What Follows the Dizzying Nuclear Waltz in Vienna?

The Islamic Republic of Iran will get the blessing of the senior members of the global nuclear club, to be admitted officially into its regional branch, which includes five countries that have managed to impose their nuclear will and circumvent the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT): India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and now Iran. At the same time, and by a decision of the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council, there is an absolute ban on any Arab country to even think of acquiring nuclear military capabilities. Iraq was thus destroyed by an international decision after Saddam made the mistake of developing Iraqi capabilities in biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Iraq was torn apart even after it was disarmed of WMDs by the likes of UNMOVIC and UNSCOM, when the major powers lied during the implementation of international resolutions and ignored the clauses that emphasized Iraq would be disarmed as part of a commitment to prevent any regional power from obtaining prohibited nuclear capabilities. The proposals to establish a WMD-free Middle East was dismissed for many reasons, including Egypt’s mistaken move to abide by it before confirming the commitment of other states in the region. At any rate, the international decision was to overlook Israel’s nuclear arsenal as long as it doesn’t officially admit its existence, and the same applies to India and Pakistan. Today, Iran will join the club of countries that ‘deny’ having nuclear weapons – despite having all but developed breakout capability – while maintaining what it terms its ‘right’ to develop ‘peaceful’ nuclear capabilities. Israel will protest and escalate its cyber attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, but what is agreed by both Israel and Iran is preventing any Arab country from ever joining the nuclear club, a bid endorsed by the five permanent members of the UNSC. On the other hand, nations like Egypt and Turkey both agree that the ‘Sunni’ nuclear bomb should not be monopolized by Pakistan, and it remains to be seen where this curious and interesting position would lead.

Now that Tehran has all but developed a ‘Shia’ nuclear bomb, its triumphalism will increase as the only other nuclear power in the Middle East alongside Israel and its ‘Jewish’ bomb. So what will the mullahs of the Iranian regime and the generals of the IRGC do with this ‘achievement’? Is possessing this weapon really that important and advantageous, or has today’s world moved past such unusable deterrents? Is the decision by the Arab Gulf states to develop themselves into modern, welfare states focused on the wellbeing of their people not the real serious achievement and the model to follow in this era, particularly since they have also succeeded in maintaining their security and interests? In other words, do the Arab Gulf states stand to lose strategically to Iran’s nuclear edge, or is the Islamic Republic of Iran the real strategic loser, as it implicates itself in direct cyber wars and proxy wars with Israel, that will remain costly despite the ‘gift’ of ending sanctions following the revival of the JCPOA? Will the Iranian regime be able to reconcile itself with its oppressed people, who find themselves in a historical and social decline that has set them back by more than forty years, while their neighbors prosper and catch up with developed nations?

First, a quick stop at Vienna, where the nuclear talks are close to reaching an agreement according to reports. Some are touting 15 or 22 December as a crucial date for the talks, with the Europeans very keen on cutting a deal before Christmas on 25 December. According to these reports, the new German government wants to kickstart its term by boasting of reviving the JCPOA with Iran following its inauguration on 6 December.

According to informed sources, there are two key differences still unresolved: the control mechanism to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities. Tehran insists it should remain the same under the supervision of the IAEA, while the Biden administration wants to have a direct role in this mechanism. In this regard, according to the same sources, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken gave promises to the Europeans during a meeting in Stockholm that the Biden administration would be flexible.

The second point is that Tehran is insisting on an ‘automatic’ lifting of the sanctions when an agreement is reached in Vienna, which contradicts the US position proposing a ‘step-by-step’ lifting of the sanctions. Here too, the Europeans are trying to convince Washington to concede to Iran. They are confident of their leverage over Biden and are insistent on reviving the nuclear deal at any cost.

Israel appears isolated and excluded from the negotiations, but its close engagement with the Biden administration gives the impression that its isolation is mainly European. Indeed, the European powers have decided Iran is their priority, and that a deal with Iran is more important than their commitment to Israel’s security – the European interest now requiring the appeasement of Iran and ignoring Israeli protestations.

