildup of nuclear stockpiles and advances in Iran’s atomic R&D as well as revamped enrichment capacity. But will they sleep any better now? On the other, China and Russia have said little on the matter; we should, at a minimum, expect to hear an eventual condemnation from Beijing and Moscow, who, it must be remembered, are, as of October, authorized to sell to Iran conventional weapons, the defensive justification for which now bears consideration. 

In DC, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, a policy maker known for building international consensus, will have his work cut out for him. While he will be counted upon to rally America’s transatlantic allies and perhaps even grant some uneasy consideration to Russia and China in resolving the JCPOA quandary, the ball may already have passed to Iran’s court in terms of where things go from here. 

Thus, as far as the knock-on effects of geopolitical instability are concerned, it remains to be seen whether the waters have been muddied, for until today, if chatter through the global grapevine were anything to go by, international companies seemed ready to contemplate a return to Iran and a resumption of mothballed projects, given Iran’s attractiveness as a destination for capital in the post-COVID backdrop of sluggish worldwide growth and supply chain vulnerability.  

In true form, the theater that is the Persian Gulf looks to be front and center in the waning weeks of 2020 and thereafter.  While waiting for Tehran’s response to Dr. Fakhrizadeh’s murder, the world faces an eerie limbo until Mr. Biden’s inauguration, bookended by another election cliffhanger in June as Iran chooses a new president. Even before today, it was debatable whether President Hassan Rouhani might finesse any form of formalized détente with America in such a short window, which notably includes the Iranian New Year and Ramadan. Now, things are more complicated.

There can be little doubt that President Elect Biden would like an early and quick win in his foreign policy. Prior to current events, salvaging the Nuclear Deal might not have been at the top of his agenda, nor was it clear that Mr. Biden would automatically score points with his electorate for reviving the JCPOA. By the same token, it was known the Republicans would make it an expensive proposition for him to pursue.

At present, however, Mr. Biden's desire to resolve a standoff with Iran may trump other priorities given that, with Iran’s nuclear stockpiles on the rise and America's ally Israel ready to act, there is the prospect of a foreign policy dilemma awaiting the 46th president and his cabinet, notwithstanding its reputedly deft diplomatic quiver. And while President Elect Biden and his team may have some limited rapport with the Rouhani administration, what about the rest of Iran’s decision makers, whose aims may now veer sharply toward considerations of national security?  

Up to this moment, there seemed some probability of an opening, however small, between the United States and Iran; now, though, put simply, can we count on anything other than more of ‘less for less’ absent swift and strategic overtures by the incoming administration?