US-TALIBAN DEAL WHAT IT HAS FOR INDIA

The “agreement in principle” that U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has hammered out in nine rounds of talks with Taliban representatives in Qatar would take the first tentative steps toward peace since U.S. and allied forces deployed to Afghanistan following the attacks on 9/11, according to senior Afghan and Trump Administration officials familiar with its general terms. Defense Secretary Mark Esper was scheduled to discuss the closely held details of the deal with President Donald Trump.

But the deal doesn’t ensure several crucial things, itdoesn’t guarantee the continued presence of U.S. counterterrorism forces to battle al Qaeda, the survival of the pro-U.S. government in Kabul, or even an end to the fighting in Afghanistan. “No one speaks with certainty. None,” said an Afghan official taking part in briefings on the deal with Khalilzad. “It is all based on hope. There is no trust. There is no history of trust. There is no evidence of honesty and sincerity from the Taliban,” and intercepted communications “show that they think they have fooled the U.S. while the U.S. believes that should the Taliban cheat, they will pay a hefty price.”

It is “not clear whether peace is possible,” nine former high-ranking U.S. officials, including a former deputy secretary of state, warned. That risk was made plain Monday, when a massive, deadly Taliban car bomb exploded in Kabul, just as Khalilzad was concluding an hour-long interview promoting the tentative peace deal to an Afghan news outlet. It was a reminder that as it now stands, the agreement does not require the extremist Islamic group to reject terrorism or stop attacking Afghan forces.

A “secretive” peace deal between United States and the Taliban could face wide resistance in Afghanistan if it opens the door to the insurgents’ hardline regime, said the son of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the slain hero of the anti-Soviet resistance.

Pakistan is using these negotiations to try assert its own interests in Afghanistan, by pushing for the Taliban to have an outsize political role in Kabul once foreign forces leave. "Pakistan is very aware of its strategic importance here," said Madiha Afzal, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and author of Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State. Pakistan is also be trying to leverage its role to press for foreign intervention in its conflict with India over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir, something India rejects.

To assist U.S.-Taliban negotiations when they began last year, Pakistan quietly released the co-founder of the Taliban from Karachi prison. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has since become the Taliban's deputy political leader and Chief Negotiator.

But the extent of Pakistan's sway over the Taliban is unclear, said Stephen Tankel, an associate professor at the American University School of International Service and author of With Us and Against Us: How America's Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror.

"Pakistan is supporting Taliban," Air Vice Marshal Shahid Latif (retired) said, to be part of the regular politics of Afghanistan. "They should be the part of the government," he said. "The formula, different options can be worked out, how much of the participation do they need" — all that could be negotiated between the Taliban and Pakistan beforehand, he said.

"We need to talk to Taliban, reach an amicable solution with them and then, based on practicality of that solution, we should approach the Americans," Latif said, referring to the Pakistani government and military.

Reaching an "amicable solution" seems reasonable to Pakistani officials, who see the insurgents as likely to represent their interests — and to be hostile to overtures from India. Western-backed politicians in Kabul, including President Ashraf Ghani, are seen by Pakistan as friendly to India, Latif said. That makes Pakistan uncomfortable.

"Any [Afghan] government that is dependent on India, and that is linked with India, will certain[ly] not have any good feelings for Pakistan, so that, obviously [is] unacceptable," Latif said. "We do not mean that there should be a government which should create enmity with India, but at the same time, it should not send a negative signal to Pakistan."

What is there for India?

In his closing speech at the Loya Jirga in February 2019, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said, “Let me thank India, a long time and historic friend of Afghanistan who has stood with us with patience and generosity. India has a deep policy towards Afghanistan. Respect to the determination of the Afghan people and respect to the constitutional order is the heart of that policy.” This goodwill towards India is not only held by the President and the Afghan political class, at large but also by the people of Afghanistan, in general, see India as an all-weather ally of their country and acknowledge the constructive role India has played in Afghanistan. With the ongoing peace talks and a potential American pull-out looming over Afghanistan, it is time for India to capitalize on the goodwill it enjoys in Afghanistan, for its benefit and for the larger good of the Afghan nation. 

India’s role in the peace negotiations between the US and the Taliban has been minimal. Barring a few consultative meetings between the US Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad and the Indian side, New Delhi has been practically on the side lines of the peace talks. This minimalist Indian involvement has definitely upset a few and raised questions, too. India’s support for the government in Kabul, Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban and the peace talks, at large, along with India’s ‘no business with the Taliban’ policy has significantly contributed to India’s exclusion from the entire process. 

