Water conflict and co operation between India and Pakistan, a case study into the river Indus

5/24/2020

Adarsh k                                     

Water conflict and co operation between India and Pakistan, a case study into the river Indus

The India–Pakistan relationship is one of the few remaining wide-ranging and globally significant security complexes. The late American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, who placed India and Pakistan at the centre of his “clash of civilizations” thesis, contended that the historic competition between Hindu and Muslim in South Asia makes the region one of the most vulnerable in the world. Compounding the political dynamics, the region is wracked with over-population and environmental stress. Environmental degradation contributes to instability and increases the possibility of war on the subcontinent.

River water disputes on the subcontinent are inextricably woven in to the environmental and geopolitical structure of the region as a consequence of British colonialism. British colonial government institutionalised deforestation and sprawling and inefficient irrigation systems, and these developments degraded the land for more than a century. Soil erosion, water-logging, and flooding are among the serious problems that can be traced to the economic Practices of the colonial era.

Against this backdrop of geopolitical instability is an increasing demand for river water, driven by expanding populations and desperate requirements for economic development. The environmental and economic pressures of scarce fresh water serve as an important component of the greater military condition on the subcontinent. Resource conflict is an unavoidable element of social interaction, and some measure of competition among social choices is efficient. The challenge, of course, is in developing peaceful mechanisms for resolving acute as well as chronic conflict before it erupts into violence.

Pakistan’s water woes

“Water shortages present the greatest future threat to the viability of Pakistan as a state and society,” explains South Asia scholar, Anatol Lieven. By 2030, Pakistan is expected to face a downgrade in categorization from “water stressed” to “water scarce” by the United Nations. Rapid population growth and outdated infrastructure are two culprits of this decline. (Anatol Lieven & John Hulsman)

Inefficient irrigation and drainage techniques have degraded the agriculture soil in Pakistan and worsened the shortages. Due to the scarcity of electricity, small-scale farmers are forced to pump for groundwater using old diesel-powered pumps, which adds the cost of rising fuel prices. In addition, over irrigation has caused soil salinity — an increase in the salt content in the soil— making vast expanses of land unable to yield meaningful harvests. Floods and poor drainage technology also plague the nation, and global warming has further exacerbated this problem. The Indus River Basin obtains water stocks from snow and rains of the Himalayas. Rising global temperatures have caused the mountain’s glaciers to thin by up to a meter per year. As they thin, river floods will overwhelm the deficient drainage system, and once the glaciers disappear, paramount river flows will continue to decrease Dramatically, by up to 30 to 40 percent over 100 years’ time. Pakistani development economist Harris Gazdar believes that more water can be made available, but stresses that “conservation and management require not only investment but changes in social and political organization and technology.” (Karin Brulliard)

India’s water misfortunes

Similar to Pakistan, India also suffers from severe water problems. According to the National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI), groundwater in Delhi, the world’s second most populous city, may run dry in three to five years. NGRI hydro geologists blame not only agriculture infrastructure, but also urban planning. Cities are turning into “concrete jungles,” resulting in very little rainfall getting infiltrated into the earth for conversion into groundwater. Ideally, 16 percent of total rainfall must seep into the earth to be recharged as Groundwater. Currently in Delhi, barely 8 percent infiltrates the ground. India’s geography also presents many obstacles for water access. Residents in the mountainous regions must travel long distances to reach a water supply, as vast parts of India are arid, making freshwater scarce. India disproportionately holds merely 4 percent of the world’s water supply, while claiming home to around 16 percent of the world’s population. India lacks adequate infrastructure, as water plants lose 30 to 70 percent of water daily due to leaky pipes and theft. “Collective annual costs for pumps and other such measures are three times what the city [Delhi] would need to maintain its water system adequately,” according to Smita Misra, senior economist at the World Bank. (Bappa Mujumdar & Sunil Mungara)

