VBIED

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are likely to be very varied in explosive type, quality & charge size. It is convenient to subdivide the IEDs into vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) & personnel-borne IEDs (PBIED). Typically VBIEDs may contain as much as a few hundred kilograms of explosives whilst PBIEDs, as they have to be carried, will not contain more than perhaps 20-30 kilograms of explosives. For the purposes of explosive effects it makes little difference whether the IEDs are delivered or used as suicide devices. The location of an IED relative to the target is crucial as blast effects from an external explosion diminish very rapidly with distance & the effects of an internal explosion are magnified as the blast is confined.

The predominant threat criteria are the charge mass & the range (stand-off distance) from the IED to the target. Both criteria are infinitely variable & fundamentally uncertain as both are chosen by the terrorist & are therefore outside the control of the building owner or the authorities.

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) offer maximum damage over other types of IEDs because of the amount of explosives it contains. A VBIED attack rapidly depletes first responder resources, tax command structures & overwhelm emergency medical services.

Whether detonated by timer, remotely or by suicide operative, the VBIED is primarily designed to maximize structural damage to property & local infrastructure, creating widespread disruption & publicity. Human casualties are inevitable with serious & fatal injuries being caused by blast effects, structural collapse & high-velocity fragmentation. The main causes of catastrophic structural damage & serious or fatal injury result from the direct physical effects of an IED & subsequent building collapse or flying & falling debris.

Terrorists are looking to have their attack create the maximum amount of civilian casualties so that this spreads terror & negatively impacts the economy of the target.

• High-Profile Residences
• Well-known & symbolic business headquarters
• Malls, Amusement parks, stadiums or historic sites attracting large crowds
• Critical infrastructure where the blast will produce devastating effects

The 2002 VBIED attack on the gas facility in Tel-Aviv was calculated to have the potential to cause an explosion that would have incinerated everyone in the entire northern neighbourhoods of the city. It was extremely fortunate that This VBIED failed to correctly detonate when triggered to detonate by cellular phone & was subsequently discovered by perimeter security. In this case, the bomb had been planted in a delivery truck where the driver was completely innocent while it was parked outside the facility at night.

The unfortunate fact is that any crowded place can be a potential VBIED target. UK’s National Counter Terrorism Security Office has identified the following types of premises as being at particular risk:

? Bars, pubs & clubs

? Shopping centres

? Stadia & arenas

? Visitor attractions

? Cinemas & theatres

? Hotels & restaurants

? Major events

? Commercial centres

? Education

? Health

? Places of worship

Types of VBIED threats

There are 5 main types of VBIED attacks – all can be deployed with or without the use of suicide operatives.

• Parked vehicles. Controlled & uncontrolled parking facilities for unscreened vehicles adjacent to a site pose a significant problem in terms of blast stand-off distances against VBIEDs.
• Encroachment is where a hostile vehicle negotiates through an incomplete line of defences without the need to impact. An alternative form of encroachment is the exploitation of an active/retractable barrier system at a vehicular access control point by a hostile vehicle “tailgating” a legitimate vehicle through the access control point.
• Penetrative attacks use the front or rear of the attack vehicle as a ram & have been used for criminal activity & terrorist attack to breach a target.
• Deception techniques rely on human weaknesses. For vehicle-borne threats this may be by the use of a trojan vehicle, whose model, livery or registration is familiar to the site or by hostile occupants working their way in on a pretence or by using stolen or cloned access control or ID passes. Alternative scenarios include an unwitting mule/delivery driver delivering an IED surreptitiously planted by an attacker or an insider threat bringing a device into their own work site.
• Duress against the occupant of a legitimate vehicle to carry a hostile payload or duress against a guard controlling an access control point.

POTENTIAL VBIED INDICATORS

• License plates inconsistent with vehicle registration
• Obviously carrying a heavy load, heavy rear end
• Modification of truck or van with heavy duty springs to handle heavier loads
• Rentals of vans with false papers for dry runs
• Rental of self-storage space for the purpose of storing chemicals or mixing apparatus
• Delivery of chemicals directly from the manufacturer to a self-storage facility or unusual deliveries of chemicals to residential or rural addresses
• Theft of explosives, blasting caps, or fuses, or certain chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives
• Chemical fires, toxic odors, brightly colored stains, or rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotel/motel rooms, or self-storage units due to chemical activity.
• Small test explosions in rural wooded areas.
• Treatment of chemical burns or treatment for missing hands/fingers.
• Untreated chemical burns or missing hands/fingers.

Suicide VBIED Attacks

On April 18th 1983, a car that had been watching the US Embassy in Lebanon drove a few blocks & flashed its lights to an explosives laden truck waiting for that signal. Within minutes, 63 Americans were dead & hundreds more were injured from the VBIED attack.

The success of this attack encouraged enemies of the US Peace mission in Lebanon to employed a far deadlier attack. In place of a 900kg bomb used against the US Embassy, a 5,400kg bomb was used against the Marine Barracks which killed 242 Americans & caused the US to leave Lebanon.

Al-Qaeda quickly realized that they had unearthed a smart bomb to rival anything in high-tech military arsenals. Unlike a Cruise or Tomahawk, the suicide driver can divert, call-off or simply postpone his mission. Terrorists learned that they could achieve their goals using this indiscriminate but very powerful weapon.

Riyadh

Not content with lethal roadside bombs such as a car left with a flat-tire or its hood up or parked under a building, terrorists have developed new MOs.

