USS INDIANAPOLIS (CA 35) -- After the Rescue, Questions about the Prosecution of Captain McVay and the Causes Contributing to the Sinking

The May 2016 edition of Naval History contains two articles in anticipation of the 71st Anniversary of the loss of USS Indianapolis (CA 35) which raise questions as to both the causes of her loss and the conviction of her Commanding Officer, Captain Charles B. McVay, III, USN.

Even during McVay’s trial, the week prior to his retirement, Fleet Admiral King submitted his third and final report to the Secretary of the Navy which stated, “In the main the Japanese submarines were ineffective … we suffered very light losses, with the exception of the sinking-with heavy loss of life-of the heavy cruiser Indianapolis, probably by an enemy submarine, on 30 July.” If Navy’s senior officer was uncertain that submarine torpedoes had sunk Indianapolis during the general court martial, how could the case have been referred to trial.

            The McVay case brought more than half a century of criticism on military justice and led, in part, to the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and its criminalization of “Unlawful Command Influence”. The trial and conviction of Captain McVay was unprecedented. No other naval officer was convicted during the 20th century for the loss of his ship during combat. Perhaps the death of President Roosevelt was the main cause of the change in policy. In addition to more than 12 years as president, FDR was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for nearly all of Wilson’s two terms and no other CO was tried for the combat loss of his ship.

The direct cause of the loss of Indianapolis was damage from two torpedoes which struck the cruiser on her starboard side, the first near the bow and the second, nearly under the bridge, forward of amidship possibly causing a magazine explosion and loss of 60 feet of the bow, exacerbated by the intentional opening of watertight doors and fittings on the second deck and above, which resulted in progressive flooding, in turn causing a lack of buoyancy which lead to capsizing and ultimately sinking. The impact of the pair of torpedoes was devastating throughout the ship, not just the forward part where there was direct impact. The ship was fatally damaged; copious quantities of water entered the hull through the massive holes and the fact that Indianapolis continued to steam forward increased the rate of flooding.

            There was a synergy of proximate causes (causes in fact) that contributed to the sinking of the cruiser. Rarely, if ever, is a ship lost as the result of a single catastrophic fault. In this case, there were multiple faults attributable to decisions made by officers ashore as well as the Commanding Officer which contributed to the loss. Moreover, Indianapolis was unseaworthy; she was not reasonably fit for the anticipated combat voyage. Simply stated, it was well-known that she could not survive significant damage caused by torpedoes because her metacentric height was inadequate, primarily as the result of alternations and additions made since the ship was constructed. “Spruance was aware of the ship’s poor design and instability. He remarked to his staff at Iwo Jima that if Indianapolis ever was hit cleanly by a torpedo, she would quickly capsize and sink.”

Furthermore, Indianapolis was unable to set watertight integrity appropriate for wartime independent steaming because the internal temperatures made the hull uninhabitable. The steps required to allow cool air to enter the living and working spaces contributed to the progressive flooding.

            The trial testimony of the defense expert, Captain Glynn Donaho, was inconsistent and self-contradictory. His redirect testimony supported a finding that zigzagging could have obstructed the submarine attack, if Indianapolis had altered course immediately after the torpedoes had been fired. This conflicted with Captain Donaho’s direct testimony. Commanding Officer, I 58, however, admitted that he would have been able to sink Indianapolis even if the cruiser were zigzagging.

Many of the contributing causes of the loss pre-dated the fortuitous encounter between I 58 and Indianapolis on 29-30 July 1945.  The two most important factors leading to Indianapolis’ sinking were the fortuitous meeting of the vessels at a time and place where the rising moon brightly illuminated the cruiser as she steamed West South West clearly visible to the Commanding Officer of I 58

Indianapolis was routed on a rhumbline course from Tinian to her destination in the Philippines on a pre-plotted route known as Peddie Route. Also, Indianapolis was unescorted. The decision to send her without escort was “largely dictated by the limited availability of escort vessels. At the time of the sailing of the Indianapolis, there was a shortage in this regard and escorts were, as a rule, not given combatant vessels which were capable of ‘taking care of themselves.’ The Indianapolis was considered to be in this class and escort, if furnished her, would have been at the expense of other requirements of greater urgency.” There was no mention of any overflight efforts focusing on the intended course of the cruiser. Nor were there any reports of instructions given to U.S. ships which followed the same course as Indianapolis. More troubling was Indianapolis’ 15.7 knots average speed of advance.

Here, it seems that I 58 was positioned perfectly for a shot as Indianapolis was illuminated by a full moon and proceeding toward I 58 and a setup. I 58 first observed Indianapolis over a 27 minute period prior to firing six torpedoes, while the range had closed from 10,000 meters to 1,500 meters.

The most significant contributing cause of the sighting and sinking of Indianapolis was the rising of the moon. The official post-trial account of the circumstances at the time of the sinking revealed that Indianapolis was torpedoed “under good conditions of visibility and in a moderate sea …” Modern scientists concluded that the moon was three-quarters full and bright; and the moon, Indianapolis and the sub were aligned in a way that allowed the sub to see the cruiser.

I 58 surfaced 65 minutes after moonrise: Her CO recounted, “The visibility was much better and one could almost see the horizon. The moon was already high in the eastern sky and there were few clouds in its vicinity … I gave the order, “Surface” … the navigator [who was on the bridge] shouted, “Bearing red nine zero degrees, a possible enemy ship.” I lowered the periscope and headed for the bridge, and turned my binoculars in the direction indicated by the navigator. Without doubt there was a black spot on the horizon on the rays of the moon. I ordered, ‘Dive’.”

There are serious questions about the lack of proper lookout and radar lookout in Indianapolis. On the other hand, Indianapolis did not sight the submarine before the torpedoes struck. The cruiser was maintaining a look out both visually and by radar. The watch was changing at midnight so there may have been some unavoidable friction and lack of attention along with the need to adjust the vision of the men assuming their lookout duties. Furthermore, the profile of the submarine was smaller than that of the heavy cruiser. CNO’s Narrative on the Loss reads:

No enemy vessel was sighted either before the explosions occurred or afterward. Watches were properly stood and good lookout was kept, both visual and radar. Normal precautions were being taken against enemy submarines. The lookouts were generally experienced men and fully alert. The damage control party, though well organized, was unable to function properly due to the heavy personnel casualties forward, the rapid flooding and the intense fire which was started in the forward section of the ship.

Additionally, when the ship was repaired on the West Coast there had been a massive transfer of officers and men. The replacements, a quarter of the ship’s complement [more than 250 men and 35 of 80 officers], were not as well-trained or prepared for combat. CNO’s Narrative on the Loss reveals that assignment to a mission of greater importance necessitated the postponement of this [West Coast] period of refresher training until a later date. While in the Navy Yard, there had been a great number of changes among the officers attached to the vessel and a turnover in her enlisted complement in excess of 25 percent. … At the time of her departure from Guam, the Indianapolis was not at peak efficiency; …”

            Finally, there were multiple procedural irregularities in the trial. The disagreement between Admirals King and Nimitz about the prosecution; the delay in the decision by Secretary Forrestal to refer the case to a General Court; the delay in preparing and serving the charges only four days before opening; the lack of adequate time to prepare; the detail of an inexperienced defense counsel, Captain John P. Cady, who is best remembered “for the one question too many” he asked his own submarine expert witness as opposed to the successful judge advocate, Captain Thomas J. Ryan, an experience trial lawyer and surface warfare officer who wore the Medal of Honor and multiple Navy Crosses. At least the members of the Court unanimously recommended clemency for Captain McVay.