What If "Dream" Wins Again in Georgia?

Attempts by the West to remind the Georgian electorate of a possible "Euromaidan" in the republic are so far having little effect.

Parliamentary elections in Georgia are approaching – on October 26, the country’s population will decide the state’s future for the next four years. Many believe that this election will resolve the great dilemma of Georgia’s orientation: NATO and the EU or Russia. Of course, the political and ideological situation in the country has long transcended this simplistic dichotomy, often used by analysts to frame the issue. Bipolarity died with the collapse of the Soviet Union, unipolarity with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in today’s multipolar world, Georgia is not bound to choose between two directions. The country can negotiate to secure the best possible political, economic, and geopolitical agreements. However, it is evident that the policy of balance, supported by most of Georgia’s "Western friends" before the onset of the war in Ukraine, is no longer acceptable. Georgian voters face extraordinary external pressure aimed at regime change.

The ruling "Georgian Dream" (GD) government has refused to sacrifice its political platform to align with Ukraine and support the West’s attempts to deliver a strategic defeat to Russia. Consequently, the ruling party has become an obstacle rather than an ally for Western interests. The West not only threatens Georgian voters daily with potential consequences but also exploits the dependency of local political, non-governmental, business, and academic elites, urging them to rally in defense of democratic values and the European benefits that are promised to Georgia if the country complies with all EU requirements.

Several American and European politicians have repeatedly referenced the possibility of a Tbilisi analogue to Kyiv’s Euromaidan. However, all previous attempts have failed, and polls indicate that GD leads the main opposition party by a twofold margin and will likely secure a majority in the elections despite external threats.

This raises critical questions: What would a GD victory mean for the West’s stakeholders in the country? What message will Georgian voters send to the West?

Firstly, a victory for "Georgian Dream" would be an open declaration of the majority’s disagreement with and unwillingness to be governed by external forces. Georgia’s politics of balance and diversification would clearly contrast with the Western drive to turn post-Soviet countries into platforms against Moscow. GD would gain further support for gradual integration with Western institutions under conditions that consider the geopolitical interests of not only NATO/EU but also Tbilisi. For some in Georgia, the interests of Washington, Brussels, and even Kyiv are assumed to align automatically with Georgia’s, but this is not the case. GD’s dominance will underscore this fact, as the opposition essentially acts as a political force prioritizing Western interests. Its campaign targets international platforms rather than local voters, offering promises to "bring Georgia back to the true path of development." A vivid example of this is President Salome Zourabichvili's statement that European colleagues assured her of swift rewards following the removal of GD’s "pro-Russian" government.

Secondly, a GD victory would damage the prestige and credibility of Western institutions, exposing their inefficacy. Georgia, long considered a stronghold of radical pro-Western sentiment, has matured enough to assert its political self-awareness, reflecting a desire to learn from past mistakes and leverage realities for maximum benefit. This emancipation—from both the Soviet past and neocolonial thinking—strikes a blow to Western interests. For Western ideologues, Tbilisi’s democratic development was supposed to mean unwavering adherence to the values and directives of Washington and Brussels. Yet, it is precisely Western reform demands that have nurtured a Georgian electorate that questions solidarity, asks why the country should prioritize Western interests over its own, and wonders whether the Western model is inevitable. This introspection was not what Western stakeholders in Georgia anticipated from the country’s democratic development, and GD’s victory will highlight the failure of radical pro-Westernism. Georgian society is reflecting, and the future is far from predetermined.

To summarize, the 2024 parliamentary elections are essentially a choice between the radical desire of part of Georgian society to integrate into the Western world and the steadfast desire of another segment to adopt a more pragmatic and sovereign approach—without subservience, this time not to Moscow but to Washington and Brussels.

The article was initially published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta and is available here.