Geography of the Indus

The Indus is located in Northwest India and Pakistan and is one of the most important rivers in the world. The main river Indus is about 2,000 miles long. Its two principal tributaries from the West, the Kabul River and the Kurram River, together are more than 700 miles long. The five main tributaries from the East, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej, have an aggregate length of more than 2,800 miles. From their origin in the Himalayan Snow Belt to their end into the Arabian Sea, the Indus Rivers carry 90 x 106 acre-feet of water and cover a drainage area of 450,000 square miles. The Indus and the eastern-most tributary, the Sutlej, both rise in the Tibetan plateau. The Kabul and the Kurram rise in

Afghanistan. Most of the Indus Basin lies in Pakistan and India, with about 13 percent

Of the total catchment area of the basin situated in Tibet and Afghanistan.

The Indus system comprises the main river Indus and its major tributaries: the Kabul, the Swat and the Kurram from the West; and the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej from the East. The main river of the system, the Indus, rises north of the Himalayas Originating near Lake Mansarovar, the Indus flows in Tibet for about 200 miles before it enters the south-eastern corner of Kashmir at about 14,000 feet. Skirting Leh in Ladakh (India), the river flows on toward Gilgit and after 35 miles toward the southwest enters Pakistan, long before it emerges out of the hills near Attock (at 1,100 feet), where it receives the waters of the Kabul-Swat system. For several miles after this, the Indus assumes the character of a many channelled, braided river rather than a meandering, volume-variable one, before it falls into the Arabian Sea near Karachi. (Gulhati)

Evolution of Indus water treaty

Critical to understanding the water dispute's origins is the role of irrigated agriculture in the basin. With a semi-arid climate, agriculture in the Indus basin is heavily dependent upon irrigation (Ahmad 1964).This is reinforced by the large seasonal and annual variability in water availability which is masked by large average annual runoff, 150-200 km. For example, the Indus River measured at Kalabagh can change from 70 km during the summer to 12 km during the winter (Michel 1967; Gulhati; 1973; Johnson 1979; FAO 1997).

With irrigation important to an agrarian economy in the basin, irrigation was extended under the British in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh (Michel 1967; Mustafa 2001). The most cost-effective developments were along the Sutlej and Indus rivers, and therefore, each province concentrated its irrigation canals and supporting infrastructure on those rivers. In Punjab this meant that the works were primarily in the west of the province using the Sutlej River. Partition in 1947 divided the province of Punjab between India (East Punjab) and Pakistan (West Punjab) and the province's irrigation infrastructure, with headwork’s (structures controlling water flow) in upstream India, and the dependent canals in downstream Pakistan.

Pakistan’s geography makes it completely dependent upon the Indus basin for its agricultural and municipal uses. Unlike India , which has a number of river systems including the Ganges-Jumna system in the north, or the Cauvery River in the south, Pakistan only has the waters from the Indus basin. Moreover, Pakistan’s agricultural products which are its primary economic income are heavily dependent upon irrigated agriculture in, firstly, the Punjab and secondly, Sindh. As Iliff pointed out, if Pakistan was deprived of her canal water from the Indus system, the whole of West Pakistan would really become a desert' (1961). Partition left Pakistan heavily dependent upon canals that were controlled by India. Initially, temporary agreements were signed by East and West Punjab to ensure continued water supply to Pakistan’s canals after partition. However, the agreements expired on 31 March 1948, and on 1 April 1948, East Punjab stopped the water flowing across the international border. For Pakistan the timing could not have been worse. Farmers in the Punjab plant two crops per year. The water shortage threatened both the winter crop that was about to be harvested, and the summer crop which would be sown immediately afterwards. Without water, both seasons' crops would be lost. In addition, the sectarian violence in India and Pakistan that surrounded the transition to independence had led to a social and economic upheaval. The displacement of people escaping this violence also disrupted food production in the Punjab (the bread basket of British India) just as there were millions of refugees to feed. As Wescoat et al. describe, violence disrupted cultivation and destroyed local irrigation channels and wells. Waterborne disease outbreaks occurred in metropolitan areas that swelled with millions of refugees. Wescoat et at. (2000)

The water stoppage woke Pakistan’s leadership up to the country's dependence upon the Sutlej River and India’s control over this supply. The headwaters of all these rivers were in India , or in territory not subject to Pakistan , and the consequences of possible aggressive in intentions on India 's part soon loomed large before Pakistan .