Terrorists have evolved the crash & blow approach into a full-scale operation designed to penetrate any security barriers. In May & November 2003, terrorists using VBIEDs assaulted multiple targets in Riyadh which were occupied by foreign workers. Post-incident investigations of these incidents indicated that the attackers drove up to each target killing those guarding the target gates with small arms fire. VBIED's were then driven into the target areas & detonated. The teams involved with executing these attacks conducted extensive pre-operational surveillance of the compounds selected. Careful, meticulous planning & pre-operational surveillance are trademarks of VBIED attacks.

In each attack, multiple armed terrorists were used to eliminate the security elements guarding the compounds so the suicide element could then drive a VBIED into the desired location & detonate it. There is also evidence that the terrorists fired shots in the air to lure victims out of their dwellings & to windows in order to maximize casualties. The split-second timing among the reported attacks in Riyadh clearly indicated that trained & dedicated teams carried out the attacks.

The Iraq war has showed that VBIEDs were still being used with deadly effect. US Forces & private military contractor (PMC) teams in country use several methods to deal with this hazard when they are on the road. All personnel in a vehicle maintain a 360 degree view at all times to remain constantly alert, looking out for potential attacks, varying routes & times, switching lanes at random.

The methods of different VBIED attacks & construction of the devices are described in publications by Al-Qaeda & are available on several extremist websites. This information is easily available to anyone with an interest. Any of the methods described could be used in a terrorist attack. The design & implementation of VBIEDS are only limited by how much the bomber has surfed the Internet.

Terrorist (hostile) Surveillance

The objective of conducting hostile surveillance is to collect crucial information necessary for planning an attack. Recognizing the types of hostile surveillance terrorist's use would help to develop plans to more effectively thwart such attacks.

Fixed surveillance is carried out from fixed positions like a nearby building, business or other location. In fixed surveillance scenarios, terrorists may establish themselves in a public location over an extended period of time or choose disguises or occupations such as street vendors, tourists, repair or deliverymen, photographers or even demonstrators.

Mobile surveillance means observing & following targets, or non-mobile facilities (driving past a power plant to observe the building or compound).

In progressive surveillance the terrorist will follow a target or observe part of a building for a short period of time from point A to point B, withdraw for a few days or weeks, before resuming surveillance from point B to point C. This surveillance process will continue until the terrorist develops target suitability &/or noticeable patterns in the target’s movement or vulnerability.

More sophisticated surveillance is accomplished over a longer period of time. A tape discovered in Indonesia, possibly compiled over months, demonstrated the patience used to compile a viable plan & the attention to detail. Watching carefully where US personnel get on their transports & detailing every possible detail that could help the attack, even manhole covers, the narrators points out in great detail how the attack might unfold.

All technologies available to the well-trained security or investigation teams watching for this type of activity are also available to the terrorists. Terrorists also use advances in technology such as modern optoelectronics, communications equipment, video cameras, drones & other electronic equipment. Almost everything is available commercially via mail order, including military night-vision devices, sophisticated GPS systems, cellular phones & radios to overhear any kind of communication on any frequency.

Blast Loading

A explosive detonation produces waves in the air & the ground, creating shock waves & ground waves. The principal damage mechanism of an explosion is a supersonic shock wave that propagates radially from the blast source like a bubble. An explosion within or immediately nearby a building can cause catastrophic damage on the building's external & internal structural frames, collapsing of walls & shutting down critical life-safety systems. Loss of life & injuries to occupants result from blast effects, structural collapse, debris impact, fire & smoke.

Blast Mitigation

Blast stand-off distance is the single most important factor in determining the extent of damage that can be caused by an VBIED. Blast stand-off is used to keep a potential VBIED away from protected assets thus limiting the damage caused by blast effects. The ability to maximize this distance will always be site-specific, but early consideration in the design process will enable optimum solutions to be achieved.

It may be unaffordable to PROTECT the building & only practicable to MITIGATE the effects of potential terrorist attacks. Depending on the geometrical situation around the protected building the stand-off distance can be increased by using several architectural & urban planning measures. Therefore, there is a need to have agreed threat levels so that designers can agree with building owners the level of mitigation that is to be achieved. The average cost of designing for blast resistance in new structures is far less expensive than the cost to retrofit an existing structure to similar standards. A point to remember is when retrofitting mitigation measures in an existing built environment, it can be difficult to create & maintain ideal stand-off distances. Adequate blast stand-off distances can be enforced through the use of physical barriers & effective traffic management. Careful planning is required as every additional metre of stand-off has a significant influence on the ability to mitigate blast.

Reducing hostile vehicle approach speed, significantly mitigates the threat from penetrative vehicle-borne attack.

In more constrained sites, emphasis should be given to site or district-wide security, avoiding direct approach routes, managing maximum vehicle approach speed & installing threshold hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures. These would include arranging exterior vehicle barriers & roadblocks to change traffic patterns near facilities, security vehicles to be parked randomly near entrances & exits, & monitoring by vigilant security staff. Security teams should drill for the type of attacks commonly used by terrorists. Examining every vehicle coming into a parking lot, especially underground should be standard practice in certain facilities.

The main effort should be directed to changing the mindset of those on the security teams that must deal with the fact that 99.9% of their efforts are routine & uneventful. It is crucial to keep everyone sharp & aware of the dangers of VBIEDs. Complacency kills!

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Endro Sunarso is an expert in Security Management, Physical Security & Counter Terrorism. He is regularly consulted on matters pertaining to transportation security, off-shore security, critical infrastructure protection, security & threat assessments, & blast mitigation. He is also a Certified Identity & Access Manager (CIAM).

Endro has spent about 2 decades in Corporate Security (executive protection, crisis management, business continuity, due diligence, counter corporate espionage, etc). He also has more than a decade of experience in Security & Blast Consultancy work, initially in the Gulf Region & later in SE Asia.