The Utria Landing January 1919

The Utria amphibious operation and the liberation of Narva by Estonian forces in January 1919 is a good example of a joint operation. Its characteristics were that of maneuver warfare rather than the attrition warfare which was so common in the years of war from 1914 to 1918. An amphibious landing was used as a means of maneuver to bypass the main enemy forces and psychologically shatter and then collapse them, rather than the common approach of a period of artillery preparation followed by massed frontal attacks. Thes Estonians disrupted Bolshevik command and communications means, resulting in a decisive defeat for the Reds. The operation culminated in driving Bolshevik troops out from Estonian soil, liberating northeastern Estonia from a brutal occupation, and the establishment of a strong, defensible line to protect Estonian territory against a renewed Bolshevik offensive. Additionally, the operation resulted in the Estonians capturing large number of prisoners of war, including Bolshevik divisional and regimental staffs, and a large quantity of captured war materiel including provisions, heavy artillery, an aircraft, field kitchens, locomotives, railway rolling stock, and other transport equipment.[1]

Estonian Background to 1918

Estonia was part of the Russian Empire from 1721 to 1918. Estonia’s population of 1.3 million people, as with other non-Russian groups on the Russian Empire’s western borders, were swept up in a rising tide of linguistic and cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As the Russian Empire fell into chaos after the Bolshevik coup in Petrograd on 7 November 1917, Estonian political leaders saw both the opportunity and necessity of national independence.

On 24 February 1918, Estonia declared independence and a provisional government proclaimed their authority, although the German Army occupied the country and held actual power until 11 November. Their declaration of independence represented an important diplomatic move as it put Estonians in alliance with the Entente Powers (or Allies during World War I), who would treat Estonia as a German-occupied country. German authorities disarmed the Estonian troops and ordered all weapons and supplies held by Estonians turned in to the occupation authorities. Estonian political leaders continued nationalist activities underground, however, and military leaders secured what arms they could into secret caches. Before the Germans occupied Tallinn—the country’s capital on the Baltic Sea—the Estonian provisional government sent out a foreign delegation to London and Paris to gain de facto recognition of their independence. Eight days after the Armistice on 11 November 1918, members of the Estonian foreign delegation requested that the British government send a naval squadron into the Baltic Sea to assist the Estonians and other Baltic countries. The British Foreign Office agreed and instructed the Admiralty to send a squadron to the region. The squadron got underway from Britain on 27 November 1918.[2]

?

The Estonian War of Independence 1918 - 1920

With the Armistice, the Estonian provisional government resumed its activities. German forces agreed to withdraw but were openly hostile to the new Estonian government. Meanwhile, the Estonians organized their government institutions and their armed forces while Bolshevik troops massed on Estonia’s borders.

On 28 November, the Red Army invaded Estonia with a total strength of 12,000 soldiers, using Jamburg and Pskov in Russia as forward bases. To repel the invasion, the Estonian government could only send about 2,000 men to the front without artillery. For the Russians, capturing Narva, Estonia, would be the first step in the drive along the shore of the Gulf of Finland to capture the Estonian capital. Narva was the easternmost Estonian city on the northern end of the 48-kilometer-wide Narva Isthmus between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipsi. The isthmus and the Narva River formed pieces of key terrain from which the northeastern border of Estonia could be readily defended. The city sits on the western bank of the river, which flows from Lake Peipsi into Gulf of Finland. The river is a broad body of water making it impossible to ford having an average width of 250 meters. The river crossing points into Narva from the east at the time consisted of two high railway bridges and a low road bridge constructed of timber.