Gulhati (1973)

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, proposed an inter-dominion conference to settle the dispute, and asked for the 'immediate restoration of the water supply' (Shivananda 1961). The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, had to intervene personally to have the Provincial Government of East Punjab restore water to West Punjab's canals. In early May, India and Pakistan met in New Delhi to discuss the dispute. The Inter-Dominion (Delhi) Agreement was signed on 4 May 1948, documenting the countries' agreement that each had needs to be met from the Sutlej River, and to continue bilateral talks. Over the next three years, as the wider conflict raised tensions and positions became more entrenched, bilateral attempts to resolve the Sutlej River dispute failed, including Pakistan’s proposal to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which India refused. The Sutlej River Dispute was heightened by differing interpretations of the Delhi Agreement And the resultant water use allowed to India and Pakistan. Hirsch (1956) suggests India’s refusal to submit the case to the ICJ stemmed from a 'feeling that a purely legal evaluation of the situation would favour Pakistan '. Pakistan believed that India was unwilling to 'test its unilateral interpretation' of the Delhi Agreement which it saw as allowing it to diminish water to Pakistan (IBRD 23/3/51). The enormity of the situation struck observers as potentially catastrophic -- a powder keg waiting to explode (Lilienthal 1966).American diplomats stationed in Pakistan and India stressed the importance of a final and binding settlement of water rights. In their view the control of Indus waters by India threatened to return the entire Punjab to a desert. Afroz (1983)

Seeing cooperation instead despite indications to the contrary, India and Pakistan were to cooperate over the Sutlej River dispute, and eventually, sign an international water treaty in 1960. Critical to the dispute's resolution was the intervention of the World Bank. In the period following the 1948 Delhi Agreement, while inter-dominion talks continued on the Sutlej River dispute, India and Pakistan were also developing their water resources. Both countries had applied to the World Bank for development loans. Despite the apparent economic viability of these projects, the Bank had to refuse the loans as the projects planned to use the disputed Sutlej River (IBRD 13/4/49 2/6/49 3/6/49 28/9/49 9/1/50 11/1/50 2/3/50 22/6/50 31/1/51).

As tensions continued to rise, and India and Pakistan’s competitive development of the Sutlej River threatened to not only obstruct socioeconomic development but also become a potential flashpoint, the World Bank offered its 'good offices' in September 1951 (Perham 1952; Bindschedler 1981). Contrary to expectations, both India and Pakistan accepted the offer (IBRD 7/8/51; Lilienthal 1966). Pakistan pointed out that the Bank's proposal would 'seriously compromise the Pakistan position if the talks failed' (IBRD 21/12/51). The Bank's offer was based upon three principles. First, that the Indus basin had enough water for both countries. Secondly, that in resolving the Sutlej River dispute, the basin would be

Treated as a single unit implying all the rivers were to be discussed. Finally, that the negotiations would put aside past grievances and retain a technical rather than a political focus. The Indus Mediations started in May 1952 at the Bank's headquarters in Washington DC.6 In October 1953, after field trips for data collection, the Indian and Pakistani delegations submitted their plans for the comprehensive development of the Indus basin. To address the gap between these plans, the World Bank presented its own plan in February 1954.The Bank's 1954 plan proposed to divide the Indus basin. India would receive the three eastern rivers (the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) or approximately 20% of the Indus waters, and Pakistan would receive the three western rivers (the Chenab, Jhelum and the Indus) and approximately 80% of the total surface waters . The infrastructure needed to divide the basin would be paid for by the party benefiting under the beneficiary pays principle. Pakistan felt the 1954 Plan left it insufficient water to meet its needs. Since Pakistan could not afford, politically, to give away water nor did it have the finances to build storage facilities unilaterally, it refused the 1954 Plan. A combination of geography, financial concerns deriving from the potential loss of the eastern rivers, and political instability made Pakistan extremely cautious in its negotiations (Lilienthal 1966).

