Warrior or Bureaucrat?
Since the fall of Afghanistan, there has been considerable written discussion in almost every forum available on the state of the United States’ military and naval leadership. (Note: the author is a bit old fashioned and uses the terms naval and military as distinctly different due to fundamental differences between naval and military operations. Although the current Department of Defense concept is that all services are “military”, it is an inherently incorrect concept.) The general lack of accountability and sometimes even a discussion on unjust rewards has been prevalent in media of late. As has the discussion on loss of public confidence in the US military and naval services. There has been quite a bit written on the glut of general officers (also referred to as GO’s) and flag officers (admirals). The authorship of these articles can be broken down into three basic groups: retired general and flag rank officers, military, and naval subject matter experts (SME’s) (general rule of thumb here is that most of these authors are retired mid-grade officers that are or have worked as contractors in the think-tank world), and then the duty expert group that are experts by education, experiences, or publication and in some cases all the above. The common thread is that there is a problem with America’s senior officer leadership. Pointing out that there is a problem is rather easy to do, especially after a colossal failure such as in Afghanistan. From a historical perspective, the military went through the same thought processes after the end of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. How and why did we lose? From an old man’s faded memory, it is interesting to note that the discussion on those earlier failures was not centered upon the unaccountability or failures of the military leadership in the post-war discussion. But instead focused upon the political failures. True enough observations but taken within a vacuum and failed to complete a full 360 review and evaluation. The current situation is a unique event from Afghanistan. But this is a discussion worth having. As is the one of accountability.
Management can identify that there is a problem but often fails to fully understand exactly what the problem is, what are the root causes of the problem and therefore are unable to fully address and resolve the problem. And there in lies the issue with America’s failed military and naval leadership. Exactly whom are the management stakeholders here? That is important to identify as this is very much a leadership, management, and an accountability problem. Note that this is clearly a problem and not just a challenge to overcome as the issue is systemic, continuous, and increasing in severity. And if the dire forecasts of impending conflict with the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and her allies are in fact true, certainly an issue with extreme national interests, if not survival, are at stake. The overall stakeholders are we, the American people. The management stakeholders are the President, as Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense (in the chain of command from the Goldwater-Nichols Act), the Unified (geographic and functional) Combatant Commanders. All of whom are in the legally prescribed operational chain of command as defined by Title 10 of the United States Code (10USC§162). The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 sets this operational chain of command and permits the President to “direct that communications pass through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” and permits the Secretary of Defense broad latitude in assigning oversight responsibilities to the Chairman.
Stepping back a bit to analyze why the military is in the state where public confidence in the institution is eroding as reported by a large variety of media sources. An observation, throughout American military history the president, senior commanders, and field commanders have routinely replaced subordinate commanders that were not achieving military or naval objectives. President Lincoln was most notable for doing so during the American Civil War, replacing numerous general officers with more competent or at least aggressive generals. During the Second World War, commanders that failed to achieve objectives were routinely removed and replaced by President Roosevelt, theater commanders (Eisenhower, Nimitz, McArthur), and subordinate commanders. General Curtis Lemay, as commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) often relieved subordinates that did not meet or uphold the exacting standards the Lemay had set for SAC. The general terminology would be “relieved for cause” or “relieved due to a loss of confidence”. A career ender and a lateral shift from combat command to a staff position. While the latter is important, a staff position was always considered to be of lessor importance to military and naval leadership in this and prior time periods of our nation’s military and naval history. An important consideration identified by General Washington during the Revolutionary War and repeated ever since has been one of Army/Navy cooperation (that of course has now been expanded to Air and Space Forces). For the uninitiated, the word Navy or Naval includes the Marine Corps and Coast Guard (relatively new in that the Coast Guard did not exist until 1915 but traces its roots back to 1790 and our first Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton). During WWII, the Joint Chiefs became an ad hoc organization led by the White House Chief of Staff, Fleet Admiral William Leahy. The composition included Fleet Admiral Leahy as acting Chairman of the Joint Staff, General of the Army George C. Marshall as the Army Chief of Staff, and Fleet Admiral Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations. As the war progressed, General of the Army (later General of the Air Force) H. Hap Arnold was added as Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces. The Commandants of the Marine Corps (General’s Holcomb (first Marine to be promoted to General upon his retirement) and his successor General Vandegrift (first Marine to assume the position of Commandant as a full General)) and Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral Russell R. Waesche, were part of the Joint Staff as consultants for any matters involving the Marine Corps or Coast Guard (as the Coast Guard had been transferred from the Treasury Department to the Navy Department per Title 10 and Title 14 USC authorization).
