VOICES OF THE COSTA CONCORDIA (PART 3) DAMAGE AND DECISIONS.

Captain Michael Lloyd, RD**, MNM, CMMar, FNI, RNR.

The Scole rocks ripped a hole down the ships port side damaging the hull in the way of 5 compartments.The damage was catastrophic, although unknown at the time. The ship had been built to SOLAS 90 regulations which specified that the number of flooded compartments the vessel would survive would be 2. 

The Hull damage was a length of 53 metres (from frame 52 to 125) and variable width up to 7.3 metres. 

Compartment No. 5 completely flooded in minutes, with rapid flooding occurring in Compartment 6 and progressive flooding of Compartments 4, 7 and 8. The flooding of these five compartments quickly increased the ship's draught so that deck 0 started to be submerged. This was the termination deck for the bulkheads so water also started to enter WTC No. 3 through a stairway connecting deck 0 to Deck C. 

The flooded compartments contained a number of critical systems such as main diesel generators, ballast and bilge pumps, electrical propulsion motors. The flooding of these compartments resulted in black out of main electrical network, loss of propulsion and various high capacity sea-water service pumps.6 compartments flooded within 40 minutes. 

Watertight Doors

Costa Concordia had 16 watertight bulkheads at frames 28, 36, 60, 74, 100, 126, 140, 156, 180, 196, 220, 236, 252, 264, 284 and 308 however 9 bulkheads at frames 28, 36, 140, 156, 180, 196, 220, 236 and 252, had two doors making a total of 25 . This is a large number of doors for the size of the vessel

W/T doors.  MSC.1/Circ.1380, 10 December 2010 Annex

 Guidance for watertight doors on passenger ships which may be opened during navigation.

1.1  Watertight subdivision is vital to ship stability and survivability to protect life, property and the marine environment in cases of hull damage after collision or grounding. The number of openings in watertight bulkheads on passenger ships is to be kept to a minimum in accordance with SOLAS regulation II-1/13.1 (previous SOLAS regulation II-1/15.1).

1.2 In order to maintain watertight subdivision, while allowing for the safe and effective operation of the ship, all watertight doors are to be kept closed during navigation, except in certain limited circumstances. SOLAS regulation II-1/22.3 (previous SOLAS regulation II-1/15.9.2), allows a watertight door to be temporarily opened to permit the passage of passengers or crew, or when work in the immediate vicinity of the door necessitates it being opened. In this case, the door must be immediately closed, when transit through the door is complete or the work is finished. Additionally, SOLAS regulation II-1/22.4 (previous SOLAS regulation II-1/15.9.3) permits certain watertight doors to remain open during navigation but only if considered absolutely necessary to the safe and effective operation of the ship's machinery or to permit passengers (*) normally unrestricted access throughout the passenger area (*).

SThis determination is made by the Administration after careful consideration of the impact on ship operations and survivability. 

Simone Canessa, the ship’s navigating officer, , says in her statement, "The opening of W/T doors was standard practice during navigation to make it easier for those who were working to come and go".While this is not contrary to MSC 1/Circ, the responsibility is now transferred to the ships staff, which means the hotel side of the organisation, as to which doors can be opened and when.

It should be noted that immediately on impact with the rocks, the Captain ordering the closing of both the watertight doors in the bow and the engine room just after the collision and then again sometime later another order to “Shut the door’s. Shut all the watertight doors immediately.”This also indicates that the leaving of W/T doors open was common practice on board.

In the case of the Costa Concordia the flag state administration (Italy) allowed some watertight doors to be kept open at sea if deemed necessary. These exceptions are Watertight Doors 7, 8, 12, 13 and 24. The only doors indicated as open at the time of the accident were 12 and 13, which were located near the laundry on Deck B. These two doors were apparently closed by order of the Captain. However, we know from the evidence presented, that a door in the engine room was open.