The Estonian defenders of Narva consisted of 787 troops with three machine guns. Most were defending the river crossing points were deployed in vicinity of the Narva–Tallinn railway line. In the coastal Narva-J?esuu district, with its wide sandy beach, where a Bolshevik amphibious landing was expected, was defended by only 19 lightly soldiers. The Bolshevik force attacking Narva consisted of 2,800 fighters with six artillery pieces, two armored cars, and an armored train. In addition, a landing force of 500–700 landed from the Bolshevik destroyers Spartak (1917) and Avtroil (1917) and two merchant ships. While the main body of the Bolshevik forces came along the railway line from Jamburg, the landing force came ashore at Narva-J?esuu, flanking the Estonian defenders. This force moved west to the village of Mereküla, threatening to cut the road and railway line from Tallinn into Narva.[3] Demolition of the railway bridges across the Narva River slowed the Bolshevik advance. According to Lieutenant Georg Leets, one of the defenders of Narva, “the task of our first line defenders was to resist but not to destroy ourselves, it was to gain time for mobilization and then to respond with an organized offensive.”[4]

Estonian troops abandoned Narva on the night of 28 November and withdrew along the road and railway line to Tallinn. Estonian forces further withdrew into a perimeter in western Estonia centered around the capital of Tallinn, which supported most of the country’s industry and the largest port facilities. Within the defensive perimeter, the Estonian government quickly organized and mobilized all available forces and materiel for the defense of the country.[5]

Simultaneously, the British Foreign Office informed the Estonian government that a British naval squadron was en route to the Baltic to assist.[6] The British vessels arrived in Tallinn under the command of Admiral Sir Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. On 12 December 1918, the first of a 30-ship squadron arrived in Tallinn and, the next day, the first British transport began to offload Lewis light machine guns, naval guns, rifles, and spare clothing. Royal Marines acquainted Estonian troops with the Lewis machine guns as it was considered the best and most reliable weapon of its kind available at the time, and it provided the Estonian Army a great deal of highly mobile firepower. The British also provided the Estonians with a small number of Danish Madsen light machine guns. The Madsen had similar characteristics to the Lewis but was not as easy to operate. The Royal Marine instructors conducting training for the Estonians in the Tallinn Customs House taught young student volunteers on the use of the Lewis gun before they departed for the front lines. Those with experience in from World War I were given more training on the Madsen.[7] The Lewis gun became the standard arms of the armored train assault troops and the amphibious landing forces of the Estonian Navy. ?

The Estonian Navy

The Estonian Navy was quickly organized in November 1918. Its first vessel was the gunboat EML Bobr (1906), a former Russian coastal defense vessel in the port of Tallinn, which Estonian sailors and officers seized from the Germans and rechristened the EML Lembit, an Estonian ancient national hero.[8] The Estonian Navy was assisted by the arrival of the British squadron on 12 December 1918. The Lembit’s first operations were ad hoc raids on Kunda Bay, Purtse, and Aseri behind Bolshevik lines. When the first British vessels arrived in Tallinn, commander of the Estonian Navy, Johan Pitka met with Admiral Alexander-Sinclair and asked him to shell Bolshevik units and supply lines at Purtse, Aseri, and Kunda Bay.[9] According to Pitka, this would “inconvenience the enemy and show that we have a navy.”[10] With Pitka aboard the cruiser HMS Cardiff (D 58) and accompanied by two destroyers, the Lembit arrived at Purtse at dawn on 13 December 1918. The attack proved highly successful, and a barrage of naval gunfire destroyed the bridge across Purtse River. Embarked Estonian observers saw supply wagons smashed, four gun-carriages that overturned and exploded, and a Bolshevik supply column that retreated in confusion. The vessels proceeded to nearby Aseri and Kunda Bay and shelled Bolshevik units.??

With the success of the attacks, Pitka decided to stage an amphibious raid on Kunda Bay using the Lembit, a civilian sloop, and a special service vessel with 32 volunteers making up the landing force on 23 December 1918. The amphibious raid took the Bolsheviks by surprise, with the capture of war materiel and prisoners, including some high-ranking commissars. The prisoners were taken aboard and back to Tallinn. Perhaps the most valuable result from the operation was the intelligence collected on Bolshevik forces and the knowledge that their drive toward Tallinn was culminating as their supply lines were becoming increasingly attenuated.[11]

With the success of the Kunda Bay operation, the Estonians planned another amphibious raid for 25 December 1918 at Port Loksa using the same vessels and a landing force of 120 troops from the navy and the army’s Kalev Infantry Battalion.[12] ?Upon arriving at Port Loksa, as the Estonians were in middle of launching the landing boats, two modern Bolshevik destroyers were observed heading toward Tallinn. The destroyers failed to spot the Estonian vessels, and Pitka continued the landing operation. The landing force scattered the Bolshevik troops occupying the port. At Loksa, the Estonians captured a battalion commander and a Red Army payroll of 28,000 gold rubles. The Bolshevik destroyers that had been spotted prior to the raid ran aground at the entrance of Tallinn harbor and were captured by the Royal Navy. Once turned over to the Estonians, the vessels—rechristened EML Lennuk and Vambola—were readied for action. On 6 January 1919, the Estonian Navy made another amphibious landing at Kuusalu Bay using the Lennuk. The Vambola, in contrast, needed considerable repair and refitting to become fully operational.[13]

In the matter of three weeks, the Estonians formed an operational navy with successful amphibious landings to their credit. In contrast, this task has typically taken a longer time for other small newly independent powers to undertake and more direct assistance from their larger allies.[14] What was Estonia’s advantage? The Estonians had been great mariners in ancient times, but the Crimean War (1853–56) reestablished them as modern mariners. After the Great Northern War (1700–21), because of their loyalty to the Swedes, Russian authorities had restricted Estonians in maritime trades. The destruction of the Russian merchant marine by British and French blockading fleets during the Crimean War made the Estonians a seafaring nation again. The coastal fishermen became experienced blockade runners and were used to making long ocean voyages. Replacing the destroyed Russian merchant vessels with the consent of Tsarist authorities, Estonians became involved in commercial enterprise and gained greater contact with the outside world.[15] This led to the development of what American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan described as a “great population following callings related to the sea is, [which] now as formerly, a great element of sea power,” allowing the Estonians to rapidly develop naval forces in the last days of 1918 and early in 1919.[16] The development of Estonian maritime enterprises was assisted by the opening of a number of maritime schools in coastal towns, the first one at Heinaste (Aina?i) in 1864. Personnel for the Estonian Navy largely came from the experienced pool of merchant mariners, including the commander of naval forces, Captain Johan Pitka.[17]

Cooperation between the Estonian Army and Navy was largely seamless and, in fact, Captain Pitka commanded the army’s first armored train sent to the front.[18] Before becoming commander of Estonian naval forces, Pitka, the consummate nationalist and civic activist, was chairman of the Kaitseliit (Estonian Defence League), a voluntary organization of local defense forces that developed into a territorial militia. In mid-November 1918, members of Tallinn’s Kaitseliit found some railway cars covered with steel plates at the Kopli freight station. This discovery prompted Pitka to put forward the idea of building armored trains in Tallinn’s engineering works and shipyards. This idea quickly translated into action, and the Estonian armed forces, with the assistance of the Estonian Railway Administration, completed Armored Train Nr. 1 on 29 November 1918. It left for the front the following day.

From its very first encounters with the enemy, Armored Train Nr. 1 proved its worth and more armored trains were quickly constructed. On 7 January 1919, the Estonians opened a general counteroffensive against the Red Army. The center of the Estonian advance was supported by four armored trains with assault troops and, from the Gulf of Finland, the Estonian Navy supported with naval gun fire and amphibious landings in the Bolshevik rear area.[19]

The Estonian Counteroffensive January 1919

The main thrust of the Estonian counteroffensive was along the Tallinn–Narva Railway, which followed the coast of the Gulf of Finland. The main highway also ran beside the railway. The Estonian Navy carried out the landing of 320 men at the Port of Loksa to support the Estonian 1st Division’s operation to seize of important railway junction of Tapa, where the railway to Tartu and Valga connected with the Tallinn–Narva line. On the following day, the Estonian Navy staged another amphibious landing at Kunda with the Lennuk and Lembit landing two detachments: one under navy Lieutenant Karl Aleksander Pauluse with 120 men and Major Martin Eugen Ekst?rm with 200 Finnish volunteers. The landing was designed to throw the Bolsheviks off balance and disrupt their communications. The landing took control of the harbor, town, a large cement works, and Kunda Manor was taken the next day. The landing at Kunda and capture of Tapa caused the Bolshevik forces to withdraw eastward toward Narva.[20]

