USSS AOP Response Part II

Concentric Rings of Security

One of the staple concepts in security, especially close protection, is concentric rings of security.? Essentially this is a layered approach where security measures get tighter and more stringent the closer one gets to the asset being protected whether it’s a person place or thing (event). This clearly represented in this case as has been seen. The closer one gets to the former president, the more security controls are present.

Authority and Responsibility

When we hear the Secret Service state, they’re “not responsible for the outer perimeter” they’re technically not wrong. They’re responsible for the entire protective operation.? Essentially, they may not be responsible for traffic control until they arrive or depart but that’s about it.? When the USSS comes in, its generally their show with local law enforcement (LE) supporting the overall security plan. ?There’s often limited communication because,” we’re the Secret Service, we will tell you what you need to know”. I’ve been on details where local LE has shut down roadways stating, “I don’t know what’s going on, I was told to close this intersection from 10-12”. Every law enforcement agency involved supports the USSS because of their protective role and movements. In the protective hierarchy in the United States it’s rarely anyone else’s show and this certainly was the case last weekend.

The Power of the Security Operations Center

One area becoming clear is the power of the security operations center (SOC) or command center as the center of information, command, control and communication for security operations and events. Not only are we seeing the criticality in having the overall security picture of the operation, but we’re seeing how communication and control breakdowns occur, creating significant gaps. The SOC is currently being used to detail what happened post incident, but its criticality and value is in its use for command and control real time. To be clear, the SOC has command and control for normal operations and is a support element in crisis.? The team on the ground in contact should have tactical command and the SOC supports their needs with assets and resources.

The Complex Attack

In my last article I talked about the complex attack. Sure enough the single attacker had a secondary method of attack: some level of an explosive device and a remote detonator. A more mature assailant may have attacked former President Trump in a different way and (God forbid) had different results. Again, we got lucky. ?We must have our teams prepared for the complex attack, not just a simple one.

What America and the world are learning about security

A positive outcome to this whole mess is that America and the world are learning a lot about security and protection on a global stage. Some might feel it’s too much. Overall, it’s a positive thing. It’s a difficult job, one you must get right every time. And there are many variables in play. One no one has discussed yet is often, the principal will override security in their asks for delaying arrivals or movements to check out issues or persons of interest. This happens quite often making securing a principal that much more difficult.

Communication & Tactical Leadership

In the audio from the event we hear agents communicating, seeking guidance and leading in the moment. They are calm cool and collected which is impressive considering the circumstances. The reason we hear questions being asked is because everyone needs to be on the same sheet of music in order to move the principal safely post attack. “We’re moving when you’re ready” let’s the team know they can get set in order to move. Again, impressive under fire, but the movement was slow.

USSS Closing Ranks

It’s shocking that while everyone outside the USSS sees a massive failure for an organization that’s funded with over $3B a year to keep our President, Vice President, former Presidents, leading political candidates and other designees safe, former USSS members see nothing wrong with the events that occurred this last weekend. In their minds, that’s what right looked like. It’s very concerning that we’re so far apart in our viewpoints and it’s dangerous. While current members are not allowed to discuss protection operations, former members are all lining up to fall on their swords and tell everyone else they aren’t qualified to talk about protective operations because they weren’t USSS. As one person posted on this platform “when the space shuttle blew up, I didn’t need to be a rocket scientist to know something went wrong.”? All of this doubling down and blaming the local support is not boding well for the USSS, the nation or the brave men and women currently serving in the USSS.? And believe me, there is a lot of bravery displayed going to work every day to protect people that have the significant threats on them.

Female Agents

There have been a lot of negative discussions about the female protective agents, their performance and stature. Some of the comments come from keyboard commandos, others come from elsewhere. Here is the reality. Women can be excellent in the protection field, and they can be horrible, just like men. I’ve met and worked with both. We have different and valuable abilities and capabilities that should be leveraged as such.

Physical stature impacts two areas: body cover and the ability to move a person. Once you realize how hard it is to move a limp unconscious body, or a even conscious one by yourself, the latter goes right out the window. Yes, some of the women are short. This is where holding up a ballistic blanket can help provide cover. It reduces agent control, but the cover is there.

Experience

Clearly some of these folks were newer agents. Considering the circumstances, and their experience, they performed as expected. When you go to work every day and work tells you you’re the best, you believe it. You have the power of the USSS behind you, like the old Sprint commercials - “Can you hear me now?”.? Who would dare attack? And yet it happened. These young agents have experienced first-hand something that no one in the USSS over 40 years has, an assassination attempt on one of their protectees. Further, I’d bet a few folks on the ground, were local field office agent augmentees, not regularly assigned to the detail.

Ingrained Security Skills and Capability

I am a big proponent of service and security. The only way to do this, from my perspective, is that our martial security skills are so deeply ingrained that you can perform your service aspects without appearing to be security. Our focus should be on being better than anyone else when we’re having a bad day, not a good one.? If we can do that, then everything falls into line fairly easily.

Use of Technology in Support

Use of technology has been a force multiplier since the beginning of time. We need to expand on it in protective operations. Drones, drone defense, OSINT, situational awareness and other technology can vastly improve protective and intelligence capabilities.

Protective Intelligence

A lot of emphasis is put on open-source intelligence which helps identify threats and intentions from afar. But protective intelligence is also the responsibility of the advance team. Hindsight provides that the attacker went to the site multiple times prior to the attack. It’d be interesting to understand who else did. A big failure here is the attacker was identified as suspicious, multiple times by multiple reporting parties. Why was he not addressed? What were the competing priorities? This is part of the attack cycle and has been a preattack indicator from the George Wallace era.

Pressure Testing the System

As Mike Tyson is famously known to have said, “everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face”. Protective packages need to be pressure tested repeatedly to ensure they are functioning. Sure, 99.99% of the time nothing will happen. But 99.99% isn’t the percentile we’re responsible for. We need to be tested on our skills regularly so those AOP skills are ingrained.

Protectors are usually very good at tactical decision making in the moment if they’ve rehearsed and ingrained their skills and responses. They’re not so great if they never expect anything to happen. This is further impacted if they’ve never been pressure tested.

One thing few practitioners do is pressure test the theories performed, because they are focused on service, not security. There are plenty of ideas that look good on paper, but when working through them under pressure don’t work out well.? Pressure testing security procedures is important for the emergency situations we’re supposed to be prepared for, not daily convenience. A simple example is keeping all medical in the back of the limo. If a principal needs Advil or a bandage, one has to stop the vehicle to retrieve the items instead of passing them back from a small kit in front. If we get that backwards, and focus on convenience first, at the first inkling of an issue, it’ll usually fail.

Social Media

A significant change since the last assassination attempt the USSS had to deal with was the availability of video cameras in every hand and the ability to post those videos globally. While we look at the videos with a critical eye learning what to do and not to do, so does anyone who would use them to attempt to do harm.

Risk

One thing that struck me was the USSS response may have increased risk for principals across the board. If a 20-year-old can cause such a disruption against the vaunted United States Secret Service, often seen as the standard in protection, and almost succeed in an assassination attempt, “surely I can defeat (insert organization’s name here) security”. As well, if the former USSS agents continue to double down on what we saw as being what right looks like, it will cause further risk. Rightfully, looking at your risk, associated risk and capabilities is a requirement right now.

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