We Need To Talk About Immigration

In my latest blog I argue that a full and frank national conversation about immigration is needed as the UK approaches the Brexit negotiations, in the name of our economic security. This article builds on material I contributed to a recent report by London First called 'Securing UK borders: an examination of the implications of leaving the EU for UK border management', which is available for download here.

The result of the UK’s general election last week challenged the assumption of Theresa May’s government that a so-called ‘hard Brexit’, based on departure from the single market and customs union of the European Union, is the Brexit model predominantly favoured by UK voters. The political precariousness of a hung parliament, and increased influence of Scottish Conservatives and Democratic Unionist Party members, has given pro-EU interest groups including Europhile Conservatives and businesses more leeway to question and challenge the government’s strategy. The re-opening of debate is making many ‘remain’ voters like me, as well as ‘liberal leavers’, more hopeful that pragmatic considerations can take precedence over rigid ideological concerns in the UK’s negotiating stance.

The political controversies around migration lie at the heart of the debate, as seemingly unmanaged immigration has been identified as a major factor underlying the EU referendum ‘leave’ vote in many parts of the country. After the referendum, May’s government and the Labour opposition took the position that maintaining free movement would be politically impossible, and May restated the commitment of her government, first made when she was Home Secretary, to reduce net migration to below 100,000. While the notion of constraining free movement is more ambiguous than it sounds, as I elaborate towards the end of the article, the fixation with a net migration target implies an approach to Brexit in which migration numbers supersede all other considerations including the economic security of the nation. It necessitates a ‘hard Brexit’ and restrictions that would preclude any flexibility of immigration to economic forces, inevitably hurting families and inhibiting businesses, to the degree that it would be, in fact, impossible to achieve in practice. The inclusion of international students within the net migration figures, and tough visa policy for these students, belies common sense and is harmful to the higher education sector in which I work as well as the UK’s wider economy.

Two areas of public administration are relevant to debates about migration. Border management is based on striking the right balance in facilitating the mobility of increasing volumes of people and goods, and managing the risks associated with cross-border travel: irregular migration, crime, terrorism, and vulnerability to pandemics. Today, a significant component of border management is the management of the digital identities of travellers, not only at national borders but also through checks before arrival and ideally before departure. Immigration planning and management is a broader matter of national and local economic policy and politics as well as public administration, taking account of the dynamics of international migration, the economic needs of the country, the politics of migration around free movement (outgoing as well as incoming) and the integration of migrants, identity management and asylum arrangements. In the UK, both policy areas fall under the remit of the Minister of State for Immigration, even though in many respects they are very different briefs.

Securing our borders after Brexit

One of the major reasons for political sensitivity around migration relates to security. There is no evidence that non-UK born individuals are any more likely to commit criminal offences than the UK citizens born here, but the government should be able to deport criminal foreigners or persons granted citizenship. There is also public concern about acts of terrorism committed by foreign nationals, although it should be noted that the perpetrators of the bombings on 7 July 2005 were UK nationals, and of the 120 people in custody in the UK for terrorism-related offences as of 30 September 2013, 79% were British nationals. Despite this, the Migration Observatory observes that common questions about security in the media and parliamentary questions relate to three stages of the migration process:

1.   Entry: Why did the British state allow a potentially dangerous individual to enter the country?

2.   Residence: What does (or should) the state know about foreign nationals in the UK?

3.   Removal: Why has a potentially or demonstrably dangerous person not been removed?

Among the ways in which the UK Government controls entry to the country are: collecting advance information about visitors from airlines, security agencies or other sources; requiring non-EU nationals to apply for visas; and carrying out checks on people arriving at the border. Such checks significantly reduce security risks but do not eliminate them entirely and, importantly, the more rigorous the checks the higher the costs, both in terms of operational expenses and any reductions in travel, tourism and trade due to the inconveniences to travellers. Austerity budgets in recent years have led to significant cuts to UK border security while the volume of travel and travel has continued to increase. If the UK leaves the single market, further pressures will come not only from the general growth in legitimate and illegitimate travel and trade in licit and illicit goods, but also additional controls on EU nationals. The challenge for all countries with respect to border management is to achieve the right balance between the competing objectives of utility and efficiency, national security, and the privacy of a country’s residents and visitors, and a national conversation about this needs to be had if a strategic, forward-looking approach is to be developed.

Immigration management after Brexit

The other politically contentious aspect of migration concerns immigration numbers, including the volume of people coming to the UK under the terms of the EU Free Movement Directive. In the event of a ‘hard Brexit’, the system of border and identity management in the UK will need to encompass new arrangements to cover EU citizens visiting, working, studying or residing in the UK. To date, the UK Government has adopted a laissez-faire approach to EU citizens’ migration, and in political and media discourse this has often been wrongly conflated with free movement.

The government’s current strategy to ‘control immigration’ is based on controlling the numbers by restricting the flow, but this is only half the story. The UK requires mechanisms for tracking the movement of people at national and local government levels, which are currently lacking, if it is to take reasonable steps to ease the impact of migration in areas of the country experiencing a rapid influx. In the absence of a system of registering EU migrants taking up residence in other EU countries, in contrast with many member states such as Germany and Spain, little is known about where they live, whether they have families, whether they move in or out of the UK, their education and skill levels, or who employs them and in what jobs (above National Insurance data). This means that little can currently be done to manage impacts on local communities, e.g. from increased demand for local public services. Notably, the migration impacts fund introduced by the last Labour government to reduce such pressures in affected areas was quietly scrapped by the coalition government in 2010.

There are a number of options for controlling the flow of migrants, of which the viability of some will depend on the Brexit negotiations. A study published by the Institute for Public Policy Research last summer outlined six options based on different levels of freedom of movement: visa restrictions, labour market restrictions, partial labour market restrictions, an emergency brake, freedom of movement for workers and the current status quo of full freedom of movement. InFacts has identified ways of restricting immigration through the taxation system, and also discussed the need for a long-term skills strategy to equip UK residents better to meet national skills needs.

The positive case for immigration

The key dimension in the migration debate is the overall social benefit to an economy such as the UK’s. Politicians frequently fail to make the positive case for migration, as was largely the case in the Remain campaign ahead of last year’s referendum. Importantly, migrants fill skills shortages in aging high income countries, both in high-skill areas such as healthcare professions, and fields of unskilled employment. Retirement ages in such countries are increasing in order to compensate for the impact of demographic ageing on the work force, and the long-term threat of aging populations to the security of such economies is well explained in the strategic intelligence assessments maintained by the UK’s Ministry of Defence and US’s National Intelligence Council. The Oxford Institute of Population Aging observes, “Migration data is complex, however the national benefit to the economy and society are often clouded by local concerns, including those based on perception rather than experience”. As we approach the Brexit negotiation, a full and frank public discussion about the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats associated with migration in and out of the UK is needed, in order to minimise the political barriers to achieving the Brexit model that will be least damaging to the economic security of the UK and its citizens.