At the end of WWII, a major reorganization was affected to further reinforce the concept of jointness with the passage of the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1947. This act formalized the positions of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Secretary of Defense. The membership of the Joint Staff was the Chairman, and the service chiefs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was granted consultation privileges on only those matters involving the Marine Corps. The Secretary of Defense was not part of the chain of command nor was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as both were considered “advisors” to the president. The former on military force use and the latter on administrative control and acquisition of materials. The service chiefs (Chief of Staff US Army, Chief of Staff US Air Force, and Chief of Naval Operations, (Commandant of the Marine Corps was not in the operational chain) were in the direct chain of command for operational force employment directly under the President as Commander in Chief. The service chiefs controlled all operating forces of their respective services. The exception was the Commandant of the Marine Corps as Marine forces were for most of the Marine Corps, assigned as type commands (amphibious forces) to the fleets of the United States Navy. These being the Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic (FMFLANT) and Fleet Marine Forces Pacific (FMFPAC). The Marines’ reserve forces, and non-FMF operating forces were under the direct operational control of the Commandant. In its original form, the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1947 envisioned that the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries were to be focused upon equipment acquisition, administrative support, and facilities to support the forces and in doing so would ensure interoperability of service equipment. For example, Army, Navy, and Air Force radios could actually transmit and receive signals from each other. A major issue discovered during WWII and not corrected by the time of the Korean War. Note that the Secretaries of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force were not in the chain of command and therefore did not represent civilian control of the armed services as might be argued in today’s environment. Understanding the historical background and intent of the Congress is key to understanding the evolution of war fighter to bureaucrat within the Department of Defense.
The organization was loosely defined in the post-WWII era with US Forces Far East and US Forces Europe. A specified command was created to address the nation’s need of nuclear delivery capabilities, that being the US Air Force’s Strategic Air Command or SAC for airborne and later inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery. The organization further evolved post Korean War by creating two unified commands to support the global military and naval operations of the United States. These commands were the US Pacific Command (US PACOM) and the US European Command (US EUCOM). The service chiefs became the force providers to these unified geographical commanders. A major subordinate command of the US PACOM was the US Korean Command, which had a multi-purpose to include joint Korean – US military command relationships and United Nations forces in Korea. As Vietnam heated up under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson; another command was created. This being Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Interestingly enough, naval forces (Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard) were given assigned areas of responsibility but were not assigned to MACV as operating components but were directed liaison and coordination. Their chain of command was still US Pacific Fleet (USPacFleet) as a component command of US Pacific Command. The Air Force’s contributions were even more complicated as some units provided direct support to Army ground forces in the form of direct air support (DAS) or close air support (CAS) missions. Other units were assigned to strategic bombing missions of North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. These missions were controlled by the President (Johnson), the Secretary of Defense (McNamara), and the US Pacific Air Force as a subordinate command of US Pacific Command (PACOM). Convoluted at best.
Since the end of the Vietnam War, it has been a mad dash to add combatant commands. Every president has added something to the mix and more importantly has changed the chain of command (and therefore importance) from the service chiefs as the force providers to the combatant commanders. To be fair to the presidents, most of them did not know or really care about adding more bureaucracy to the mix. The presidents were following the recommendations of the service chiefs, chairmen of the Joints Chiefs and of course the primary representative of the Department of Defense, the Secretaries of Defense for each administration. Congress even got into this one-upmanship by creating the US Special Operations Command in 1987 as part of the Goldwater Nichols Act. Since this time, more commands have been added such as US Africa Command, US Space Command, US Strategic Command, and the list goes on. Not to be outdone, President Trump trumped all by creating a new military force, the US Space Force. A feat not accomplished since the creation of the US Air Force and the Department of the Air Force under National Defense Act of 1947 under President Truman. The Space Force was created out of the Air Force and like the Navy Department, added a second service to the Department of the Air Force. Looks like a bureaucracy to even the most casual of observers. Each of these entities carries a significant load of general and flag officers, support staff that includes military and DOD civilians and of course the contractors. With each GO/FO another layer of colonels/captains and other senior/field grade officer ranks is added. Not to mention the warrant and enlisted ranks. Standing joke on these senior rank staffs is that the lieutenant colonels/commanders are the coffee getters. Getting a second lieutenant/ensign on staff is a sign of “arriving”.