Pakistan succeeded in persuading the World Bank that it needed storage facilities to meet its needs, and having the 1954 Plan amended with the 1956 Aide-Memoire which envisaged storage facilities on the western rivers for Pakistan. Whereas India had accepted the 1954 Plan, it objected to the Aide-Memoire because it was concerned about incurring additional financial obligations to Pakistan. Further negotiations separated discussions on the technical need for infrastructure from their funding. Parallel to the main negotiations were discussions to have ad hoc agreements under which India would supply water to Pakistan for six or 12 months. A succession of agreements was signed, each of which were negotiated separately, starting on 1 April 1955 and lasting until 31 March 1960. The only period for which India and Pakistan were unable to agree on an ad hoc agreement was 1 October 1957-30

September 1958.Following a coup d’état in October 1958, the Government of Pakistan unconditionally accepted the 1954Plan (the division of the basin) and the 1956 Aide-Memoire (storage facilities on the western rivers) in December 1958. Though India had already accepted these documents, it took two years to draft the treaty. The Indus Waters Treaty was signed on 19 September 1960 by India, Pakistan and the World Bank (World Bank 1960), and ratified by the countries in January 1961. India received the three eastern

Rivers (the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) or 20% of the basin's waters, and Pakistan received the remaining 80% or the three western rivers (the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus).  

Indus water treaty

The IWT divides the Indus watershed between its Eastern Rivers and its Western Rivers, granting control of the three Eastern Rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) to India (IWT, Article II) and the three Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) to Pakistan (IWT, Article III). The IWT obliges Pakistan and India to let the river flow without interference respectively within the Eastern and Western Rivers. The allocation is not absolute, as the IWT allows Pakistani citizens to take water from the Eastern Rivers as they flow through Pakistan for domestic use

(Which includes household, municipal and industrial purposes), non-consumptive uses (navigation, flood control, fishing and wildlife protection) and irrigation (IWT, Article II). Indian citizens can draw upon the Western Rivers as they flow through India for domestic uses, non-consumptive uses, irrigation and generation of hydroelectric power (IWT, Article III). India is granted an exception to construct non consumptive storage works on the Western Rivers by Annexures D and E of the Treaty. The IWT allows either party to initiate works of drainage, river transport, soil conservation or dredging as long as the work does not cause material damage to the other party (IWT, Article IV). Article IV declares that each party is obliged to India compensated Pakistan, through the World Bank, with 62 million pounds sterling for the transfer of infrastructure and construction of replacement works(IWT, Article V). India received the use of those irrigation canals which depended on water from the Eastern Rivers. The treaty states that compensation is unique without any provision for additional compensation between the two sides (IWT, Article V). The IWT established monthly data exchange between the two nations for data collected daily (IWT, Article VI). An annex to the treaty authorized India to build hydroelectric projects on the Western Rivers allocated to Pakistan contingent upon agreement by Pakistan (IWT, Article III, Annexure D). The IWT created the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) with separate Pakistan and India Commissioners to represent the respective governments on matters arising under the IWT, furnish information, settle questions and meet at least once a year (IWT, Article VIII).The PIC is authorized to examine appropriate questions which arise between Pakistan and India (IWT, Article IX). If the parallel Indian and Pakistani Commissioners cannot come to mutual agreement on a question, either Commissioner can refer the question to a Neutral Expert (Article IX) through a process listed in Annexure F, part 2. If the Neutral Expert renders a decision, it is final and binding (IWT, Article IX). If the Neutral Expert informs the PIC that the differences should be treated as a dispute, then either party can invite the other government to solve the dispute by agreement (IWT, Article IX, and Section 4) or refer it to Court of Arbitration to deliberate and act under terms of Annexure G.

Although the IWT was not the first bilateral transboundary water treaty, it was

Unusual in three dimensions: its origin, the water allocation mechanism and its incorporation of previously established norms in customary international water law. The IWT was the first bilateral transboundary water treaty created through mediation of an international organization, the World Bank. Indeed, the World Bank is a signatory to the IWT and makes commitments of its own for tasks specified in Article V and X as well as Annexure F, G and H. principle of law or any precedent” (IWT, Article XI, Section 2), the International Law Association (ILA) used the IWT as context for its Helsinki Rules in the Use of Waters of International Rivers (Helsinki Rules) adopted in 1966.

Some conflict prone issues over the years and how they were resolved

The Tulbul Navigation Project (Wullar Barrage) Dispute

The Wullar Project was proposed to be built at the mouth of Wullar Lake in Baramulla district of Kashmir Valley. The original Indian plan was to construct a barrage of 139 meters long and 12 meters wide with maximum storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet (AF). The basic objective of the project was to increase the flow of water in the Jhelum River during the lean season to make it navigable. The project was envisaged in 1980 and the work began in 1984, but Pakistan raised the objection on the ground objected that the project allegedly violates the provisions of the treaty.

On-going discussion over Wullar Project: In 1986 Pakistan referred the Wullar Project dispute to Indus Water Commission, but after one year the Commission recorded its failure to resolve it. Subsequently, India stopped the construction and Pakistan did not take the case in the International Court of Arbitration. From 1986-91, the two sides have held 13 rounds of talks to settle the dispute, but dispute remained unresolved. At 1991, both the parties reached to sign an agreement but the differences could not be resolved due to Pakistan’s apprehensions. During the subsequent data exchange process, India agreed to keep 6.2 meters of the barrage ungated with a crest level of 1574.90m (5167 feet), and would forego the

Storage capacity of 300,000 acre feet. In return, the water level in the Barrage would be allowed to attain the full operational level of 5177.90 acre feet. However, in February 1992, Pakistan added another condition that India should not construct the 390 MW Kishanganga hydropower project, but India refused to accept this condition.53 Following 18 years of stalemates did not produce any results and the differences in the project persisted. As disputes dominated Indo-Pak talks and discussions at political forefronts in 1999 at Lahore, the Agra Summit of 2001, secretary-level talks of 2011, but not much development has been achieved yet. (Shaheen)

The Baglihar Project Dispute

The Baglihar project was the major issue between the two countries that went to neutral experts for determining on technical “questions” raised by Pakistan. The dispute over the Baglihar project emerged in 1999, when Pakistan challenged the design of the project under the Article IX (1)54 of the treaty. Pakistan’s objections were related to poundage level, gate spillway, under-sluices, level of intake tunnels, and height of gates and elevation of tunnels. Pakistan’s main concerns were that the project is the violation of the treaty. The gated structure of the project would result in a loss of 7000 to 8000 cusecs of water a day.55 further; the project gives India a strategic leverage to manipulate the flow of river during any critical situation. The “questions” and “differences” over the project imply that one party

Deemed the project as the violation of the treaty, while the other party assessed the project within the parameters of the treaty. Since Commissioners level talks over the project remained unsuccessful, the World Bank intervened eventually and appointed a neutral expert to resolve the dispute. The neutral expert, Professor Raymond Lafitte59of Switzerland, classified Pakistan’s objections while delivering the verdict for minor design changes including the reduction of the dam’s height of 1.5 meters. The neutral expert did not question

the right of India to construct the project and did not even call the project a “dispute” between the two countries, but considered it as “differences”. The neutral expert required India to make some changes but Pakistan was not satisfied with the verdict, as the expert did not consider much of Pakistan’s objections.60 The Baglihar dispute was settled by the third party intervention but relations between two countries again became hostile over the project when water was to be filled in the dam. According to the provision of the treaty, a minimum flow of 55,000 cusecs has to be maintained above Merala and it should be filled during the period

