U.S. Supreme Court strikes down affirmative action in admissions
In landmark decision, U.S. Supreme Court strikes down affirmative action in admissions
Samantha Ketterer ,?Staff writer - June 29, 2023
The U.S. Supreme Court on Thursday struck down?affirmative action in public and private college admissions , undoing a policy that selective schools such as the University of Texas at Austin have relied upon for decades to increase the diversity of their admitted classes.
The decision is a crushing defeat for institutions that consider race as a factor in the admissions process, and is one that will certainly cause those institutions to scramble for ways to diversify their applicant pools as minority populations remain underrepresented in higher education.?
More from Samantha Ketterer:?White man alleges six Texas medical schools illegally consider race, gender in admissions
UT Austin is the only public university in Texas that uses affirmative action in undergraduate admissions, whereas certain graduate programs including the University of Houston Law Center use the practice. Rice University is among the private institutions in Texas that employ affirmative action.?
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel?Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney-Barrett.
He determined that the use of race in admissions at the University of North Carolina and Harvard University violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, adding that colleges have long "concluded, wrongly, that the touchstone of an individual’s identity is not challenges bested, skills built, or lessons learned but the color of their skin. Our constitutional history does not tolerate that choice.”
The justices voted 6-3 in the case against North Carolina and 6-2 in the case against Harvard. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson sat out the Harvard case because of a former role on an advisory board, although she still wrote that the decision was "truly a tragedy for us all."?
While the admissions tactic has been repeatedly brought before the court, its use has declined over time. Still, it had mostly remained protected as civil rights activists and higher education leaders consider it a necessary method of improving education access for historically marginalized minority populations.
Those supporters immediately decried?the court's opinion, fearing it would have a devastating impact.
"In a society still scarred by the wounds of racial disparities, the Supreme Court has displayed a willful ignorance of our reality," NAACP President and CEO Derrick Johnson said.?
Prior court decisions placed limits on affirmative action, however. The U.S. Supreme Court first upheld the use of race as one factor in choosing among applicants in the 1978 case University of California?v. Bakke – yet it also ruled unlawful the use of quotas to reserve seats for minority students.
The court again held in 2002 that the University of Michigan’s use of race in laws school admissions was constitutional because it furthered a compelling interest in obtaining “an educational benefit that flows from student body diversity.” The case,?Grutter v. Bollinger, confirmed that race could be just one of many factors considered in holistic reviews of individual applicants.
The court once again took up the issue in the case of Abigail Fisher?v. University of Texas, deciding in 2016 that that affirmative action is a compelling state interest but must withstand “strict judicial scrutiny.”
The two Supreme Court cases were brought by Students for Fair Admissions, which alleged that the University of North Carolina and Harvard University’s use of affirmative action discriminates against Asian students. The court ultimately ruled that the practice violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
UNC and Harvard’s supporters told the court they feared overturning the policy would reinforce inequality on college campuses. Others said they do not know of “workable alternatives” that have managed to achieve diversity goals, and the president and chancellors of the University of California wrote the court that banning race-conscious admissions in their state in 1996 resulted in a major drop in minority enrollment that has not rebounded.
This story will be updated.
Written By
Samantha Ketterer is a?Houston Chronicle ?reporter covering higher education.
She joined the staff as a breaking news reporter in 2018. She later covered criminal justice and the Harris County courthouse.
Samantha, who is from Houston's suburbs, graduated from the University of Texas at Austin and is a proud alumna of The Daily Texan. She is a former reporting fellow for the Dallas Morning News' state bureau and a former city hall reporter for The Galveston County Daily News.
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The Wagner Group Will Live to Fight Another Day
COMMENTARY by?Molly Dunigan - June 28, 2023
Over the weekend, the world watched with a mixture of fascination, anticipation, excitement, and horror as the?Russian paramilitary Wagner Group ?appeared to launch a direct challenge to the?nuclear-armed Russian military ?establishment. Still, it is unlikely that Wagner's paramilitary enterprise will be dissolved.
It is nearly impossible to imagine that the Russian leadership will?completely disband ?the corporate underpinnings of the Wagner Group and its overall personnel—they are too significant to Russia's greater geostrategic aims and economic strength.