Other doors in the damage zone were opened and closed by crew to assist with their escape. All watertight compartments are fitted with emergency escape trunks but these may not have been reachable. 

On Tuesday 12 November 2013 Mr Hugo di Piazza,a technician in the engine room, told the trial; 

"Before he could phone the bridge, he was hit on the shoulder by a 10-metre jet of seawater. He then managed to close a watertight door, only to see water seep underneath it, before he found a stairway, which was blocked, possibly due to the buckling caused by the collision",he recalled.

Di Piazza, who was on his first shift in the engine room, said he opened another door from which water was gushing, before finding a safe route to higher decks as the water swirled to knee level. 

Another engine crewmember Mr Tonio Borghero, said the engine room was flooded within 20 minutes of the collision.

The nature of the incident was so fast that it necessitated the opening and closing of W/T doors in order to escape and secure the engine room.

While the hull was damaged over a length of 53 meters, the report does not say if the watertight integrity for this whole length was affected. Many ships have had quite severe damage to their hulls without losing the watertight integrity in those compartments adjacent to that area. While the opening and closing of W/T doors is not good practice, the reality is the ship had an inadequate subdivision and a lower achievable survival state. Greater subdivision, or better longitudinal bulkheads would address the issue of raking side damage as recommended by Lord Mersey I the Titanic inquiry a hundred years ago.

Regardless of this, because of the extensive hull damage, the eventual loss of the ship was inevitable, especially as, through the failure of the emergency generator, it was not possible to use the pumps, the watertight doors would have had no effect on the final loss of the ship although, if doors were open, as seems to have been the case in the engine room, then there obviously was contribution to the rapidity of the flooding resulting in a decrease in the time those had on board to abandon the vessel.

 It should be noted that any ship intending to approach land and navigate at such a close distance should have all the watertight doors closed well before closing on the land and during the close passage no doors should have permission to be opened.

TimeLine

21 45 07 the ship collides into the rocks. The speed decreases to 8.3 knots, the ship loses propulsion of the two engines, and adrift, proceeds in a direction of 350 ° 

21 45 33 master orders W/T doors closed.

21:46:05 the emergency generator that provides power starts only for 41 seconds. 

2150; Blackout.

21:55 Bridge advised at least three compartments flooded. the computer software used for the calculation of stability (NAPA), despite the dedicated UPS, is not working.

The Emergency Generator.

With the loss of power from the main generators due to flooding, the emergency generator was essential to keep the emergency functions of the ship such as the pumps, lifts, and essential bridge equipment.

Three Electricians testified that all lifts reached their scheduled deck after the blackout however one elevator was found by the speleologist divers with the doors opened, and bodies were found on the bottom of the shaft. This suggests that the doors wereopened on this lift, when the emergency switchboard was connected in the forced mode at around 22.15. 

“There were people stuck in the lifts screaming so we climbed up the large staircase.”

Monique Maurek, 41, and her husband Anton. Both journalists.

IMO does not have any special inspection or operational requirement for elevators on ship. However, the SOLAS Convention chapter l, part B (Surveys and certificates) requires that it is established that all equipment is in satisfactory conditions and fit for the service for which it is intended, so that would also include elevators. Considering the number of lifts that continue to grow with the sizes of these ships the lack of any specific legislation regarding their operation is totally reprehensible.

Decisions

As those of us who have been involved in critical emergency situations, the first decisions often formulate the outcome. This is not a time for ‘management team’ decisions as all now rests with the command. It is something that we should all be prepared for but on merchant ships, very few are, and, too often, indecisiveness and hesitation can cause in the first breach of the chain of command.

