What does Targeting really mean?

What do Jenny Kwan, Han Dong, Erin O’Toole, Kenny Chiu, and Michael Chong all have in common??

If your answer was that they are all, or were at one time, politicians, well you’re right.?

But more specific to this article, each one of them has been labelled “targets” of foreign interference.?

Although the term “target” has been cited in several articles, just what is meant by the term??

In this article, I will explain what a target is, and how targeting is used in the world of Intelligence.?

What is a target, and what is targeting?

The use of the word “target” may conjure up images of noir detective films for some, where men driving dark coloured sedans and wearing trench coats follow unsuspecting victims for nefarious reasons. But targeting within the Intelligence Community has a much wider scope (but can stil be a frightening affair, nonetheless).?

Having worked over 20 years in Canada’s Intelligence Community, the concept of targeting is not new to me. At the most fundamental level, targeting stems from a country’s / government’s interests, concerns, or threats (whether perceived or otherwise).?

Typically, the focus of a country’s Security and Intelligence agencies is national security threats. For example, take the Canadian Security Intelligence Act. Under section 2 of the CSIS Act, threats to the security of Canada are defined as:?

• (a)?espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,
• (b)?foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,
• (c)?activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and
• (d)?activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.

Using the analogy of an archery target, these threats constitute the outermost rings of the target.?

Meanwhile, each circle inside of the outermost rings further identify groups and individuals who fall within these defined threats. These are generally foreign enemy states and non-state actors that pose a threat to Canada. In turn, they are then “targeted” by CSIS for the purpose of investigation, gathering of information, and the formation of actionable intelligence.?

This can be considered a defensive approach to allow CSIS to investigate those individuals or organisations suspected of engaging in activities that may threaten the security of Canada including:

·??????Espionage

·??????Sabotage

·??????Political violence

·??????Terrorism

·??????Clandestine activities by foreign governments?

How Enemy Foreign Governments Use Targeting

Along similar lines, an enemy foreign government has its own targeting against other foreign governments’ intelligence and security agencies if they are perceived as posing a threat. The spy-versus-spy cliché.?

Meanwhile, this same targeting concept can extend to political and economic goals.

For example, a foreign government that places priority on economic expansion or political influence may use their intelligence and security agencies to target organizations, businesses, industries, or government officials in foreign countries. In this scenario, foreign Intelligence agencies will align their intelligence collection efforts with foreign economic and political departments to gather intelligence that is beneficial to their country’s economic and political aspirations.?

Intelligence can have both defensive and offensive aspects. Foreign states will employ offensive tactics to forward their own political and economic goals and agendas. This is where the targeting of Canadian politicians comes into play.?

Much like the thematic threats identified in the CSIS Act, a foreign state will have thematic economic and political outward reaching goals against other countries (such as Canada). Simply put, their goals are to improve their own economy and garner as much international political influence and power as possible.?

Why Do Governments Use Targeting?

You may be wondering, “Why don’t foreign governments just work through normal channels to foster an environment of exchanged information to expand on their economic or political goals?”?

The answer, unfortunately, is that targeting provides results that diplomatic channels could never produce on their own.?

Additionally, enemy states are exactly that—the enemy. Therefore, the typical political avenues are not available to countries with strict sanctions placed against them, meaning that skullduggery is often required and studiously employed.?

Recent Targeting of Canadian Politicians—Why?

Has China targeted Ms. Kwan, Mr. Hong, Mr. O’Toole, Mr. Chu and Mr. Chong because it’s possible they could be manipulated to assist China in achieving its political and economic goals??

Well, yes … but also no.?

I can hardly claim that I have access to what the Chinese Government’s intentions are—or were?—regarding the individuals mentioned in this article. But what I can say with confidence is that the Chinese Government has its own political and economic agenda when it comes to the west, including Canada.

Let’s look again at that “archery target” analogy, which illustrates how targeting within the Intelligence Community works, with concentric rings around the bullseye representing the level of targeting for a foreign state:?

·??????The?outer rings?represent the general targeting authority, which may be access to and influence over Canadian economic or political organizations or government departments of interest to the Foreign state.

·??????The?inner circles?represent more specific requirements. For example, the introduction of 5G technology and access to Canada’s technological infrastructure for economic gain and infiltration of classified communications.?

·??????The?bullseye?represents an individual or individuals who have been identified as having access to these organizations or government departments, and who have access to information and can act as agents of influence, making decisions that are aligned with the goals of the foreign state.?

As political figures and government employees work their way up the ranks or acquire access to different departments and organizations, they may also acquire a level of control or influence on policy, procedures and contracts to other government departments or political positions.?

Therefore, the fact that political figures are targeted by Foreign Governments to provide access to, and influence over Canadian economic and political realms should seem self-evident. But the recent First Report by David Johnston helps solidify how Canadians have been shaken from a dreamworld—one where Canada works cooperatively with other foreign states, who would rather use trickery and deception to get what they want.??

Meanwhile, the fact that CSIS is now publicly talking about meeting with politicians to discuss how they are being targeted may be a bit of a misnomer. Let’s be clear:?any?politician or individual who has access to information or a position of influence is likely a target of a foreign state.?If not in a specific sense, at least a general one.?

So Now What?

Now that we know, without a doubt, that Canadian politicians are being targeted, how do we minimize the impact??

The first step is awareness. Every politician in Canada—whether, municipal, provincial, or federal—must realize that foreign states may try to target them in the hopes of identifying a potential avenue to access or agent of influence. This includes regular briefings with Intelligence and Security officials to help identify potential threats from foreign influence.?

The next step is a bit of a stretch. Those same?politicians need to be honest with themselves, their constituents and Security and Intelligence agencies—and communicate when there is reason to believe they are being targeted. This includes but is not limited to the identification and voluntary provision of information relating to:?

·??????Unusually large donations to campaigns and political parties with any potential link to a foreign government state. This means that donations need to be recorded, monitored, and scrutinized.?

·??????Continued and frequent security screening of political appointees who have access to sensitive information, critical infrastructure or business dealings with foreign states or actors who have demonstrated a willingness to circumvent established financial or political practices.

·??????Politicians should be advocating for an increase in resources, both personnel and financing, for the Canadian Intelligence Community to continue to identify and combat the threat of foreign interference.??

Targeting is not a complex concept, but it is one that demands more attention than politicians and the Canadian public have previously given.?

Keeping with the analogy of archery, foreign states have as many arrows as we have politicians to target.?Let's prioritize throwing off the aim of enemy states by focussing our own efforts and encouraging our politicians to become hard targets to hit.