War and Management. Case 1

War and Management. Case 1

The Second World War is certainly the most significant event of mankind. The war directly affected the lives of a billion people. And other billions indirectly.


When Bloomberg writes about the fact that COVID is the biggest post-war crisis, then all over the globe they understand what kind of war they are talking about, even those whose grandfathers were not even born during WW2 and even those on whose states not a single bomb fell.


For me, military history, from a purely boyish hobby, at some point began to be of different interest, I don’t even know how to formulate it correctly, managerial or something. I began to be interested not just in events and exploits, but in how people of different levels make decisions, what obvious mistakes they made, who had the right strategy, and who did not have it at all.


Over the course of the nearest months, I (if I have the patience to write at night and on weekends) will try to analyze 10 interesting cases of WW2 from the point of view of management, giving each case a small conclusion. May Providence blesses my modest epistolary labors.


I will not tire those few readers who will find the strength to read to the end with an analysis of narrow military and specific topics. My task is the concentration of attention exclusively on the behavior of the organization and the person in it.

So case number 1. "How a manager hides the failure of a subordinate"

On October 11, 1941, the forward column of the 4th division of the Wehrmacht was beaten by Soviet troops. Let's give the floor to lovers of fiction:


“In the evening, when the vanguard of the 4th Panzer Division cautiously entered the burning suburb of Mtsensk, the division stretched out for 15 miles along a narrow road, where supporting artillery and infantry were almost out of radio contact.


It was time for Katukov to strike again. T-34 tanks moved quickly across the ground freezing at dusk, and their wide tracks carried them freely where the German T-IVs got stuck, landing on armored bottoms. The Russians attacked the German column swiftly and fiercely, dismembering it into pieces, which were systematically destroyed. The tankers of the 4th Division, whose morale had been shattered in their first encounter with Katukov five days earlier, saw their shells again bounce off the sloping armor of the Russian tanks. “There is nothing more terrible than a tank battle against superior enemy forces. Not in terms of numbers - it was not important for us, we were used to it. But against better cars - it's terrible ...


Russian tanks are so nimble, at close range they will climb a slope or cross a swamp faster than you can turn a turret. And through the noise and roar, you hear the clang of shells on the armor all the time. When they hit our tank, you often hear a deafening explosion and the roar of burning fuel, too loud, thank God, to hear the death cries of the crew. The 4th Panzer Division was effectively annihilated, and the defense of Tula got another small respite. But apart from the tactical assessment, Guderian drew an ominous conclusion: “Up to this point we had the advantage in tanks. From now on, the situation has changed to the opposite "



In the above text, there are a lot of traces of severe drug consumption, obviously.?


But these poetic descriptions of the battle, worthy of Homer's verses about the battles of the Achaeans with the Trojans, were taken from the official report of the division commander Langemann, who obviously made several mistakes that were unforgivable for the manager. What did Langemann write?


"After the capture of Orel, the Russians for the first time used their heavy tanks massively in several engagements, which led to heavy tank battles, since the Russian tanks no longer allowed themselves to be knocked out by artillery fire. For the first time in the eastern campaign, the absolute superiority of the Russian 26-ton and 52-ton tanks over our Pz.Kpfw.III and IV.?

Russian tanks usually used a semi-circle formation, opening fire with their 7.62 cm cannons from a distance of 1000 meters, unleashing monstrous penetrating energy with high accuracy. In addition to the best weapons and armor, the 26-ton tank "T-34" is faster and more maneuverable, and its turret rotation mechanism is clearly better. In the course of moving from Glebov to Minsk, we did not find a single Russian tank that failed due to breakdowns "


Imagine that your subordinate sends you such a report on the failure of the project entrusted to him - most probably you gonna understand your employee, and maybe even some tears will appear on your face.

If you do not remember a few simple things.

In violation of the instruction, the division column marched without reconnaissance, combat guards, head outposts, artillery, and infantry cover.?

Russian general Katukov, seeing such a “gift” from the Germans used it with great results, obviously. Langemann obviously neglected his managerial duties, for which he paid the price.


What did Guderian, Langemann's direct supervisor, do when he received such a report?


Let's give him the floor

“I drew up a report on this situation, which is new for us, and sent it to the army group. I described in understandable terms the clear advantage of the T-34 over our T-IV and gave the corresponding conclusions that should have affected our I concluded with a call to immediately send a commission to my sector of the front, which would consist of representatives of the artillery and technical department, the ministry of armaments, tank designers and tank manufacturers ... They could inspect the wrecked tanks on the battlefield ... and listen to the advice of people who have ridden them on what should be taken into account in the design of new tanks. I also asked for the acceleration of the production of a heavy anti-tank gun with sufficient armor-piercing power against the T-34"


The top manager Guderian, instead of understanding the reasons for the obvious defeat, drawing the right conclusions, and extending them to the entire company, reminding all managers of their duties, begins to throw a tantrum, demand a commission to study the T-34 (and specifically to his own sector of the front, yes), to tell LSD tales about "Soviet tanks flying so fast through the snow that it's impossible to even aim at them."


The funniest thing about this whole story is that exactly a month before that, Guderian literally stated the following: “... the Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank cannot be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by the faithful sons of the Reich and repeatedly proving their superiority...”


For such brilliant behavior - extinction of a whole panzer division -?Langemann was quietly removed from command of the division and .... was promoted to the head of Corps, that is, to command several divisions at once. Where he was killed in the summer of 1942 by Soviet mortars near Stalingrad "during reconnaissance."


To get under mortar fire, being a corps commander, and personally (!) conducting reconnaissance - this is certainly a management "talent".


Conclusion: it is clear that the German convoy was attacked in the march and caught off guard, and it was the fault of the German commander Major-General V. von Langemann. He did not organize reconnaissance in order to deploy the column ahead of time in order of battle. The 4 Panzer Division had enough funds to organize anti-tank defense: the Pak-50 38-mm cannon, the 88-mm anti-aircraft cannon, and cannon cannons. But the Germans let themselves be taken by surprise, and in order not to admit their mistakes, they piled their blame on the “terrible” Russian “miracle tanks”. Guderian supported the report of Langemann so as not to undermine his reputation.



Moral: A corporation should have a culture of constant dispassionate and unemotional analysis of failures so as not to repeat the same mistakes. A kind of feedback system that drives information in both directions without failures. For this, managers should not be in the grip of "only successes are reported to the top." And if a f_ckup happened, then there is no need to hide it or explain it with bullshit factors “the Martians flew in and interfered.” Because business will begin to allocate resources to fight the Martians, and not to improve particular processes.


Maybe you have been in such sad meetings, where everyone seems to be doing well, everyone did everything right, and everyone has awesome presentations, but competitors crushed the business and at the same time, everyone is waiting for awards.

Alexey Mikulik

Head Of Service Department

2 年

Sound is good...

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Sergei Liashenko

Customer Experience | Customer Service at Yandex.Travel

2 年

Stas what a great idea. Looking forward to your new posts. The moral resonates deeply. Meetings with heads down ??

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