What foreign and security policy offers are the Romanian presidential candidates putting forward?

Status Quo fans, Rent-seekers, or Policy entrepreneurs? In less than two months, the Romanian citizens will elect their new president, marking an end of the 10-years tenure of Iohannis. Given Romania's governance architecture, the president is at the center of the foreign and security policy ecosystem, with powers in the spectrum of coordinating diplomacy and intelligence services, chairing the Supreme Defense Council of the country and being the supreme commander. The president also represents Romania as a member of the European Council, and the North Atlantic Council.

The offers put forward by the candidates are likely to shape how Romania’s foreign and security policy in the next decade. The stakes, but also the opportunities for Romania to assert itself, are huge, considering the regional trends, the war in Ukraine, and the reform process of the European Union. In this article, I have analyzed the sectorial offers of the first 5 competitors, labeling them according to their substance and degree of ambition to modernize Romania’s foreign policy toolbox.

Mircea Geoan? - the Policy Entrepreneur

Capitalizing on the reputation gained as a result of consistent international experiences (most recently as deputy NATO secretary general), Mircea Geoan? has by far the densest presidential platform in the field of foreign and security policy, with proposals ranging from maximizing Romania’s influence in EU and NATO and a more robust economic diplomacy to reuniting the diaspora around a project of national renaissance. The platform was launched just a few days after the international investigation into the links of Geoan?'s former collaborator (and alleged campaign manager) Rare? M?nescu to a Russian propagandist close to the Kremlin came into the public eye, which triggered much rumor in the Romanian public space and stifled any debate on his policy proposals. While there is hardly any evidence that Geoan? has known of these questionable enterprises in which M?nescu was involved, and his opponents' criticism that he is "the Russians' man, not NATO's" seems rather passionate, suspicion about Geoan?'s political integrity exists among citizens and is mainly driven by his controversial entourage.

Running as an independent, Mircea Geoan? is aiming to win hearts and minds on both sides of the political spectrum, banking on a rhetoric that places enlightened nationalism at its core. Examples of this rhetoric include aiming for continued support for Ukraine, including military, while prompting a more active stance on the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine. In the speech presenting its platform, Geoan? has even suggested that Bucharest shall use its religious diplomacy to convince Kyiv to let the Romanian Orthodox Church offer its patronage for the orthodox churches in Ukraine frequented by the Romanians. In relation to Republic of Moldova, this candidate calls for continuing the support for its European path, and doubling the political support with concrete connectivity projects, such as Romania's interconnection with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine by European gauge railways and their integration into the European transport corridors network.

The former deputy secretary general of NATO calls for a reorientation of the diplomatic agenda towards promoting exports, including through the creation of a Fund for Commercial Diplomacy, a public-private instrument that will fund the Presidents’ initiatives in this spectrum. Through a Strategic Council for promoting a new Romanian brand established within the Presidency, Geoan? hopes to revitalize Romania’s soft power, especially outside Europe.

On defense, Geoan? pledges that he will present in the Parliament a new Defense and Security Strategy, including a plan for bolstering Romania’s military capabilities by the end of 2035. This plan would also include a component related to offset capacity for the planned acquisitions. He advocates for a holistic definition of national security, and for the creation of an integrated bureau that will handle policy action aimed at growing societal resilience.

Geoan? is also proposing a minilateral format between Romania – United States – Israel for stimulating technological cooperation, and Romania's accession to the Weimar Triangle (the recently revitalized cooperation format between Germany, France, and Poland).

Although entrepreneurial in his offer, Mircea Geoan? will need the support of the government to materialize it. Otherwise, his foreign and security policy proposals will remain just a list of committees and strategies at the level of the Presidential Administration. As an independent, this enterprise will be especially difficult.

Nicolae Ciuc? – the Status Quo fan

While Nicolae Ciuc?, the former prime-minister and Chief of Defense, currently leader of the National-Liberal Party, has yet to present its political platform, he has used its recently launched autobiography as a campaign tool to tie his previous military career with current political aspirations. Running on a conservative platform, in which elements such as the Army, the Church and the family are central, Ciuc? proposes, from a foreign and security policy perspective, a maintenance of the status quo and a reaffirmation of the country's Euro-Atlantic direction. He is considered a close follower of Klaus Iohannis, the current Romanian president, which also indicates that a presidential mandate in which Ciuc? would be the incumbent would not bring many changes on the external relations agenda.

At the EU level, Ciuc? pledges for more integration in sectorial areas such as energy, but also foreign and security policy, and for the adoption of an EU strategy for the Black Sea (an ongoing objective of the Romanian government). Consistent with a conservative agenda, he calls for a more robust EU policy concerning migration, and for the European elite to learn the lesson of the past elections, in which the populists thrived. Ciuc? is also proposing that Romania will continue to advocate for both the enlargement and reform of the European Union but does not go into details in terms of preferences of how that novel EU would be managed. For Ciuc?, the integration of the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey, and the Western Balkans countries into the European Union are considered strategic priorities.

In premiere, we have a candidate that explicitly argues that Romania shall have its own “grand strategy”, but the conceptualization of what would it look like are, again, missing. The 4-star general turned presidential candidate makes the case for an increased military budget and for policies aimed at growing the attractiveness of the military career.

An overarching theme of his foreign and security policy-oriented discourse is Romania’s prospective membership to the OECD, whom he considers the biggest foreign policy goal since adhering to the EU in 2007. While Ciuc? was acting prime-minister in 2022, OECD has adopted the roadmap for Romania’s accession and re-opened the negotiations after a period of stagnation.