It is well known that disasters and catastrophic crises strongly affect human behaviour:

"People undergoing a crisis or dealing with the aftermath of a disaster are normally, well-functioning people who are struggling with the disruption and loss caused by the disaster. They do not see themselves as needing mental health services and are unlikely to request them." Because of this, it is important that those treating individuals undergoing a crisis learn to recognize the common reactions to a traumatic event. Reactions can include changes in behaviour, physical well-being, psychological health, thinking patterns, and social interactions. The following signs, symptoms, and reactions are common psychological responses to a crisis or traumatic event: disbelief, emotional numbing, nightmares and other sleep disturbances, anger, moodiness, and irritability and forgetfulness."

The Captain has just suffered a most severe traumatic shock. Certainly more than most people have ever endured.

‘Immediately after a traumatic event, it is common for people to feel shocked, or numb, or unable to accept what has happened.

Shock  - when in shock you feel:

·      stunned or dazed or numb

·      cut off from your feelings, or from what is going on around you.

Denial - when in denial, you can't accept that it has happened, so you behave as though it hasn't. Other people may think that you are being strong or that you don't care about what has happened.

Over several hours or days, the feelings of shock and denial gradually fade, and other thoughts and feelings take their place’

The Royal College of Psychiatry

In this case the trauma resulting from the accident was increased by the guilt.

‘Patients with a higher level of shame and guilt at the start of treatment displayed a higher level of PTSD symptoms over the course of treatment compared to other patients’.

Trauma-related shame and guilt as time-varying predictors of post traumatic stress disorder symptoms during imagery rescripting. A randomised coltrolled trial. Asle Hoffart and Tomas Formo Langkaas. Oslo University.

“The captain appears to have succumbed to “normalcy bias”, where disbelief and overconfidence obscure realities too horrible to contemplate. “He wanted to believe things were not as bad as they looked, minimising problems and stalling decisions, while giving or receiving information. And then the command structure simply collapsed,”

It is well known that disasters and catastrophic crises strongly affect human behaviour:

"People undergoing a crisis or dealing with the aftermath of a disaster are normally, well-functioning people who are struggling with the disruption and loss caused by the disaster. They do not see themselves as needing mental health services and are unlikely to request them." Because of this, it is important that those treating individuals undergoing a crisis learn to recognize the common reactions to a traumatic event. Reactions can include changes in behaviour, physical well-being, psychological health, thinking patterns, and social interactions. The following signs, symptoms, and reactions are common psychological responses to a crisis or traumatic event: disbelief, emotional numbing, nightmares and other sleep disturbances, anger, moodiness, and irritability and forgetfulness”.C

areProfessor David Alexander. The Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction 

These comments are supported by the bridge officers.

Captain Schettino called Roberto Ferrarini, the head of the crisis unit of Costa Cruises, the Genoa-based company that operated the ship.

“Roberto, I took the ship past Giglio. Palombo was telling me ‘sail close, sail close’. I hit the rocks. I’m destroyed, I’m dead, don’t say anything to me.’’

First mate Giovanni Laccarino, said that the Captain put his head in his hands and told the officers on the bridge: “I messed up”.

During the trial,Mr Laccarino told the court that he was using his Play station in a crewmate’s cabin when the ship hit the rocks.He rushed to the bridge, where instruments showed that the ship had lost propulsion, but was surprised at the captain’s calm demeanour.

"He was completely lost," he said. "He was out of his routine mental state. He was under shock. He wasn't the person I knew."

Ms Canessa, the navigator, also said Captain Schettino showed chronic indecision as he contemplated the loss of his ship.

“I was saying to him very insistently that he needed to do something, to give the general emergency signal, but he was telling us to wait,”she told the court. “even as officers screamed at him to do so”, said Canessa. "He told us to wait, he didn't give us answer," she said.

Capt. De Falco of the Coast Guard stated that;

“following the contact that took place between the person in charge of the Company, Mr Paolo Mattesi present in the operations room and Capt. Schettino, it was decided to send another person, subsequently identified as Officer Martino Pellegrini, since the captain did not appear to be lucid.”

