To what extent has social media transformed state-sponsored disinformation campaigns?

Social media was initially labeled as "force of good" which enabled open discussion on matters, such as politics and social debates (Badaway, Ferrera & Leerman, 2018). It was and is a paradigm for freedom of speech and democracy. This free and open characteristic of social media has transformed today and has become a brewing ground for disinformation. This essay argues that social media has explicitly transformed and even facilitates state-sponsored disinformation campaigns to a great extent. This essay will initially argue some of the existing Cyber-Enabled Influence Operation (CEIO) mechanisms like IIA and OODA loop model. Following the theoretical argument, this essay will bring Facebook and Twitter into discussion and argue how these social media platforms have become effective tools for disinformation campaigns. Lastly, the case of BREXIT is being argued, in which the interaction between the theoretical models and social media platforms can be seen.

Influence operations (IO) can be referred to as non-military means applied to influence the mind-set of the opponent or target group, so that their decision-making process and action changes. Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations (CEIO) are deployed through the usage of online platforms (which in this essay is Facebook and Twitter) and communication means (marketing and promotional campaigns) to bring a behavioral change among the target population (Eric et al., 2009). Cyberspace or the emergence of social media allows two ways of conducting influence operations. The initial approach is where it is used as a distribution channel i.e., cyber-assisted, and the other being a manipulation and recruitment channel itself i.e., cyber-enabled (Omand, 2018). The next section of this essay will discuss the second approach regarding social media. The goals of CEIOs are to change the perception of target groups, to shape the actions of the target groups (Lin & Kerr, 2017). So, what are the existing CEIO mechanisms that can be deployed?

Two significant CEIO mechanisms can be deployed in cyberspace using social media platforms; IIA loop model and Col. John Boyd’s OODA loop model (Hammond, 2018). The IIA model first identifies the target group, then imitates the target group and lastly amplifies the information and messages to bring a change in perspective. This IIA model later affects the first ‘O’ of the OODA loop model, which is the observation part. The target groups’ observation of the surrounding environment changes following the implication of the IIA model, which affects their perceiving mechanism of messages, later affecting their decision making and actions, leading to behavioral change. Now, how are these CEIO models relating to social media?

Social media can facilitate mobilizing political agendas (Wolfsfeld, Segev & Shaefer, 2013). These political messages can influence political values and voting-behavior and patterns (Bond et al. 2010). Facebook can be explicitly utilized as a CEIO tool since it offers targeted marketing options like age, gender, location, interest, social networks and so forth (Kim et al., 2018). It is true that Facebook or meta platforms allow users to effectively target their desired population. It was developed for the purpose of improving marketing and promotion mechanisms. Today, these options allow efficient deployment of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns turning social media into a cyber-enabled influence operation tool. On the other hand, Twitter has also become a CEIO instrument since almost everyone has a Twitter account and one can acquire news updates from the platform. As a result, the next section is arguing how Russian-backed social media accounts influenced the BREXIT referendum.

A Russian-origin network of Twitter accounts disseminated racial hatred to disrupt the political environment in the UK and Europe (Burgess, WIRED, 2017). This network posted anti-BREXIT and anti-immigration content on twitter. To reach the mass audience, the network amplified their own messages. This displays the implication of the IIA loop model in Twitter, where Russian-backed accounts are targeting the anti-BREXIT population. Twitter confirmed to the US Congress that this network of accounts was Russian backed, had 268,643 followers and many of their posts were retweeted hundreds of times. The hundreds of retweets are also the amplification part of the IIA model. Twitter took a regulatory role and suspended the accounts. Twitter, Facebook and Google were directly charged by the EU and the US for facilitating grounds for Russian disinformation campaigns. The EU and US perspective positions Twitter, Facebook and Google as CEIO instruments. Furthermore, an academic study at City University discovered 13,000 Twitter bot accounts spreading pro-Brexit messages (Ball, BuzzFeed, 2017). These 13,000 Twitter bot accounts identified pro-BREXIT groups, imitated them and amplified their messages, which affected the observation and orientation of the pro-BREXIT messages leading to an influenced decision-making and action of the users.

Based on the theoretical and empirical argument of this essay, it can be concluded that social media has not only transformed the dynamics of state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, but rather social media also itself has become a CEIO tool and instrument. It is a challenge to regulate social media because, if it is regulated it will lose its essence of freedom and openness. On the other hand, without regulations, social media is an efficient and effective tool for CEIOs.