Voices from the Field: Wildland Fire Managers and High-Reliability Organizing Mindfulness

[Note: this is a repost and major update of a really old summary which had a different format back then]

Abstract

Wildland fire management agencies manage wildland fires for resource benefit while protecting firefighter and public safety. Firefighting fatalities and property damaged by wildfires prompt reviews aimed at preventing similar accidents.

The principles of high-reliability organizing (HRO) have been used to analyze such unexpected, high-consequence events. However, fire managers who agree to the value of an HRO framework often have difficulty applying and teaching it.

Using data gathered from experienced fire managers, we identify salient examples that illustrate each HRO mindfulness behavior. We then focus on specific language choices encountered in these examples and suggest how these choices might add to the applicability for both HRO theorizing and practice.?

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From the full-text article -

In relating the five HRO behaviours to interviews: (I’ve only picked a tiny number of examples)

·????????Preoccupation with failure: One firefighter said they are a “worst case scenario” person, continually creating bad news for himself. Another firefighter recalled a close call he had which forced him to size up fires differently.

·????????Reluctance to Simplify Interpretations: Firefighters need to simplify complex environments to get work done, but must also be wary of over-simplifying, since this attenuates information. One example of reluctance to simplify is fire managers consciously pausing to question the applicability of their standard operating procedures. Questioning automatic routines allow them to “complicate simplifications”, remaining sensitive to novel events. Rules of thumbs, as embedded in SOPs, are both necessary to successful fire operations but also “leave a lot out”.

·????????Sensitivity to Operations: This was highlighted with firefighters developing cognitive maps in collaboration with peers, in order to estimate fire behaviour (intensity, rate of spread etc). This allows individual operators to check, verify and adjust to each other’s perceptions.

·????????Deference to Expertise: This HRO behaviour was linked to fire operators having an environment where they could discuss one’s strengths and weaknesses with coworkers, building credibility. As one fire manager recalled “by publically admitting his ‘‘weaknesses,’’ helped his coworkers more easily establish his expertise and credibility” (p7). It’s said that “deference to expertise is ‘‘not just an issue of content knowledge’’ but is closely aligned to credibility, trust, and attentiveness” (p7).

·????????Commitment to Resilience: This was seen in examples of fire operators “‘[growing] from episodes of resilient action’’ (p7). One specific example was a fire manager that took advantage of learning from every opportunity possible including news articles etc.

In discussing the findings more generally:

·????????“When literal language does not suffice to explain complex, tacit, or otherwise hard-to-articulate concepts and ideas, fire managers … use figurative and imaginative language to shape thought and action.” (pg. 10).

·????????“When fire managers needed to imagine and communicate highly uncertain hypothetical scenarios, like those that would mark a preoccupation with failure, figurative language, especially exaggeration, was used. Similarly, when language became worn or overused and ceased to have the intended effect, fire managers deliberately changed their language to initiate a change in thinking in others.” (pg. 10).

·????????To clarify on the previous point: ‘‘Near misses’’ became ‘‘near kills,’’ wildfires became animals that could easily escape their fences [control lines], tense political situations, both personal and organizational, became moments ‘‘to fall on your sword’’ and to get ‘‘nicked.’’ In each case, these fire managers were stretching their language to jolt themselves into thinking freshly about wildfires, and to renew their own sources of resilience” (pg. 10).

·????????Identifying and critiquing language is said to be an important step in driving how metaphors, and discourse more generally, can help or hinder our ability to increase doubt or doubting (e.g. preoccupation with failure). An example of a metaphor was fire being thought about as a wild animal, such that its unpredictable and always potentially dangerous.

·????????The authors suggest that while training in mindfulness is important for developing HRO-mindfulness, it is a difficult thing to accomplish. Instead, the authors argue that in order to develop resiliency, it is far more effective through in-depth and focussed conversations that allow reflection.

·????????Furthermore, it is argued that workshops that permit conversations about contradictions, ironies, organising practices and specific tasks and consequences helps to sustain people and organisational systems.

·????????On the previous point, discussions about the meanings associated with the language used in the operational setting, and in particular regarding the anticipation and containment of unexpected events allows an opportunity to reflect on how language reflects and influences our thinking.

·????????Group sessions involving a discussion of language provides an opportunity to unpack how language “both reflects and influences our thinking” (p11). It’s said these discussions can help “enhance critical attributes of HRO-mindfulness by more deeply defining what each person means when they are using the same words. ‘‘Words,’’ note Weick and Sutcliffe (2007), ‘‘can limit what you see and report” (p11).

Link in comments.

Authors: Thomas, D., Fox, R., & Miller, C., 2015, Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal.