UVL II - Nooks and Bits

The second terms of UVL are bound to renew, but actually we dont know a lot about what she wants and what is important to her. During her first term, she met complexity with tolerance, and by developing principles to deal with it, keeping an open mind. She is a good leader, but at the same time, there is a need to reflect on what Strategies the EU should pursue in the next legislature in the light of the challenges and opportunities facing the EU to have a clearer understanding of what is required for the success of the European integration project.

For me, the case is simple: the EU needs to tighten and sharpen its strategies in the next transformational phase of the European integration project. And good design is about how the EU can move forward and how the EU's interests can be advanced.? The same ambition and determination displayed during the Ukraine war is necessary, which has concentrated minds and presents an opportunity to consolidate the European integration project. My approach is compatible with Hugh Blane's The Seven Prin-ciples of Transformational Leadership: Create a Mind-Set of Passion, Innovation, and Growth. The EU Commission should assume the role of European executive rather than being a hybrid organiza-tion. The evolution of the European integration project will lead to organizational adjustments so that strategies and corporate design match each other to achieve organizational goals.

Below is an excerpt from my political platform from my aborted campaign to represent Venstre-ALDE, which I lost to the incumbent Asger Christensen, part of which has already been taken on board e.g. the annual foreign economic report has been subsumed under the Letta-report on competiveness as part of a daily power practice. The next phase will be Mario Draghi's report. There will then have to be one on the forging of a european political economy before a research project of a european capitalism with its own objectives and values are adressed. There is a sequence to this, and it is bound to be integral to the overall exercise.

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My key issues:

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1.????? EU Strategy towards reform of the UN Security Council

2.????? Vision Group on the crucial second and third phases of the EU Defence Policy

3.????? Annual External Economic Report of the European Commission with EU and Member State Competitiveness project portfolio

4.????? Multi-Bilateral Policy Review of the EU’s Strategic Partnerships

5.????? European Media and Film Strategy

6.????? The creation of an EU Centre of Excellence in Metropolitan Governance

7.????? Gov. eu program

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1.????? EU Strategy towards UN Security Council reform

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The EU’s policy objective is to reform the UN Security Council to create one seat for the EU in the UNSC. It has identified a mechanism to achieve success through a dialogue with its strategic partners. The European Commission communicated this in 2019 (link: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_622).

But the EU needs a strategy to realize its stated policy objective based on a reflection on how the EU-UN Partnership can move forward and how the EU can pursue its interests. Therefore, I propose a three-pronged strategy comprising.

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-A European approach including climate diplomacy, further IMF reform, energy governance, and state-market and cost-benefit analysis of the UN Human Development goals (Copenhagen Consensus).

Incorporation of Germany's UNSC initiative ( Link: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-organisationen/vereintenationen/reformsr/231604)

-Further development of Nathalie Tocci's UNSC policy has informed the EU's official line as contained in the EU Global Strategy, which is built around environmental diplomacy and leveraging the EU and Member States' contributions to the UN budget.

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This involves a weighing up of what values are essential in the UN and, at the same time, relates to the facts in Europe and a reflection on the obstacles to reform of the UN Security Council. In the energy field, I identify a blueprint for back-to-back state-market action so that the EU can better engage in the tug-of-war between producers and consumers of energy more effectively. The relationship between the IMF and the EU has changed in the monetary field. In the area of development, economic theory must be used to analyze allocations so that money maximizes the welfare of as many citizens as possible. There are thus several layers to how the EU can strategize towards reform of the UN Security Council with a seat for the EU, Brazil, and India—evolution, Incorporation, and Recollection. I have written an article on the subject, which you can read more about here (embed pdf. file JMPP paper EU strategy on reform of UNSC). From this can be derived the seeds for formulating scenarios for the evolution of the international monetary system: $-hegemony, €-$-dominance, €-$-Y-tripolarity, a multipolar "managed float.” The aim is to create a renewed and updated excel-lent power governance. This seems to be the transatlantic consensus in a world that is in-creasingly interdependent and, at the same time regionally differentiable - in a spirit of unity in duality, duality in unity.

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2.????? Vision Group for the second and third phases of Europe Defence

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As you may be aware, the origins of EU defense policy are seen as a Franco-German compro-mise or great power bargain. Germany would gain influence over French defense policy in re-turn for German acceptance of Turkish membership in the EU. The development of defense policy is enshrined in Article 42 of the Treaty, which lists three stages: (1) common security and defense policy, (2) EU defense policy (3) common defense. All three stages of development must be compatible with the obligations of NATO members under the Washington Treaty, while Member States provide EU soldiers to the EU. The Strategic Compass covers the first stage, the Common Security and Defence Policy (link: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-copass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/).

There are three problems with the Strategic Compass: First, military strategy is about linking and balancing objectives, courses of action, and resources, i.e., the means must be sufficient to realize politically determined dreams through the intended methods of action. The Compass is uncertain whether it has the standards and the deployment of the deploy-.ment capability, and other forces are done without a secure perspective on the organization of an operational headquarters to manage the EU's military and civilian missions. Military power can be defined as the ability to exercise specific combat missions in a given situation. The deployment capability must be logistically integrated and backed up by drones and aircraft to be deployable and able to exercise control over government centers, control maritime lines of communication and operate and project power from the air and space. As this is not the case in the first phase, the EU's security and defense policy is reduced to missions in Europe and its surroundings at the lower end of the spectrum. The EU must make active and agile use of military force, while the territorial defense of Europe is delegated to NATO, but this is not what the operational scenarios envisage. They are geared toward getting Member States to deliver on investments in a few strategic enablers. My policy is that the EU must be able to intervene in areas like Transnistria and Gaza. I, therefore, expect the EU's military institutions to plan, allocate and deploy military assets to fulfill this policy.

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Second, the regional security environment has worsened while competition intensifies globally. Europe needs to recognize the consequences. The EU needs hard power to assert itself in Europe and the world's hot spots. However, the strategic compass does not link threat analysis with military strategy and war operational principles. A serious military actor can increase its military power with a principled approach to using armed force as an instrument of statecraft. These operational principles are (1) Objective Defining the objective and ensuring that every military action contributes to its realization (2) Manoeuvre gaining a positional advantage (3) Surprise unexpectedly attacking one’s opponent (4) Mass concentration of military power to achieve superiority (5) Economy of force ensuring that secondary effects achieve sufficient force only as necessary (6) Offensive seizing the initiative or temporary advantage (7) Security ensuring that one's forces are well protected (8) Simplicity Avoiding complicated plans and forms of communication(9) Unified command the placing of the direction of war under one politico-military authority to avoid conflicting interests (Echevarria Military strategy). Progress on individual principles must be integrated with performance to harmonize strategy, operations, and governance. Otherwise, the EU's military posture will not be coherent,t and it will not be possible to move from a common security and defense policy to an EU defense policy from phase one to phase two.

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Third, in military terms, integrated and community-based approaches are a work in progress. The Strategic Compass is a work program - not a strategy. A strategy is about how an organization will move forward. Making a strategy is about figuring out how to advance an organization’s interests—and explaining to the public why the organization should pursue its objectives. This requires the integration of the entire foreign and security policy palette and even interweaving diplomatic, economic, military, and domestic policies to realize long-term interests: the unification of Europe, stable borders, and the building of a state-like fiscal-military actor.

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EU Defence Policy 2030-2040

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As can be seen, a European security and defense policy is primarily a matter for govern-ments. Nevertheless, it would benefit from a more significant role for the EU institutions in stabilizing relations between France and Germany so that the threat picture matches military capabilities for the EU to fulfill the mandate of the TFEU42 and respond to acute threats outside the Union's territory. How can the EU become more involved in the second phase of the European Defence Policy?

The first idea is to strengthen TFEU222 so that the President of the European Commission can deploy EU soldiers whenever the EU Member States are hit by terrorism and natural disasters in a spirit of leadership, solidarity, and presence. The second idea is for EU pro-grams and foundations to be set up to realize strategic enablers such as refueling, long-range sea and air transport, and surveillance. The third idea is to merge DGs and offices dealing with crisis management, security, and defense under a single defense commissioner. The fourth idea is to make the EU's rapid reaction force (EUFOR CROC) a more permanent and operational force rather than a hypothetical object of study in force catalogs as it is today. The fifth idea is to set up a proper military intelligence DG and a smaller EU Centre for Targetting. This could eventually lead to the Europeanisation of France's nuclear weapons targetting policy in laying the foundations for a European defense policy, thereby forestall-ling attempts by Germany to play to zero in a renegotiation of the European settlement belonging to a bygone era. The sixth idea is the contradiction between integrated and Community-based approaches in the strategic compass and what happens in reality. The Commission must thus incorporate the EU's capabilities in the military domains with the actual deployment capabilities under the European Defence Policy. The seventh idea is to identify why the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is kept separate from the EU and France’s price for transforming EI2 into an EU and NATO-certified force. The eighth idea is to integrate the EU's three defense funds under one EU budget line or a mix of the prune on the desk and cigar boxes as in the development area. The ninth idea is introducing proper treaty provisions for a standard arms export policy. The tenth idea is to create a joint Franco-German naval corps of 10,000 men to permanently contribute to the European Maritime Force. The eleventh idea is to strengthen the EU Security and Defence College, integrating language training in the EU's ten strategic partners with an enhanced curriculum and strengthening the College's external relations.

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In short: institution-building, policy development, political will and a proper military strategy, and a principled approach to the use of armed force as an instrument of statecraft are what the EU needs because nothing in this world can be taken for granted.

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COMMON DEFENCE 2040-

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Nobody knows what phase three - a common defense - will look like, except that the European Council (EC) is competent to decide unanimously to establish a common defence. A united Nordic Region in a strong Europe could be one of the objectives, e.g., a Nordic procurement of a hangar, a Nordic bark, to which Germany would submit, Russia learns to live, and the UK take note of. Denmark could house an Indigenous People's House on the North Atlantic Docks in CPH, and an EU Centre for Meteorology and Oceanography in a new headquarters with DMI.

There could be joint patrolling of submarines in EU territorial waters, while an EU Navy could be in the world's oceans. An EU Land, Sea, and Air Command has been proposed. An actual European army of 1.4 million men is unlikely to be negotiated with the Member States. Still, all officers and recruits in the Member States should be able to take courses in person and online at the EU's security and defence college. Airspace could be patrolled in peacetime by the EU and in the event of war by the EU and the US. Sea, land, and air exercises with the EU's ten strategic partners could be organised. In time, the EU could be equipped with a nuclear strike force.

The underlying issue is peace in Europe, the interpretative context of EU defence policy is the German question and the potentially explosive issue of building supranational political leadership in Europe. Therefore, the battle for Europe's military order is also about the EU's political end goal, at the crossroads of French Brio-sans Competence and German Genie ohne Weissheit. I say these words out of an interest in a better and broader understanding of the origins of the European integration project in war and peace in Europe. It is a question of striking a balance between the "right" and the "good" to recreate a new well. Therefore, let us set up a vision group to make proposals for the crucial second and third phases of European Defence. The European Union is neither a security subcontractor to NATO nor a junior partner to the United States, nor should the United States play on the antagonism between France and Germany as part of a divide-and-rule policy in Europe. Therefore, transatlantic policy capacity in the defence policy area is essential. However, explaining why policy and organisational changes are necessary to achieve strategic success in developing an autonomous military capability is also crucial; after that, Europe's defence profile must be normalised, Europeanized, and adequately resourced. This is my second key issue.

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3. Annual External Economic Review

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The European Commission has long been interested in formulating an external economic policy and organised a conference in 2009 (link: https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/events/event14709_en.htm). More recently, Germany and the Brueghel think tank have put forward ideas on the same topic (https://www.brughel.org/book/instruments-strategic-foreign-econommic-policy). This is a sure sign that the EU has lost its way. There needs to be more leadership in Europe. So, it is urgent to clarify whether there is a contradiction between the two approaches or whether they can be harmonised. I favour the formulation of an annual Foreign Economic Report with a project portfolio at the European and Member State levels in the field of competitiveness. This further developed the competition pact, in which the Member States were given a list by the EU institutions from which they could draw inspiration. Competition from Asia is increasing. Asians are full of self-confidence, while Europe is characterised by doubt. Europeans once ruled the world. Today, they are no longer masters of their own houses. For two decades, "we have crawled along the skeleton of the planet, forgetting History and even the obscure migrations of the forgotten age" (Carpentier The Lost Steps) while the world's suburbs wait to take over from their former colonisers. In addition, there is a policy review of the EU's Competition Policy and formulating an Economic Security Strategy. The legal basis for a foreign economic policy statement could also be Article 21(2)(h) of the Treaty, which states that "the Union shall define and implement common policies and shall ensure a high degree of cooperation to promote an international system based on enhanced multilateral co-operation and good global governance.”

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4. Multi-Bilateral Policy Review of EU Strategic Partnerships

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The EU has concluded ten strategic partnerships with the USA, Russia, Korea, Japan, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, and Canada. Due to the gradual establishment of partnerships, a common strategy for the EU's Strategic Partnerships has never been formulated, so it has been left to the civil service to adopt a pragmatic and flexible approach. The European Commission prepared so-called Progress Reports on some Partnership countries under Lady Ashton for some time, but this practice was quickly forgotten. Most recently, the EU's management of Strategic Partnerships and communication with strategic partner countries have been criticised in a book that is part of a series edited by my thesis supervisor Professor Knud-Erik J?rgensen (link: The European Union's Strategic Partnerships: Global Diplomacy in a Contested World (The European Union in International Affairs): Amazon.co.uk: Ferreira-Pereira, Laura C., Smith, Michael: 9783030660604: Books). The EU is not doing it well enough and seems to have become a quitter in global diplomacy. I have written about this in a paper on EU Strategic Partnerships, proposing four areas of effort to set the EU’s SP-ship on the proper keel in an interdependent and rapidly changing business world characterised by increasing geoeconomic competition between big players in a daily power practice, which is subtle but not without horizon, humble but not without ambition (Embed Office document EU's Strategic Partnerships paper). At the same time, there is a need for a multilateral framework around the EU Strategic Partnerships, an EU11, and an EU-led international society. This could follow on the heels of revitalising an international community in the Middle East, the likely heart of a global diplomatic community (Insert? PDF paper Diplomacy in Antiquity). There is the Chinese concept of a “new type of power politics”? (xin xing dagou guanxi), launched in 2013, which had a defensive aim to prevent an Asia-Pacific system directed against China but which was perceived as a power grab by the US and therefore rejected by Washington upon which relations went off the rails. The EU must act as an independent international actor with its own objectives and interests and not limit itself to promoting human rights. Historically, there are no permanent winners and losers in global politics. I submit that an EU-led international society is the second-best solution implemented with delay to a new type of significant power policies and that the EU’s interests are linked to both restorations of EU leadership in world affairs and to a peaceful transition from unipolarity over non-polarity to multipolarity in the international system. The EU needs to weigh in to ensure a multipolar world becomes as democratic and quiet as possible. Thus, there is both unfinished business and responsibilities to assume. I am prepared to lead that effort.

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5. Towards A European public sphere: EU film and Media strategy

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A European public sphere is needed between civil society and the European political system. Media or the press is a form of democratic awareness: community-building and mutual accommodation between the governing and the governed. Freedom of expression helps to support open societies and produce autonomous, rational, and loyal citizens, according to the philosopher Immanuel Kant. He further refers to the formation of cosmopolitan public contingency as the more effective way to ensure that rights are consistent with human dignity. The K?nigsbergers believed that the value of political development is derived from what different nations and governments have contributed to the goal of citizenship. The transition from government to governance means that states are no longer central actors. The new institutions are slowly becoming Europeanised as people feel a sense of community and as a function of the expected democratisation of European integration. The European Parliament has studied the possibility of a European public sphere in the EP elections. At the same time, the European Commission has adopted an audio-visual directive. It expects the Euro-Pean Media Freedom Directive to be adopted at the end of the mandate to create better transparency and coordination and strengthen ERGA, the national media regulator of the Member States, within a European framework. The EU is now ripe for creating a truly European public sphere, a cosmopolitan one. I am ready to take the next step and the EU one level higher.

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I, therefore, propose that a European Film and Media Strategy be adopted with, among other things, the following elements: (1) European Media Directive (2) Restructuring of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) into an agency of the EU subject to the general guidelines of the European Commission (3) Designation of five European news media installed on EU citizens' TV sets such as Euronews, Arte & F24. (4) Europeanisation of France24's shows (Office file embedded) in combination with the privatisation of the ownership structure of France24 and new HQ with a Museum Centre for Languages (5) Strengthening the European streaming industry (6) Tripling the MEDIA Programme (7) Film studio and Media and Film School in Provence (8) Strengthening EU journalism in the newsroom of member state news institutions, included through the use AI to stitch the European public sphere together under EBU’s European perspective-project. I have written a pamphlet on the subject, which is for sale on Amazon, where you can read more ( Embed the link EU's ICT Strategy: - A POLICY BRIEF eBook: ILCUS, Christian: Amazon.co.uk: Books). In it, I propose, among other things, to create and integrate a European public sphere comprising citizens, social media, media, business, and the EU. Or, to quote Niall Ferguson, those in the Tower must both take responsibility for Europe and heed the social networks that have historically challenged political leaders and often won. The EU is not post-modern but a thoroughly modern and rational political construct that has gradually developed in political, economic, military, emotional, and cultural terms.