India has been observing these developments with a sense of wariness as it has not been brought into the loop so far by Washington. It is only recently that the US officials started briefing India after New Delhi made its reservations clear. India’s position of not having anything to do with the Taliban had become untenable. It was only in November last year that New Delhi decided to send two former Indian diplomats “at a non-official level” to participate in Moscow round of talks with the Taliban. More recently, New Delhi has articulated certain conditions that it feels need to be met if the negotiations with the Taliban were to succeed.

The Americans, in the way of the peace deal with the Taliban, seem to be in a hurry to withdraw from Afghanistan. However, in the long term, pro-democratic forces and Afghan women, in particular, will bear the consequences of the hurried withdrawal which eventually will undercut India’s influence in Afghanistan’s future because, in a race to win over the Taliban, Pakistan will most likely outcompete India which has long supported the group and shares ideological affinities. 

India’s soft power push in Afghanistan, in the post-Taliban era, has ensured New Delhi a great deal of goodwill in the nation. The goodwill for India in Afghanistan could be materialized to enhance India’s political influence in the political structure which could potentially emerge from the peace talks along with the Taliban’s integration. In the light of Afghan goodwill for India, India needs to revisit its approach from solely providing support to the government of Afghanistan to potentially lobbying for the Afghan government with the Taliban and also securing conditions for a democratic political system in Afghanistan.

New Delhi has also underlined that “any process should respect the constitutional legacy and political mandate.” This is important as the Taliban remain reluctant to commit themselves to broader democratic processes and key aspects such as women’s rights even as they remain committed to their own interpretation of the Sharia law. Finally, it is vital for India that any process in Afghanistan “should not lead to any ungoverned spaces where terrorists and their proxies can relocate.” Last time when the US had departed from Afghanistan, giving Pakistan a free hand, Indian security interests were severely compromised, as a rising tide of extremism and terrorism in Kashmir made India extremely vulnerable.

India can and should bargain with the United States to not accept a compromise of the Afghan constitution, the nation’s democratic rights, women’s rights, human rights and the rights of ethnic groups who would be more than happy if the Taliban are kept at bay, in the name of a deal with the Taliban. In this way, India would be better off in being more influential in Afghanistan without directly confronting Pakistan or appeasing to the Taliban’s undemocratic demands. 

It is not entirely clear how many of these objectives India would be able to secure as Washington is seeking a quick departure from Afghanistan. India’s significant economic and cultural investment would come to naught if it does not do a quick course correction. Earlier this month, the Modi government while allocating around $58 million as development aid to Afghanistan also cut its allocation to Iran’s Chabahar Port to $6.5 million from $1.5 billion. This was a recognition of the changing ground realities in Afghanistan where future Indian role looks uncertain.

Many in India will find in these developments a reason to blame the Trump administration. But that’s a trope New Delhi should avoid. Washington has its own interests in Afghanistan that it is trying to protect. In fact, it is likely that in the process, it would safeguard some Indian equities in Afghanistan as well, as — with or without Afghanistan— the US needs India to maintain a favourable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. But India’s approach towards Afghanistan has, from the very beginning, been too dependent on the benevolence of others. New Delhi continued to insist that it wants to invest only its soft power in Afghanistan but the fact that it succeeded was due to the American security umbrella. India has done some great work in Afghanistan — in being one of the largest aid givers, in being a major source of cultural influence, in building capacities in various sectors of an emerging democratic polity and in training security forces. But when it came to the crunch, it had to rely on others for hard power projection, even when its own civilians were targeted.

Attacks have stepped up in the country while the US and the Taliban seem to be reaching towards the end of their negotiations. Meanwhile, campaigns for the Afghan presidential elections, which are scheduled for September 2019, as of now, have also started. Technically, this leaves India with two options: engage with the Taliban to secure Indian interests in Afghanistan and the region and subsequently also lobby for the Afghan government with the Taliban or hold ground, provide institutional support for the Afghan government and the administration in conducting the forthcoming elections.

For a nation that is looking to be recognised as a leading global power, that’s not a very comfortable position to be in. Being too risk-averse in foreign policy has its own set of costs. There is too much at stake and New Delhi should become more proactively involved in the peace process and not be shy of drawing its own red lines. After all, India too can play the role of a disruptor if its interests are ignored. This is important to underline not only because Indian interests are involved, but also because the hopes and aspirations of ordinary Afghans cannot be dealt a mortal blow to satisfy the whims of any single power. New Delhi should make it clear that nice guys need not always finish last! If India fails to protect its interest with hard power in Afghanistan, it would be facing a long protracted battle in Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir as Pakistan will be the only winner.