A Web of Responsibility: Grenfell Inquiry Demands Change

The publication of the Grenfell Inquiry Report Part 2 is a landmark for the sector - the 1,700+ pages carry one fundamental and damning indictment - that the deaths were avoidable and the people in the tower were failed multiple times by legislation, procurement, design, construction, manufacture, building management, and in the response to the fire.

The Inquiry was divided into two phases;?Phase 1?which addressed the events on the night of the fire; and?Phase 2?which investigated the wider situation, looking to understand the underlying causes and mistakes, bringing forward information and making recommendations that can be used to ensure a similar disaster does not happen again. I commend it to you, at least read the executive summary (or the summary we have written on the FIS website).

Beyond the blame and recommendations, I want to draw attention to a couple of insights contained in the report that link to themes referenced previously in FIS Work.

Modern methods of procurement and “value engineering”

It was highlighted that in the?tender process,?parties were appointed that were clearly not competent to fulfil the functions that they were allocated.??This type of cost engineering is not what we mean by modern method of procurement:

“Although Rydon’s (the appointed main contractor) tender was judged to be the most competitive, it still exceeded the Tenant Management Organisation’s (TMO) budget. As a result, although the TMO had received advice from its lawyers that it would be improper to do so, it entered into discussions with Rydon?before the procurement process had been completed leading to an agreement that, if Rydon were awarded the contract, it would reduce its price to an acceptable level.”

Value engineering is inevitable, but this is not that, this is a fixation to reduce cost ultimately at all costs - the lines and limits have to be more clearly drawn in the future. The irresponsible ask has to be called out and whilst we can wait for Regulation, there is a need to think about our duties and consider when it is appropriate to deploy the Responsible No (see FIS Responsible No Campaign here).

Managing design development

The design process?(or lack thereof) also came under heavy fire, this was exacerbated by poor contracts and process control that ultimately led to confusion in terms of responsibility:

“Studio E (architect), Rydon (main contractor), and Harley (cladding specialist) all took a casual approach to contractual relations. They did not properly understand the nature and scope of the obligations they had undertaken, or, if they did, paid scant attention to them. They failed to identify their own responsibilities for important aspects of the design and in each case assumed that someone else was responsible for matters affecting fire safety. Everyone involved in the choice of the materials to be used in the external wall thought that responsibility for their suitability and safety lay with someone else.”

There are reminders throughout that, not being told?and?ignorance?is not an effective excuse – there were repeated failures to ask and clarify.?

Again the “Responsible No” resonates.

Industry response

The report is a hard read, not because it is not well written, but because it rightly pulls no punches. It is an excellent, accessible, and clear summary of the environment and events that led to the tragedy that was Grenfell, and that frankly is a hard read.

If we look around and consider where we are as an industry, we have to acknowledge that the underlying culture that caused this tragedy has become endemic in working practices and is part of the sector’s culture – this has to change, we have to change. The Report presents 58 recommendations.

These are summarised in the link above, so I won't repeat here - instead, I will give the final word to Architect and Inquiry panel member Thouria Istephan:

“Put simply, if you work in the construction industry and you do not feel the weight of responsibility you have for keeping people safe, you are in the wrong job.”

This blog was taken from the leader of SpecFinish October 2024, other stories include:

Technical: A look at the new Finishes and Interiors Sector guide ‘Walls as a system’.

A look at the pitfalls and solutions, as the responsibility for testing internal glazing and doorsets in flexible supporting structures now lies with the manufacturer.

Two FIS members explain why metal mesh is celebrated in contemporary architecture and design

Skills: FIS member Platt Reilly is thinking outside the box in an attempt to resolve the skills shortage challenges.

Sustainability: Finishes and Interiors Sector Project Reuse partners discuss how the project will help address and aim to resolve the issues blocking a more systemic approach to product reuse in the f it-out sector.

Market: Noble Francis shares his thoughts and reflections on the new Government’s housing targets and planning system

FIS hosted a Round Table event to discuss Building the northern powerhouse: The legislative landscape, devolution, and their impact on work pipelines, procurement, and skills development.

An explanation from legal experts Alistair Dean and Jonathan Bond on the intricacies of collateral warranties.

Recognising and celebrating the outstanding projects completed by FIS members across Scotland.

As Space celebrates its 21st anniversary, Nick Bond reflects on the challenges, lessons, and people who have shaped the company.