After the Kunda operation, the Estonian Navy made immediate preparations for a new amphibious landing. Given their previous successes, the navy planned with growing confidence. The next destination was to be deep behind the enemy lines to achieve a decisive impact. The first idea was to land at Narva–J?esu because of its sandy beaches and proximity to Narva but also the lack of cliffs made conditions seem quite suitable. However, the threat of an amphibious operation was known to the Bolsheviks, and the Estonians believed the beach at Narva–J?esu to be mined. Therefore, the Utria region was chosen for the landing in spite of unfavorable terrain, including a rocky beach and high cliffs. The switch to Utria was meant to provide the element of surprise as the enemy did not expect an amphibious landing to be attempted in this area. The amphibious landing was planned to have the initial effect of disrupting communications between the Bolshevik front lines in the Vaivara–Sinim?ed area that was defended by 86th Regiment and the Bolshevik base of operations in northern Estonia at Narva. Leon Trotsky, the Bolshevik government’s Minister of War and Marine, reportedly was in direct command of operations in Estonia at Narva. For the Estonians, Captain Johan Pitka commanded the amphibious force, while the 1st Division under Colonel Aleksander T?nisson continued the advance on land to link up with the landing force. A high bridge at Rakvere was being reconstructed by engineers, resulting in the 1st Division advancing without support from the armored trains.[21]

The Utria Landing Operation 17 – 19 January 1919

The landing operation began on 17 January 1919. The landing fleet was assembled at Kunda Bay and got underway at 0315 hrs. The destroyer?Lennuk?had been sent ahead and was laying mines an hour’s sailing time east of Narva – J?esu to protect the fleet in case Bolshevik vessels would make a sortie from Kronstadt. Essentially imposing sea denial on the Bolsheviks. The plan of the landing force was for the main body to take hold of the Utria and Laagna area. One company of Finns (2nd Finnish Company) was to move towards and take Narva-J?esu and move towards Riigi (Riigiküla) and then assault Narva. In the meantime, the Estonian 1st Division would continue its land advance along the Tallinn – Narva Railway aided by the amphibious force disrupting Bolshevik command and communications behind the Bolshevik lines. After laying mines, the?Lennuk?rendezvoused with the rest of the fleet off near the landing area at 1030. The fleet was spotted by Bolshevik forces and an artillery battery at Mereküla and a Red armored train operating on the branch line from Auvere station on the Narva – Tallinn mainline to Mereküla opened fire on the fleet. There were some near misses, but the fleet suffered no serious damage. At 1300, the location of the enemy battery was pinpointed, and it was silenced by the guns of?Lennuk?and?Lembit. The armored train was forced to pull back to the mainline. The landing operation then proceeded without disruption from enemy artillery. As the landing boats came ashore, they were attacked by machine gun fire from the shore. However, the defending troops soon pulled back. As the landing continued, the sea conditions became more and more difficult as winds increased, and waves rose higher. Several of the landing boats capsized and troops had to swim or wade ashore in the cold water. Coming ashore was also difficult because of icy rocks on the beach. Only about 250 to 300 men could be landed by the evening of 17 January and ship to shore transfers had to be suspended.[22]

The naval vessels bombarded the area of Auvere station where they suspected Bolshevik troops were massed. This was the moment the enemy could have thwarted the landing but, enemy forces remained largely passive. Not knowing the exact strength of the enemy in the Utria area and considering that men ashore had very limited ammunition, Captain Pitka radioed the general staff in Tallinn to urge the 1st Division to move faster towards Narva. On that day, elements of 1st Division took J?hvi. Among those who landed were also some local students from Narva who knew the surrounding terrain and thus the assault force was able to operate in the darkness and move inland. On their own initiative, the students from Narva helped to find a better location for landing the boats for the rest of the assault force. Information on the new landing area reported back to fleet at 2300 hours. With the more suitable landing location, the entire force was successfully put ashore by the 1100 hours on the morning of 18 January.

