What's behind Uzbekistan's Afghan policy?

For the first time in my nearly 25 years covering Uzbek foreign policy and the country’s relations with the West, I sat down with a top Uzbek diplomat for an extensive interview inside the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself. On a recent visit to Tashkent, I made a request, heard back within a few days, set the date and time, and then hoped they would not cancel at the last minute. And they did not. Dunyo Information Agency, the ministry’s press arm, assisted me at its media center. I strongly encourage the Ministry to grant these kinds of interviews regularly – and to do regularly scheduled press briefings, in-person and online, so that those covering Uzbekistan and the region can engage both action officers and decision-makers on issues related to the country’s diplomatic goals, strategies, and policies. And of course, the ministry should be open to interviews with both domestic and foreign media.

The topic of the interview was the fate of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan’s embattled neighbor, which is increasingly unstable, beset by the prospect of American withdrawal and competition among the outside powers, and is a perennial concern for Tashkent. I discussed Uzbekistan’s Afghan policy with Ismatilla Irgashev, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.

Here are the highlights of our conversation:

It took a change in leadership in Tashkent in 2016, says Irgashev, to refresh and renew Uzbek policy toward Afghanistan. Specifically, the government now takes its cues from President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who has a personal focus, concern, and interest in Afghan issues.

Irgashev has 30 years of experience inside the Uzbek diplomatic system. He served as Deputy Foreign Minister in the late 1990s, then as Tashkent’s Ambassador to China and Mongolia for four years. He returned to become President Islam Karimov’s point person on Afghanistan but only for a year. Then, he was sent to Baku as Uzbekistan’s top diplomat and stayed for eight years. In 2012 he left the government but was called back in the spring of 2017 to take on his current role.

Irgashev stresses Mirziyoyev’s role in answer to my question about change in Uzbek-Afghan relations and the evolution of Tashkent’s posture. It takes, he claims, “one passionate leader to make a turn in foreign policy, keeping in mind the interests not only of his country but the entire region as well as the great powers.” Many in the Uzbek system have Afghanistan experience, born of the crucible of the Soviet war in that country and the chaotic decades that followed in its wake. And these people, he says, had wanted a policy shift for a long time. They hoped the Uzbek leadership would listen to them about what was and wasn’t working, take their recommendations into account, and change course by becoming open to more communication, cooperation, and assistance to Afghanistan, instead of just limiting Uzbekistan’s role to little more than a transit area for international actors fighting a war and bringing in their own foreign assistance.

Tashkent now prides itself on a more robust and multidimensional Afghan policy. And this new approach is in sync with Uzbekistan’s Western partners, specifically the United States, but respects Kabul’s and Washington’s interests while also maintaining open channels of dialogue with Afghanistan’s armed opposition, the Taliban. 

Irgashev argues that Uzbekistan has a balanced approach and that its close ties with Taliban militants does not hurt Tashkent’s credibility with those who still regard them as an extremist or terrorist group. “Whether you like it or not, admit it or not, the Taliban is part of Afghanistan, still fighting for a political role … It took a long time for our partners, including the United States to come to terms with this reality. We are happy that we pushed for a dialogue and helped in the process.”

Like Washington, Tashkent hopes that the current peace talks, slow as they are, will take Afghanistan to a better, more stable, more secure and prosperous place. “We know the situation is not going to change overnight. There are very deep disagreements and fundamental differences of view about how Afghans should continue as a people and Afghanistan as a state … We look at these talks as an initial step.”

Irgashev also argues that the international community should not assume that Tashkent has an exclusive relationship or a strategy toward the ethnic Uzbeks in Afghanistan. “They are not a diaspora. They are the people of Afghanistan. We look at them as Afghan citizens,” Irgashev stress, admitting that there are cultural and historic ties but denying that Tashkent uses them as its proxy in Afghan politics.

Irgashev claims that Marshal Abdurashid Dostum, who is ethnically Uzbek, is no more of an ally than are other political leaders in Afghanistan. “Dostum is honored and given a high status by his own government, so we obviously treat him as an important figure.” Irgashev admits that Dostum plays a critical role in Afghan politics and says the leadership in Kabul always seeks his support. That, he says, is because he represents the Uzbek part of Afghan society, with all of its complex political, economic and social dynamics.

Tashkent is deeply committed to the ultimate goals of peace and prosperity in Afghanistan, says Irgashev, and will continue to assist it, despite Uzbekistan’s own energy crisis and economic challenges at home. “Our neighbor needs us, and we will support them as much as we can, because we strongly believe that peace and economic development go hand-in-hand.”

Irgashev says that President Mirziyoyev has tasked him to do whatever is necessary to make sure that none of Uzbekistan’s partners on Afghanistan doubt or question Tashkent’s vision for that country, for itself, or for Central Asia writ large. For Uzbekistan, he says, Afghanistan is now an integral part of this larger region.

Does Uzbekistan really believe that war will come to an end in Afghanistan and that Kabul can emerge as a reliable partner? Irgashev says “yes,” and offers a vision of how a peaceful Afghanistan can link Uzbekistan and other countries in the region to the rest of South Asia, including Pakistan and India, which would, in turn, offer landlocked countries access to seaports and global supply chains.

Tashkent hopes that the Biden Administration will keep three common interests in mind as it shapes its Afghanistan policy: peace and security, economic development, and regional connectivity. These three goals are intrinsic to Afghanistan’s future and connect to the regional components of a strategic partnership between the region’s countries. Indeed, those are the main priorities in the C5+1 platform for dialogue between the Central Asian countries and the United States. 

Why, I ask, does Tashkent trust the Taliban, anyway? “Because we have common interests with them as well,” He replies. Indeed, Irgashev claims, the Taliban “want peace in their country. They want peace with us as a neighbor. They want to have constructive relations with the world. They want to rebuild their country.” He stresses that all those ostensible Taliban goals are in line with what Uzbekistan, too, wants for Afghanistan.

Still, Irgashev points me to a more practical consideration for Tashkent than a just a belief that the Taliban has “good intentions”: the fact is, he says, the Taliban has promised not to threaten or attack Uzbekistan and its neighbors … “We believe in that promise. Breaking that promise will be very costly, they know,” says Irgashev, arguing that the Taliban does not want conflicts with Tashkent, or anyone else in the region, for that matter. That is precisely why the Taliban are now at the negotiating table, concludes the Uzbek diplomat.