But there were other more subtle events taking place to shape this creation. After the end of the Vietnam War, the Cold War and the War on Terrorism; significant military personnel draw downs happened. But the bureaucracy still had to function. How was this done? Numerous positions were converted from military personnel to civilian personnel as employees of the Department of Defense and its subordinate service departments, i.e., civil servants. The Congress was fully complicit with this effort for several reasons. First and foremost, jobs were created in the members’ districts and states. These civilian positions did not transfer on a regular basis and were not eliminated. In fact, civil servants cannot be outright terminated when the job goes away, they simply transfer to a new position. Congress even wrote laws such that the civil servant positions cannot be replaced with contractors. A good portion of these civil servant positions are filled with retired service personnel due to hiring preferences and demonstrated expertise. Congress tried to limit this at one time by forcing pay cuts on retired military officers seeking a civil service position. That law has since been rescinded by the Congress. Then the Congress tried to limit the civil service community by restricting hiring. The DOD civil servants and GOs/FOs were quick to recognize that hiring contractors to do the leg work jobs was easy enough to accomplish and did so. During the War on Terrorism, it got to the point that DOD was hiring contractors to do armed military-like missions. Anyone remember the various incidents with Blackwater? Of course, with so many contracts to be overseen and administered, a need for more DOD civilians arose and Congress quickly agreed. By definition, civil servants are bureaucrats.
The problem with bureaucrats is that the number one priority of any bureaucrat is job security. So how does the bureaucrat accomplish job security? Start by strictly following the rules, policies, and procedures. Does not matter if it makes sense or not. Just consider the capabilities processes and the defense acquisition processes. Make sure that the budget and appropriations are fully expended by the end of the fiscal year. Grow the work force by adding more civil servant positions and failing that or in conjunction with that effort adding contractor work force. This also has the added benefit of more budget. Congress loves to spend money in their home districts and states. Miliary officers in the form of generals and admirals looking to retire and become members of boards of directors of defense companies also see the importance of having large staffs and organizations to improve their chances of being hired to these positions and or promoted while on active duty. Thus, we have completed the transition from warrior to bureaucrat. But at what cost? In simple terms, the failure of Afghanistan and Iraq. The lack of accountability of any general or admiral in either conflict with regards to failure. Lt. Col. Stu Schiller is right in that regard. We continue to draw down our operating forces while maintaining our hugh bureaucratic combatant commands and senior staff positions. When was the last time a general or admiral led from the front with pistol and sword in hand? Been awhile. In the meantime, the warfighters (actual trigger pullers) continue to do more with less and less. Could we in fact fight and win a war with the PRC, Russian Federation, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea, and the Islamic Republic of Iran? Individually or collectively?
Unfortunately, this bureaucratic expansion has continued to grow unabated, with the aid of a willing Congress, from more political appointments to the executive leadership of the Department and the service departments, to the civilian employees, the senior military and naval leadership of the services, to the officer ranks, the warrant officer ranks, and now to the senior enlisted ranks. A sad situation when the only service chief that has operational and administrative control of the force is the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Of course, the Coast Guard is not part of the Department of Defense but does assign forces to the geographical combatant commanders under the Coast Guard’s Title 10 authority for various missions and requests from those commanders.
Why is this so important to address and solve? Because our nation’s military exists for one reason and one reason only: to fight and WIN our nation’s wars. A strong military is a deterrence to war, but deterrence does not always work. Being ready for the eventuality is key. To do that, our top military and naval leaders must be warriors and not bureaucrats, as must each level of service member from junior Soldier, Marine, Sailor, Airman, Guardian, Coast Guardsman, and National Guardsman to most senior ranks of the non-commissioned/petty officer, warrant officer, and commissioned officer ranks of each service (to include the Coast Guard).
How do we (Americans) address and solve this problem? We must recognize and acknowledge that this is a problem and that must have priority in solving. The Congress must lead this effort as Congress writes the laws and controls the purse strings. Both the executive civilian leadership and the military and naval leadership of the Department must work to remove the bloat from the organization and return the Department to an apolitical organization based upon warfighting needs and skills. Removing just one combatant command from the overhead would return to the services an Army division plus of military personnel (using USSOCOM as an example, at 70,000 personnel and a headquarters staff of 2,500 military and civilians according to the SOCOM website. The number of general and flag officers is more than ten.) Think of dollars and budget, how much could be used to fund service level personnel, operational units, and maintain legacy capabilities while acquiring new technologies.
This cannot happen overnight, even if Congress and the bureaucrats of the Department of Defense were to agree. But it must happen and in relatively short order. As a first step some suggestions are contained in the following articles published in LinkedIn: Hopefully the next Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize this need and act. To help, I have published a series of articles here on LinkedIn to at least start that discussion and hopefully action: