Vietnam War History
I was with A-1-16 Infantry 1ID 66-67. This article is the result of my historical research and personal experience. The photo is from Life Magazine.
General William DePuy and the Vietnam War
In March 1966, General Westmoreland stood up a new organization, the II Field Force, a Corps type command, to be over the 1st Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the newly arrived 25th Infantry Division. He gave this command to Major General Seaman and placed his MACV operations officer (J3), Brigadier General William DePuy, in command of the 1st Infantry Division.
A highly decorated battalion commander of the 90th Infantry Division in WWII, DePuy considered himself an expert on infantry tactics. Much of these tactics he learned from the German Army while fighting them during WWII. He was also a practitioner of covert operations, having served with the CIA during the Korean War. One of his assignments at the Pentagon just prior to his transfer to MACV was Director, Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS).81
DePuy had already played a major, though hidden, role in the events leading up to the Gulf of Tonkin incident that was used by President Johnson to justify a major escalation of the war, the introduction of American combat troops in Vietnam. He was also an architect of Westmoreland’s strategy of attrition and the ‘search and destroy’ tactics to attain it.82
The counterinsurgency strategy of ‘clear and hold,’ or the ‘oil spot’ concept of securing the civilian population, did not interest him because he said, “We didn’t know how to do counterinsurgency very well and we had white faces.” He wanted the ARVN forces to do that job, but, since we had trained them, and ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people’ was only practiced at that time by the communists in Vietnam, this would be a losing proposition.83
Both Westmoreland and DePuy came of age in the European Theater during WWII. Westmoreland was an artilleryman and DePuy an infantryman. Neither of these men ever served in combat at the battery or company level nor had they ever fought in the jungle, nor had they fought guerrillas. The culmination of their war experience was the dash across France with Patton’s Third Army—the gold standard for army leaders in years to come. They would take the expertise they had developed and refined in fire twenty years earlier in Europe and use it to try and destroy Ho Chi Minh’s jungle fighters.
General Nguyen Chi Thanh
General Thanh left Hanoi and arrived in South Vietnam in 1964. He was a ‘political’ General and it doesn’t appear that he ever saw any infantry combat. He discarded General Vo Nguyen Giap’s recommendation that a mix of guerrilla warfare and big unit fighting should continue until the south was deemed ready for a general uprising that would put an end to the Saigon regime.
Instead, Thanh pushed for a big unit war against the ARVN and its American advisors. Thanh was the perfect match for Westmoreland and DePuy. He wanted big battles with the South Vietnamese Army, hoping to destroy it before the Americans introduced combat troops to the war.
He continued his ‘Big Unit’ war tactics when the 1st Infantry Division arrived and continued to throw his troops against U.S. firepower until his death in July of 1967. After his death the hard-liners in Hanoi approved launching the General Offensive/General Insurrection resulting in the TET Offensive of 1968.
General Thanh’s tactics were simple: “One slow, four quicks” described: slow planning, quick advance, quick attack, quick battlefield clearance, and quick withdrawal. Thanh said, “A battle should last only 15 to 20 minutes.” He directed the use of the slogan, “Grab the enemy’s belts to fight them,” for all VC and NVA forces on the battlefield. Thanh’s tactics were a perfect match for General DePuy’s ‘rules for combat.’84
DePuy’s Rules for Combat
DePuy took command of the 1st Infantry Division on 15 March, 1966. On the 27th of March he published this tactical directive for his subordinate commanders: “The term ‘pinned down’ is no longer part of the vocabulary of the 1st Division. During the first five to ten minutes of a meeting engagement, the chances are the VC will have the advantage. He will initiate combat at the place and time of his choosing--usually from prepared positions.