Between June 21 and August 31. Pakistan claimed that the filling was not done in the stipulated period. Hence, the filling of the dam has made colossal damage to the country’s agriculture sector in downstream areas of the Chenab River.64 India replied that the filling of the dam was done on time stipulated in the treaty.65Pakistan demanded compensation from India for its losses incurred at the time when the dam was filled. India insisted that it had not violated the treaty and refused Pakistan’s claim. Therefore, a lot of discussions were held between the two countries, even pitching top leaderships in both countries. Finally, differences over the filling of Baglihar dam were resolved in 2010 at a meeting of the PICs in the spirit of cooperation and goodwill. (Akhtar)

The Kishanganga Project Dispute

The Kishanganga Project is another project being constructed by India over the Kishanganga River at Gurez. The project’s power generation capacity is about 330 MW and the height is about 75 meters. It is located about 160 km upstream of Muzaffarabad (Pakistan Administrated Kashmir Capital). The project involves the diversion of Kishanganga (Neelum River in Muzaffarabad) through a 23 km long tunnel into the Madumati Nala, which will empty into the Wullar Lake, through which the Jhelum River flows. Pakistan is of the view that the diversion of the Kishanganga River will reduce the flow of 140,000 million acres feet of water to the Neelum Valley in Pakistan Administrated Kashmir. In response to Pakistan’s appeal for ‘interim measures’ against the dam which may inhibit the restoration of the river flow to its natural channel, “The International Court of Arbitration (ICA) barred India from any permanent works on the controversial Kishanganga hydro-electricity project (KHEP) on River Neelum at Gurez in occupied Kashmir Indian experts denied the allegations raised by the Pakistani Government on building Kishanganga Dam. Former Secretary, Water Resources, Ramaswamy R Iyer in his column titled “Pakistan: Water on the Boil Again” writes: “ So far as one knows, India has not built any storage, not even the 3.6 MAF permitted by the Treaty, nor does it intend to cause harm to Pakistan by diverting Indus waters. In any case, there is such a thing as the Permanent Indus Commission. How can India

Store or divert waters to the detriment of Pakistan under the watchful eyes of the

Indus Commissioner for Pakistan” (Iyer, 2011)

Some 0f the other undertakings which are wellspring of worry for Pakistan

* Salaal venture in Kashmir on River Chenab. This was first task on which Pakistan raised concerns. This dam was redirecting water streams to Western Punjab. In 1976, through talks this issue was effectively settled and India imparted all subtleties to Pakistan (Siddiqui, 2010)

* DulHasti hydroelectric plant is on River Chenab in region Doda in Kashmir. It is a 390MW force plant. Pakistan guaranteed that it was a full fledge dam as Baglihar. Anyway the effect of this venture isn't so more regrettable. It will just influence water flexibly up to 1-2 days (Ahmed, 2012)

* Uri II Hydel power venture is on River Jhelum in Baramullah District in Kashmir. It is downstream of Uri. Pakistan brought up criticism and requested subtleties in October 2002. India is as yet proceeding with the task (Nosheen and Begum, 2012, p. 279).

* Nimoo Bazgo is the run of waterway 45MW venture in Ladakh

* Bursar dam is the biggest venture on Jhelum and Chenab. The hydroelectric potential will be 1020MWwhile it will store 2.2 MAF which is far high tan IWT's reasonable breaking point (Nosheen and Begum, 2012, pp. 279-280)

Other international examples

The 1994 Convention on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Danube River, the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of The Mekong River Basin and the 1999 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine.

At the Regional level, the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes of 1992 has entered into force And effect in 1996, and in 1995 the Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Development Community Region was concluded (which was replaced in 2000 by the Revised Protocol). Those multilateral and regional efforts built up the momentum for the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by the General Assembly in May 1997. In parallel, at the bilateral level, the conclusion of the

Mahakali and Ganges treaties in 1996 place the South Asian Sub-continent in line With the global cooperative trend over international watercourses. Indeed, the preamble of the Mahakali Treaty reaffirms the determination of India and Nepal to cooperate in the development of water resources, while the preamble of the Ganges Treaty underscores the desire of India and Bangladesh to share by mutual agreement the waters of the international rivers flowing through their territories. The birth of the Nile Basin Initiative is a clear indication that the cooperative spirit could, with persistence and determination; prevail even in basins where there are very diverse riparian Interests. Even the Indus Treaty, which was based on dividing rather than sharing, emphasized the importance of settlement of disputes in a cooperative spirit.