On the evening of 17 January, the landing force took the Utria and Laagna area and Mereküla. Bolshevik attempts to retake Laagna on the morning of 18 January were thwarted. The landing came as a shock and Bolshevik morale was shattered. The taking of Laagna - Utria area cut the communication of the Bolshevik forces in defensive positions in the Vaivara – Sinim?ed area with Narva. The bulk of the 86th Regiment deserted their positions and surrendered to the 1st Regiment of the Estonian 1st Division. On the afternoon of 18 January with the landing force successfully put ashore, the?Lennuk?and?Lembit?steamed to Narva – J?esu and upon their arrival enemy troops in shore positions retreated without resistance. The Finnish companies of the assault force moved in quickly and took Narva-J?esuu and Riigi (Riigiküla) and from there launched an assault on Narva. At 1500 hours the?Lembit?landed a naval detachment on the beach at Narva – J?esu to support the advance of the Finns. The Finns moved rapidly as they had Narva students as scouts who knew the local terrain intimately. Two Finnish companies arrived in Narva between 1720-1840 hours. The city was filled with retreating Bolshevik troops, support units, and headquarters units. Some fighting took place in the city as the Bolsheviks desperately tried to evacuate their forces across the Narva River; they had some success in doing this. Desperate battles took place all night for the most military significant points of the city: the railway station (and related facilities) and the railway bridges.[23]

The Finns seized the wooden road bridge across the Narva River under enemy fire. Elements of the Estonian 1st Division linked up with the assault force. The whole city was under the control of Estonia on the early morning of 19 January 1919, cleared by the elements of the cavalry regiment under the Estonian 1st Division. On the same morning elements of the Estonian 1st, Division’s 5th Regiment crossed the Narva River and took Jaanilinn (Ivangorod) across the river from Narva. Estonian troops continued moving towards Jamburg on the Luuga River. The Estonians captured 35 field artillery pieces, 7 naval guns, 118 machine guns, 2,000 rifles, an aircraft – a Farman FH30, 9 locomotives, 180 railway cars, 4 coastal vessels, 13,000 shells, and a large quantity of rifle ammunition.[24] The speed of the Estonian assault on Narva took the Bolsheviks by surprise, resulting in the capture of Red Army divisional and regimental staffs. The Bolshevik Minister of war, Leon Trotsky, narrowly escaped. Among the prisoners of war were 31 Red commanders and regimental commissars.[25] Other captured material included heavy machine guns (most likely 7.62 mm Maxims) with repair parts, horses, supply wagons, 12 field kitchens, 9 caissons and 500 rifles. The Estonian forces took at least 3070 prisoners of war. Of the amphibious force the Estonians had one killed in action and 12 wounded, the Finns suffered three killed in action and 11 wounded. The number of Bolshevik forces killed and wounded were about 300 to 400.[26] From the standpoint of later military theory, the Utria operation was a good example of infiltration or an indirect approach, the landing force largely bypassed and collapsed the enemy’s combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them in costly attritional battle.[27] With the taking of Narva, Northeastern Estonian was cleared of the Russian Bolshevik Army within twelve days, the Bolsheviks had needed forty days to overrun the same territory. The Estonians had limited more limited numbers of troops to go on eastern bank of the Narva River, as the Finnish volunteers refused to go East of Narva based on their agreed upon terms of service, the majority of them being immediately sent to southern front. From February to May 1919 Narva would be in range of Bolshevik artillery thus being on the frontlines of the war.[28] However, in the immediate aftermath the Utria landing and the Estonian retaking of Narva, Bolshevik leader Valdimir Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov), despite being in an infirmed condition made a trip to the frontlines east of Jamburg, ordering the retaking of Narva in eight days, ordering the town to be plundered and its inhabitants to be put to death.[29] By the good fortune this was an idle threat as according to the Estonian Chief of Staff Colonel Andres Larka on the Bolshevik troops on the Viru Front at the time,

“Military authority no longer exists among the Bolshevist troops. Their general morale is exceedingly low. They fight only when they have machine guns behind them. Every day many officers desert. They all confirm the belief that the Red troops intended for the defense of Petrograd are seeking to give themselves up. Above all, the. Bolshevist leaders are terrified at the possibility of Entente troops and British warships appearing off Kronstadt.”[30]