On Monday, Russian President?Vladimir Putin said ?that he would?keep his promise ?to allow Wagner's soldiers to move to Belarus, go home to their families, or sign contracts with the Russian Defense Ministry.
Leading a?“march of justice,” ?Wagner owner Yevgeny Prigozhin led?25,000 primarily Russian fighters ?from Ukrainian territory into Russia and marched to Moscow, taking over military commands in the towns of Rostov-on-Don, Voronezh, and Lipetsk in their wake.
The Wagner Group is just one of several known Russian private military companies that have operated abroad in the relatively recent past. But Wagner is unique in its scope and scale, having reportedly?deployed 5,000 fighters ?at the height of the Syrian civil war in 2017, and?50,000 fighters in Ukraine ?as of early 2023. The organization is also active throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, and is often the tip of the Russian spear in power projection into these areas.
Wagner Group Is an Important Income Source for the Kremlin
Moreover, the organization is a significant source of income for the Kremlin, enabling the Russian government to quietly and securely?overtake ?lucrative mining and extraction sites for a significant profit.
This is not surprising: The foundations of the current Russian market for force are shaped by?private firms ?that emerged in the post–Cold War era to support the security needs of state energy companies such as Gazprom, Tatneft, Stroytransgaz, Zarubezhneft, Rosneft, and Surgutneftgaz.
Russia has for years employed Wagner with strategic ambiguity: Private military actors?remain illegal in Russia , allowing for broad uncertainty about the Kremlin's intent toward the group. Putin, in particular, has preferred to paternalistically treat Wagner's Prigozhin as one son, while treating his own Ministry of Defense as the other—never wanting to declare either to be the “favorite child.”
While this has served his aims at times in terms of plausible deniability, it was ultimately an unsuccessful venture.
In my book?“Victory for Hire,” ?I found that mercenaries can strengthen military effectiveness when deployed in place of a military force, but can really weaken it when “codeployed” alongside regular military forces. Codeployment can work, but only if a clear and consistent command-and-control structure is put into place and everyone abides by it.
Putin has intentionally done everything to avoid instituting such a clear and consistent command-and-control structure between Wagner and his military, instead preferring to pit the private and public sides of the coin against each other.
Prigozhin Staged Power Play with March on Moscow
Prigozhin's rebellion with 25,000 Russian-hired fighters is an extreme example of what goes wrong when private and public forces are codeployed without unity of command structure. This was not a coup or actual attempt to take over political power; it was a theatrical power play by Prigozhin to demonstrate his significance in relation to other parties in Putin's inner circle.
It came as the Russian Ministry of Defense?attempted ?to bring Wagner fighters under its direct control through individual contracts by the end of June, which would have effectively circumvented Prigozhin's control in Ukraine and put Wagner's numerous profitable ventures in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the Global South at risk. This was an example of brinkmanship to counter a long-term business threat posed by Russia's military leadership.
Russia's next steps will be carefully calculated and may include a renaming or rebranding of the Wagner Group, the replacement of Prigozhin as its leader, and potential withdrawal of Wagner fighters from any territories adjoining Russia—including from Ukraine—due to the risk of another mutiny.
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Wagner's 50,000 troops have formed a sizable proportion of Russia's ground forces in the war in early 2023, compared with the roughly?169,000 to 190,000 Russian troops ?estimated to be operating in and around Ukraine as of February 2022. Given the importance of Wagner's personnel to Russian operations in Ukraine and its willingness to essentially employ its fighters as?“cannon fodder” ?in suicide missions, this latter option of complete Wagner withdrawal from Ukraine could have significant implications for Russia's ability to effectively fight a ground war there.
Whether Putin will pivot to primarily air, nuclear, or other unconventional tactics in the wake of such a withdrawal remains to be seen.
Molly Dunigan is a senior political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation; director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program within the RAND Arroyo Center; and a senior lecturer in Carnegie Mellon University's Institute for Politics and Strategy.
This commentary originally appeared on?USA Today?on June 27, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.
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Is U.S. Military Gear Too Complex and Expensive?
The battlefield conditions of Ukraine are demonstrating that American military equipment runs into practical problems in the field.