The way forward for India and Pakistan

Indus II

Thus, the time has come now for an ‘Indus II Treaty’, which can address new concerns and also enhance the benefits from the Indus Treaty. With the help of integrated development of the basin, there are possibilities of building more storage facilities across the Indus and its tributaries to ensure better management of the water. To meet the increased water demands and growing uncertainties of its availability crucial decisions also need to be taken about water and the way it is to be controlled and used. Rather than continuing to exploit more and more water to meet growing demand, the time has come for both the riparian countries to decide what to do with the amounts that can be developed feasibly and in a sustainable manner. For the appropriate and competent management of Indus systems, it is vital to build

upon effective and independent institutions at the basin level, which will have the capability of taking decisions on its own and will remain out of the political control of any national government. Under an integrated programme of river development, water projects can be situated at optimum locations, notwithstanding geographic divisions along political lines. The Indus basin is fast approaching a serious water scarcity situation. The adoption of a supply management strategy addressing only water shortage is not nearly sufficient. To meet growing demand there is a need to minimise water use, particularly in the agricultural sector. Planned allocation of agricultural activities in their various parts of the basins may be the suitable option in order to meet the future demand for food. The Indus River Agreement of 1960, with its limited character of acceptable partition of the system, has not been able to influence the riparian states to cooperate. The positive spin-off effects of the Indus Treaty over the overall bilateral relationship of the countries have been quite minimal. If both India and Pakistan come forward to renegotiate the Indus Agreement into a comprehensive and integrated form of basin management and establish a joint and independent river basin organisation, the benefit-sharing of it will not be limited only to water resources; it might have other peace-enhancing effects and significantly contribute to the regional public good. The time has come to move to the next stage in Indus river cooperation.

References-

Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia’s International Rivers a Legal Perspective

Salman M. A. Salman

Lead Counsel Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development and International Law Group Legal vice Presidency the World Bank

Anatol Lieven & John Hulsman, Ethical Realism (2007)

The Water-Security Nexus in Pakistan, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, May 30, 2013, available at Karin Brulliard, Rhetoric grows heated in water dispute between India, Pakistan, and The Washington post

Bappa Mujumdar & Sunil Mungara, Delhi groundwater may run dry in 3-5 years: Study,

The economic times,

Gardiner Harris, Rains or Not, India is Falling Short on Drinkable Water the New York Times, Mar. 12, 2013

Crucial Water Issues between Pakistan and India, CBMs, and the Role of Media Muhammad Rashid Khan University of the Punjab, Lahore

Questioning the water wars rationale: A case study of the Indus waters treaty Alam, Undala Z.

The Geographical Journal; London Vol. 168, (Dec 2002): 341-353.

Phil's Stock World: India vs. Pakistan Water Conflict Poses Global Threat Weblog post. Phil's Stock World [Phil's Stock World - BLOG], Chatham: Newstex. Nov 4, 2016.

Sharing Water, Preventing War—Hydro diplomacy in South Asia. James kraska

The Indus basin: water cooperation, international law and the Indus water treaty

 Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi

Indus Water Treaty: From Conciliation to Confrontation

Water sharing between India and Pakistan: a critical evaluation of the Indus Water Treaty

Mary Miner, Gauri Patankar, Shama Gamkhar & David J. Eaton

Indo-Pak Water Disputes: Time for Fresh Approaches

Manish Vaid & Tridivesh Singh Maini

The Indus II and Siachen Peace Park: Pushing the India–Pakistan Peace Process Forward

Ashok swain

Water as a Human Right: A Case Study of the Pakistan-India Water Conflict

Waseem Ahmad Qureshi