However, the possibility of the British ships off Kronstadt was diminishing quickly as ice was closing the Gulf of Finland. While not being able to recapture Narva, the Bolsheviks did focus on punishing the inhabitants of the city.? The Bolsheviks targeted the city, notably, the residential districts with wooden homes with artillery bombardment. As it was daily occurrence, the population adjusted to it but many also left Narva if possible. A particularly heavy attack came on 25 April 1919. The Bolsheviks targeted railway station and telegraph facilities, the Great Alexander Church, as well as the Joaoru district where most of the houses were made of wood. The Estonians quickly moved the locomotives in the yard in front of the station out of artillery range. The bombardment damaged the station and telegraph facilities, the telegraph operators, with some difficulty but as quickly as possible, moved operations to a building near the railway. The attack also took a toll on Narva’s fire brigade as firefighters were hit by artillery fire while trying to contain the conflagration. An artillery shell destroyed a fire engine and killed and injured several firefighters. Reportedly hundreds of houses burned, and some 5,000 people were made homeless.[31]

With the recapture of Narva and successes in southern Estonia, notably the liberation of Tartu and the taking of the railway junction of Valka on the Estonian – Latvian border, on the first anniversary of the Estonian declaration of independence on 24 February 1919, the commander-in-chief of Estonia’s armed forces, General Johan Laidoner, reported to the provisional assembly that all of Estonia had been liberated from Bolshevik forces.[32] ?However, Estonia’s war of independence would continue to 2 February 1920.

Conclusions

The Estonian Navy’s initial amphibious operations were to raid unexpectedly behind enemy lines to disrupt the enemy offensive against Estonia. On the offensive, in the Utria operation in January 1919 to retake occupied Narva, an amphibious force landed behind Bolshevik front lines isolating the enemy troops from their command and control. What is perhaps an enduring lesson of the Utria Operations is the imperative to develop a command structure and military units which can execute maneuver warfare. ?In maneuver warfare, as according to military theorist William S. Lind, in the Maneuver Warfare Handbook,

significant features are momentum and tempo which in combination lead to shock action and surprise. Emphasis is on the defeat and disruption of the enemy – by taking the initiative and applying constant and unacceptable pressure at the times and places the enemy least expects – rather than attempting to seize and hold ground for its own sake.[33]

Accordingly, maneuver warfare encompasses the ability to make command decisions quickly based on the emerging tactical and operational situation, if one side in a conflict can consistently go through their decision cycle faster than the other, it gains a tremendous advantage.?A command philosophy encourages decentralized decision making and initiative fosters a fast decision cycle. Quick decision making and reaction allows forces effectively to operate in a confusing and disorderly situation and generate confusion and disorder for the enemy by doing the unexpected. Particularly for small armed forces, the focus in operations must be on isolating and collapsing the enemy’s combat forces rather seeking to close with and destroy them in attritional battle.[34]

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[1] “Esthonians Retake Narva from the Reds,” New York Times (22 January 1919), 2

[2] Estonian War of Independence, 1918–1920: Reprint of a Summary of prepared in 1938–1939 (New York. Eesti Vabadusv?itlejate Litt., 1968), 11–13; O. Toomara, “British Squadron to Tallinn: Its Gallant Record during the War of Liberation,” Baltic Times, 19 December 1938, 4; Evald Uustalu, The History of the Estonian People (London: Boreas Publishing, 1952), 155–61.

[3] G. Leets, “Uus H?daoht–Dessant N. J?esuu” [A New Danger–Assault on Narva-J?esuu], Postimees, 7 December 1938, 2.?

[4] G. Leets, “15 Aasta Eest Vabaduss?ja Algus Narva Lahing 28 Novembril 1918” [15 Years since the Beginning of the War of Independence: The Battle of Narva, 28 November 1918], Kaitse Kodu!, 28 November 1933, 686.

[5] “Memorandum Giving a Narrative of Events in the Baltic States for the time of the Armistice, November 1918 up to August 1919,” Admiralty: Record Office, 1852–1965, ADM 116, 1864, United Kingdom National Archives, Kew; Estonian War of Independence, 1918–1920: Reprint of a Summary of prepared in 1938–1939 (New York. Eesti Vabadusv?itlejate Litt., 1968), 15–16; and Evald Uustalu. The History of the Estonian People, (London: Boreas Publishing, 1952), 163–66

[6] Edgar Anderson, “British Policy Towards the Baltic States, 1918–1920,” Journal of Central European Affairs (October 1959): 278.