Iranian-made Shahed drones have caused mass destruction in Ukraine. With their Volkswagen-style engines, they can fly undetected for about 120 kilometers and deliver an explosive power of 40 kilograms. The components to make this drone? A?mere estimated $20,000 . Yet to shoot them down, Ukrainians are using American-made NASAM missiles that cost about… $400,000 per drone taken down. One can hardly blame the Ukrainians for?resorting to using ?1960s German Gepard anti-aircraft guns instead.
The lessons of the awful Ukraine war so far are many and varied. But something that has struck most observers is that while the Russians have been outmaneuvered, they have been holding their own against modern Western military equipment by using old tanks and artillery. In particular, American gear, while technologically advanced, is either not always the best choice on the battlefield, prohibitively expensive, or both.
A number of examples ought to be considered.
Which is the “Best” Tank?
The news that Germany and the United States?agreed to supply ?Ukraine with Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams tanks created quite a stir. Both tanks, which are superior to their Russian counterparts, are similar in size and firepower. The American Abrams in particular is known to be battle-proven and virtually indestructible.
Yet there are a few issues with the Abrams tank. For one, an Abrams weighs up to seven tons more than the Leopard, which could easily get stuck in Ukraine’s muddy fields or bring down some of its light bridges. Another issue is that the latest version of the Abrams is?optimized to run on jet fuel , which is understandably hard to replenish on the battlefield. Even more problematic, however, is that on-field repairs aren’t always possible for an Abrams. In fact, some logistical considerations make the prospect?seem like a living hell . For example, a frontline battalion cannot fix an Abrams with broken optics. Replacing these requires pulling out?entire subsystems?and shipping them to a depot—potentially hundreds of miles away—while also ordering replacement subsystems. Finally, there is?the cost dimension : producing an Abrams can top $10 million per unit, while the latest Leopard 2 costs around $6 million.
All things considered, the German Leopard 2 is a better choice in Ukraine over the American M1 Abrams. In fact, because of existing availability, the Leopard 2s have entered service, mainly via Poland and Canada, months ahead of the Abrams.
Airpower Isn’t Cheap
The United States, along with other NATO members,?was initially reluctant ?to supply Ukraine with F-16 fighter planes; Washington took the view that doing so could escalate the conflict. The F-16 is, after all, a battle-proven jet with fifth-generation stealth technology. It is more than a match for any Russian fighter jet and can carry a vast array of air-to-ground missiles and loitering munitions.
However, the Swedish government?has offered Ukraine ?its Saab JAS 39 Gripen plane. The Gripen (Griffin in English) is a fourth-generation fighter jet that can land on small runways and highways, and has highly effective sensors and electronic jamming equipment. While not battle-proven like the F-16, the Gripen has consistently scored highly in air-to-air war games. The result has been?something of a lobbying battle ?over which jet to procure.
Yet despite Kyiv’s open preference for F-16s, a number of Ukranian pilots concede —in private—skepticism of whether such is the best choice.
Consider the costs. According to?industry group Aviatia , the Gripen cost $7,800 per hour to fly, while the F-16 cost $12,000 per hour. Gripen maintenance is also much cheaper: while SAAB (which makes the Gripen) and Lockheed Martin (which produces F-16s) do not advertise the yearly maintenance cost of their fighter jets, practically all commentators agree the F-16 is more expensive.? Executiveflyers.com estimates ?that an F-16’s maintenance comes at about $10 million per year. Yes, the Gripen is more expensive to produce than the F-16, as it sells for $17 million more per plane, but this is due to the existing scale: the F-16 has been produced and exported since the mid-1970s.
There is also a sizeable gap in terms of training. Swedish pilots and maintenance recruits are trained for twelve months to operate the Gripen. The F-16, by comparison, takes at least thirty-six months.
Finally, there are on-the-ground conditions to consider. As noted recently in?The Economist:
Soviet runways were built like floor tiling: panels of concrete blocks with sealant in between. That allows them to withstand the expansion and contraction from extreme heat and cold. It also means that moss, stones and other debris accumulates in between. The Gripen, with smaller air intakes that sit higher up on the fuselage, would cope with this far better than the F-16 [...] Ukraine could resurface some airfields, but that would only invite Russian missiles. And while the F-16 can land on roads in a pinch, its lighter undercarriage is not as well suited to the stresses of short runway…
Don’t be surprised if Ukraine provisionally decides to buy Gripens as well as F-16s.
