WANTED: Better Leadership in Major Programmes... Yes, I am talking about myself too.

Throughout my career, I have witnessed how programme leaders and their leadership styles have influenced programme outcomes from multiple vantage points.?

As I reflect back, there is one particular programme that perfectly provides context regarding programme complexity. There were three situations that occurred along the programme continuum that arguably shaped the programme and its outcomes. Broader programme leadership approached this situation in a specific way, and now with hindsight I can understand the alternative methods that may have led to a different outcome.?

Along with the biases associated with major decisions made by the client organization at the beginning of the programme, I will reflect on how the distinct subcultures of the two organizations involved influenced the problem-solving approach when unexpected events disrupted the already complex system. Finally, I will reflect on how project delays were viewed as a technical problem rather than an adaptive problem.?

Upfront Decision Making

The phenomena of optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation in major programmes are well-researched topics.?Flyvbjerg identified these two biases as root causes of major programmes: delays and cost overruns. I have personally witnessed this several times throughout my career. I have been able to observe firsthand how these biases made an already complex programme even more complex.?

It only took a few months into the? nearly year-long procurement process, for it to become very clear that original estimates were full of optimism bias and potentially strategic misrepresentation; all three proponents indicated that the project could not be delivered within the specified affordability cap and prescriptive specifications. At the time, I was totally oblivious to the fact that major programme sponsor teams are affected by optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation, and that these biases are left unchecked in order to secure major programme funding and approvals. After all, if the correct budget was actually put forward, there would be a high likelihood that the programme would not move forward. It was my role to deliver a fully compliant bid within the given affordability cap, even though that meant perpetuating the optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation within the consortium I was representing and the parent company I worked for. Securing such a prestigious contract was part of my remit and given my consortium’s significant investment into the bid process, failing to secure the contract was not an option—even though this could have meant significant losses during the implementation phase.?

Kahneman identified the twelve biases that a leader should keep in check before making decisions and hold close as they lead teams or programmes. As a leader, I failed to keep at least four of these biases in check. By attempting at all costs to bring our bid within the affordability cap, I perpetuated the planning fallacy by having an overly optimistic view of our consortium’s ability to deliver the commitment included in our fixed-price, date-certain bid. I do not believe I employed strategic misrepresentation, but that was more due to my ignorance of these biases than any active efforts not to misrepresent. Another bias I was not aware of as I was leading the consortium was disaster neglect. In this case, disaster would manifest as significant financial losses to the consortium if they were unable to deliver in accordance with our proposal. Finally, I believe anchoring bias also affected my leadership by “anchoring” my view of the programme to the client’s view without questioning them. Specifically, I never questioned if the affordability cap was unrealistic given the specifications provided by the client.?

How Leaders Deal with Their Biases

As major programme leaders, we cannot remove biases from our day-to-day decision-making process since they are inextricably built into our cognitive behaviour. However, being aware of the existence of these biases allows leaders to build fail-safes into their leadership style. For instance, I now consciously listen to people who disagree with me and make every effort to understand their perspective. Seeking alternative diverging viewpoints can help reduce the effects of my personal biases. For many years, I have subconsciously tried to implement an outside view process when data is presented to me, utilizing simple and crude comparative analysis (benchmarking) to lead me to my ultimate answer. This approach allows me to question the data presented to me in a constructive way, irrespective of the validity of the outside view methodology; the mere fact that an alternative approach is considered allows leaders to question what is in front of them and therefore make more informed decisions.?

Leading Through The Unexpected

In my personal experience, the relationship between contracting parties was never very collaborative; it was professional, cordial, but very contractual. It never felt as though there was a common sense of purpose, instead the two organizations were focused on enforcing their contractual rights, real or perceived. During the construction phase of the project, I wondered why the two project teams could not work together more collaboratively. I have always assumed that the commercial and legal structure of the programme, including an insufficient programme budget for the reasons discussed earlier, created a litigious environment not conducive to collaboration. However, reflecting on the situation using Goffee and Jones’ definitions of culture, I now believe there might have been further extenuating circumstances that led to a lack of collaboration, including the programme’s legal and commercial structure.