[7] “Supply of Madsen Machine Guns to Esthonians,” 25 January 1919, Paris Peace Conference, 1919–1920: FO 608, United Kingdom National Archives, Kew; Estonian War of Independence, 21; Paravane [pseudonym], “With the Baltic Squadron, 1918–1920,” Fortnightly Review, no. 653 (2 May 1920), 707.

[8] Lembit (a.k.a. Lembitu) was an ancient Estonian king of Sakala County who led the military against the German Livonian Order at the beginning of the thirteenth century. In 1215, Lembit’s stronghold near the present-day Suure-Jaani was taken by Germans. Lembit was taken prisoner and not released until 1217. He attempted to unite the Estonians to withstand the German conquest and assembled an army of 6,000 troops from different counties, but was killed at the Battle of St. Matthew’s Day in September 1217. “Recollections of a Former Estonian Naval Officer by Karl K. J?gis (Lieutenant Estonian Navy) as Told to Heino J?gis” (unpublished manuscript, University of San Jose, CA, 1967), 1.

[9] Johan Pitka attended the Paldiski Maritime School receiving a merchant ship captain’s license in 1895. He performed only short compulsory duty aboard the Imperial Russian Navy armored cruiser Admiral Usakov. He then became an experienced merchant mariner and engaged in marine salvage work. Between 1907 and 1917, Captain Pitka operated a shipping company headquartered in Tallinn that operated between Baltic ports and Great Britain.

[10] Johan Pitka, “My Reminiscences of the Assistance of the British Navy in Our Fight for Independence,” Baltic Times, 4 February 1939, 2

[11] Johan Pitka, “My Reminiscences of the Assistance of the British Navy in Our Fight for Independence,” Baltic Times, 4 February 1939, 2

[12] Leopold T?nson, Chairman of the Kalev Sporting Association in Tallinn, organized the Kalev Infantry Battalion on 18 December 1918 from volunteers from his organization.

[13] Edgar Anderson, “An Undeclared Naval War: the British–Soviet Naval Struggle in the Baltic, 1918–1920,” Journal of Central European Affairs 22 (April 1962), Paravane [pseudonym], “With the Baltic Squadron, 1918–1920,” Fortnightly Review, no. 653 (2 May 1920), 707; Taavi Urb, “Meredessandid Eesti Vetes 20. Sajandil” [Amphibious Landings in Estonian Waters in the 20th Century], Kaitse Kodu!, April 2012, 38.??

[14] In comparison, for example, Moshe Tzalel notes of the quickly organized Israeli Navy in the 1948 Israeli War of Independence that sank some enemy ships through sabotage in foreign ports. Despite this, their other operations were not very successful: “Several small-scale landings behind enemy lines were also carried out, but they accomplished little due to insufficient intelligence and lack of training. The few attempts at shore bombardment were likewise disappointing.” Moshe Tzalel, From Ice-breaker to Missile Boat: The Evolution of Israel’s Naval Strategy (Westport, CT: Westwood Press, 2000), 12–13.

[15] H. Sepp, “P?gus pilk Eesti laevanduse arengusse” [A brief look at the development of Estonian shipping], ERK (1937): 74–75.

[16] Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History 1660 – 1783. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), 50.

[17] ?H. Sepp, “P?gus pilk Eesti laevanduse arengusse” [A brief look at the development of Estonian shipping], ERK (1937), 75.

[18] “Le vice-Amiral Pitka,” Bulletin de I’Esthonie, November 1919, 1; Fred Limberg, Isamaa eest: Eesti Vabariigi S?jaj?udude Organisatsioon ja Juhtkond [For the Fatherland: Organization and Leadership of the Estonian Republic’s Armed Forces] (Cardiff, Wales: Boreas Publishing House, 1980), 38.