Yet regardless of which plane is chosen, the war in Ukraine has provided another valuable lesson. Air superiority, so valuable in all twentieth-century wars right up to Desert Storm, may no longer be achieved by manned aircraft alone. Sophisticated surface-to-air missiles make the airspace dangerous. Both Ukraine and Russia have hundreds of S-300 missile batteries. Ukraine has also recently obtained the Patriot battery system. All these systems are battle-tested and very effective against manned aircraft.
As a consequence, the combat duties of fighter aircraft have transformed; jets are now primarily used as short-flight, air-to-ground missile launchers. Dogfights are extremely rare. Downed aircraft by friendly fire is not uncommon—Ukrainians have taken to crudely inpainting the underside of their fighters with the national colors of blue and yellow.
The alternative to manned aircraft is?the use of drones . The Ukrainians?have been ?ingeniously making thousands ?of inexpensive “suicide” drones. Comprised of cheap electronic parts, some made with 3D printers, they only have to last long enough to deliver their deadly cargo. American-made aircraft, including drones, now face additional competition that often delivers far more bang for the buck.
Do You Want to Ride into Combat in a Deathtrap?
Delivering combat infantry to and from the battlefield is a challenge in and of itself, and often requires a specialized vehicle. In Ukraine, there is the choice between the Australian Bushmaster—a smelly, powerful, loud, and heavily armored fighting vehicle—and the American?Stryker M1126 Infantry Carrier Vehicle , which is of similar size, and power.
The major difference is that whereas the Bushmaster will stay and fight with infantry, the Stryker will deliver and leave. This is just as well, given that the Stryker is lightly armored and vulnerable to any gun more powerful than a machine gun. It?has been described ?as “a deathtrap.” When used by U.S. forces, it usually enters battle alongside the powerful and well-protected Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a tank in all but name. That may not be an option in Ukraine. The Stryker also suffers from a variety of technical issues, as recounted in Responsible Statecraft: “the armor shielding it was fitted with proved largely ineffective and weighty, mud spattered from its rubber wheels into the engine during deployments caused innumerable maintenance problems, computer command displays inside the vehicle didn’t always work, soldiers in battle gear were being killed in rollover incidents because their seatbelts didn’t fit and (crucially), the bottom or the vehicle was thinly armored.” On top of all this, the Stryker is notoriously difficult and expensive to maintain.
The Bushmaster, in contrast, can sustain itself in the field for three days,?has withstood Russian attacks , and costs $1.57 million per unit compared to the Stryker’s $4.9 million per unit. For a cash-strapped, war-time government like Ukraine that requires both effectiveness and low costs, it isn’t hard to see which vehicle is preferable.
Bang for Your Buck
It is worth repeating that all the systems mentioned above are not like-for-like, and offer different capabilities depending on the terrain and fighting conditions. Similarly, all the listed (estimated) unit prices do not take into account bulk-buying discounts (but also, crucially, the often costs of ongoing maintenance). It is also worth recognizing that American equipment often—but not always—utilizes super technology, and the price tag may reflect the expense that went into research and development.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian conflict delivers a clear warning to U.S. arms suppliers of the need to rationalize and simplify production and maintenance costs, along with system complexity. And this is without factoring in concerns that some arms suppliers are?engaging in price gouging .
Ultimately, though a particular platform may be “the best,” that does not mean much if a particular platform isn’t sustainably usable on the battlefield, either because of its complexity, its costs, or because of the particular environment in which it has been deployed. Foreign, non-Western buyers may not—and often do not—have Western budgets, and will be looking for simpler and less expensive, yet as-effective, options. Policymakers in Washington—many of which come from electoral districts that play host to arms suppliers and employ constituents—ought to take note of this.
Patrick Drennan is a?journalist based in New Zealand, with a degree in American history and economics.
Image: U.S. Army Flickr.
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9 个月Interesting developments in the Supreme Court decision on affirmative action. The complexity and cost of military gear is definitely worth discussing further. Let's connect and continue the conversation. Feel free to send me a connection request.