Weekly Tracking Syria 01: The background (1/2)

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We are an uniqueness made by nuances?

 The Doc , contextual intelligence 03 – 22-3-2019 – Resilient Rating

Weekly Tracking Syria 01: The background (1/2)

Syria is starting to face a new development and the county’s political and economic recovery is uncertain.

Potentially, (and at the moment theoretically),we talk about a market of not less than 250 billion dollars.

Potentially and theoretically.

The main problem is that Russia:

• is not so strong to force the local actors to follow what Moscow wants. From Assad that gambles between Russia and Iran to the Profiteers, (the local power brokers), that have their own agendas
• additionaly Moscow has not the money to finance the reconstruction
• and the Russian private companies, (like the Iranian ones), are not so enthusiast to invest due to the instability, And this is one of the reasons that explain the creation of companies involved inside the security business as we described inside one analisys 
• but despite of this weakness Moscow wants to set the rules for the investors, (Assad must be the president and no one has to interfere on the peace agreement), and no one accepts this

Starting from this key element inside the Syrian geo-strategic equation we start Weekly Tracking Syria.

A weekly analysis describing the key variables of the global equation mainly focused on the business dimension of the reconstruction.

Today we shortly introduce “what” shapes the equation and next week  the ” Who is Whom” of the country.

Syria since the beginning of the civil war has been transforming from a Shadow State, (where the security apparatus controls all under the Assad’s clan strict supervision), into a Transactional State, (where the state is losing the control and old and new actors are gaining power).

Today Syria is ending the Deconflicit-building Phase and the country is starting the Stabilization-building,(the next phase will be the Peace-building).

The key variables of the global equation are:

Variable 1: The relationship between Iran and Russia in Syria

Russia and Iran are living a complex relationship.

They are the main allies, (both from a military and from a financial point of view), and enablers of the Syrian regime. Russia till now has invested between 2.5 -4.5 Bln US$, (Russian sources), and Iran around 18 Bln US$, (Iranian sources).

Both are engaged and, at the same time, they are in competition over access to the Syrian economy ,(the reconstruction contracts).

Variable 2: Russian and Iranian companies on the field

Till today the real winner either in terms of lines of credit and of the supply of vital strategic products, ( food, oil…), is Tehran.

But the Iranian companies are losing because the Russian ones are winning the most lucrative contracts

Variable 3: The security, the Syrian Private Security Forces

Both the Iranian and the Russian private companies are cold and are waiting to full engage in the country due to the persistent problems in term of security.

This explains the developing of a local industry that supplies this kind of service: Syrian Private Security Forces.

But the problem is that such forces have a dual use because they are also a para-military force that can be used for political reasons.

And the tensions are rising … .

Variable 4: Moscow demands something that cannot obtain

Russia is demands unconditional international support for the reconstruction of the country.

This either to stabilize the security of the regime and to allow the return of refugees.

Unlucky Moscow had not the power to set the rules in Syria then cannot ask this to the international investors.

Additionally Teheran does not like the return of refugees because wants to change the Syrian demography in order to strength its long term influence. The less Sunnis and Minorities will return the more pro-Iran Shiias will control the territory.

Variable 5: The local power brokers, (the old ones and the new ones, the Profiteers)

Moscow and Tehran built up alliances with local militias and are creating their private security forces, (PSF).

But also alliances with businessmen in Syria, and each country has established a business council to support and boost these relationships.

Most of the warlords that control the militias as well as the businessmen that own the PSF’s are also the businesspeople involved in such alliances.

Variable 6: Assad plays either with Moscow and with Teheran … and with the internal powers

President Assad constantly seeks to enlarge his own margin for maneuvers and his relative, (and fragile), power.

This happens by manipulating the interests of his Russian and Iranian allies.

And to his ongoing efforts to re-establish his authority we must also add that Assad astutely

manages Syria’s economic interests on a case-by-case basis to maximize revenues.

Doing that he wants to empower his internal network with the old and new local brokers of power, (see variable 5)

Variable 7: The International investments (1/2)

The US and EU economic sanctions on key sectors of the Syrian economy and individuals as well as on Russia and Iran have impeded the capacity to initiate and push the reconstruction phase.

We are still living the end of the Deconflict-building and the start of the Stabilization-building Phase is really timid.

it is for sure that the sanctions have deeply discouraged major foreign companies from investing

in Syria.

Doing that he wants to empower his internal network with the old and new local brokers of power, (see variable 5).It is all a matter of “elites bargaining”.

At the moment we can see that the contracting Russian private companies pays a lower political cost to Syria however, Iran will remain in?uential in the foreseeable future as it is an important trade partner with Syria and an essential provider of products like oil and food.

Not mention about the huge investments to pay either militias, the army paramilitary unitis and the local PSF’s and to supply them in terms of training and weapons.

Variable 7: The International investments (1/2)

The US and EU economic sanctions on key sectors of the Syrian economy and individuals as well as on Russia and Iran have impeded the capacity to initiate and push the reconstruction phase.

We are still living the end of the Deconflict-building and the start of the Stabilization-building Phase is really timid.

it is for sure that the sanctions have deeply discouraged major foreign companies from investing

in Syria.

Variable 8: The International investments (2/2)

Additionally either the Governments and the Multinationals are aware of the tensions between Iran and Russia and that Moscow cannot set the rules in Syria.

Then no one of them accept that Russia wants to set the rules about the international investments in the country.

Variable 9: The Political Landscape

The President Trump’s decision about the Golan Heights how will impact?

The Arab-Kurds with the US support victory against IS?

The around 70 French and the around 400 US special troops in the Syrian Kurd region?

The Iranians that are consolidating around Dier az-Zor will create a stronghold for the Iran-Med Corridor?

If the Syrian Kurds, (YPG), will support Assad will that counter-balance the pro-Iran militias?

Will be the YPG integrated inside the Syrian Army?

Does Moscow try to replace the USA and France inside the Syrian Kurdistan?

Or Moscow will be there along with Paris?

And Ankara will fight a pro-Assad YPG indirectly fighting the regime alternating its relationship with Moscow?

And a lot more as we can see in the next analysis.

The situation can be described using an innovative diagram. A fractal 3D diagram where we connect the 9 variables using the Resilient Rating’s evaluation instruments:

And a lot more as we can see in the next analysis.

Today we have shortly introduced “what” shapes the equation.

Next week we will introduce “who” is shaping all, (the “Who is Whom” in Syria).

Paolo Dealberti?2019

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Declaration of Conflicting Interestes: 

The Author declared not potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article

Funding:

The Author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article

 

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