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6. The creation of an EU Centre of Excellence for Metropolitan Governance

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The European Commission deals with good urban governance in various contexts. There is talk of scattered fencing and Italian aesthetics so political leaders can jump from fire to fire. I find this undignified. Cities contribute 2/3 of the world's population, resource consumption, and CO2 emissions. Many factors that affect the competitiveness of countries and regions - from innovation, education, infrastructure, and public administration - are the responsibility of cities, which could become innovation hubs in Europe. Green transition (link: www.greencities.eu ), New Bauhaus (embed link https://new-european-bauhaus.europa.eu/index_en), and UN-Habitat policy (link: https://unhabitat.org/wcr/) are all three topics to which the EU has devoted attention. Constant investment and nurturing of cities are necessary for regions and Member States to flourish. The speed and breadth with which cities absorb and apply technology through adaptable policies will determine their ability to compete and attract talent and new citizens (Klaus Schwab: The Fourth Industrial Revolution). At the same time, around the world, in Africa, Asia, South America, and the United States, there are often dysfunctional cities with high population growth rates, which means that the urban population could double to five billion by 2050. This presents an opportunity for the EU to serve the world's cities better and more broadly as "our knowledge of the different scenarios and possibilities for the future of cities becomes clearer, the course is adjusted, and change is anticipated. In other words, there is an internal as well as an external and multilateral dimension to EU urban policy. What is needed is a well-structured and disciplined approach at the EU level, not a Chinese-style situation with many competing actors. I, therefore, propose the creation of a new EU agency, an EU Centre of Excellence in Metropolitan Governance. This centre would bring together the different units and offices of the European Commission dealing with urban governance, which are currently spread across different Directorates-General such as DG Regio, DG Environment etc, with a budget allocation of €15 billion between 2014-2020. The Centre will support European cities, including London, Istanbul, and Kyiv, oriented by the European Commission's general policy guidelines and informed by the various urban governance benchmarks (Embed Link: kora-benchmarking-of-koebenhavn.pdf (sm. dk)). The EU must develop its urban policies, partner with and influence the organisations that manage these benchmarks, and integrate them into augmented and better-greased EU policy toward creating climate-neutral and intelligent cities. That challenge is worth more than €300million. I envisage an EU Top Urban100 index and Bottom Urban50 index to be developed and adequately funded in the interest of integrated European approaches to sustainable urban development and developing strategy and competition among European cities. I also propose a 10-12 billion budget allocation for a Brussels building program so that the political capital of Europe also gets the status of a real metropolis: conference and events building, a Media House (IPC), a Museum of Modern European Art, New Opera and Theatre and Houses of EU SP10, so that a happy alchemy can emerge between the different parts of the EU's strategies. For example, William Pedersen could design the House of the USA, Toyo Ito could design the House of Japan, MAD could design the House of China, C P Kukreja could design the House of India, Sergei Tchobano could design the House of Russia, House of Mexico designed by Rojkind Arquitectos, etc. The Africa Museum in Tervuren would be converted from a museum of colonial artefacts into a cosmopolitan cultural, learning, and museum centre for the African Union, designed by David Adjaye.

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7. Gov. eu program

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The EU has adopted a Digital Services Act and a Digital Markets Act, which will focus on how citizens interact with the different platforms and the impact of digitalisation on our societies, provided that European and national data protection authorities function correctly. The European Commission, the Council President, President E, and the European Parliament have adopted a Joint Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles (LINK: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7683 ), a preliminary culmination of the Commission's Digital Transformation Strategy for Europe. The strategy aims to drive digitalisation forward through digital by default, user-centred platforms, the importance of digital skills being present and adequate resources being allocated. It is essential to achieve this through platform technology and that digital transformation supports the other strategic focus areas. Denmark is at the forefront of digitalising public administration, while other member states could be more advanced. At the same time, Europe’s lag needs to catch up in its industrial muscle in the digital industry, unlike China, Russia, and the United States. These few stars are making money and have concentrated money and power in the hands of a few billionaires. A European initiative is needed to change this sorry state of affairs and help Europe stand up for itself. This requires more than just EU programs picking up the crumbs thrown to Parliament by the European Commission. The capacity to generate European Digital Entrepreneurs is needed so that the intelligence and energy of young people are nurtured and beneficial so that the EU can compete with the US and China.

At the same time, there is a need for better digital governance so that the distance between Brussels and its citizens becomes shorter, more relevant, and more democratic without undermining the sincerity and authenticity of the interaction. Finally, there are significant differences in how EU Member States apply digitisation. The EU must, therefore, create and develop a gov. eu platform that manages the digital transformation of the EU institutions and strengthens citizens' involvement in the democratic process beyond have your say diller-daller. So, I will carry out a policy review and ensure adequate resource allocation. I? also propose to switch the EU Executive institution's email addresses from Europa—Eu to gov. eu. I will also arrange for the conduct of systematic online surveys of EU citizens and stakeholders launched by Eurobarometer with the working title Demoscope to employ focus groups and enact better stakeholder management so that the "political market" is properly understood. This will support policy and strategy development in other areas towards the underpinning of purposeful EU public policies, better involvement of the citizenry, ownership and permanence of public data – notably identity-related ones - respect for the private sphere, accessibility of digital services throughout the EU, and ensuring public digital literacy.

What do you think?