The Biden administration is convinced that it can manage the crisis with Israeli bilaterally through military and strategic pledges and inducements that enhance US commitment to Israel’s security. For its part, Israel does not seem to be too mobilized against a deal with Iran, despite its verbal escalations and threats to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. There may also be some unspoken agreements that would allow Israel to conduct operations in Iran, Syria, or Lebanon if necessary.

Meanwhile, according to informed sources, the Russian assessment is that Iran wants to avoid war in the coming period. Instead, Iran wants to quietly focus on a period of domestic restoration and formulate a ‘New Iran’ that the regime wants to launch. Therefore, Iran is unlikely to seek adventures with Israel and will not provoke it in the next few years, although this would not reflect a permanent strategic decision.

“We are not concerned by Iran’s conduct vis-à-vis Israel,” said a Russian source. “Iran is in dire need to see through its other priorities,” he added, such as arms deals with Russia, economic recovery through the funds unlocked by the lifting of sanctions and controlling the Iranian interior as it boils over with Persian nationalism rejecting the Islamic regime for having impoverished the Iranians, isolating them, and setting them back by forty years.

?“Iran today does not worry us much,” the Russian source continued. “It will not gamble against Israel in this period. It may do so later, maybe in three to five years. But no real war between Iran and Israel is on the horizon now”, he added. There may be some skirmishes in proxy arenas such as Syria and Lebanon. There may be Iranian provocations in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. But none of this concerns Russia, which sees in its relationship with Iran a chance to play a role to influence Iran and to “guarantee the stability of Iran”, as the thinking in Moscow goes, though major treaties along the lines of the Chinese-Iranian pact.

The Biden administration has no vision for what comes after cutting a deal with the Iranian regime. Robert Malley, the US envoy for Iran, sees his mission as being limited to the nuclear issue because the basis of the negotiations in Vienna is the absolute focus on reviving the deal and not discussing Iran’s regional activities.

If Robert Malley’s job title was envoy to the nuclear negotiations with Iran, the optics would have been clearer and his positions would have caused fewer recriminations. Yet the man is right not to apologize for his position that the issue of Iran’s regional activities does not fall under his remit. That is how he interprets his duties. The clarification must rather come from President Biden, who must look into appointing another envoy to follow Iran’s ‘malign’ regional activities, as his administration put it.

The men of the IRGC will set their gazes on Iraq and Lebanon after their nuclear ‘victory’ and will double down on their designs in Yemen as a key to Gulf security and to undermining Saudi security when needed. Those men will boast of Iran’s scientists as evidence of Persian superiority over the Arabs, and will forget that once, Iraqi scientists were hunted down by an international decision and operations carried out by the UN at the behest of the United States.

What interest does the United States have in blessing the transformation of the Islamic Republic of Iran into a nuclear power, regardless of the justifications and excuses claiming that reviving the nuclear agreement would restrain Tehran’s nuclear capabilities for five or ten years? What does the United States stand to gain from Iran becoming a major regional power through greenlighting its nuclear superiority, when Iraq and its nuclear programs were destroyed? Is there a US and international strategic decision to prevent the Arabs from ever acquiring nuclear capabilities? Or is there a hidden agenda behind adding a ‘Shia’ nuclear bomb to the Pakistani ‘Sunni bomb’, the Israeli ‘Jewish bomb’, the Indian ‘Hindu bomb’, and the North Korean ‘Juche bomb’?

In a way, remaining outside the nuclear club may be a good thing for the Arab peoples, especially those able to afford to ‘purchase’ nuclear abilities, if not to develop them. Indeed, the vision for prosperity, development, and modernization – not regional bullying and nuclear dominance – is the language of the future, of superiority, and of stability. The best example today is the UAE’s celebration of the success of its miraculous model that has invested in its people for the past fifty years and bet on prosperity instead of investing in destruction.?