“After the first five to ten minutes, the combat advantage will begin to shift rapidly in favor of 1st Division forces as additional fire power is brought to bear. Under NO circumstances, repeat, NO circumstances will the forward element in contact withdraw in order to bring artillery fire on the VC. The base of fire will stand fast and reinforce if necessary. Contact will be maintained if necessary throughout the night.”85
General DePuy Takes Charge
General DePuy knew Westmoreland wanted to use the U.S. troops to fight the enemy forces that had been overwhelming the best ARVN units. While serving as the MACV Operations Officer, DePuy believed that General Seaman wasn’t aggressive enough in his efforts to make contact with the enemy. He said, “I knew the difference between what the division was doing and what was expected of it. It was clear to me that he (Westmoreland) wanted me to get cracking.86
“It was my idea to go after the Main Forces wherever they could be found and to go after them with as many battalions as I could get into the fight—what was later called ‘pile-on.’ To do that required a very agile and fast moving division, a division which was, in fact, airmobile. My initial efforts were to create just such a division.”87
General DePuy’s command style was different from General Seaman’s. Seaman’s command post was at the division headquarters; DePuy’s was in a helicopter circling the battlefield. Since many of Seaman’s officers remained with the division, he heard about the negative things being said about his tenure as division commander before DePuy took over. BG James Hollingsworth, DePuy’s assistant division commander, was quoted as saying that he and DePuy had been sent there “To clean out the damn 1st Division and organize it.”88
That they did. Hollingsworth got the ball rolling when he relieved Seaman’s former aide. By December of 1966, they had relieved nine lieutenant colonels and two majors; seven of the LTCs were battalion commanders. Terms such as being “DePuyed” and “the midnight Chinook” were used to describe the consequences of running afoul of them. Lower ranking officers and NCOs also felt their wrath and a climate of ‘career-fear’ fell upon the division.89
DePuy Gets ‘Cracking’ Operation Abilene
DePuy’s first opportunity to ‘get cracking’ came when he launched Operation Abilene, a two brigade search and destroy mission. On 11 April, C-2-16 Infantry made contact with a small element of the D800 VC Battalion. After medevacing their wounded, Charlie Company began to set up a night defense perimeter, about 100 meters from the D800 base camp. Around sunset, the VC attacked with mortars and heavy machine guns before launching several ground assaults. The fighting continued through the night.
The next morning Charlie Company counted forty-one dead VC in front of their positions. Their own losses were 34 KIA and 72 WIA. Charlie Company went into the fight with 134 men and came out with 28. General Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff came to Vietnam shortly afterwards and told DePuy that, “The American people won’t support this war if we keep having the kind of casualties suffered by Charlie Company.”90
Operation Birmingham followed Abilene in the last part of April and continued until 16 May. Two brigades were moved into Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border. There were several contacts resulting in the estimated deaths of 425 VC and the capture of 130 weapons. U.S. casualties were 62 KIA and 324 WIA. He sent the 3d Brigade to Loc Ninh on 19 May where three battalions conducted search and destroy operations until 26 May with no contact.91
Operation El Paso II/III
On 2 June, DePuy launched Operations El Paso II/III. The first contact was at Ap Tau O on 8 June, when the 272d VC Regiment ambushed Alpha Troop, 1-4 Cavalry on Highway 13, 85 miles north of Saigon near Quan Loi. The VC lost 93 men and the U.S. forces lost 14 KIA and 37 WIA. On 11 June the 2-28 Infantry fought with a battalion of the 273d VC Regiment north of Loc Ninh. The VC lost 98 dead and the U.S. losses were 33 KIA and 33 WIA.
On 30 June, once again north of Loc Ninh on Highway 13, the 271st VC Regiment ambushed B Troop, 1-4 Cavalry. C Troop fought their way into the battle and the two Cav troops held their ground while airstrikes and artillery hammered the VC on both sides of the highway. The 2-18 Infantry conducted an air-assault nearby and the VC retreated, then returned two days later and attacked the 2-18 Infantry perimeter.
The infantry held their positions while airstrikes and artillery pounded the VC. When they retreated they left seventy-eight dead and the total for the three day fight was 270 VC dead. The U.S. casualties were nineteen KIA and ninety-four wounded. The U.S. troops captured forty small arms and twenty-three crew-served weapons. The VC knocked out a helicopter and eleven armored vehicles including four tanks.92
Minh Thanh Road
Believing that he could lure the VC into attacking the Cav again, DePuy sent B and C Troops, 1-4 Cavalry and Bravo Company, 1-2 Infantry down Route 245 from An Loc toward Minh Thanh. This was a clever trap laid by DePuy based on information given to him by his G2 (Intelligence) officer LTC LeGro.