Marcel Ciolacu – the Fixer

Marcel Ciolacu, the current prime-minister of Romania and the leader of its largest party – PSD, is credited with the most generous score by opinion polls now and has the first chance to enter the second round of the December presidential elections. However, given the tradition of the last two decades, the second round usually knocks the candidate of the left out of the race, with the right united in the vote against the PSD candidate. Therefore, his chances of winning are debatable and relies mostly on the mobilization of the local elites.

He has yet to present a comprehensive political program. However, by analyzing his relative foreign policy gains as a prime minister, we can say that he has embodied the “Fixer” archetypal model. Guided by pragmatism rather than a holistic strategy or enlightened vision, Ciolacu has used the finite number of tools in the PM portfolio to advance the path towards OECD membership, obtain a partial victory for getting Romania into Schengen (eliminating air and maritime internal border controls, with terrestrial borders still on-hold) and negotiate a position of Executive Vice-president for a Romanian in the next European Commission. During his tenure, the government has also marched towards Romania’s accession in the US Visa Waiver program, and the prospections of that becoming policy in 2025 are positive. He has been the first international figure to visit Israel after the 7th of October massacre, meeting prime-minister Netanyahu.

Regionally, he maintained a pro-Ukraine stance (chaired a common governmental meeting with the Ukrainian counterparts) and made multiple visits in the Republic of Moldova to mark Bucharest’s unwavering support towards Chi?in?u’s European path. He has made a visit to Turkey and advanced a common project with its government for allowing Romanian citizens to enter this country without visas. The Romanian-Bulgarian-Turkish de-mining regional initiative for the Black Sea has also been activated in his tenure, marking a limited progress towards cooperation in this strategic region.

Concerning defense, during his tenure as prime-minister in 2023, Romania has missed its defense spending target, with only 1.6% of the GDP spent for this sector, which is below NATO’s 2% pledge. Recently, Ciolacu and the US ambassador to Romania have announced that Romania accessed a 920-million-dollar loan from the US to produce artillery ammunition. The government has also made decisive steps for buying F-35s from the United States, with the sale being cleared this September.

Gaffes such as asking publicly Olaf Scholz to send more troops to Romania, without prior consultations with Germany’s federal government, but also the lack of strategy regarding the finalization of the Schengen dossier are some of the foreign policy mistakes of Ciolacu. The gains, although consistent, may demonstrate Ciolacu's ability to listen closely to his governmental apparatus, but to fulfill the highest office in the state, the PSD candidate also needs a credible program, one that clearly highlights his foreign and security policy offer, with no ambiguities.

Elena Lasconi – the Rent-seeking liberal

The fight against corruption, education, health are the main discursive priorities of Elena Lasconi, candidate of the liberal party USR (Union Save Romania). Her statements on foreign policy and security issues remain very thin in terms of content and generally focused on reaffirming the importance of the strategic partnership with the United States, but also on supporting the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Since she launched her presidential campaign, the former journalist has met several ambassadors based in Bucharest and discussed general concerns regarding the status of Romanian diaspora.

The sitting mayor of a small city – Campulung Muscel, which she has modernized by attracting important EU funds for cohesion, Elena Lasconi is the candidate with the least convincing foreign and security policy record. She has recently declared for Radio Free Europe that she does not believe the Romanian Army needs a bigger budget, but more NATO troops, which can be seen as a concerning factor, especially in the context that all NATO allies are encouraged to grow their defense budgets, ramp up their productions and modernize their capabilities. Even more troubling is that Lasconi has recently proven, in an interview, that she is unaware of the role of Turkey in NATO.

Relying exclusively on NATO troops without a national and modernized arming strategy, especially as the U.S. commitment to Europe in the coming period is increasingly unclear, could become a vulnerability for Romania in this increasingly hostile security landscape.

George Simion – the Disruptor

By far the most populist candidate likely to make it to the second round is George Simion, leader of the radical right-wing AUR party. Simion has been vocally against Romania’s support towards Ukraine, condemning the decision of the government to send a Patriot system to Kyiv. For his violent political acts, he has been neglected permission to enter Republic of Moldova.

In his presidential program, “the Simion Plan”, the AUR leader has pledged that will keep Romania out of any war, and he believes that the only way to end the conflict in Ukraine is through negotiation, and not militarization. His program is deeply Eurosceptic, and he vows to never allow the EU to shift from a unanimity condition to qualified majority voting when it comes to foreign and security policy decisions.

Simion proposes a cultural diplomacy centered around new policies for diaspora, in which the state and the Church should together build networks of Romanian schools abroad. He also explicitly mentions the Romanian-Moldovan unification.

Relaunching the defense industry and making Romania a more credible player in NATO is another priority mentioned by George Simion in his program.

Conclusion

The Euro-Atlantic vocation of Romania is undoubtedly affirmed by all the main competitors in this race, and so is the need of a more entrepreneurial foreign policy in this increasingly competitive geopolitical landscape. The candidates talk extensively about opportunities but fail to present their risk-mitigation strategies when it comes to the prospect of U.S. disengaging from Europe, for example. They also avoid synchronizing their policy agendas to the ones in other Euro-Atlantic capitals when it comes to topics like handling China’s growing geoeconomic footprint in Europe, or the need for a more robust European pillar in NATO. There seems to be a built consensus that Romania needs a more active diplomacy, especially in regional politics, but the “How?” question remains largely unanswered.