I believe there was a clash of cultures between two diametrically opposed corporate subcultures present within the two contracting parties. Utilizing the descriptors developed by Goffee and Jones, it has become clear that one party has a corporate culture that falls in the “networked” category, where there is high sociability and low solidarity. On the other hand, the other party’s corporate culture was “mercenary,” with sociability and solidarity at the opposite end of the spectrum. This may be due to the fact that the latter is a temporary organization set up with the sole purpose of delivering the major programme on time and on budget, as well as ensuring returns for the parent companies that own it.?

Employees in a networked organization value solidarity and therefore, seek out that camaraderie when working together. Employees in mercenary organizations are more focused on getting the work done. These different cultural needs created a clash of cultures in the programme. Furthermore, mercenary organization employees expect high performance and have a high degree of accountability for programme outcomes, while employees in networked organizations tend to contest performance measures. On the major programme I was part of, this clash created a high level of mistrust between the employees of the two organizations. These subculture clashes manifested themselves when the programme faced unforeseen challenges such as the inability to prove that the system was ready for revenue service. This is to be expected from an organization with a high degree of solidarity where individuals come together to achieve a common outcome despite their lack of social relations. This is just one example among many of how subculture clashes can influence programme outcomes.

As programme leaders, understanding and managing corporate subcultures is a very important task. Being able to bridge the cultural gap between two clashing subcultures is even more important. In order to do so, I believe programme leaders must possess a high degree of emotional intelligence and apply it in everyday leadership tasks. First of all, programme leaders must be aware of their own level of emotional intelligence as well as how they are perceived by other people. Furthermore, programme leaders must use their emotional intelligence to close the gap rather than exploiting the cultural gap for their own interests. Failure to bridge the subculture “gap” will result in a dysfunctional major programme environment where collaboration breaks down and an already complex endeavour is made even more complex by organizational cultural differences.?

Programme Delays Will Happen

Major programmes have been defined as complex adaptive systems (Nair, A., & Reed-Tsochas, 2019). and therefore require adaptive leadership. During this particular? major programme, leadership of the two key parties failed to provide such adaptive leadership; instead, they focused on solving problems as if they were purely technical.?

For instance, one major challenge faced by the programme was a delay in the completion of the construction phase. Heifetz and Laurie describe the work that leadership must do to identify and tackle adaptive challenges. As a member of the leadership team, I failed to stand back from the programme and assess the nature of the adaptive problem at hand; instead, I focused solely on the technical challenges associated with the programme. Being part of this major programme showed me that when dealing with adaptive challenges, the simple solutions within immediate reach are rarely the right solutions because an adaptive solution requires collaborative input from multiple sets of individuals.?

Becoming a Better Leader

Reflecting on my own experience applying the three-leadership framework retrospectively solidified my understanding of the situation and allowed me to see day-to-day issues in a different light. Here are my three biggest takeaways:

1. Biases impact decision-making. And in major programmes, certain biases can shape programme outcomes from the very beginning or even doom the major programme entirely if irreversible decisions are made.
2. Adaptive problems require more complex solutions. These solutions revolve around leadership rather than technical intervention. Technical intervention typically manifests itself in the adoption of heuristics, since these are readily available and implementable.
3. Subcultures matter. Subcultures can affect an organization’s performance, and clashes between organizations with different subcultures can have disastrous effects on the outcomes sought by both organizations.

As leaders, if we want our major programmes to succeed, we must set up the right cultural environment, remain aware of human biases, and implement systems and procedures that counter these human tendencies.?

Furthermore, as programme leaders, we must challenge ourselves on a daily basis to avoid falling victim to our biases or neglecting adaptive work simply because it requires more effort and ingenuity. Embarking on solving adaptive problems requires a high degree of emotional energy and even physical energy, since the solution to an adaptive problem will require more time and effort to be implemented.??

So, I ask you simply: What will you do to be a better leader?