LeGro was aggressively collecting information from many sources. From a prisoner captured by the Special Forces, he learned that the 272d VC Regiment was moving along Route 245. The prisoner said he was on his way to dig holes along the road when he was captured. LeGro was also getting daily reports from a signals intelligence unit that was following the same VC unit by direction finding their radio signals.
LeGro and DePuy decided to tell the ARVN District Chief that they were sending a troop of the Cav to escort some engineers and their equipment from Minh Thanh to An Loc. They reasoned that whatever they told the ARVNs would quickly reach the ears of the VC. DePuy staged five infantry battalions and most of the division’s artillery within striking distance of the suspected ambush site. Airstrike and artillery concentrations were planned.
At 1100 hours on 9 July, as the column continued southwest on Route 245, the VC sprung their ambush with three battalions of the 272d VC Regiment firing from the north side of the road. The Cav and infantry pulled into a defensive perimeter and fought for their lives. The airstrikes and artillery were bringing effective fire on the VC almost immediately and DePuy maneuvered his infantry units in an attempt to surround the VC regiment and annihilate it.
When the enemy retreated into the jungle, they left 239 dead, eight prisoners and fifty-four weapons. U.S. Casualties were reported as 25 KIA and 113 WIA. Operation El Paso II/III continued through September and resulted in 825 VC dead, the destruction of hundreds of base camps and supply depots, and the capture of tons of rice and other supplies.93
DePuy was especially pleased with the results of the Minh Thanh Road battle and the way it had been brought about. He even wrote a lengthy article for the division newspaper. He hoped to lure the VC into traps like this again and he had his G2, LTC LeGro working day and night toward that goal.
Effort verses Results
General DePuy had his maneuver elements in the field almost continually, trying to find and engage the VC with his superior firepower. Every night Arc-Light B-52 bombing runs shook the ground like an earthquake and left long straight lines of bomb craters, which, when filled with water looked like iridescent turquoise jewels from the air. During the nightly shooting sprees, harassment and interdiction (H+I) fire missions rained down thousands of artillery shells on suspected enemy locations in the jungle such as trail junctions in what were called ‘free-fire zones.’94
Years later, General DePuy looked back on his efforts to engage the VC in battle. “I guess I was surprised a little bit, too, after I took over the division, about the difficulty we had in finding the VC. We hit more dry holes than I thought we were going to hit, they were more elusive than I had expected and they controlled the battle better. They were the ones who usually decided whether or not there would be a fight.”95
81--Gole (General William E. DePuy-Preparing The Army For Modern War)Pages 75, 97, 138, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY: 2008
82--Ibid Pages138-142
William E. DePuy (Changing an Army-An Oral History) Page 130, CMH, DC 1988
83--Ibid Page162
84--Wilkins (Grab Their Belts To Fight Them-) Pages 22, 39
85--Brig. Gen. William DePuy (Commanders Notes #1) HQ, 1st ID, 27 Mar March 1966 See Appendix 1 for the complete Notes #1-2
86--Gole (General William E. DePuy-) Page 169
87--DePuy (Changing an Army-An Oral History) Page 138
88--Gole (General William E. DePuy-) Pages 170-171
89--Ibid Pages 170- 171,173,180-181
90--Ibid Page 170
91--Wheeler (The Big Red One-) Page 435-436
92--Ibid Pages 437-442
93--William LeGro (Interview) Pages 335-337 The Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive Oral History Project Conducted by Laura Calkins, Ph.D. October 31, 2005
Wheeler (The Big Red One-) Page 440-442
94--Hay (Vietnam Studies-Tactical and Material Innovations) Page 32
Gole (General William E. DePuy-Preparing the Army for Modern War) Page 181
95--DePuy (Changing an Army-An Oral History) Page 160