‘Video of the chaos on the bridge that night later surfaced, and while it sheds little light on Schettino’s technical decisions, it says worlds about his state of mind.“From the video, you can tell he was stunned,” says John Konrad, a Nautical Analyist. “The captain really froze. It doesn’t seem his brain was processing.”

In an interview with the Naples daily newspaper Il Mattino, Gianluca Marino Cosentino, medical officer on board the Costa Concordia, also mentions the long delay before abandoning ship and accuses Schettino,"Everyone was looking for the captain. As a doctor, I thought he appeared upset and no longer rational. He did nothing to coordinate the rescue. Personally, I was very surprised to see Schettino out of uniform on the quayside after midnight. During the rescue operations on land I could be identified easily because because of my uniform.”

The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that Captain Schettino was suffering from traumatic shock syndrome and was in a mental state of denial therefore, obviously, incapable of taking any decisive action. This was supported by video evidence of the chaos on the bridge. As this was recognised by two officers on the bridge, then this should also have been recognised by the Staff Captain who was also present. It was therefore his duty to assume command while the Captain was in this state. The question must be then why didn’t he?

The Captain’s mental state and the Staff Captain’s failure to assume command was never mentioned or discussed at the initial inquiry or the trial or even the appeal. Yet this contributed to the delay in sounding the general alarm calling all to their muster stations and ultimately the delay in abandoning the vessel and to the deaths and injuries to the passengers. This delay was the central part of the charges of manslaughter against the Captain.

Traumatic shock is well recognised by the armed forces as well as in the emergency services, yet not by the merchant navies. 

Advice to the passengers

Shortly after the blackout at 2150, passengers were told that the ship was suffering a "blackout", but that the situation was under control. Following the massive jolt and noise caused by the original collision, and the subsequent blackout the initial message to the passengers via the public announcement system was as follows; 

“Ladies and gentlemen, your attention please, I speak on behalf of the Captain, we are currently in a blackout experience an electrical fault. At this point the situation is under control”. 

At some point, passengers and crew started spontaneously putting on lifejackets, and assembling in the lifeboat areas. 

Again, a member of the crew, under the captain’s command, informed the passengers that; “We kindly ask you to return to your cabin or if you prefer you can stay in the lounges. Once we’ve finished addressing the problem that we have the electrical problem with the generator everything will be fine. This is why we have these emergency lights. Everything is under control. If you wish to remain here, that’s fine but I kindly ask you to return to your cabin and stay calm”. 

This was despite the fact that the ship had a noticeable list and it would have been obvious to most on board that there was more than just an electrical problem.

These announcements were a clumsy attempt to avoid panic, however, as it was obvious to all on board that the situation was far more serious, the promulgation of such false information instead began a loss of confidence in the shipboard leadership. As the delay in any decisive action continued, passengers now began to make their own decisions regardless of those in authority. 

Indeed, it was a passenger, not the bridge staff, who alerted the shore authorities. 

First Report

Somewhere on the ship, an Italian woman named, Concetta Robi, took out her cell phone and dialled her daughter in the central Italian town of Prato, near Florence. She described scenes of chaos, ceiling panels falling, waiters stumbling, passengers scrambling to put on life jackets. The daughter telephoned the police, the Carabinieri.

Rescue Services Response

The Coast Guard Headquarter of Livorno, home to 2nd Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre has responsibility over an area corresponding to the surface of the region of Tuscany. The Rescue Centre of Livorno is the element of organization that at 22:06 received the news of unspecified problems on board the Costa Concordia by Prato Carabinieri station. These were, in turn, informed by the mother of a ship passenger that reported the collapse of a portion of a room ceiling and also spoke about an order given to passengers for wearing life jackets. 

Following this, the coast Guard Headquarters, through the operations room of Livorno, established a first contact with the ship, which was followed by many others, on VHF channel 16, in which the coast Guard received misleading information from aboard the ship, apparently intended to minimize the risk on board as well as the true scale of the emergency.

The rescue efforts were now about to begin.