[19] Estonian War of Independence, 1918–1920: Reprint of a Summary of prepared in 1938–1939 (New York. Eesti Vabadusv?itlejate Litt., 1968), 21; Jaan Maide, ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?dast 1918–1920 [Overview of the Estonian War of Independence 1918–1920] (Tallinn, Estonia: Kaitseliidu Kirjastus, 1933), 217–22; and “Formation of Armoured Trains and their Importance in the Estonian War of Liberation,” Baltic Times, 19 December 1938, 1.

[20] Jaan Maide, ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?dast 1918–1920, [Overview of the Estonian War of Independence 1918–1920] (Tallinn, Estonia: Kaitseliidu Kirjastus, 1933), 212–17; Johan Pitka, “My Reminiscences of the Assistance of the British Navy in Our Fight for Independence,” Baltic Times, 4 February 1939, 2

[21] Jaan Maide. ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?jast 1918–1920, [Overview of the Estonian War of Independence 1918–1920] (Tallinn, Estonia: Kaitseliidu Kirjastus, 1933), 225

[22] Paul Hanson. Vabaduss?da Konspekt kapten P. Hansoni loenditele s?jakool aspirantide Klassis 1930/1931 a.[ War of Independence: Synopsis for Captain P. Hanson's Work as military school Aspirant in the Class of 1930/1931] (Tallinn: Kaitsev?e ühendatud Oppeasiliste Staabi Valjaaane. 1930): 49

[23] Paul Hanson. Vabaduss?da Konspekt kapten P. Hansoni loenditele s?jakool aspirantide Klassis 1930/1931 a.[ War of Independence: Synopsis for Captain P. Hanson's Work as military school Aspirant in the Class of 1930/1931] (Tallinn: Kaitsev?e ühendatud Oppeasiliste Staabi Valjaaane. 1930): 50

[24] Eesti Vabaduss?da, 1918–1920, vol. I [Estonia War of Independence] (Tallinn, Estonia: Vabaduss?ja Ajaloo Komitee, 1939), 373–75; Maide, ülevaade Eesti Vabaduss?dast 1918–1920, 225–27; and Siim ?ismaa, Landing in Utria on 17–19 January 1919 (Tallinn, Estonia: Eesti S?jamuuseum, 2009), 1–14.?

[25] “Esthonians Retake Narva from the Reds,” New York Times (22 January 1919), 2,“Trotsky Flees from Battlefield: Bolsheviki Army Defeated by Esthonians,” San Francisco (CA) Chronicle, 22 January 1919, 1; “Trotzky Near Capture after Red Defeat,” Chicago (IL) Daily Tribune, 22 January1919,2; and “Trotsky’s Check in Baltic Provinces,” Times of London, 24 January 1919, 7.

[26] Eesti Vabaduss?da, 1918–1920, vol. I [Estonia War of Independence] (Tallinn, Estonia: Vabaduss?ja Ajaloo Komitee, 1939), 375

[27] As according to the military theorist B.H. Liddell-Hart, “The impression made on the mind of the opposing command can nullify the whole fighting power his troops possess.” - Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1954; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 212.

[28] Paul Hanson. Vabaduss?da Konspekt kapten P. Hansoni loenditele s?jakool aspirantide Klassis 1930/1931 a.[ War of Independence: Synopsis for Captain P. Hanson's Work as military school Aspirant in the Class of 1930/1931] (Tallinn: Kaitsev?e ühendatud Oppeasiliste Staabi Valjaaane. 1930): 51

[29] “Lenine Orders Reds to Recapture Narva,” New York Times (29 January 1919), 3

[30] “Lenine Orders Reds to Recapture Narva,” New York Times (29 January 1919), 3

[31] “25. Aprill 1919,” [25 April 1919] Vabaduss?da Lood. (April 1937), 197 – 198, “Saatus,” [Fate] Vabaduss?da Lood. (January 1937), 113

“Reds Set Narva on Fire,” New York Times (29 April 1919), 1

[32] Evald Uustalu, The History of the Estonian People (London: Boreas Publishing, 1952), 171

[33] William S. Lind Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Bolder CO: Westview Press, 1987): 2

[34] William S. Lind Maneuver Warfare Handbook. (Bolder CO: Westview Press, 1987), 3-4